Is it normal for submariners to have experience on the land battlefield?
This material is based on several short publications by Commodoro (in Russian) navy There is no equivalent to this rank, between Captain 1st Rank and Rear Admiral) Paolo Frade, who commanded for several years the German-made Type 214 submarine with an air-to-air propulsion system in the Portuguese Navy.
Frade made a very interesting projection of what happens inside a submarine in a combat (or near-combat) situation onto the land theater of military operations.
It might seem like complete nonsense, but... The Portuguese sailor is right: times are changing, and principles that were once characteristic of submarines are now rapidly spreading to other branches of the armed forces. Indeed, there's a great deal of truth in his rather dry musings.
We monitored the contact for six hours. The acoustic signature was ambiguous. The geometry was incomplete. In the last hour, the tactical picture changed twice.
I still gave the order to go on alert. Not because I was certain, no. I gave the order because the window of opportunity for decision-making was narrowing. Waiting for complete clarity was no longer a strategy, but a risk. It's in this gap, between incomplete information and irreversible actions, that a submarine commander serves. That's where I spent 14 years.
Paolo Frade, commander of the Portuguese submarine Arpão.
I still gave the order to go on alert. Not because I was certain, no. I gave the order because the window of opportunity for decision-making was narrowing. Waiting for complete clarity was no longer a strategy, but a risk. It's in this gap, between incomplete information and irreversible actions, that a submarine commander serves. That's where I spent 14 years.
Paolo Frade, commander of the Portuguese submarine Arpão.
Space of uncertainty
The term may not be the most apt, but the Portuguese captain was operating with what he could reach. It's a purely physical term, derived from the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, formulated by Werner Heisenberg back in 1927. Easy to read, impossible to understand.
However, it is possible to identify and understand the space of uncertainty. This is a space in which it is impossible to clearly define/measure the parameters/characteristics of the environment. The essence of the principle can be formulated as follows: the more accurately one characteristic of a particle is measured, the less accurately the second can be measuredAnd this can be applied to many quantities, because the uncertainty of this space is not associated with the imperfection of measurement methods or instruments, but is a consequence of the specific nature of micro-objects and their corpuscular-wave nature.
Yes, we're talking about a submarine, whose crew must measure and account for a large number of parameters that affect the operation of the submarine's sensors. Water salinity and temperature in layers at various depths, current speeds, signal penetration, and so on. Considering that the submarine we're using as an example isn't a scientific one, but rather a military one, the challenges are numerous.
And in reality, it turns out that any submarine operates in a space with undefined parameters and properties in a specific period of time.
Modern militaries have been trying to eliminate this uncertainty for decades. Networked sensors, satellite surveillance, and instant communications promised commanders that the battlefield could be seen, understood, and controlled in real time. But electronic warfare and great-power rivalry are dashing these hopes. Commanders are once again forced to operate in a world of incomplete information and confront adversaries who manipulate everything they think they know.
In other words, they begin to act in the same way that submarine commanders have acted, starting with the submarines of World War I. Below, we will examine the various aspects of this thinking in turn:
- the structural nature of the uncertainty associated with underwater objects and the reasons why it cannot be eliminated by technical means;
- collective discipline of constructing a tactical picture under stress;
- the value and limits of patience;
- the moment when analysis gives way to decision making;
- a way of thinking necessary for successful work in conditions of uncertainty.
The unique lessons of submarine command can be applied to other complex conditions of modern warfare, including land, air, and maritime operations, where information is limited. In each of these domains, information is becoming increasingly fragmented, and the consequences of waiting are indistinguishable from those of active action.
The structural nature of underwater uncertainty
The term may not sound very clear, but the uncertainty is not only present, but is also a major source of problems for any submarine commander.
Uncertainty underwater isn't caused by weak intelligence or outdated equipment. Instead, it's structural. It's embedded in the physics of the environment. Sound propagates through water in ways that are understandable but very difficult to predict. Thermal layers distort acoustic signals. Background noise masks contacts. Passive sonar rarely provides precise identification or location. It produces patterns, general directions, and probabilities. From these fragments, the submarine crew constructs a picture of what's likely happening outside the pressure hull.
The crew of a modern submarine can be compared to the gunners of warships before the First World War, when, using the most basic mathematical devices, gunners had to send a shell to the point where the enemy ship would be located within the shell's flight time.
The enemy faces the same problem. Both sides try to detect each other without revealing themselves. Both sides interpret incomplete data. As a result, it's not so much a struggle for visibility as a struggle for analytical discipline. The side that builds a more accurate picture based on the same ambiguous initial data wins. In such conditions, the primary task of command is not to gather more information, but to decide when the available information is sufficient for decision-making.
In general, another comparison can be made: a duel between two knights blindfolded. You can strike, but without seeing your opponent, relying on the creaking of their armor, their breathing, and other sound sources. In other words, the tactical picture is flawed.
Building a tactical picture
Decision-making on a submarine is a collective process, culminating in the captain's sole decision. This is important to understand. In the control room, sonar operators monitor acoustic signals. The navigation team refines the submarine's location and trajectory. The operations officer integrates this information into the emerging tactical picture. This picture is never static. Targets change course. Acoustic conditions shift. New data emerges, forcing a reconsideration of previous interpretations.
The commander's role isn't to personally analyze every bit of data. Their job is to maintain a holistic view of the overall situation and make decisions in two situations that no modern system can handle for a commander. The first is determining which information is reliable and which is questionable. The second is deciding whether the current picture has reached a level of certainty that warrants action.
During one patrol, we tracked an object for several hours but were unable to accurately determine its type. The hydroacoustic team heard machinery and engine noise, but the signature didn't match any known profiles. For a long time, the object behaved like a merchant vessel. But subtle changes in speed and maneuverability indicated something entirely different.
Each new data point challenged my previous assessment. During these hours, I learned discipline: openly acknowledging uncertainty and resisting the temptation to hastily resolve it. This is one of the most difficult cognitive skills to learn in an underwater environment.
Each new data point challenged my previous assessment. During these hours, I learned discipline: openly acknowledging uncertainty and resisting the temptation to hastily resolve it. This is one of the most difficult cognitive skills to learn in an underwater environment.
(A small digression. After slightly altering the quote, removing as much of the naval reference as possible, I gave it to someone working, let's say, in the airborne location department. The response was: "It's poorly written, but it's all on topic." He meant, on his topic.)
Patience and its limits
Speed often hinders effectiveness. In combat, swift action often provides an advantage. But underwater, too much speed can undermine the very conditions that make a submarine effective. Revealing a submarine's location—through maneuvering, active sonar, or communications—can provide a short-term advantage at the expense of long-term stealth. But once stealth is compromised, it's extremely difficult to restore. Any adversary will make every effort to avoid losing the submarine once it's detected.
Sometimes the right decision is to wait. But waiting doesn't mean passivity. It requires constant reassessment of the tactical situation, a willingness to act when conditions change, and the ability to resist the pressure to do something—anything—just to show you're taking action.
In one case, obtaining additional information would be easy. Activating sonar could resolve the uncertainty in minutes, but this puts the submarine at risk of detection. There will always be a struggle between the desire to obtain operational information and the risk of giving oneself away.
However, patience has its limits. The window of opportunity for decision-making opens and closes. A commander who waits too long for a situation to develop that will never be fully resolved is making a decision as crucial as any other—and, as a rule, the worst possible one. Discipline isn't patience for patience's sake. It's understanding the difference between productive waiting and paralysis.
The moment of decision
There's a special moment in submarine command when analysis gives way to decisive action. Typically, this happens without unnecessary drama. In the control center, the tactical picture is being built for hours. Sonar operators continue to monitor the situation. The operations officer continues to analyze the data. The commander quickly scans the displays to ensure that the current data matches the mental model formed over the previous hours.
The tracking object can change its position, slow down, accelerate, and so on. It can be classified and reclassified multiple times to obtain the most accurate image. The sensors operate in both active and passive modes.
Five principles that make this possible
Over the years of service on a submarine, any commander develops certain mental habits that enable him to operate effectively in conditions of structural uncertainty.
At firstMaintain stealth until a clear objective justifies the risk. Every action—maneuver, emission, communication—must be weighed against the probability of detection. Actions without a clear operational objective can lead to a violation of the conditions under which mission accomplishment is possible.
Secondly, separating the known from the assumed. In ambiguous situations, commanders must constantly ask themselves: what are the sensors actually showing, and what has the crew done based on these readings? If assumptions become perceived as fact, the entire crew begins to operate within the erroneous framework. Clearly and consistently drawing this line, even when it's inconvenient, is one of the most important tasks of a submarine commander.
ThirdlyTrust your professional intuition, but don't rely on it blindly. With experience comes the ability to recognize patterns that aren't yet fully expressed in the available data. When something in a tactical situation seems off, this reaction often reflects subtle inconsistencies identified over years of work. We should treat this signal as data worth studying, worth lingering on, but not acting blindly.
FourthlyBefore taking action, consider the consequences of a possible mistake. Any decision at sea is fraught with uncertainty. Instead of striving for absolute certainty, ask a more practical question: if the assessment turns out to be wrong, what will happen next, and will the crew be able to cope? The right decision isn't one that guarantees the right outcome. It's one that can live with the consequences of an error.
Finally, the fifthly — and in some ways, this is the hardest thing to do—to delay a decision if the consequences of a mistake could spiral out of control. If the command staff can't determine the most likely consequences of a proposed action and prepare for them, it's wiser to wait. This isn't cowardice, but the understanding that an irreversible mistake made under pressure is worse than a missed opportunity.
These conclusions have been developed over many years in the unique conditions of combat, but they are now applicable beyond the underwater environment. Electronic warfare, cyber operations, and counter-sensor systems introduce an element of uncertainty into land, air, and sea operations, something familiar to any submarine commander.
One aspect of command deserves special attention. Submarines always operated in conditions where communications with higher command were intermittent at best, and when enemy control was exerted over the radio, communications were completely nonexistent.
Communications generally work like this: shore-based command posts transmit commands. Submarines receive them. A response, if one arrives at all, can take several hours. This isn't a technical limitation that can be overcome. It's the fundamental principle on which the submarine command system was built. Commanders receive orders that must be interpreted, not simply executed. They make important decisions without the benefit of clarification. They exercise their authority based on a predetermined understanding of intent, bypassing the need for a data link.
This model—execute a mission within known parameters, report when radio silence allows, and adapt when circumstances require—is exactly what land and sea forces must learn as their own communications become increasingly unreliable.
The submarine force didn't choose this discipline; it was imposed upon them by the laws of physics and honed over decades of operational necessity. It's being imposed on other branches of the armed forces by their adversaries, who have studied the same laws of physics and arrived at the same conclusions.
Ground units must monitor their electromagnetic signature. Naval surface forces must operate in conditions where communications can be disrupted without warning. Air operations are conducted in an electronic countermeasures environment where available information cannot be relied upon. In each of these scenarios, the primary challenge is the same: making informed decisions despite the limited information available, rather than waiting for clarity that will never come.
The disciplines described here were not intended as universal leadership principles. They arose out of operational necessity in the most information-poor combat environment—underwater.
Conclusion
Uncertainty is not the exception in submarine warfare, but the norm. The methods of operation described here were shaped by this reality as a professional necessity, driven by the consequences of ignoring them deep beneath the Atlantic Ocean.
As modern military operations increasingly unfold in adversarial and information-poor environments, the question is no longer whether other domains will encounter conditions typical of submarine warfare—they already are. In such circumstances, the primary challenge for command is not achieving perfect situational awareness, but making informed decisions despite uncertainty.
What could be the final, and somewhat unexpected, conclusion from all that the commodore has stated? It is indeed interesting.
What has distinguished submarine commanders throughout history? Yes, their ability to independently analyze available information and make decisions independently. And while a hundred years ago they had to make the simplest decisions—"sink or not sink"—today, nuclear submarine commanders are tasked with missile Cruisers have somewhat greater responsibilities.
So, it's simple: making the most effective decisions with the least amount of data.
Nowadays, on land, things are often much the same. The development of electronic warfare systems, missiles that follow enemy radio signals, drones And so on. "Radio silence" is a given, a daily occurrence. That's why instant messaging apps are used, internet access is provided by satellite constellations like Starlink, and that's why a wide variety of communication methods are employed. But overall, communication on land isn't very good, that's a fact.
And here, a completely normal way to counter the enemy could be for commanders, like submariners, to make independent decisions based on the prevailing tactical situation, regardless of the flow of information upwards and the receipt of instructions and corrections from there.
Today, relevant departments in many armies around the world are considering this. And it's quite likely that in future conflicts, the key players will be those commanders who can operate with maximum independence in any given situation.
So, the marine underwater experience can easily be mastered on land.
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