Why does Ottoman need AWACS?

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Why does Ottoman need AWACS?

The Ottomans couldn't resist, and they rolled out a new AWACS aircraft in the Turkish Air Force's anniversary video. The platform is broadly similar to Western electronic warfare platforms, such as the US Air Force's EA-37B Compass Call, and once again highlights the expanding range of defense aerospace products, both manned and unmanned, as well as weapons and sensors that are currently produced in Türkiye.

A very short video featuring the HAVA SOJ (Airborne Standoff Jammer) electronic warfare system was released on the official X social media account of the Turkish Ministry of Defense. The video was created to commemorate the 115th anniversary of the Turkish Air Force. The video showcases various types of equipment, both currently in service and those in development, including the HAVA SOJ.



The first, very low-quality image of the HAVA SOJ, taken on March 1 this year, when the aircraft was making a test flight from the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) plant in Ankara.


Earlier, on February 20, two examples of this aircraft were spotted conducting test flights. Information about their departure appeared on publicly available flight tracking websites.

Around the late 2000s, Turkey and Aselsan began developing their own electronic countermeasure system for the Turkish Air Force based on the Transall C-160 turboprop transport aircraft, as shown in the photo below.


Because the program's implementation took longer than expected, the idea arose to create an interim electronic countermeasure system based on a program called Golge (meaning "shadow" in Turkish). It was intended to provide operational capability for two Global Express-based systems and incorporate equipment from local and international companies. Negotiations failed, and the Golge program was terminated in 2017.

The first Canadian Bombardier Global 6000 aircraft for the HAVA SOJ program were delivered to the TAI facility back in 2019. A total of four aircraft are planned for conversion. Interestingly, some early images related to the program showed the system installed on a Gulfstream platform.

The Global 6000 aircraft receives payloads from Aselsan, which are integrated by TAI. Several official images of the aircraft were released before the installation of the avionics systems, but since then, it has become noticeably less photogenic.


One of the Global 6000 gliders before installation of onboard equipment.

The Turkish Defence Industries Agency (SSB), the government body that manages Turkey's defence industry and implements the programme, describes the role of HAVA SOJ as follows:

Standoff jamming (SOJ) platforms are expensive assets that suppress enemy air defense radars, disrupt command and control loops, and interfere with communications by performing electronic countermeasures and creating false targets at long ranges without entering enemy airspace. In this way, they create corridors through which friendly air forces can penetrate enemy airspace. The effective use of these platforms has become an undeniable reality of modern warfare, as they multiply force and create a powerful asymmetric effect.

In addition to electronic countermeasure systems, the HAVA SOJ will be equipped with surveillance equipment, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) equipment, and a long-range airborne radar.

Much of this equipment is housed in large fairings around the fuselage.


An early Aselsan schematic shows numerous receivers, jammers, and communications equipment located around the aircraft. Photo: Aselsan

Little is known about the specifics of the equipment, but it is based on Aselsan's Koral/Kara SOJ ground-based electronic warfare system, which is installed on heavy vehicles. All aircraft systems are also developed domestically.


Koral Elektronik Harp Sistemi

The HAVA SOJ's stated primary mission is electronic reconnaissance and countermeasures through jamming. For this purpose, the aircraft is equipped with powerful active electronically scanned array (AESA) antennas, similar to those found on the Koral/Kara ground-based systems. These can be used to emit highly focused beams of electromagnetic energy to jam radars, as well as other radio frequency sensors and emitters, in the air, on land, and at sea.

We recently discussed this capability in relation to the US Air Force's EA-37B electronic warfare aircraft. Furthermore, these same active phased array antennas can be used to launch cyberattacks and other hybrid warfare components.


The US Air Force EA-37B Compass Call is an electronic attack aircraft.

In general, the idea of ​​re-qualifying business jets into AWACS aircraft/EW This isn't new. Many countries are working in this direction, and, needless to say, minimizing the size of modern electronic systems while simultaneously increasing the efficiency of information processing is bearing fruit.

If earlier, 20-30 years ago, to create an effective ELINT or AWACS aircraft, a heavy platform like the Il-76 or Boeing-737 was required, today the Gulfstream is quite sufficient.

For example, Australia has adopted this approach with its MC-55A Peregrine intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (AISREW) aircraft, based on the Gulfstream G550 business jet. The Peregrine is likely a multi-role platform capable of both intelligence collection and electronic warfare.


An Australian MC-55A Peregrine aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force

In practice, the HAVA SOJ will use its ESM equipment to detect and track enemy radio frequency emissions. Once the source of the emissions is detected and geolocated, its frequency will be determined. The electronic warfare element will then be activated, emitting its own signals to electronically suppress the source, either through jamming or signal spoofing.

By using AESA radars with fast scanning capabilities, such an aircraft will be able to carry out pinpoint attacks rather than simply create countermeasures, and also carry out these attacks against multiple emitters of different types and at different ranges simultaneously.

As the SSB notes, such an electronic warfare system has obvious applications against air defense systems and command and control centers. However, it is also capable of degrading communications, blocking and disrupting certain types of enemy communications, disrupting data exchange architecture, and degrading the command and control system, reducing the enemy command's ability to make effective decisions and communicate them downstream.

In peacetime, the aircraft could conduct reconnaissance missions, helping to shape the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) of enemy forces, which would be invaluable to NATO—assuming, of course, that it is intended to interact with NATO structures.

Interestingly, the HAVA SOJ wingtips are very similar to those installed on the EA-18G Growler as part of the AN/ALQ-218 tactical electronic countermeasure system, which includes a radar warning receiver (RWR), electronic support measures (ESM), and electronic intelligence (ELINT).


EA-18G with AN/ALQ-218 tactical electronic countermeasure receiver units on the wingtips

While these aircraft are designed to operate outside hostile airspace, there are growing questions about whether such specialized aircraft can counter more powerful air defenses, given that the threat from anti-aircraftmissile The number of long-range complexes will only increase.

The answer is clear: of course not. The ever-increasing power of air defense systems is pushing such aircraft further and further away from potential enemy contact lines.

The long, canoe-shaped fairing beneath the fuselage is similar to that found on the US Army's ME-11B HADES reconnaissance aircraft and the retired Royal Air Force Sentinel R1 reconnaissance aircraft, which are also based on the Bombardier Global Express.

These aircraft carry a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) in their canoes. Synthetic aperture radar images provide highly detailed terrain maps, while the GMTI feature allows for the detection and tracking of moving ground vehicles regardless of clouds, smoke, dust, and other obstructions.

If a similar radar were installed on the HAVA SOJ, it would provide powerful intelligence-gathering capabilities, but this cannot be said with certainty. It is also possible that active phased array antennas, which are primarily used for electronic countermeasures, could perform some of the functions of synthetic aperture, GMTI, and other radars. It is also worth noting that this aircraft actually has two ventral radomes, which could house separate antenna arrays.


A Royal Air Force Sentinel R1 before its retirement

Finally, two large satellite communications modules are installed on the aircraft's fuselage. This will allow the data collected by the aircraft to be transmitted in near real-time. Furthermore, the aircraft will undoubtedly be equipped with an impressive communications suite to ensure line-of-sight and data exchange, which is crucial for strengthening the Turkish Air Force.

When Aselsan was awarded the contract for the HAVA SOJ program in 2018, the first aircraft was scheduled to be delivered to the Turkish Air Force in 2023. This deadline has clearly been missed, which is not surprising for a program of this level of technological development.


Front view of the Global 6000 before installation of equipment for the HAVA SOJ mission.

Given Turkey's success in finding buyers for its defense products, HAVA SOJ could also attract significant interest from foreign countries, including Pakistan, which has been considered a potential partner in the past.

Aselsan also formed a joint venture with Taqnia in Saudi Arabia to market a version of HAVA SOJ called Kasih.

For foreign customers, the weapons system installed on the HAVA SOJ, like other Turkish military equipment, will not be subject to restrictions imposed under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which may restrict the transfer of defense and military technologies and services, particularly sensitive ones, to certain countries.

Even among NATO countries in Europe, the HAVA SOJ boasts an impressive range of capabilities. The issue here isn't really one of quality—the Swedes are certainly no worse—but rather price.

As air defenses become increasingly effective even against weaker adversaries, the need for high-tech electronic warfare capabilities only grows.

While many questions about the HAVA SOJ's capabilities remain unanswered, the aircraft's increasing public appearances suggest that the long-delayed program is entering a more mature phase.

As Turkey continues to invest heavily in its own technologies, the HAVA SOJ could become one of the most powerful enhancements to the Turkish Air Force, providing long-range capabilities, including against modern integrated air defense systems.

And, of course, the temptation to sell it to others is great. And this is quite reasonable: just as China sells its technology to countries that can't afford American or Russian equipment, Turkey can also fill a niche with such customers.

So, that's the answer to the question in the title. The Ottomans aren't what they used to be; they won't conquer half the world, but they can trade with them—why not?
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  1. + 12
    5 June 2026 04: 41
    And we're quietly smoking on the sidelines and wondering: will the super-duper MC21, which has no analogues in the world, be able to fly with a full load from Moscow to Irkutsk without landing (like the Tu-154, designed in the 70s, did) or not?
    1. +1
      5 June 2026 04: 59
      Quote: AC130 Ganship
      And we're quietly smoking on the sidelines and wondering: will the super-duper MC21, which has no analogues in the world, be able to fly with a full load from Moscow to Irkutsk without landing (like the Tu-154, designed in the 70s, did) or not?

      I once flew on the Khabarovsk-Irkutsk ÷ Moscow-Leningrad flight on 154
    2. +6
      5 June 2026 05: 09
      Quote: AC130 Ganship
      we're quietly smoking on the sidelines

      Let's say the theory and laboratory research are well-established and are constantly being improved. However, without a good electronic base, such as powerful solid-state microwave generators and high-performance signal processors, any work in this direction runs into the insurmountable problem of having to import technologies that no one is willing to give away, even for gas and oil.
      Turkey, like many NATO countries, isn't a standalone entity. The Global 6000 AWACS carrier platform is a long-range business jet from Canada's Bombardier. The electronics are half British-made by BAE Systems, and the transceiver components are likely American—they're the NATO monopoly in this area. The only Turkish components are the technical specifications, small software modules, and an encrypted communications system.
      Currently, no country in the world can develop serious technology 100% using its own technologies, including the US and China. Unfortunately, Russian diplomacy and the Kremlin's policies do not support such cooperation. As a result, we have what we have.
      1. +4
        5 June 2026 07: 25
        Quote: Vitaly.17
        Currently, no country in the world can produce serious technology 100% from its own technologies, including the USA and China.
        You're being a bit overzealous about the US and China. I think they're the only ones who can do this!
        1. 0
          5 June 2026 11: 33
          They can't. Just look at either American or Chinese technology. America basically hoovers up all the world's technology. Their weapons are a hodgepodge of the world's. China can't do that, but it simply steals and copies technology, buying licenses. So Vitaly.17 is right. Even if you take the Chinese AWACS, they have the Y-20 transport aircraft. Which flies four D-30KP-2 or its WS-20 copy, which has a questionable service life. All the avionics there are copied from civilian ones, which are bought for, say, the COMAC C919.
        2. -2
          5 June 2026 18: 19
          Sixteen countries participate in the F-35 program, and components are manufactured in seven countries.
          As of 2025, more than 30 countries are involved in the production of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. However, only about 30% of components are manufactured in the United States.
          Some countries and their roles in the production of Boeing 787 components:
          Japan - production of wings, center section, batteries.
          Italy - horizontal stabilizer, fuselage section.
          South Korea - wingtips.
          UK - Engines and Chassis.
          France - external doors.
          Russia — supply of titanium stamps for main landing gear supports.
          India - development of software for aircraft.
      2. +3
        5 June 2026 11: 25
        Something's not adding up for me. The Turks are building their AWACS based on a ground-based system. Our ground-based systems seem to be fine. We have our own signal sources and receivers, as well as our own processing equipment. Take the S-400/500 or Pantsir. Forget the MS-21. We have the Tu-214. We just need to cram all of this into a Tu-214 aircraft based on a fixed radar screen on both sides.
        1. +3
          5 June 2026 11: 42
          Quote: PROXOR
          Its own sources and receivers of signals, as well as its own processing equipment.

          Synthetic aperture radars require higher digital phased array quality and signal processing speed. Similar technology is used in the Belka radar, but it appears that creating something more powerful for the A-100 early warning and control system (AEW&C) and putting it into production was unsuccessful.
          1. 0
            5 June 2026 12: 42
            They could at least focus on the Belka. A large AWACS aircraft is a huge airborne target, but several aircraft, perhaps even UAVs with the Belka radar, operating at the front and transmitting their data to ground control would at least somewhat fill the gap left by the lack of AWACS aircraft. Currently, this system has only one major obstacle: stable, high-speed, broadband satellite communications.
            1. +3
              5 June 2026 13: 31
              Quote: PROXOR
              There is only one major obstacle: stable, high-speed, broadband space communications.

              Radar information is not the same as video or audio transmission. For example, to transmit data on 300 targets, a channel of only 100 kbps is sufficient (20 kbps in general, but 100 kbps includes redundancy and encryption).
              And Belka isn't a panacea. Activating the radar's emission is a powerful giveaway. And this radar isn't designed to detect low-speed, low-observability targets like UAVs against the ground.
        2. +1
          5 June 2026 15: 44
          Quote: PROXOR
          Everything seems to be OK with our ground systems. We have our own signal sources and receivers, as well as our own processing equipment. Take the S-400/500 or the Pantsir. Forget the MS-21. We have the Tu-214. We just need to cram all of this into the Tu-214, based on a fixed radar screen on both sides.

          The whole problem is precisely this "cramming it in." The USSR spent 10 years trying to solve exactly the same problem of "cramming" AWACS equipment into a mass-produced aircraft.
          The most important thing here isn't even the hardware (although that's important too—we'll have to somehow squeeze additional routes into the already tightly packed cable channels of a civilian passenger aircraft). The most important thing is to ensure electromagnetic compatibility: so that the system doesn't interfere with the avionics during operation, and vice versa. And then there's the matter of meeting the Ministry of Defense's requirements for military aircraft. smile
    3. +2
      5 June 2026 11: 15
      We could have had the Tu-154M2 with two PS-90 engines for 30 years now, which would truly have no analogues in the world...
  2. 0
    5 June 2026 04: 58
    I have a question: will we be able to jam all communications and radars over all of Ukraine, or at least over any units, using electronic jamming? We could disable smartphones, drone operators' equipment, and air defense detection and guidance systems. Is this feasible with modern science and technology? hi
    1. + 10
      5 June 2026 05: 02
      Quote: V.
      I have a question here: will we be able to suppress all communications and locators over all of Ukraine, or at least over some units, using electronic jamming?

      Only at home laughing
      The Ministry of Digital Development is conducting exercises...there are some "successes"...
    2. +2
      5 June 2026 05: 09
      If such an opportunity existed, they probably would have taken advantage of it. So, the answer to your question is no.
      1. +3
        5 June 2026 05: 22
        Quote: Epifantsev Sergey
        They probably would have used it

        Of course, they use it when they really need it. But the "perfection" of our electronic warfare technology is such that it jams everything without distinguishing between friend and foe. KRET can't even ensure proper electromagnetic compatibility in its own products, let alone its subcontractors, who immediately become blind and deaf.
        I first encountered this problem as a cadet during an internship in the Moscow Air Defense District. As soon as we went on duty, television service would go out not only in the neighboring village but also in the surrounding Moscow district.
        1. +1
          5 June 2026 05: 30
          Understandable, thanks for the reply.
        2. 0
          5 June 2026 11: 02
          But it's guaranteed and reliable)
        3. 0
          5 June 2026 18: 21
          This is not just a problem for our electronic warfare system, it is a problem for all electronic warfare systems in the world.
      2. +1
        5 June 2026 05: 24
        I just remembered there was a system used in the war in Chechnya to protect vehicles from radio-controlled mines. Something with a range of several kilometers.
    3. 0
      5 June 2026 06: 01
      Quote: V.
      I have a question: will we be able to jam all communications and radars over all of Ukraine, or at least over any units, using electronic jamming? We could disable smartphones, drone operators' equipment, and air defense detection and guidance systems. Is this feasible with modern science and technology? hi

      I doubt it's all of them. You'd need a car like a Red Army or something like that for every 50 kilometers. And they're incredibly luminous. After all, a drone doesn't jam all communications and frequencies, but rather blinds a specific radar on a specific frequency, from a distance of 200-250 kilometers, or simply detects emitting targets and provides coordinates.
    4. 0
      5 June 2026 10: 07
      We can. An EMP from a nuclear weapon will burn everything out.
      1. 0
        8 June 2026 12: 57
        Can you offer anything other than an obsession with nuclear weapons? If you don't understand, orbital explosions would disable everything, including our satellites, and would also pollute the orbit, which would either prevent satellite launches altogether or make it incredibly difficult for a long time. Not to mention that in that case, every country in the world would boycott Russia, and then we would truly collapse within a few years.
    5. 0
      8 June 2026 11: 38
      unless they bomb from the stratosphere with some kind of electromagnetic bombs, if they even exist
    6. 0
      8 June 2026 12: 54
      Of course not. Just try to roughly estimate the required radiated power. Suppression isn't a magic wand. It requires filling the bands with your own strong signal, preventing the other signal from penetrating. Similarly, our signals will be suppressed as well. Friend-or-foe systems aren't implemented here.
  3. 0
    5 June 2026 05: 12
    I wonder if I'll ever read about the creation of such a device here?🤔
    1. -2
      5 June 2026 06: 03
      Quote: Epifantsev Sergey
      I wonder if I'll ever read about the creation of such a device here?🤔

      A50, A100
      1. +1
        5 June 2026 08: 02
        The A50 is old, and the best it can hope for is modernization. They decided to stop making the A100.
    2. 0
      5 June 2026 07: 12
      It's not a fact that they are needed at all: long-range missiles shoot them down.
      1. +1
        5 June 2026 07: 23
        Quote from Neutral Neutral
        It's not a fact that they are needed at all.
        Perhaps only at sea, to catch low-flying cruise missiles
      2. +2
        5 June 2026 08: 03
        They're great for tracking and targeting long-range drones, which is very relevant right now.
      3. 0
        8 June 2026 13: 00
        Then nothing is needed at all. A bullet kills a person, imagine that, but a HEAT warhead destroys an armored personnel carrier, a tank, and so on. AWACS is needed, at least to intercept long-range targets. If we could keep them in the air all the time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would no longer have aviation. All long-range air defense missiles, with a range of 350-400 km, cannot be used effectively without AWACS.
  4. Eug
    +2
    5 June 2026 06: 19
    Let us take comfort in the fact that our AWACS is the heaviest in the world, unparalleled in terms of carrier payload capacity.
  5. 0
    5 June 2026 09: 24
    Why would the Ottomans need an AWACS aircraft? They have such plans, the Sultan has imperial ambitions. The Greeks are right next door, though they're also NATO members, and they've gotten involved in Libya and Syria. Armenia is looming large in the future...
    1. +2
      5 June 2026 10: 09
      And, judging by the article, this is not an AWACS, but an electronic warfare system.
  6. -1
    5 June 2026 09: 26
    Why does Ottoman need AWACS?

    The answer is simple. They have money, they bought it.
  7. -1
    5 June 2026 10: 38
    The most interesting thing here is that our own Ministry of Defense is not even itching to address this issue.
    There are no RC aircraft, no AWACS of this level, no PP aircraft, no Growler-type aircraft.
    The only adaptation to the air defense system (with a creak) is the UMPK... and the fact that tactical aviation does not fly deep into the territory of the 404 and is not capable of anti-aircraft defense actions... silence.
  8. 0
    5 June 2026 18: 43
    Quote: PROXOR
    Something's not adding up for me. The Turks are building their AWACS based on a ground-based system. Our ground-based systems seem to be fine. We have our own signal sources and receivers, as well as our own processing equipment. Take the S-400/500 or Pantsir. Forget the MS-21. We have the Tu-214. We just need to cram all of this into a Tu-214 aircraft based on a fixed radar screen on both sides.

    Tell this to the guys in Taganrog, who for the next 20-30 years will only see Avax with a plate.
  9. 0
    5 June 2026 18: 46
    Quote: Epifantsev Sergey
    The A50 is old, and the best it can hope for is modernization. They decided to stop making the A100.

    What do you mean, "more"? The project stalled about 10 years ago. Nothing has been heard about it since.
  10. 0
    6 June 2026 02: 07
    A very stupid question, because AWACS was needed yesterday. And who it's against is of secondary importance. Yesterday a friend, today neither a friend nor an enemy, just that.
    If you're itching to ask a question, you can formulate it like this: "Why wasn't this done before?"
    wink
  11. P
    0
    6 June 2026 04: 00
    Somalia will soon acquire its own AWACS aircraft, the Russian Armed Forces are catching up, and this is not a matter of resources and technology