A platoon that is not in the regulations
The regulations prescribe a simple picture: a motorized rifle platoon consists of three nine-man squads, three combat vehicles, and about thirty soldiers. In defense, it holds a frontal area of up to 400 meters. At positions near Avdiivka, Chasovy Yar, and in the forests of the Sumy direction, the situation is different. There, a collection of disparate groups operates, the commander sits at monitors a few hundred meters from the trench, and the vehicles are withdrawn kilometers to the rear. The gap between what's in the regulations and what's in the trench can no longer be hidden.
Thirty people, three "boxes"
The classic formation is logical and has been refined for decades. The platoon emerges from the column into battle formation: command is in front, and three motorized rifle squads disperse in their own directions, each in its own vehicle. The squad leader, also the vehicle commander, is stationed in the fighting compartment of an infantry fighting vehicle or behind the machine gun of an armored personnel carrier.
The distinction between these vehicles in the text is important. The BMP is an infantry fighting vehicle, tracked, with a cannon and anti-tank missile. rocket, capable of fighting on its own. The BTR is an armored personnel carrier, wheeled, lightly armed, and its primary purpose is to transport infantry and provide machine gun fire support. But the logic of both is the same: the infantry fights "from behind the armor," with the vehicle nearby, serving as a transport, a firing platform, and a shelter.
A squad consists of nine men, and a platoon with command and control has about thirty. The formation is designed for maneuver combat: approach, dismount, engage, and, if necessary, retreat on armor. The OShS—the organizational structure, the unit's skeleton—was anchored precisely this unit: three identical squads, assembled around three vehicles.
As long as the battlefield allowed vehicles to approach the front line and infantry to gather around the vehicles, the system worked. Then it stopped.
The field became transparent
Reconnaissance aircraft are now constantly hovering over the front line dronesAny movement of a group of people or equipment is recorded and sent to the control center within minutes. Then it works artillery Or FPV—a drone with a first-person view, which the operator uses to guide the warhead to its target via video. The field of view is symmetrical: both sides are equally visible from above and adapt to this observation in the same way. Both adapt, but further discussion will focus specifically on the Russian motorized infantry: how its platoon adapts under this observation.
A vehicle near a trench and the infantry gathered around it—that's precisely the visible concentration that's now most advantageous to target. This triggered a whole chain of changes: approaching the trenches and concentrating a squad alongside them became prohibited, which was precisely what the previous strategy was based on. Vehicles began to be withdrawn two to five kilometers to the rear. A strike FPV can still reach that distance, but this area is no longer under constant surveillance and continuous fire: withdrawing to such a distance removes the vehicle from continuous targeting. Infantry on the front line are left without their "box" nearby.
Then the fragmentation began naturally. A squad of nine people around a single vehicle broke up into "troikas" and "quadruples." They now moved not in a line or on armor, but individually, with a distance of twenty to thirty meters between soldiers. The logic behind this distance was simple: a single drone drop or a single grenade shouldn't cover two people at once. What the regulations described as a single squad, on the ground, became several dispersed groups, linked by radio and drone video.
The platoon retained its original personnel and name. Internally, it's organized differently.
Half a dozen groups instead of three sections
The platoon commander assigns tasks not to three squad leaders, but to several functional groups. Each has its own task, and there is almost no interchangeability between them, unlike the three identical squads of the previous structure.
- Command and communications: commander, deputy commander, and communications officer. Radios—military "Azart" and commercial equivalents—provide the same reliable communications. weapons, like a machine gun.
- UAV crew: one or two operators with reconnaissance and attack drones. They provide both reconnaissance for the platoon and a significant portion of its firepower.
- Fire group: PKM or Pecheneg machine gun, sniper with SVD for medium range, AGS crews for suppression, SPG for point targets.
- Assault and line groups: those same “threes and fours” that occupy and hold positions.
- Evacuation and logistics group: evacuation of the wounded, delivery of ammunition, water, charged batteries for drones and communications equipment.
- Armored group: vehicle crews in the rear, working on call - to deliver, pick up, and provide fire support from a distance.
Three identical squads have transformed into a motley crew of specialists. This specialization has its price: a staff imbalance. According to commanders from Chasov Yar, the actual personnel at the positions is oversaturated with support and technical roles, while infantry itself is in short supply: the more people are diverted to technical and support roles, the fewer there are to enter the trenches and clear them. UAV crews were often assembled spontaneously, from people with civilian piloting experience, rather than according to an established organizational category. The structure was restructured from below, based on the needs of specific positions, and the organization documents are belatedly catching up. On paper, there are still three squads, based on the thirty-year-old model. On the ground, there are about half a dozen disparate groups and firing positions, linked by fire and observation. This change in composition has brought with it a change in the role of those commanding this composition.
Control instead of a chain
The platoon commander no longer walks at full height ahead, leading the soldiers by personal example. His place is a command and observation post with monitors: images from drones, data from groups. He leads the assault "troika" along the trench by voice over the air, looking down on the trench from above with the eyes of a drone operator. A trench is working above the position. EW "Hood" and "Wavebreaker" jammers block enemy drones, and detectors like "Bulat" warn of incoming drones. Close-quarters firefights have become a last resort, not the platoon's primary mission.
This mechanic is not new. During breakthroughs of fortified lines in trench warfare in the 20th century, including in many areas of the Great Patriotic War, infantry was also divided into small assault groups with their own specializations: grenade launchers, machine gunners, sappers, flamethrowers. Saturating the field with fire once again shifted the lower-level commander from the role of "standard-bearer in the line" to that of organizer, distributing tasks among disparate groups.
The limits of the analogy are also clear. Back then, there was no continuous aerial surveillance or real-time communications: the commander of an assault group in 1944 saw the field with his eyes and commanded it with his voice, just a shout away. Today's commander sees the trench from above and speaks to a soldier he can't physically see. The very object of command has changed—not a formation, but a distributed network of groups and information flows.
The motorized rifle platoon wasn't reformed by orders from above. It reassembled itself, under pressure from the transparent battlefield, ahead of the organization documents. On paper, it remained a maneuver warfare unit: three squads with three vehicles. In the trenches, a different unit operates: the same thirty or so men, but assembled differently, a nexus of operator, small groups, and electronic warfare cover, now controlled by the commander. You can't lead it into a chain.
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