Artillery of the armored cruiser Bayan
Artillery The armored cruiser Bayan was armed with 2×8-inch, 8×6-inch, 20×75-mm, and 8×47-mm guns. The 8-inch guns were in turrets, all 6-inch guns and the 8×75-mm guns were in armored casemates, and the remaining guns were mounted in the open. Four 75-mm guns were mounted in the cruiser's hull under the upper deck, paired in the bow and stern, and the remaining 8 were on the upper deck above the 6-inch gun casemates. In addition, the cruiser had 8×47-mm guns, 2 of which were located on the maintop (the mast at the stern), 2 on the forward bridge, and the remaining 4 above the part of the casemate where the 75-mm guns were located. The ship also had 2×37-mm guns for arming mine-laying boats and 2×63,5-mm Baranovsky landing guns.
About the characteristics of the cruiser's guns
Brief performance characteristics of the guns of the armored cruiser Bayan
Explosive content in shells
I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the information about explosives is not completely accurate, as the sources provide different information. For example, in the "Instructions to the Commanders of Batteries, Groups, and Plutongs of the Squadron Battleship Peresvet," artillery officers M. Rimsky-Korsakov and V. Cherkasov indicated the total weight of dry and wet pyroxylin in a 6-inch steel high-explosive shell as 2,44 pounds, while in the "Regard of the Naval Technical Committee to the Chairman of the Investigative Commission on the Battle of Tsushima," it is given as 2,46 pounds. The difference is small, amounting to approximately 8,2 grams, since a Russian pound is equal to 0,40951241 kg. But it is there.
In addition, I unfortunately do not have documented data on the amount of explosives in an 8-inch armor-piercing shell, so here I trusted the respected V. Polomoshnov.
Of course, the small amount of explosives in Russian high-explosive shells is noteworthy. Certainly, some of the "payload" was "eaten up" by the brass casing, necessary to prevent interaction between the pyroxylin and the shell walls—0,77% of the weight of an 8-inch high-explosive shell and 1,07% of the weight of a 6-inch shell.
However, it was impossible to replace the weight of the case with the explosive at a 1:1 ratio, even if we could figure out how to avoid the chemical interaction of the pyroxylin with the shell walls without a spacer. After all, the weight of the explosive was determined by the size of the shell chamber, so additional explosive could be added in the volume occupied by the brass case, but not in its mass. And, since the specific gravity of brass is obviously much higher than that of pyroxylin, it would still be impossible to significantly increase the explosive content in the shell.
Popular literature often cites different explosive weights in Russian shells, and unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that many authors don't pay much attention to this issue. For example, in books, we can find an explosive content of 9,3 kg in an 8-inch high-explosive shell. This was indeed the case, but not in the "Dotsushima" ammunition, but in the later 1907 shell. Moreover, 9,3 kg is the mass of TNT, not wet pyroxylin, of which the shell would have contained less. If someone had thought to equip the 1907 shells with pyroxylin, of course.
Armor penetration of Russian shells
I presented the final versions of the tables of calculated armor penetration of 8-inch and 6-inch shells to the esteemed reader in the article Shells and Armor of the Russo-Japanese War. Lessons and Conclusions, but I'll repeat them here again. The calculations were performed using de Marr's formula, with "K" coefficients of 1825, 2100, and 2275 applied to Garveyed, "improved Garveyed," and Krupp armor, respectively.
Calculated data on armor penetration of 8-inch shells
Calculated data on armor penetration of 6-inch shells
Since armor thicknesses less than 127 mm were typically not cemented, penetration values below this thickness are marked in red. However, this factor is not taken into account in armor thickness calculations. For example, for Krupp armor, a resistance of "K" = 2275 was always used, even if the calculated thickness was less than 127 mm.
The data are presented for shells without armor-piercing caps, since there were no such shells in the ammunition load of the armored cruiser Bayan before it entered the Japanese fleet Not listed. A certain number of 6-inch shells equipped with armor-piercing caps were supplied to the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, but they were not in Port Arthur.
Turrets of 8-inch/45 guns, model 1892
The turrets of the armored cruiser Bayan were French and, it should be noted, of a completely modern design.
The drawing is taken from the book by S. Vinogradov and A. Fedechkin "The Armored Cruiser Bayan and Its Descendants"
The firing arcs of both turrets, fore and aft, were 270 degrees. The turrets were traversed horizontally by electric motors, with a 27-degree traverse taking 59 seconds. Elevation of the gun was manual.
The gunner was alone and positioned to the right of the gun, while the turret commander was on the left. Both were protected by armored covers. The loading hatch was located to the left of the gun, and shells and charges were chambered manually using wooden rammers, manned by two enlisted men. Ammunition was fed from the magazines to the gun at a rate of one round (shell and charges) every 30 seconds, giving the turret a technical rate of fire of 2 rounds per minute.
The turret was protected by 150 mm of vertical "garveyed" armor, with a roof thickness of 30 mm. The mount's weight is usually given as 157 tons. The gun centerline height above the waterline was 8,5 m for the forward turret and 7,5 m for the aft turret. These are very good figures, guaranteeing the guns could be used in poor weather.
Casemate 6-inch/45 guns, model 1892
There's little I can add to the figures presented in the table. The field of fire for each 6-inch gun was 120 degrees. The casemates were protected by 60 mm of non-cemented armor, and the guns were also equipped with armor shields.
And there's no clarity whatsoever regarding these shields. The respected S. Vinogradov and A. Fedechkin claim that the thickness of this shield was 25 mm (more likely 1 inch), but in my opinion, they are mistaken, as they are citing the specifications of a standard 6-inch deck shield. Meanwhile, on the cruiser Admiral Makarov, built in the Bayan style, according to the testimony of its officers, the thickness of the shields for the 6-inch guns was 3,5 inch, or 88,9 mm.
Consequently, confusion arises regarding the weight of the 6-inch mount. S. Vinogradov and A. Fedechkin state it as 14,69 tons, but this is the weight of the deck mount. Meanwhile, the popular resource navweaps.com claims that the Bayan's casemate mounts weighed 16,24 tons, which could well be explained by the presence of a heavy shield. Alternatively, this weight could also be taken from Shirokorad, who states that the 6-inch mount with a 76-mm shield weighed 16,24 tons.
In fact, difficulties establishing the correct weights for artillery mounts are present not only for 6-inch guns but for many others as well. For example, the 75 mm/50 gun model 1892 lists the mount's weight as 1,72 tons. This likely originates from Shirokorad, who cited this weight for the mount with the Möller mount. However, he also gave much higher mount weights with other mounts, around four tons. A mount typically weighs roughly the same as the gun, but in this case, subtracting the 1237 kg of the gun and oscillating part from the 1720 kg mount's weight leaves us with only 483 kg for the mount and shield. Interestingly, Shirokorad lists 213 kg for the Möller mount on the 47 mm/43,5 gun, while the gun itself weighs 235,5 kg.
But enough about the weights. A major advantage of the Bayan's 6-inch guns was their ammunition feed—each gun had its own feed, eliminating the need to transport shells and charges from a single feed mechanism to multiple guns. Ammunition was transported in troughs, three rounds in each, and the feed rate ensured a rate of fire of 4-5 rounds per minute. This, of course, was lower than the technical rate of fire of 6-inch guns, but, to be fair, neither our own nor the Japanese guns typically fired even 4-5 rounds per minute in combat. Still, I'm inclined to view this limitation as a drawback.
Another drawback of the Bayan's 6-inch guns was their relatively low position above the water - 4,46 m, which was a consequence of their placement in the hull rather than on the upper deck.
Mine apparatus
The Bayan had two 15-inch (381 mm) mine tubes, each carrying three torpedoes. The most modern torpedo at the time, the 1898 model, weighed 430 kg, of which 64 kg was explosive. Their ranges were 0,4 and 0,9 km at speeds of 30 and 25 knots, respectively. In my opinion, this torpedo armament should be considered a strength of the design, and here's why.
A clear advantage was the elimination of the bow mine tube, a successful hit to which could have disabled the cruiser. Of course, the other two could have been removed, and the resulting savings in weight and volume used to enhance the cruiser's other capabilities. But, firstly, according to the prevailing views of the time, torpedo armament on cruisers was essential. Secondly, in some cases it also proved useful, allowing for the rapid sinking of an intercepted transport vessel—although the latter, due to the low power of 15-inch torpedoes, was also not always possible.
Comparison of the performance characteristics of Russian and Japanese guns with a caliber of 6-8 inch
In general, the performance characteristics of the guns installed on Russian and Japanese cruisers differed only slightly.
As far as I know, Japanese cruisers used comparatively light 8-inch shells weighing 95,3 kg in the naval battles of 1904–1905, although many sources cite heavier, 113,4 kg shells. The latter significantly exceeded our 8-inch shells in explosive content: the respected V. Polomoshnov cites 5,66 kg/10,19 kg for armor-piercing/high-explosive shells, while Russian shells (documented data) had an explosive content of 1,47 kg/2,42 kg.
Of course, in this comparison, we can ignore armor-piercing shells, as the Japanese didn't have armor-piercing shells in the classic sense. What they called armor-piercing should have been considered high-explosive, or perhaps at best, semi-armor-piercing shells. But it's quite clear that even if Mikado's sailors did use lightweight 95,3 kg shells, they still contained at least 2,5–3 times more explosive than our own.
As for 6-inch shells, V. Polomoshnov gives an explosive content of 2,49/6,01 kg for armor-piercing and high-explosive shells, respectively. For our shells, it was 0,63/1,0 kg.
Comparison of the artillery of the armored cruiser Bayan with Japanese cruisers
At first glance, comparing the artillery of the armored cruiser Bayan and Izumo with that of Nisshin is shocking and awe-inspiring, as the Japanese cruisers, with their 4×8-inch and 14×6-inch guns, were almost twice as powerful in these calibers as the Bayan. However, the devil, as they say, is in the details.
The main caliber of Russian and Japanese cruisers
Studying stories The Russo-Japanese War led me to a rather curious conclusion. In my opinion, twin 8-inch turrets were premature for that historical period.
Let's look at the expenditure of shells in battle. Let's begin with the battle of January 27, 1904, when the Combined Fleet, with almost its entire main force (the only missing item was the armored cruiser Asama, which was engaged with the Varyag), attacked our squadron near Port Arthur.
If my data is correct, the Japanese expended 209 8-inch shells in this battle. Of these, 26 8-inch guns were deployed on their side, 20 of which were on armored cruisers and another 6 on three armored deck "dogs." This equates to an average of 8 shells per gun. Let's assume that the "dogs" didn't fire their 8-inch guns at all, which is impossible—they were following in the wake of H. Kamimura's cruisers and participated in the battle. Then it turns out that the Japanese armored cruisers expended approximately 10,5 shells per gun, or 41-42 shells per cruiser.
Meanwhile, the armored cruiser Bayan expended 28 8-inch shells, or 14 shells per gun. Considering that the eight-inch guns of the "dogs" did participate in the battle, the twin-gun Bayan expended slightly fewer shells than the four-gun Japanese cruisers.
Let's now look at the battle in the Korea Strait, when H. Kamimura finally managed to intercept the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment. The Japanese ships could fire four 8-inch guns per side, while the Russians could only fire two. However, the Japanese cruisers, on average, fired only 47% more 8-inch shells than the Russians—239,5 versus 163.
However, even these figures are incomplete and unsuitable for comparison. The fact is that all 16 Japanese 8-inch guns were undamaged during the battle and remained operational until the end. Meanwhile, Gromoboi lost its left aft 2-inch gun early in the battle, and Rossiya had only two aft guns still operational by the end.
And so it turns out that the Japanese cruisers, firing 16 8-inch guns throughout the battle, expended 958 shells of that caliber, while the Russian cruisers Gromoboy and Rossiya, firing an average of at least three guns, expended 326 shells. This means that, on average (rounded up), one Japanese 8-inch gun expended almost 60 shells, while one Russian gun expended 109! Taking the maximum rate of fire into account, the Japanese Azuma expended 276 shells, which gives 69 shells per gun, while one 8-inch gun on the Rossiya, which operated the entire battle without damage, expended 120 shells.
In other words, if Russian 8-inch guns had remained operational throughout the entire battle, just like the Japanese, then our cruisers, firing two such guns, would have expended an average of 218 shells per cruiser, while the Japanese, firing four guns, would have expended 240. It turns out that by doubling the number of barrels per side, the Japanese achieved only a mere 10% increase in firepower!
In the Battle of Tsushima, H. Kamimura's Japanese armored cruisers expended even fewer 8-inch shells than in the battle with K. P. Jessen's detachment - 915 units, that is, 152-153 shells per ship (in Tsushima, H. Kamimura had not 4 cruisers, but 6, and the battle with the FOC lasted longer).
Let's now recall the Battle of Gotland, since it involved two cruisers built to the Bayan design. It should be noted that although the turret designs of the Bayan II and Admiral Makarov were different, there were no fundamental differences. The Admiral Makarov fired at the Augsburg and Albatross for an hour and a half at most, expending approximately 130 shells. The Bayan II, engaging the Roon, fired 40 8-inch shells in half an hour.
In other words, when we read that the Asamoids had four 8-inch guns versus the Bayan's two, we imagine that the Japanese cruisers' main guns were twice as powerful. But this is absolutely not the case, and one can assume that if the Japanese had replaced their twin-gun turrets with single-gun turrets, their firepower would have dropped by no less than 10-15 percent, not by half.
Incidentally, the same thing was observed with the Italian cruisers. The Nissin and Kasuga, each with six 8-inch guns in their broadsides, expended 307 shells of that caliber in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, or approximately 51 shells per gun, while at Tsushima, they expended 284. However, the latter is less significant, as the Nissin's guns were inoperable.
Why were the twin-gun 8-inch turrets so slow?
Russian-language sources have written extensively about the shortcomings of the turrets on British-built Japanese cruisers. Among them is the presence of only one elevator for two guns, which, of course, was half as many as needed and in no way ensured the required rate of delivery of shells and propellants. To somehow maintain an acceptable rate of fire, a significant portion of the shells were stored in the turret, while the propellants were stored in magazines located beneath the armored deck.
At the start of the battle, the loaders used shells stored in the turret, and the charges for both guns were lifted by a single elevator. This method allowed each turret to fire 62 shells, but after that, the rate of fire would drop sharply, as the elevator simply wouldn't be able to lift the required number of shells and charges from the magazines.
While this certainly played a role in a prolonged battle, I still don't consider the single elevator to be the key problem with the Japanese 8-inch turrets. Simply put, the Azuma turrets were perfectly adequate; all shells and charges were stored in magazines, and two elevators—one for each gun—handled the ammunition. But in the battle with the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment, Azuma fired 276 shells, while the other three cruisers with single-elevator turrets averaged 227-228 shells.
It turns out that the single-elevator 8-inch twin-gun turret of the British-built Japanese armored cruisers demonstrated approximately the same firepower as a single deck or casemate gun on the armored cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboi. It turns out that in this regard, the British-built Japanese cruisers, with four eight-inch guns in their broadside, were almost no superior to the FOC cruisers until their guns failed. And the firepower advantage of the Azuma's "correct" turrets over the Rurikovichs, with a double advantage in broadside 8-inch guns, would have been only 27%.
Therefore, I believe the main reason for the low firepower of twin 8-inch turrets is the crowding and difficulty of servicing two guns in the cramped space of the turrets. This inconvenience was eventually overcome by automating the loading process, but during the Russo-Japanese War, loading 6-8-inch caliber turret guns was essentially manual. At the same time, single-gun turrets provided more space for the crews and were more convenient for their work, which is why their rate of fire closely approached that of deck-mounted 8-inch mounts. This is evident from the firing results of the Bayan in the battle of January 27, 1904, and from the combat rates of fire of the 8-inch guns of the Bayan II and Admiral Makarov off Gotland.
My assessment of the firepower of single- and twin-gun 8-inch turrets is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the French Navy was in no rush to implement them and for a long time preferred single-gun turrets with 194-mm guns. Even Britain, mistress of the seas, even in late 1903 and early 1904 laid down four Warrior-class armored cruisers, whose main battery—six 9,2-inch (234-mm) guns—was housed in single-gun turrets.
Warrior-class armored cruiser Achilles
Did they know something like that?
Some conclusions
This article does not finish the discussion about the artillery of the armored cruiser Bayan, but some conclusions should be made now.
When setting the specifications for an armored cruiser for their navy, the Japanese wanted to pack maximum armament, protection, and speed into a minimum displacement. The British accommodated them, fortunately, a solvent customer is always right, and the Japanese got what they ordered.
But, alas, miracles don't happen, and it's true what they say: if you mount ten guns on an eight-gun ship, only six will be operational. Technically, the British accomplished their goal by installing 4×8-inch guns on cruisers built for Japan. In reality, by cramming the 8-inch guns into relatively small twin turrets with minimal mechanization, the British reduced their combat effectiveness by approximately half.
It's important to understand, and I want to emphasize this, that we're not talking about technical rate of fire, which plays a minor role in combat. The point is that, in combat, the effectiveness of the 8-inch caliber guns of British-built Japanese cruisers with two twin-gun turrets was virtually identical to that of a cruiser with the same number of single-gun turrets. If that's the case, why waste weight and money? After all, by using single-gun turrets, the cruiser's ends could be lightened, and the weight saved could be used to improve other performance characteristics.
As for the medium caliber, Izumo certainly outnumbered Bayan in terms of the number of six-inch guns. Moreover, Izumo's 6-inch guns were better positioned than Bayan's, as Izumo only had 6 guns below the upper deck, where all the Russian cruiser's 6-inch guns were located, while the remaining 8 were located "above," on the upper deck.
Russian-language popular science literature almost always mentions the poor seaworthiness of Japanese armored cruisers, and this is true, as they lacked a forecastle and had a low hull. The barrel axes of the Japanese 8-inch guns were even lower than those of the cruiser Bayan's aft turret—for the Asama, these were 7,2 meters (fore turret) and 6,5 meters (aft turret), while, as noted above, the Bayan's aft turret had a barrel axe of 7,5 meters.
But despite all this, the gun axes of the eight 6-inch guns on the Izumo's upper deck rose above the waterline by certainly more than 6 meters, at least 1,6 meters higher than those of the Bayan. This obviously gave the Japanese cruisers an advantage in gunnery training in strong weather, since gunnery training in those days was primarily conducted with 6-inch guns.
Therefore, one can only regret that the MTC did not accept Rear Admiral N.N. Lomen's proposal to construct "two-story" casemates, which would have placed four of the Bayan's eight 6-inch guns on the upper deck. In this case, the cruiser would have been comparable to the Japanese Asamoids in terms of ease of gunnery.
Another obvious shortcoming was the excessive reliance on 75mm artillery by domestic admirals. The Diana-class cruisers were armed with 24 such guns, while the Bayan, apparently taking pity on them, was given only 20, but even this was an excessive amount. Subsequently, the number of 75mm guns was reduced to 12 on the large armored deck cruisers of the "six-thousander" class, and to 20 on the enormous Borodino-class battleships, which had almost twice the displacement of the Bayan.
Of course, determining the weight of artillery mounts is a challenging task, as I've written about previously, but we can use the weight data provided to the French for the Bayan design as a starting point. The weight of the mount, including ammunition, gun accessories, mount, and 3-inch shield, was determined as follows:
1. 8-dm/45 gun mod. 1892 - 49,3 tons;
2. 6-dm/45 gun mod. 1892 - 28,2 tons;
3. 75 mm/50 gun model 1892 - 6,4 tons (without shield).
Therefore, it can be said that four 75mm guns could have been replaced with a single six-inch gun. It's worth remembering that, in addition to the weight savings, such a solution would have saved on gun crews, reduced the overall crew size, and, consequently, reduced the need for food and other supplies to support them.
There was absolutely nothing to stop Bayan from mounting ten 6-inch guns on the hull, reducing the number of 75mm guns to twelve. This wouldn't have increased armor weight; in fact, it would have actually reduced it, as two additional six-inch guns could have been installed in place of the eight 75mm guns currently housed in the casemate. Furthermore, it's quite obvious that two six-inch guns would require less casemate space than eight 75mm guns, so the size of Bayan's central casemate could even be reduced.
Unfortunately, none of this was done, and we can only confirm the clear superiority of the Japanese cruisers in 6-inch guns. On the other hand, it should be noted that guns of this caliber could not inflict decisive damage in a battle between armored ships. But we will discuss this in more detail in the next article, dedicated to the armor of the cruiser Bayan compared to Japanese armored cruisers.
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P.S. As mentioned above, the Combined Fleet lacked fully-fledged armor-piercing shells during the Russo-Japanese War, so the calculations below should be viewed as nothing more than a game of wits. How could our naval officers have estimated the armor-piercing capabilities of Japanese guns before the Russo-Japanese War? What would the capabilities of Japanese guns have been if they had been equipped with high-quality armor-piercing shells? These are certainly questions of alternative history, but why not answer them?
Calculation of armor penetration for the “heavy” and “light” 8-inch shells in comparison with the Russian 8-inch shell, armor - “improved Harvey”, “K” = 2100
Calculation of armor penetration for 6-inch Russian and Japanese guns, armor - "improved Harvey", "K" = 2100
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