Kerensky's Offensive: A Test of the Break
Alexander Kerensky, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, speaking to soldiers at the front
In the summer of 1917, the Provisional Government decided to test whether revolutionary freedom would galvanize soldiers into attack better than the old discipline. The offensive began with a breakthrough and ended near Tarnopol with the retreat of entire armies. The plan failed.
The previous article discussed Order No. 1, about how he legitimized the soldier's right to discuss events and participate in politics. By the summer of 1917, committees were operating almost everywhere at the front, meetings had become part of army life, and orders were increasingly being voted on. And this army was about to advance.
Why attack at all?
From a purely military perspective, the summer offensive was a dubious undertaking: the exhausted and disillusioned army was ill-prepared. But there was no trace of military calculation here—politics, and politics alone, drove the action.
The Provisional Government was bound by its obligations to its Entente allies. They expected Russia to take proactive action, capable of drawing off the German divisions. Abandoning the offensive would have meant the new government losing credibility abroad and at home. There was also a domestic calculation: a successful operation could unite the divided country, raise the government's authority, and prove that a free Russia was a better fighter than the Tsarist one. Historians still debate the extent to which the decision to attack was motivated by genuine political calculations and to which it was a forced concession to the Allies.
Alexander Kerensky's trip to the front in the summer of 1917
The Chief Persuader
Minister of War and Navy A.F. Kerensky placed great emphasis on the spoken word. In May and June 1917, he toured the front, addressing troops with speeches about freedom, revolution, and duty to the homeland. He possessed remarkable oratorical gifts; his speeches made a powerful impression, with soldiers swaying the minister in their arms and passing resolutions declaring their readiness to go into battle.
It was for this style that Kerensky earned the ironic nickname "the persuader-in-chief." The problem was that the rally's enthusiasm lasted only until the moment when it was time to emerge from the trenches and face fire. The mainstay of the offensive was not the agitated masses, but volunteer shock troops: "death battalions," assault squads recruited from those prepared to attack in earnest. Across the entire front, there were only a few dozen such units—a mere drop in the ocean compared to the army of millions.
Days of Breakthrough
Artillery Preparations on the Southwestern Front began on June 16, 1917 (Old Style). On June 18, the infantry advanced. The first days brought success: on the Lviv front, units of the 7th and 11th Armies broke through the enemy's defenses. Further south, the 8th Army, under the command of L. G. Kornilov, made particularly successful advances, occupying Galich and Kalush at the end of June.
But this success rested on a narrow foundation. The breakthrough was secured by artillery and shock troops, those very same volunteers. The massed infantry followed them reluctantly. Documents record a scene that would later become typical: the forward battalions would take their position, while the second echelons would hold meetings, debating whether to advance further, and often refusing. It wasn't so much the enemy that halted the advance as their own infantry: the advance faltered on its own; there was simply no one left to advance.
A mass rally of soldiers and civilians in Ternopil during World War I, presumably in June 1917.
Tarnopol failure
The turning point came in early July. On July 6, the German command launched a counterattack in the Tarnopol area. The attack had been prepared in advance and was powerful: the Germans had transferred fresh divisions from the Western Front and were attacking the already disorganized Russian units. But the enemy's strength wasn't the only issue. Regiments refused to take up positions, abandoned their trenches, and retreated without orders. In the General Headquarters reports of those days, this was repeated like a refrain: "units did not take up positions." The roads to the rear were blocked by soldiers who had deserted without permission, and in some places, they accompanied their retreat with looting and violence against the local population.
Sources vary in their assessments of the scale of this collapse: in some places, the retreat was relatively orderly, while in others, it degenerated into a panicked rout. But the overall picture leaves no doubt. In a matter of six weeks to two weeks, almost all of Galicia was lost, the region that had been recaptured in previous campaigns and at great cost in recent weeks. The retreat was covered by the same shock troops and Cossacks—the few remaining fighting men. Volunteers died covering the flight of those whom the government had recently hoped to inspire.
What was the bet worth?
The government essentially posed the question point-blank: would a free revolutionary army be able to carry out an offensive as effectively as a disciplinary army? At Tarnopol, the answer it received was not what it had hoped for.
To be fair, the question itself wasn't quite posed fairly. It was basically impossible to rebuild the motivation of an army exhausted by three years of war in two months of rallies and speeches, so the blame doesn't lie solely with the soldier who refused to go. But there's no other case. story She didn't give it, and I had to judge based on that.
The connection with the previous article is direct. Order No. 1 gave soldiers the right to discuss orders. At Tarnopol, a soldier exercised this right: he discussed the order to advance and refused to carry it out. In the spring, this seemed a reasonable concession to the mood of the troops. By July, it became clear what it was worth at the front. The army was unwilling to die for goals that remained alien to it.
The government responded harshly. On July 12, 1917, the death penalty, abolished nationwide back in March, was reinstated at the front. The same government that had abolished executions to applause in the spring reinstated them in the summer. The slogans of March were short-lived: circumstances dictated their own.
What will happen next
The military disaster on the Southwestern Front had far-reaching political consequences. Both society and the officer corps sharply increased their demand for a "strong hand," for someone capable of restoring order in the army and the country by force. The failure of the revolutionary army became the best argument in favor of dictatorship.
This man's name has already appeared in our history. General Kornilov, whose 8th Army advanced furthest during the June days, was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief on July 18. The next article in the series will discuss the results of Kornilov's attempt to restore order.
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