Russian nuclear arsenal in 2026
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published its latest annual report on the state of Russia's nuclear forces in its Nuclear Notebook column. The report was prepared by a team of authors led by Hans Christensen, Deputy Director Matt Korda, and Senior Research Fellows Eliana Jones and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle.
Note: All quantitative figures below are Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates based on open sources, not official data. Warhead numbers cited are expert reconstructions subject to significant uncertainty, particularly for non-strategic forces.
Russia is completing a multi-year modernization program that will replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear systems with more modern ones. However, the program is facing significant challenges, delaying the entry of the new systems into service. At the time of writing, we estimate that Russia possesses approximately 4400 nuclear warheads for strategic and non-strategic forces—slightly more than a year earlier. A significant increase in the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons weaponsThe Pentagon predicted five years ago has still not materialized. Construction of a nuclear weapons storage facility in Belarus appears to be nearing completion.
Despite Moscow's continued emphasis on nuclear forces, commercial satellite imagery and other open sources indicate that the modernization of Russia's nuclear arsenal is proceeding significantly slower than planned. The modernization of its ICBM fleet missiles (ICBM) and bomber production is behind schedule, and the "significant" increase in non-strategic nuclear weapons that the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) predicted five years ago has not materialized (Richard, 2020).
According to FAS estimates, as of March 2026, Russia possesses approximately 4400 nuclear warheads assigned to long-range strategic missiles and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. This is an increase from the previous year, largely due to a revision to the overall estimate of warheads assigned to non-strategic forces after U.S. Strategic Command released its own assessment of the Russian arsenal. According to this estimate, the first released by the U.S. government in more than three decades, "Russia's nuclear warhead arsenal consists of approximately 4600 warheads: 2600 of these are assigned to the strategic triad, and up to 2000 are assigned to tactical nuclear weapons" (Correll, 2026). Because the US intelligence community estimates that Russia has between 1000 and 2000 non-strategic warheads (US Department of State, 2025), the wording “approximately” in the STRATCOM statement indicates that the total number of warheads is less than 4600 and the non-strategic number is less than 2000. Our strategic warhead estimates are consistent with these data, but to bring the total numbers together, we had to adjust the non-strategic warhead estimate toward the values published in 2023 (Christensen, Korda, and Reynolds, 2023).
Of the approximately 4400 warheads, approximately 1796 are strategic: approximately 892 on land-based ballistic missiles, approximately 704 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and approximately 200 on heavy bombers. Another approximately 810 strategic warheads are in storage, along with approximately 1794 non-strategic warheads. In addition to this military arsenal, approximately 1020 decommissioned but still serviceable warheads are awaiting dismantlement. This brings the total stockpile to approximately 5420 warheads.
For clarity, three categories are distinguished below: "deployed" (warheads on ready-to-use carriers or at bases from which they can be quickly loaded), "storage" (stored separately, in active-duty reserve), and "awaiting dismantlement" (withdrawn from active-duty service). The stated 4400 is the sum of deployed and storage warheads; 5420 includes those awaiting dismantlement.
Experts believe that the modernization program of Russia's nuclear arsenal is partly driven by the Kremlin's desire to maintain quantitative and qualitative parity with the United States. Furthermore, it appears to be designed to compensate for Russia's inferior conventional weapons and is based on the Russian leadership's long-standing belief that the US national missile defense system poses a real threat to Russia's deterrent potential. During the military operations in Ukraine, Russia launched a series of strikes with dual-use precision-guided weapons: Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles (the nuclear version is the Kh-102), 3M-14 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, 9-A-7760 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) air-launched cruise missiles, and Iskander land-based missiles (Interfax, 2022; Reuters, 2023). The UK Ministry of Defence also published several intelligence reports indicating that Russia had used non-nuclear Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) cruise missiles in Ukraine (DefenceHQ, 2022, 2023).
In early 2026, photographs of debris from Russian strikes on Ukraine confirmed that Moscow had also used the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile, a nuclear-capable missile previously reported in 2022 and 2025 (Balmforth, 2026). As early as 2014, the Obama administration claimed that Moscow had developed and tested this missile in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The Kremlin denied this. The dispute over compliance with the INF Treaty was a factor in the Trump administration's withdrawal from the treaty in 2019.
Russia's arsenal modernization programs, coupled with direct nuclear warnings and threats to other countries amid the full-scale war in Ukraine, are heightening uncertainty about Russia's long-term intentions and fueling international debate about the nature of its nuclear strategy. These concerns, in turn, have led to increased defense spending, Russia's own nuclear modernization programs, political resistance to further nuclear weapons reductions in Europe and the United States, and decisions by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to expand their arsenals.
The New START Treaty expired in early February 2026. If Russia were to exceed its terms, it could theoretically deploy hundreds of additional warheads on its existing delivery systems, increasing its arsenal by approximately 60 percent (Korda and Christensen, 2023). The speed of such an increase depends on the type of system: bombers can be armed in hours or days, fully loading warheads onto submarines would take months, and reconfiguring the warheads on each ICBM would take several years. For now, the Russian government has declared its intention to comply with the treaty.
Research methodology and degree of confidence
The analytical materials and assessments of the Nuclear Notebook are based on three types of open sources:
- government data (government statements, declassified documents, budget information, military parade materials, contract disclosures);
- non-governmental data (media reports, materials from analytical centers, industry publications);
- commercial satellite imagery.
Because each of these sources provides limited and varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data point with multiple sources and, where possible, supplement it with information from personal interviews with officials.
Analysis of Russia's nuclear forces is complicated, in part, by President Vladimir Putin's decision in 2023 to suspend Russia's participation in New START, the bilateral Russian-American treaty that obligated the parties to share data on the number of deployed strategic warheads and launchers. The treaty was a critical transparency tool, allowing analysts to rely on aggregate official figures when assessing the distribution of deployed forces. After its expiration in February 2026, the reliability of open-source estimates will diminish until a new agreement is reached that provides for data sharing and public reporting.
According to the latest available data on New START, as of September 1, 2022, Russia possessed 1549 deployed warheads on 540 strategic launchers (US Department of State, 2022). Russia has not published data since then, but appears to remain below the established limits. Current strategic force estimates are relatively close to the 2022 figures. However, New START data differs from the Nuclear Notebook estimates: according to the treaty's counting rules, each deployed bomber was assigned one warhead, even though Russian bombers do not normally carry nuclear weapons, and the treaty did not consider weapons at bomber bases "deployed." We classify such weapons as deployed if they can be quickly loaded on board—this provides a more realistic picture.
Since Russia has not provided data to the US since September 2022, it is increasingly difficult to gain a full understanding of its force structure. Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia will remain below the overall New START limits, but the US State Department's January 2025 report notes that "the United States cannot determine whether the Russian Federation complied with its commitment to limit the number of deployed warheads to 1550 during 2024 due to Russia's proximity to the limit at the time of the last data update and its failure to comply with its obligations under the Treaty's verification regime" (US Department of State, 2025). The report also states that “the United States has high confidence that Russia did not undertake significant actions outside the treaty’s scope in 2024,” but adds: “Russia was likely close to the deployed warhead limit for most of the year and may have been slightly above that limit for parts of 2024” (US Department of State, 2025).
In September 2025, Putin stated that Russia was prepared to comply with the main provisions of the New START Treaty for one year after its expiration and would consider voluntary restrictions in 2027 (Putin, 2025). After the treaty's expiration in 2026, US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Yeo reported that the United States had rejected the Kremlin's offer to preserve the treaty's main provisions, calling New START "a bad deal" (Yeo, 2026).
To increase confidence in the estimates, we supplement historical Contractual data and official statements are being replicated through publications in Russian state and non-state media, industry reports, translations of strategic documents, video footage from the Russian Ministry of Defense, and other sources. Such secondary materials often contain valuable information on procurement progress: system commissioning and decommissioning deadlines, expected numbers of units, and technical specifications. However, access to this data is difficult: after the outbreak of hostilities, the Russian government blocked access to a number of previously accessible websites.
Moreover, high-ranking Russian military officials typically give interviews to state media at the end of the year, discussing the state of affairs within their departments. Sometimes they reveal specific details—for example, the number of new units of equipment introduced during the year—and also share plans for the following year, which analysts use as a benchmark for assessing the progress of modernization.
For this analysis, we make extensive use of commercial satellite imagery, tracking the slightest changes in the force structure. The images allow us to identify aviation, missile and naval bases, and potential nuclear weapons storage facilities, and are particularly useful for monitoring the construction and modernization of critical facilities—ICBM silos, air and submarine bases, and warhead storage facilities. By analyzing the observed force structure, we provide a substantiated assessment of the strategic arsenal. However, without data sharing under the New START, the relative reliability of such assessments will decline over time.
Estimating non-strategic nuclear weapons is even more difficult. Almost all Russian delivery systems are dual-use, capable of both nuclear and conventional strikes. Therefore, assuming that every non-strategic carrier carries a nuclear warhead overstates the estimate. Many non-strategic weapons are decades old, and it is difficult to say how many are still combat-ready and how many are due for replacement. The picture is complicated by both Russia's largest stockpile of such weapons in the world and the lack of reliable public information about them. The US government estimates that Russia has between 1000 and 2000 non-strategic nuclear weapons—significantly fewer than the 2000 to 4000 it held more than a decade ago (US Department of State, 2025; Christensen, 2019). The margin of error is significant. The March 2026 STRATCOM statement estimating "up to 2000" non-strategic warheads indicates that their number has not increased significantly and does not exceed 2000 (Correll, 2026). We estimate that Russia has approximately 1794 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which is within this range. However, our analysis of non-strategic forces is limited to satellite imagery, current and archival documents. news and other non-governmental sources; in the absence of reliable public data, this estimate cannot be considered highly reliable.
It's also important to be critical of external assessments—in particular, the risk of citation and confirmation bias, when government and non-governmental organizations constantly cite each other's assessments, sometimes without the reader noticing. This can unintentionally create an echo chamber effect, whereby inaccurate information is replicated and leads to an overestimation of numbers and capabilities. An additional factor: the initial information on Russian weapons quantities in public discourse primarily comes from the US military, which, when assessing threats and formulating countermeasures, tends to choose the most pessimistic scenarios.
Despite these limitations, we trust our estimates of Russian forces more than those of a number of other nuclear-armed states (China, Pakistan, India, Israel, North Korea), for which official and unofficial data is scarce, unreliable, or both. At the same time, Russian force estimates—especially non-strategic ones—are less reliable than those of more transparent countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France).
Russia's nuclear strategy
Russia last updated its public deterrence policy in 2024, issuing a decree outlining the conditions for the possible use of nuclear weapons (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2024):
- receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and (or) its allies;
- the use by an enemy of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against the territory of Russia and (or) its allies, against Russian facilities and (or) military formations outside its territory;
- the enemy's impact on critical state or military infrastructure of Russia, the disabling of which would disrupt the response of nuclear forces;
- aggression against Russia and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the use of conventional weapons, creating a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;
- receipt of reliable data on the massive launch (takeoff) of aerospace attack weapons (strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the Russian state border.
These conditions are broader than those in the 2020 doctrine, according to which Russia could use nuclear weapons in response to an attack with weapons of mass destruction or "in the event of aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020). In the West, the new wording may be interpreted as a lowering of the threshold for use; it likely reflects the changing nuclear dynamics in East-West relations during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, in the West, it is unclear whether the Russian military has actually changed its plans for the potential use of nuclear weapons, and to what extent.
The nuclear signals Putin and other Russian officials have sent throughout the conflict have forced Western observers to question where, how, and when Russia might use nuclear weapons. The question also remains as to which countries, besides Belarus, explicitly named as a member of the Union State, are among Russia's "allies" capable of engaging in a nuclear retaliatory strike. In response to Western reactions to the doctrine change, Putin stated: "I emphasize once again that no one should accuse us of trying to intimidate everyone with nuclear weapons: this is a policy of nuclear deterrence" (Russian Federation, 2024).
Although many Russian officials regularly speak out about nuclear doctrine, it is believed that only three individuals hold the so-called "nuclear portfolios" that authorize the use of nuclear weapons: President Putin, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. According to available information, Putin's order must be echoed by at least one of the other two portfolio holders before the signal to use them is given (Ven Bruusgaard, 2023). It is possible, as American experts believe, that Putin sees strategic advantage in keeping his views on the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons under wraps—views that, under Russia's current political structure, effectively constitute the official position of the state. At the very least, Russian warnings appear to be primarily aimed at deterring the US and NATO from direct military intervention in the conflict in Ukraine.
Russia's silo- and sea-based strategic missiles remain on alert with warheads installed and capable of launch within minutes. It was believed that the warheads of non-strategic forces were stored separately from the launchers in central depots. However, in a speech to the Security Council in December 2024, Putin stated: "It is also important to maintain non-strategic nuclear forces in a state of constant combat readiness and continue to conduct exercises with their possible use" (Russian Federation, 2024). It is unclear whether this referred to the non-strategic launchers or their warheads. If Russia were to keep even some of its non-strategic forces armed with warheads on alert, it would represent a significant shift in its deterrence strategy; however, there are still no indications that nuclear warheads are normally stored on non-strategic launchers.
In February 2024, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner requested the declassification of information regarding a "serious national security threat" (House Intelligence Committee, 2024). The following day, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby confirmed that the information concerned a "concerning" anti-satellite weapon being developed by Russia (The White House, 2024). At a House Armed Services Committee hearing in May 2024, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb stated that the Pentagon was concerned about Russia developing a means of "delivering nuclear weapons into space," which would threaten satellites and other space infrastructure (Harpley, 2024). In April 2025, one of the Russian satellites believed to be involved in this program began "spinning uncontrollably" and may have failed (Roulette, 2025). Russia's deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit would not only violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but would also be a highly destabilizing and unprecedented step.
Is a return to nuclear testing possible?
In November 2023, Putin signed a law revoking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear explosions (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2023). This "deratification" followed reports that Russia may be preparing to resume testing at the former Novaya Zemlya test site. Satellite images recorded increased activity at the site: heavy trucks, construction cranes, shipping containers, and new construction in the area of administrative and residential buildings (Lewis, 2023). The head of the Novaya Zemlya test site, Rear Admiral Andrei Sinitsyn, stated in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta in September 2024 that the site was "fully ready" to resume "full-scale testing" (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024). Then, following President Trump's controversial statement that the United States would begin testing "on an equal footing" with Russia and China, the Russian Defense Minister stated that "it is advisable to immediately begin preparations for full-scale nuclear testing" (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2025). This, however, contradicts Moscow's previous statements that it would not resume testing until the United States did so (Isachenkov, 2023; Osborne, 2023).
Joint use of nuclear weapons in Belarus
Apparently, between 2022 and 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko created the infrastructure for the forward deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. It is unknown whether the warheads for these weapons are located in Belarus.
In March 2023, Putin clarified that Russia had converted 10 Belarusian Su-25 aircraft to nuclear weapons capability and transferred Iskander (SS-26) short-range dual-use mobile launchers to Minsk (Smotrim, 2023). The Belarusian brigade armed with Iskanders is believed to be based on the southern outskirts of Osipovichi, approximately 11 kilometers west of where satellite imagery shows a double security perimeter erected around the weapons depot; similar structures are commonly found at Russian nuclear facilities (Christensen and Korda, 2023). According to a number of open sources, the most likely candidate for a new "collaborative nuclear weapons deployment" base in Belarus is the Lida airbase, just 40 kilometers from the Lithuanian border and home to the only Belarusian Air Force unit equipped with Su-25 aircraft (Korda, Reynolds, and Christensen, 2023). Rather than storing weapons at the base, Russia will likely send aircraft to its territory to retrieve the warheads and then deliver them to their targets.
In late December 2023, Lukashenko announced that Russia had completed the delivery of nuclear weapons to Belarus, and in early January 2024, Belarus updated its military doctrine, which reportedly called nuclear weapons “an important component of preventive deterrence of a potential adversary from unleashing armed aggression” (Associated Press, 2023; Belta, 2024; Knight and Lau, 2024).
Despite these claims, construction appears to be ongoing at the most likely Russian storage site in Belarus. This is a modernized Cold War-era nuclear weapons depot in Osipovichi, which has undergone significant changes in recent years. Since 2023, it has been equipped with a four-layer security perimeter, an extensive forest belt, a new secure access point, new communications equipment, air defense barriers, and a new rail spur connecting the depot to the Belarusian rail network and Iskander deployment sites (Kristensen, 2023b; Kristensen and Korda, 2024; Shaulyukha and Furlong, 2025). As of March 2026, the rail spur and loading platform were still under construction, but appeared to be nearing completion. If Russia deploys warheads in Belarus, they will likely be delivered by rail. Furthermore, new multi-story residential buildings have been erected nearby, specifically for military personnel (Osipovichi District Executive Committee, 2025)—likely for employees of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, responsible for the maintenance and transportation of nuclear weapons.
Indirect evidence also points to the Osipovichi facility's connection to nuclear issues: radiation indicators have been installed on nearby buildings, and the tender documentation for the railway construction calls for an "iodine prophylaxis station" in a neighboring village—a measure typically used near nuclear infrastructure facilities or areas of potential radiation exposure (Svaboda, 2025).
In December 2024, Lukashenko claimed that Belarus had "dozens" of Russian nuclear warheads (Associated Press, 2024). However, by March 2026, no convincing public evidence of nuclear weapons storage in Belarus had been presented.
Analysis of satellite images and statements by the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia also indicate the transfer to Belarus of new Russian dual-use Onyx missiles, first used in Ukraine in November 2024 (see the section "Land-Based Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons").
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) employ several silo-based and mobile ICBM variants. Silo-based ICBMs include the RS-20V Voevoda (NATO reporting name: SS-18), RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1), RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2), and Avangard (SS-19 Mod 4); mobile ICBMs include the RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) and RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2).
By comparing satellite observations with official Russian statements and previous START-related communications, we estimate that Russia may possess approximately 324 nuclear-tipped ICBMs, capable of carrying, by our estimates, up to 1092 warheads. The modernization of the ICBM force also includes equipping silos with new air defense and perimeter defense systems; in addition, the Peresvet laser system has been deployed in at least five mobile ICBM divisions to "cover their maneuver operations" (Hendrickx, 2020; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2019)—which may include the ability to blind reconnaissance satellites.
Russian ICBMs are part of the Strategic Missile Forces and are distributed among three missile armies, comprising 12 divisions and a total of approximately 41 missile regiments. One regiment of the 8th Missile Division in Yurga is equipped with the Sirena-M system, based on the Topol-M ICBM (we estimate the designation to be SS-27 Mod 1; source materials contain inconsistent designations). The Sirena-M is believed to serve as a backup launch code transmitter and therefore is not armed with nuclear warheads. The Sirena-M recently replaced the earlier Sirena command system.
The number of Russian ICBMs has been declining for three decades. Russia claims that the program to replace all Soviet-era missiles with new ones is approximately 90 percent complete (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2025). Since 2023, the stated pace of modernization has remained unchanged, suggesting a slowdown—possibly due to the reorientation of production capacity to the needs of the war in Ukraine (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023).
Russia appears to be expanding solid-fuel motor production in support of its ICBM modernization program (Hinz, 2024). Following the retirement of the mobile RS-12M Topol (SS-25) ICBM in 2023, the only remaining Soviet-era ICBMs in service, in our assessment, are the silo-based SS-18 and a small number of SS-19s converted to launch the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.
Unlike the silo-based group, all mobile ICBM units have completed the transition from Soviet-era missiles to new ones. However, not all modernized garrisons have been expanded sufficiently to accommodate all the servicing equipment for the new launchers: some support vehicles have to be stored outdoors under camouflage nets. Moreover, while some garrisons have completed their conversion and significantly expanded, construction at others, judging by satellite imagery, has slowed or paused in recent years, forcing some teams to temporarily occupy concrete pads.
In addition to the missiles and silos themselves, the modernization includes a large-scale overhaul of the external fences, internal roads, and support facilities. Each silo complex is being equipped with a new "Dym-2" perimeter defense system with automatic grenade launchers, small arms, and remote-controlled machine gun mounts (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2021; Russia Insight, 2018). The launch control centers overseeing each missile regiment have also been significantly rebuilt.
The RS-20V Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 5) is a silo-based heavy ICBM accepted into service in 1988. In 2022, Russian state media released a video of the RS-20V, which indicated that the missile can carry up to 14 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—two tiers of seven warheads (Kornev, 2022). However, the operational configuration is considered to be up to 10 warheads—that is how many Russia declared for this missile under the START Treaty. The remaining four warhead slots are presumably reserved for missile defense penetration capabilities.
The RS-20V's service life is coming to an end. The 13th Missile Division in Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division in Uzhur have approximately 40 SS-18 Mod 5 missiles, capable of carrying up to 400 warheads, remaining. We estimate that the number of warheads on each RS-20V has been reduced in accordance with the limit on deployed strategic warheads under the New START Treaty. The official decommissioning of the RS-20V began in 2021 in preparation for the rearmament of the 302nd Missile Regiment with RS-28 Sarmat (SS-29) ICBMs.
The silo-based UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19) ICBM with six warheads, accepted into service in 1980, was previously removed from combat duty, but a small number of missiles were converted and deployed in two regiments of the 13th Missile Division at the Dombarovsky Test Range as SS-19 Mod 4 missiles—carriers of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. The first regiment (the 621st) completed its rearmament in December 2021 (Russian Federation, 2021), and the second (the 368th), according to available data, in December 2023 (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023). However, as of March 2026, work related to the rearmament, including the laying of new cable lines, was still ongoing, and the regiment may not have achieved full combat readiness. The UR-100N UTTKh remains in service; it is planned to be replaced by the RS-28 Sarmat in the future (TASS, 2025).
The RS-12M1 and RS-12M2 Topol-M (both NATO reporting name SS-27 Mod 1) are single-warhead ICBMs in mobile (M1) and silo-based (M2) configurations. Deployment ended in 2012, with a total of 78 missiles—60 silo-based in the 60th Missile Division in Tatishchev and 18 mobile in the 54th Guards Missile Division in Teikovo. In December 2024, the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev, stated that "the Strategic Missile Forces currently have 1000 missiles" and named the rearmament of one mobile regiment (in Teikovo) and one silo-based (in Tatishchev) with RS-24 Yars ICBMs (SS-27 Mod 2) as a priority for 2025 (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2024). The remaining Topol-M regiments are planned to be re-equipped with Yars missiles in the second half of the decade. In December 2025, Karakayev announced that "the first regiment of the Tatishchev formation has entered combat duty, equipped with the Yars silo-based missile system" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2025). However, judging by the modernization schedules of other divisions, the re-equipment of the Teikovo and Tatishchev formations may take longer: satellite images from February 2026 show that construction work has only just begun on five silo launchers of the first regiment being modernized, with several years remaining until completion. Replacing single-warhead Topol-M missiles with MIRVed Yars missiles could increase the total number of warheads on Russian ICBMs by several hundred.
The RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) is a modification of the SS-27 Mod 1, capable of carrying up to three MIRVs. Several variants of the system appear to exist: one, according to some reports, is equipped with "light warheads," while the other (the Yars-S) carries more powerful medium-yield warheads for destroying hardened targets. As of March 2026, Russia was completing the final stage of rearming the 28th Guards Missile Division in Kozelsk with the RS-24 Yars. Loading of the missiles into the silos proceeded slowly—about two ICBMs per year; in 2024, this occurred in November and December (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2024; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2024a). In December 2025, Karakayev announced that "this week, the last Yars ICBM was loaded into a silo launcher in the Kaluga region, completing this significant milestone" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2025). However, as of March 2026, satellite images showed that construction had not yet begun on two silo launchers, and minor work was ongoing on several others.
In December 2020, in an interview with the Russian Ministry of Defense TV channel, Karakayev stated that the Strategic Missile Forces had approximately 150 mobile and silo-based Yars ICBMs in service (Zvezda, 2020). According to our estimates, by March 2026, this number has grown to approximately 207 mobile and silo-based Yars ICBM launchers.
The next major modernization stage will be the long-awaited replacement of the RS-20V Voevoda (SS-18) with the new RS-28 Sarmat (SS-29); in the future, the Sarmat will likely also replace the SS-19 Mod 4. The Sarmat's unveiling, originally planned for 2018, was plagued by years of production and technical delays and numerous test failures. This has placed the Ministry of Defense under political pressure, leading to contradictory statements from high-ranking officials that are inconsistent with on-the-ground observations and satellite imagery.
With the exception of the Sarmat's first flight test in April 2022—the only known successful one—test results have been unsatisfactory. According to US officials, a February 2023 test likely ended in failure, and several others have been canceled or postponed (Interfax, 2022; Kamchatka Info, 2022; Liberman and Bertrand, 2023; TASS, 2021). In September 2024, a serious accident occurred during a Sarmat flight test, damaging the test silo at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Trevelyan, 2024).
Despite the limited number of successful tests, Russian officials have repeatedly stated that the Sarmat missile is close to being adopted. In November 2022, the CEO of the Makeyev Rocket Center, which developed the missile, announced the launch of its serial production (Emelyanenkov, 2022). In October 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported on Telegram about the "final stages" of construction and installation at the first launch complex and the associated command post (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2023). In November 2023, TASS—apparently erroneously—reported that the first Sarmat regiment was already on "test combat duty" and would officially begin combat duty in December 2023 (TASS, 2023). In December 2023, Karakayev noted that work on the Sarmat was “practically complete” (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023).
According to satellite imagery as of March 2026, the 302nd Missile Regiment in Uzhur was disarmed to modernize its silo launchers and launch control center for the Sarmat missile. All six silos in the regiment were in the final stages of construction; some may already be complete. However, we estimate that by March 2026, not a single Sarmat missile had been loaded into a silo or deployed. Notably, the Sarmat was not mentioned in Karakayev's annual interviews in late 2024 and 2025, suggesting that no significant results worth announcing were achieved during these years (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2024, 2025).
If the Sarmat replaces all current SS-18 (R-36M2), it will be deployed in 46 silos: three regiments at the Dombarovsky range and four at the Uzhursky range (six regiments of six missiles and one regiment of 10 missiles).
Some media outlets are calling the Sarmat "Son of Satan"—a development of the SS-18, nicknamed "Satan" by the US and NATO. This is a media label, not a technical specification. The combat configuration will likely be similar to the SS-18's payload (up to 10 warheads) plus missile defense penetration capabilities. A small number of Sarmats may be able to be equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles, which are currently being installed on a limited number of SS-19 Mod 4 carriers at Dombarovsky. In December 2024, Karakayev noted that the Avangard command posts were designated "Bugai" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2024).
The Sarmat is believed to have a significantly longer range than other Russian ICBMs. Karakayev claimed the missile could pass over both the North and South Poles (Lenta, 2023), and in 2023, the Russian company testing the Sarmat published an environmental study suggesting that the missile could be tested at a range of nearly 36,000 kilometers (Marcuz, 2023). Extremely long range may be more important for image than for practical purposes; Russia is building a new test site in the Severo-Yeniseisky District to test the Sarmat and other ICBMs at short ranges—a decision announced in December 2020 (Marcuz, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020). The bulk of the work there may be completed by the end of 2024, but the site does not appear to be in use yet. The construction of the new complex could also have been dictated by the fact that Kazakhstan, where Russia has historically conducted tests at the Sary Shagan test site, has acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which requires “the destruction or irreversible conversion of all nuclear weapons-related facilities” (United Nations, 2017).
Russia appears to be in the early stages of developing at least two new ICBM programs, as well as various hypersonic guided reentry vehicles for modified ICBMs. However, significant uncertainty remains regarding the designations and characteristics of these systems. In December 2021, Karakayev announced the development of a "new land-based mobile missile system," and in December 2022, he noted that the system would be "more mobile" than the Yars, with its development officially commencing in 2023 (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2021, 2022). In December 2023, he stated that the system would be stealthy and could potentially replace the RS-24 Yars (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023). However, these systems were not mentioned in Karakayev's interviews in late 2024 and 2025.
It's unclear which system Karakayev was referring to, as there are several candidates. Russia is reportedly developing a new Yars-M ICBM with multiple warheads, each with its own propulsion stage (called independent upper stages). This configuration allows for early separation of the warheads, theoretically increasing its resistance to missile defense. Although the Yars-M reportedly uses the same launcher and first stage as the Yars and Yars-S, it is a relatively new delivery system: its GRAU index is significantly higher, and development will likely take years. (The GRAU index is a Russian Ministry of Defense designation system for classifying weapons, equipment, and ammunition; the final digits indicate a specific model. Significantly different indexes may indicate that the systems were developed independently, rather than as successive versions.) The Yars-M follows a characteristic—and somewhat confusing—Russian naming scheme, in which systems with similar names (Yars and Yars-M, Topol and Topol-M) have little technological similarity. Available data indicate that the Yars-M has already been tested.
The second ICBM under development is the Osina-RV; it can be launched from mobile and silo-based launchers and, according to some reports, is a modernized version of the Yars-M (Marcuz, 2023c; Ryabkov, 2023; War Bolts, 2021). Flight tests of the Osina-RV were expected in 2021 and 2022, but it is unknown whether they took place (Marcuz, 2023).
Russia is also developing another ICBM system, the Kedr, which is expected to replace the current Yars missiles in mobile and silo-based configurations by 2030 (TASS, 2021). The Kedr is the only new Russian ICBM system publicly mentioned by the STRATCOM commander since 2022 (Richard, 2022).
Russia is apparently developing a series of hypersonic glide vehicles for its new ICBMs, similar to the Avangard, which is currently installed on the aging SS-19 Mod 4. Publicly available Russian industry documents mention, among other things, the Gradient-RV and Anchar-RV, but these programs are highly classified, and their specifications are unclear. Karakayev did not mention these or any new ICBM programs in interviews in late 2024 and 2025.
In addition to ballistic missiles, Russia is developing a ground-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile with intercontinental range—the 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO reporting name SSC-X-9 Skyfall). Its development was initially plagued by serious setbacks, including nearly a dozen failed tests. In one of these, the missile fell into the sea, and its recovery from the seabed had dire consequences: five scientists and two service members died in the Nyonoksa disaster (DiNanno, 2019; Panda, 2019). After The New York Times, using satellite imagery, suggested the imminent start of Burevestnik tests in October 2023, Putin announced a successful test of the system without providing details (Mellen, 2023; RIA Novosti, 2023).
In 2024, Dekker Eveleth of CNA Corporation identified a likely Burevestnik deployment site—near a known nuclear weapons storage facility (Landay, 2024). The site, near the Vologda-20 national-level storage facility near Cherepovets, approximately 360 kilometers north of Moscow, includes nine launch sites arranged in three groups within bunded areas, with roads leading to auxiliary buildings and adjacent nuclear bunkers. This is an unusual location: Russia typically does not locate missile sites near warhead storage facilities. Satellite imagery suggests construction began in 2021, and although much work had been completed by March 2026, only four of the nine planned launch sites had been completed. Work on the missile's integration is likely underway at the site.
Submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
The Russian Navy operates 13 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of two classes: five Project 667BDRM Delfin (NATO reporting name: Delta IV) SSBNs and eight Project 955/955A Borei SSBNs, five of which are improved Borei-A (Project 955A) SSBNs. Each submarine carries 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and each MIRVed SLBM carries four to six warheads, depending on the missile type. Not all submarines are fully combat-ready, and the number of warheads on some missiles may have been reduced to ensure Russia does not exceed the deployed warhead limit under the New START Treaty. We estimate that at any given time, one SSBN of each type is typically undergoing maintenance, repair, or reactor refueling, so only enough warheads are available for the remaining submarines. Thus, according to our estimate, the Russian SLBM arsenal consists of up to 928 warheads, of which approximately 704 are deployed (the difference is the warehouse warheads that are not on launch-ready launch vehicles).
Five obsolete Project 667BDRM Delfin SSBNs, built in 1985–1992, are part of the Northern Fleet. fleet and are based in Yagelnaya Bay (Gadzhiyevo) on the Kola Peninsula. The Dolphins carry 16 Sineva (SS-N-23) SLBMs, each carrying up to four warheads, or their Liner modification (Podvig, 2021). The Liner can be equipped with the same warhead as the Bulava SLBM and, according to some reports, can carry up to six low-yield warheads, but most likely carries three or four. The SS-N-23 missiles and warheads are likely stored at submarine bases. Typically, three or four of the five Project 667BDRM submarines are operational at any given time, with another one or two undergoing various stages of maintenance.
Note on the material. In the source materials, the submarine classes were mixed up. Project 941 Akula (NATO reporting name: Typhoon) heavy submarines are a separate class, not related to Project 667BDRM Delfin (Delta IV). Of the seven Project 941 ships that once existed, the Podmoskovie (formerly K-64, now BS-64) was decommissioned in 1999 for conversion to a "special-purpose" carrier. The Yekaterinburg (K-84), a Project 667BDRM submarine, was decommissioned in 2022 after 36 years of service (TASS, 2016, 2021). Since the assignment of specific hulls to classes varies in open sources, cautious wording is retained below.
In October 2025, the Bryansk (K-117) Project 667BDRM SSBN took part in the annual Russian nuclear exercises, launching a Sineva SLBM from the Barents Sea (Russian Federation, 2025).
Each Borei-class SSBN (Project 955/955A) is armed with 16 SS-N-32 Bulava SLBMs, each carrying up to six warheads. The payload has possibly been reduced to four warheads per missile to comply with the New START Treaty limit. Eight Project 955A Borei-class submarines are in service, of which one or two are undergoing maintenance or repair at any given time, and four more are at various stages of construction. A total of 12 Project 955A SSBNs are planned: six are expected to be assigned to the Northern Fleet and six to the Pacific Fleet, replacing all remaining Project 941 Akula-class submarines (TASS, 2024). In October 2024, the strategic missile submarine Knyaz Oleg (K-552) also participated in the annual Russian nuclear exercises, launching a Bulava missile into the Barents Sea (Russian Federation, 2024).
Typically, the time from the keel-laying of a new Borei-class submarine to its delivery to the fleet is eight years, although some ships have been delayed longer. The newest cruiser, Knyaz Pozharsky, was launched in February 2024, began sea trials in July 2024, and a year later, after a longer-than-usual trial period, was delivered to the Pacific Fleet (Russian Federation, 2025). The next SSBN, Dmitry Donskoy, was scheduled to be commissioned in late 2025, but the deadline has been pushed back. According to TASS, the keels of the last two Borei-class submarines were scheduled to be laid in 2024, but the deadline has also been pushed back (TASS, 2024). It is possible that two more Borei-class SSBNs will be ordered.
At the Army-2022 forum, the concept for a new generation of Russian strategic nuclear submarines, dubbed the Arcturus, was presented. Submarines of this design are expected to replace the Borei-class submarines around 2037 (RIA Novosti, 2023), will be smaller than the current Borei-class submarines, and will carry fewer missiles (RIA Novosti, 2022). The Arcturus could also potentially carry the Surrogat autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), expanding its role compared to traditional SSBNs (Dempsey, 2022; RIA Novosti, 2024). Igor Vilnit, CEO of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, stated in an interview with RIA Novosti that the fifth-generation Arcturus will be focused on "robotics" and will feature "even greater stealth and the ability to disorient enemy assets" (RIA Novosti, 2024). It is still unclear what this ship will be like.
In addition to ballistic missiles, the Russian Navy is developing the Poseidon intercontinental-range nuclear torpedo. Underwater testing began in December 2018; the weapon is rumored to be highly powerful, possibly several megatons (Hruby, 2019; TASS, 2019). The weapon is intended to be deployed on specially built submarines; it is expected to enter service with the Navy in 2027 (TASS, 2018a). The first such submarine, Project 09852 Belgorod (K-329), was launched in April 2019 and delivered to the Navy in July 2022; it can reportedly carry up to six Poseidon torpedoes (Naval News, 2022; Sutton, 2021). Russian defense sources reported that the "first batch" of Poseidon torpedoes had been produced and would soon be delivered to the Belgorod, although a November 2022 test of the torpedo was apparently aborted (TASS, 2023b). The unsuccessful test was reportedly followed by a drop test of a Poseidon mockup from the Belgorod in January 2023; some reports suggested another test could have taken place in June 2023 (Cook, 2023; Sciutto, 2022; Sutton, 2023; TASS, 2023). The Poseidon was tested again in October 2025, but as of March 2026 is not believed to be operationally ready (Reuters, 2025).
Subsequent Poseidon-carrying submarines will belong to a new class, Project 09851 Khabarovsk. The first of these was scheduled to be delivered to the fleet in the fall of 2021, but due to delays, it was launched only in November 2025 (Newdick, 2025; Starchak, 2023; TASS, 2021, 2023). According to available information, the Khabarovsk can carry up to six Poseidon torpedoes (TASS, 2020a). By 2027, another submarine, the Orenburg, is scheduled to be delivered to the fleet. Thus, Russia will have at least three, and possibly four, Poseidon-carrying submarines (TASS, 2023).
Both the Belgorod and Khabarovsk will be based at the Pacific Fleet's Kamchatka naval base, which is currently undergoing modernization, including a warhead storage facility (TASS, 2023). According to some reports, in 2025, Russia built its first unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control center with anti-drone nets at the Rybachy nuclear submarine base to improve control. drones and protection of objects (Izvestia, 2025).
Over the years, there have been periodic reports of Russian submarine deployments off the US coast and in the Mediterranean Sea (Brugen, 2023). In September 2025, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force first spotted a Borei-class submarine in the La Perouse Strait (Joint Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2025; Mahadzir, 2025). In April 2023, UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace stated that the United Kingdom was also tracking Russian submarines "in the North Atlantic, Irish Sea, and North Sea, following unusual routes" (Cook, 2023).
Strategic bombers
Russia has two types of heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons: the Tu-160 (NATO reporting name: Blackjack) and the Tu-95MS (Bear-H). We estimate that approximately 60 bombers are in service. This figure is based on a comparison of satellite images of various bases and maintenance facilities for the year 2025.
Both types are capable of carrying the AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) nuclear air-launched cruise missile, while upgraded versions are equipped with the new AS-23B (Kh-102) nuclear cruise missile. Several modifications of the Tu-95 are believed to have been produced over the years: the aging Tu-95MS6 and Tu-95MS16, as well as the upgraded Tu-95MSM. The 1991 START I Treaty differentiated the two older modifications by their missile armament: the Tu-95MS6 carries up to six missiles internally, while the Tu-95MS16 carries up to six internally and up to 10 on underwing pylons, for a total of 16. We estimate that the MS16 version lost its external hardpoints at some point, effectively becoming a variant of the MS6. As part of the Tu-95MSM program, hardpoints are being restored: obsolete Tu-95s are being equipped with eight external pylons for AS-23B missiles, allowing the aircraft to carry up to 14 missiles, including six AS-15s internally. Tu-160s are also being upgraded to accommodate up to 12 AS-23B missiles internally. Over time, the AS-23Bs installed during the upgrade may replace the AS-15s.
During North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's visit to the Russian airfield in Knevichi in September 2023, the commander of Russia's Long-Range Aviation demonstrated a Tu-160, armed, according to some reports, with the "new" Kh-BD cruise missiles, which may be based on the AS-23B. According to the commander, the new missile has a range of over 6500 kilometers, which could indicate nuclear capability: a nuclear warhead is much lighter than a heavy conventional one, freeing up weight for fuel. The Russian Defense Minister added that the Tu-160 would be able to carry 12 such missiles, although some experts doubt this (Cook, 2023; TASS, 2023). There is little information about the new missile, but the Ukrainian military news resource Militarnyi reported in October 2025 that it had received Russian procurement documents according to which the Russian Ministry of Defense ordered 32 Kh-BD missiles for delivery in 2024–2026, with both conventional and “special” warheads (Yan, 2025).
The number of nuclear weapons assigned to the heavy bombers is unknown. Each Tu-160 can carry up to 40 tons of ordnance, including 12 air-launched cruise missiles, while the Tu-95MS can carry six to 16 missiles, depending on configuration. Combined, the bombers are capable of carrying over 650 weapons, but we estimate that only those aircraft in combat readiness carry these weapons—a total of approximately 200 nuclear weapons at bases. These weapons, according to FAS, may be stored at the Engels (Saratov Region) and Ukrainka (Amur Region) airbases and are therefore considered "deployed"; the rest are presumably stored in a central depot. Modernization of one of the two nuclear weapons bunkers in Engels began in 2018, but work appears to have stalled or ceased. This could mean that Russia will store fewer weapons at the base in the future: since 2022, strategic bombers have been largely redeployed due to the threat posed by Ukrainian long-range drones.
STRATCOM Commander General Cotton recently stated that the Tu-95 and Tu-160 are "capable of carrying nuclear gravity bombs" (Cotton, 2025). However, the older and slower Tu-95 is virtually defenseless against modern DefenseThe Tu-160 is not stealthy, and although both were used to launch cruise missiles during the war in Ukraine, neither is believed to have dropped free-fall bombs, which would have required them to penetrate air defenses. Therefore, despite the potential bomb-carrying capability of the Tu-160, we do not consider free-fall bombs to be a strategic capability of Russia.
In 2025, Russia conducted several exercises with heavy bombers, including one in October, when several Tu-95MSs participated in strategic nuclear force exercises and, according to the Kremlin, fired a "salvo" of air-launched cruise missiles (Russian Federation, 2025). On December 9, 2025, two Tu-95s conducted a joint strategic air patrol with Chinese H-6 bombers over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea; according to Chinese military media, this was the tenth such exercise, designed to "demonstrate the resolve and ability of the parties to jointly maintain peace and stability in the region" (China Military, 2025). In January 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that two Tu-160s completed a scheduled flight over the Arctic Ocean lasting over 11 hours (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2025).
Some Russian bombers were destroyed, others damaged by Ukrainian drone strikes. Following a probable Ukrainian air strike on Engels Air Base in December 2022, Russian authorities reported damage to two aircraft, one of which—a Tu-95—is visible on satellite imagery (Kramer, Schwirtz, and Santora, 2022; Christensen, Korda, and Reynolds, 2023; Röpke, 2022). Then, on June 1, 2025, Ukraine launched Operation Spiderweb, a large-scale drone attack on five Russian air bases. According to satellite imagery, seven Tu-95s were destroyed (four at Olenya Air Base and three at Belaya Air Base) and another damaged (Janes, 2025).
Satellite imagery after the June strikes shows that the majority of Tu-95s are concentrated at Ukrainka Air Base, with only one or two each at Engels, Belaya, and Olenya. Following the strikes, according to the imagery, Russia completely stopped deploying Tu-160s to Belaya. The Tu-160 fleet is now widely dispersed: three to five aircraft are usually seen at Ukrainka, one or two at Engels, and three at Ugolny Air Base near Anadyr, from where they perform patrol missions in the Arctic and the Far East.
In addition to upgrading existing aircraft, Russia is producing additional Tu-160s and plans to build up to 50 new aircraft. There is considerable confusion over the designations of the upgraded models: Tu-160M, Tu-160M1, and Tu-160M2. According to some sources, all upgraded aircraft are Tu-160Ms, and the M1 and M2 suffixes indicate successive stages of modification: the first is equipped with a new NK-32-02 engine, increasing range by approximately 1000 kilometers (TASS, 2017), as well as a new autopilot, and the replacement of outdated components; the second is equipped with a new radar, cockpit, communications equipment, and avionics (TASS, 2020). According to other sources, the designation “M” refers to Tu-160s assembled under the “reproduction” program from Soviet-era airframes and spare parts (Shcherbak, 2025; Taylor, 2026).
The first newly built Tu-160M completed its maiden flight in January 2022 (United Aircraft Corporation, 2022). In July 2023, the Rostec state corporation announced that the aircraft was undergoing joint testing by the Ministry of Defense and the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). In February 2024, Putin visited the S. P. Gorbunov Kazan Aircraft Plant, inspected four Tu-160Ms, and took a roughly 30-minute flight on one of the upgraded bombers, the Ilya Muromets (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2024b). After the flight, Putin stated that the upgraded Tu-160s "may be accepted into service" (Associated Press, 2024). According to Russian media, the Ministry of Defense is expected to receive 10 Tu-160Ms by 2027 (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2018). In 2025, the private intelligence and analysis company Janes, using intercepted documents, established that as of May 2025, five operational Russian Tu-160s were undergoing repair and modernization at the Kazan Aircraft Plant, and two new Tu-160s were under construction (Janes, 2025). According to available data, the Ministry of Defense was supposed to receive four Tu-160Ms in 2025, but by early January 2026, only two had been delivered to the Armed Forces (Johnson, 2026; Taylor, 2026).
Delays in the Tu-160M program have been so severe that the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade has filed a lawsuit against the manufacturer (Interfax, 2022). The target of 50 new Tu-160Ms may not be met, but if it is, most, if not all, of the remaining Tu-95MS will likely be retired by 2035.
The Tu-160 modernization program is only an intermediate stage on the way to the next-generation PAK DA bomber, which has been in development for several years. This subsonic aircraft will reportedly have a reduced radar signature and will be able to carry long-range cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles (Tsukanov, 2023). In 2013, the Russian government signed a contract with Tupolev for the production of the PAK DA at the Kazan Aircraft Plant; the aircraft is expected to be largely similar to the Tu-160M (TASS, 2019). State flight tests (usually following manufacturer tests) were planned for February 2026, the start of production for 2027, and serial production for 2028–2029 (Izvestia, 2020; TASS, 2019). However, internal Tupolev documents—describing the itinerary of the management's visit to Kazan and inspection of the work—reveal that as of March 2026, assembly of the first PAK DA prototype for static ground testing was still ongoing in Kazan (Janes, 2025). A completion date has not yet been determined. Such significant delays in the Tu-160 and PAK DA may indicate the insufficient capacity of the Russian aviation industry to develop and produce two strategic bombers simultaneously.
Non-strategic nuclear weapons
We estimate that Russia has approximately 1794 warheads for non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons in storage. Unlike strategic warheads, these are not believed to be deployed, but are instead stored in central warehouses and base storage facilities separate from their delivery systems. This category is extremely diverse: it includes munitions for surface ships and submarines, tactical aircraft, air defense and missile defense systems, and land-based short-range missiles. Almost all delivery systems are dual-use, so any estimate of the number of warheads is subject to significant uncertainty (see the Methodology section).
The distribution of this arsenal by type of carrier in open sources is only roughly estimated, and the totals by category do not always match the overall figure. The figures provided below by type of force should be understood as orders of magnitude, not as precise, item-by-item estimates.
Naval non-strategic nuclear weapons
The largest share of Russia's non-strategic arsenal, according to our estimates, is held by the Navy—approximately 767 warheads. These are designed for a wide range of delivery vehicles: long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine missiles, torpedoes, depth charges, and anti-aircraft missiles on surface ships and submarines. Nuclear warheads are believed to be capable of being deployed, in particular, on sea-launched Kalibr (SS-N-30) cruise missiles, Onyx (SS-N-26) anti-ship missiles, and a number of older Soviet-era systems.
Airborne non-strategic nuclear weapons
The second largest component is the air component, with approximately 488 warheads for medium-range bombers and tactical aircraft. Dual-capable carriers include the Tu-22M3 bomber (NATO reporting name: Backfire), as well as the Su-24M (Fencer) and Su-34 (Fullback) frontline aircraft, and the Su-30SM and Su-35S multirole aircraft. Some of these aircraft are dual-capable, meaning they can fire both conventional and nuclear weapons. Tu-22M3 bombers can carry Kh-22 and new Kh-32 missiles, as well as Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
Warheads of air defense and missile defense systems
We estimate that approximately 307 warheads are used in air defense and missile defense systems. Russia has historically retained nuclear warheads for a number of anti-aircraft missiles and the missile defense system covering the Moscow region (A-135, and potentially A-235). Some of these munitions are apparently being gradually decommissioned, but the exact trend is unclear from open sources.
Land-based non-strategic nuclear weapons
The remainder of the non-strategic arsenal consists of dual-use, short- and medium-range land-based missile systems. These primarily include the Iskander-M (SS-26) tactical missile systems, capable of firing both ballistic missiles and 9M728 and 9M729 (SSC-8) ground-launched cruise missiles. As noted above, debris discovered in Ukraine confirmed the combat use of the 9M729—the missile at the center of the INF Treaty dispute.
In November 2024, Russia used the Onyx land-based cruise missile for the first time in Ukraine; according to some reports, such missiles may have also been deployed to Belarus (see the section "Joint Use of Nuclear Weapons in Belarus"). Russia is also developing land-based hypersonic systems, including the Zircon (3M22) system, originally developed as a sea-based anti-ship missile but apparently adaptable for land-based launchers. The capability of these new systems to carry a nuclear warhead has not been reliably confirmed.
Conclusion
Russia continues large-scale modernization of all components of its nuclear triad and non-strategic forces, but the actual pace of progress is significantly lagging behind stated plans and official rhetoric. Programs for key systems—the RS-28 Sarmat, the PAK DA, and the upgraded Tu-160 fleet—are experiencing persistent delays, likely due to technical difficulties, limited industrial capacity, and the diversion of resources to the war against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the overall size of the arsenal remains stable, and the expiration of New START in February 2026 deprives the international community of its last bilateral instrument for verification and data exchange. In the absence of a new agreement, the reliability of open-source assessments will steadily decline, and the risk of an arms race and strategic uncertainty will increase. Against this backdrop, the combination of nuclear modernization and regular nuclear signals from the Russian leadership makes transparency and arms control more urgent than ever in recent decades.
Information