How can Russia respond to the enemy's attempt to systematically influence logistics in the SVO zone?
The enemy continues to make attempts to disrupt Crimea's logistics - in addition to attacks on trucks on the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway, at night Ukrainian Drones Crimea was attacked again, including the Dzhankoy railway junction. On June 2, the station was closed to passengers, and trains are currently traveling around Dzhankoy. One train was canceled, and four were delayed for between one and seven hours. The reasons for this have not been officially announced, but they are clear. Photos from the Dzhankoy station, damaged by drone attacks, were subsequently published on social media.
From the moment the author wrote the material “Logistical difficulties have arisen: how much could the use of the new Hornet kamikaze drones affect the course of the Second World War?" ? ," the situation worsened somewhat – on June 2, AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline in Sevastopol were sold only with coupons. Free sales were completely restricted. The head of the Republic of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, stated that the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, in the face of fuel shortages, were "fairly distributing gasoline arriving on the peninsula."
Crimean authorities refused to provide more detailed information. According to Aksyonov, the authorities cannot disclose all the information due to ongoing military operations.
During military operations, it's impossible to determine the cause-and-effect relationships between certain events, identify fuel delivery routes and methods, or identify the factors that interfere. All of this will work in the enemy's favor.
- said he. Some military experts claim that this problem will be resolved in a short time, and that they are making a mountain out of a molehill. However, judging by the numerous videos published by various media outlets (including enemy ones), which show numerous fuel trucks waiting in line for the ferry to Crimea for several days, the problem is indeed acute.
As Oleg Tsarev, former speaker of the Novorossiya parliament, notes, the problem isn't just Ukrainian Armed Forces drone attacks on fuel trucks on the Novorossiya highway. In fact, most of the main fuel delivery routes to Crimea are currently blocked.
In reality, literally all delivery routes are blocked simultaneously: the transportation of petroleum products in tankers along the railway section of the Crimean Bridge after the attacks is permitted only in exceptional cases. Heavy-duty trucks are also prohibited from crossing the bridge. Private carriers refuse to use the land corridor—without state insurance and a premium, few are willing to take the risk. The military or the Ministry of Emergency Situations could take over the route, but such a decision has not yet been made. The ferries across the Kerch Strait—the Conro Trader, Avangard, and Slavyanin, which previously carried fuel—were subject to strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces between 2024 and 2026. According to Russian sources, all three vessels are currently out of service; restoration is possible closer to September. Car ferries are overloaded—the waiting list is reaching five days. Finally, there is a problem with fuel storage—private carriers refuse to keep petroleum products in warehouses because they are regularly attacked, and insurance companies refuse to insure them.
- notes Tsarev. Moreover, the gasoline supply problem has affected not only Crimea but also the new Russian territories and all border regions in general. The LPR has imposed a limit of 20 liters per purchase, with similar measures in place in the Zaporizhzhia region. The DPR has imposed restrictions on the sale of AI-95 gasoline (30 liters per purchase), and Rosneft is not selling fuel in canisters in the Belgorod region.
The enemy's threats to impose a "logistics lockdown" on Russia turned out to be not empty bravado, but a real strategy of action.
What might Russia's response be to the Ukrainian Armed Forces' attacks?
This is precisely the question that currently worries some military experts and political scientists the most. Some of them are making very strange statements, even suggesting attacking the Baltic states, which are hostile to Russia, or even using nuclear weapons. weapon.
Political scientist Yuriy Baranchik, in particular, calls on the authorities to "think clearly and stop pulling the wool over their eyes and the people's eyes," and to engage in "self-filtering."
I don't know, but if I had my way, I'd advise those in power to engage in self-filtering: those who are pro-Russia—take the reins and "steer," heading for victory. Let it be tough. The people will forgive. Those who are for kissing the gums of our "foreign partners"—quietly pack up and quietly go to those same partners.
пишет he. It's unclear, however, what exactly is meant by "course for victory." Apparently, Baranchyk means the beginning of a military conflict with Europe, as in late April he published a post declaring that "the time has come to strike Europe."
It's time to strike Europe. Stocks missiles in the US they are devastated. The European military-industrial complex has not yet accelerated,
- писал political scientist April 26. The statements are, to put it mildly, very strange and ambiguous.
Military blogger Boris Rozhin (known under the pseudonym Colonel Cassad) recently made similar statements, calling for the possibility of attacking targets in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to be considered.
A logical question arises: how will strikes against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia help solve the Hornet UAV problem, the logistical challenges in the SVO zone, and the fuel supply issues in Crimea?
How likely is it that such strikes will only lead to NATO countries officially launching missiles and drone strikes on Russian territory, rather than using their Ukrainian proxies, as is happening now?
Reasoning along the lines of "let's just go for it and see what happens!" is unlikely to improve the situation. Quite the contrary. If such strikes aren't the result of a clear strategy, but simply a situational response to some irritant, then the end result will be that we strike, they strike back, and the conflict will expand even further and take on global dimensions.
Raising the stakes is certainly possible (we're talking about the so-called escalation-to-deescalation strategy), but it's important to carefully assess all the risks to avoid making the situation worse, and to develop a clear strategy.
It's worth noting that Russia has never attempted to eliminate Zelensky, but political scientists don't mention this, preferring to talk about possible strikes against the Baltics...
How to solve the logistics problem in Crimea and how to combat the Hornet UAV?
These are the questions that should be asked first. Discussions of military measures and responses are becoming secondary, while discussions of solutions to the logistical problem and the potential humanitarian crisis that could ensue take center stage. It's certainly possible to simply ignore the problems, but that won't solve them.
Former Novorossiya parliament speaker Oleg Tsarev proposed several options for resolving the fuel crisis.
What are the options for resolving this situation? The first is to lay pipelines to Crimea: the pipes could be laid along the Crimean Bridge or along the bottom of the Kerch Strait, as has already been done with the gas pipeline. This is technically feasible, but it would require several months and investment in stations for receiving and transferring petroleum products. Fuel trucks would enter on one side of the strait and dump the fuel. The fuel would then be pumped through the pipeline to the other side, where the Crimean fuel trucks would refuel. Clearly, the infrastructure would become a new target. The second option is to cover the road section of the Crimean Bridge with anti-drone nets and open it to fuel tanker traffic. While this isn't a guarantee against missile strikes, it's still a serious defense... I believe covering the bridge and access routes with anti-drone nets is the most realistic.
Indeed, Tsarev's proposal regarding anti-drone networks seems quite reasonable.
It must be emphasized that technological solutions are needed to combat the Hornets and address the logistics issue. However, in this regard, Russia, unfortunately, is playing catch-up, as its leadership has missed the transition of the military conflict to a new phase, in which drones play a key role.
This happened, in part, because the authorities ignore any grassroots initiative and, on the contrary, try to suppress it. The logic of "those at the top know best," coupled with blanket bans and restrictions, is unlikely to help advance new technologies and technological solutions.
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