Iranian Anabasis by Grigory Vasilchikov
The lion and the sun are the symbols of the Safavid Empire.
His Majesty's Envoy
In the last article "Through Thorns to the Shah: The Journey of Russian Diplomat Grigory Vasilchikov to the Court of Abbas I"We covered a number of twists and turns in the journey to Iran of Tsar Feodor Ivanovich's envoy, whose mission was a response to the arrival in Russia of Shah Muhammad Khudabende Andi-bek, a representative.
So, in the autumn of 1588, G. Vasilchikov crossed the border of Iran and, not far from its then capital, Qazvin, was met by an official of the new ruler Abbas I, Maghmut Sultan, who inquired about the goals of the mission.
In a conversation with him, the Russian diplomat first used the formula for a military alliance between the two countries. The corresponding source, whose style and spelling I have preserved, was cited by Iranologist P.P. Bushev in his fundamental work on the embassy:
Whoever is a friend to our sovereign will also be a friend to the Shah's Majesty, and whoever is an enemy to our sovereign will also be an enemy to your sovereign.
After such an unambiguous statement, Magmud Sultan inquired about the degree of the Tsar’s readiness for war with the Porte.
But here G. Vasilchikov showed diplomatic evasiveness:
As your sovereign's great ambassadors will be with our sovereign in Moscow and will make an agreement with the boyars on these matters
This response, I believe, was due to the need to clarify the position of the new Shah on the subject of Russian-Iranian rapprochement, given the arrival of the Ottoman embassy in the Safavid state.
From the previous material, the reader already knows about the exhausting and unsuccessful war for Iran with the Porte, which resulted in territorial losses in the Transcaucasus and Mesopotamia, and the loss of part of Khorasan as a result of the campaign against the Safavids by the Bukharan ruler Abdullah Khan II.
But Istanbul, too, was exhausted, in need of peace and preparing for confrontation with the Holy Roman Empire. To make matters worse, the Porte's eastern Anatolian lands began to be rocked by rebellions in 1588.
Curiously, the Shah's administration isolated the Russian and Ottoman embassies from each other. Meanwhile, G. Vasilchikov insisted on the higher status of his mission.
Considering Andi-bek's mission to Moscow, mentioned in previous materials, which was prompted by Khudabande's desire to conclude a military alliance with Russia, or, to be more precise, to test the waters for this, such a position is justified.
However, first, G. Vasilchikov needed to ensure that the new Shah's views on rapprochement between Moscow and Qazvin were unchanged and that he was prepared to hand over to Russia the previously promised but then Ottoman-occupied Derbent and Baku. This required an audience with the ruler. And this is where delays arose on the Iranian side.
The Elusive Shah and Ottoman Priority
Abbas I forced G. Vasilchikov to wait approximately five months for an audience. Moreover, at the time of the mission's arrival in Qazvin, the Shah was in Khorasan, engaged in military operations against the Bukharans, and the Ottoman ambassador, unlike his Russian counterpart, was allowed to travel there for negotiations.
Why did Abbas I give priority to representatives from Istanbul?
In the military realities that developed for Iran at the turn of 1588 and 1589, the main direction of the Shah's foreign policy became not the conclusion of an anti-Ottoman alliance with distant Russia, but peace with the neighboring Porte.
I would suggest that at first, G. Vasilchikov's mission did not arouse any interest in Abbas I, as is indirectly evidenced by the funds allocated by Qazvin for the maintenance of both embassies:
"The Iranian authorities allocated food allowances to the Turkish embassy," wrote P.P. Bushev, "at the rate of three tomans (the monetary unit in Safavid Iran – I.Kh.) per day for twenty people, while the Russians received one toman per 50 people, or seven and a half times less. And this meager food was distributed to the embassy irregularly, despite Vasilchikov's reminders."
Multi-vector Alexander
However, during his stay in the Safavid capital, Grigory Borisovich learned many interesting things. For example, he was visited by the Iranian official Hossein Bek, who had recently returned from Kakheti, where he had met with Tsar Alexander II, who, as mentioned in the previous article, had previously requested the Russian sovereign's patronage.
G. Vasilchikov was surprised to learn of a similar request from Alexander II to Abbas I. Add to this the contacts between the Kakhetian monarch and Istanbul – an example of multi-vector policy in the 16th century.
This is generally the fate of border states squeezed between powerful powers. Take Kazan's maneuvering between Moscow and Bakhchisarai in the first half of the 16th century, whose mobilization potential was significantly inferior to the two leading players in the geopolitical game unfolding in the Volga region.
The Jame Mosque, the construction of which began in the 9th century, and its walls must have been seen by Russian ambassadors in the 16th century.
But time passed, and there was no audience. G. Vasilchikov continued to remind the Shah's officials of his presence, and after much delay, they finally responded by stating Abbas I's willingness to receive the Russian diplomat in Isfahan, but only on the condition that he take nine people with him, which seemed incompatible with the embassy's status.
Grigory Borisovich protested:
There is no way that I can travel without people.
He spent two weeks arguing with the Qazvin authorities, but only managed to increase the mission's size by two people. However, the Shah's representatives promised the remaining members a salary.
Having reached Isfahan, located south of Qazvin, G. Vasilchikov was visited by one of Abbas I's military commanders, Ferhad Bey, who had learned about Russia from the words of a former captive who had escaped in 1587 and soon assumed the Khan's throne—that of the Crimean Prince Kazy Giray. Ferhad Bey assured the Russian envoy of the Shah's readiness to join forces with Russia in the struggle against the Porte.
This did not correspond to reality, since Abbas I saw his main goal as concluding peace with the Ottomans, even through territorial concessions and concentrating military efforts on confronting the Bukharans.
True, our diplomat did not remain in debt, telling the Iranian all sorts of things about Moscow’s alleged readiness to break off relations with Istanbul for the sake of friendship with Qazvin, something B. Godunov had no intention of doing.
The meeting with the Shah in Isfahan also failed to take place, as the latter, without entering the city, proceeded to Qazvin, where G. Vasilchikov was supposed to go. It seemed that Abbas I was reluctant to receive the Russian embassy.
Grigory Borisovich spent a month in Isfahan, and all this time he insisted on an audience with the Shah, although the situation was becoming unpleasant for him: the embassy, despite the promised support, was almost starved, but was not allowed to deliver the goods stored on the ships that could have been exchanged for food.
And again to Qazvin
However, there was nothing to be done; he had to prepare for the return journey. About 60 kilometers before Qazvin, G. Vasilchikov was informed that the Shah, returning from Khorasan, was finally ready to receive him. Moreover, Abbas I apologized to the Russian diplomat for the delays and, in keeping with the etiquette of the time, inquired about the health of Tsar Feodor Ivanovich.
Vasilchikov also learned, wrote P.P. Bushev, that he had to kiss the Shah’s foot and that the possibility of simultaneously receiving other foreign ambassadors along with the Russian embassy was not excluded.
Moreover, the Shah planned to sit on horseback during the audience. Our diplomat could not agree to such conditions. Why? After the Ottoman conquests, the Russian Tsardom remained the only Orthodox power in the world, and, accordingly, the figure of the sovereign, both by himself and his subjects, was viewed in sacred terms.
Lands beyond Russia's borders were seen by our compatriots as "unclean." A visible demonstration of such beliefs was the symbolic sweeping of "filth" from a church when a non-believer entered. For more details, see:Eschatology and Geopolitics: On the Eve of the First Russo-Turkish War».
Thus, the demand to kiss the Shah's foot seemed incompatible with the worldview of the Russian diplomat and the status of the embassy he headed, which at that time represented a more powerful state than Iran.
The Shah and the Ambassador: The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed
A four-day discussion followed between G. Vasilchikov and the Shah’s representatives, which ended with the former’s success: Abbas I ordered him to go to Qazvin, where on April 9, 1589, the embassy was finally granted a royal reception.
How did it go? According to P. P. Bushev:
In Vasilchikov's view, the conditions were completely unsatisfactory. First, no one met him near the Shah's palace: neither in the courtyard nor under the awning where the Shah sat. Second, after Vasilchikov's speech, when the envoy "made the Tsar's bow and presented the funeral rites" for Tsar Feodor, the Shah did not rise. Third, "the Shah ordered his close clerk, Litvin, to receive the Tsar's letter and ordered it placed" next to him.
At the same time, the Shah approved of the memorial gifts presented to him, especially the gyrfalcons.
An interesting detail about the ideological differences between the parties, cited by P.P. Bushev:
After the end of the official reception, Vasilchikov and his retinue were invited to the table, which the Russian envoy refused due to the Christian fast (which preceded Easter – I.Kh.).
If we talk about the essence of the audience, then G. Vasilchikov repeated the proposal made earlier by Andi-bek on behalf of Khudabande to conclude an alliance between Iran and Russia against the Porte, as well as:
The Russian ambassadors, writes orientalist T.K. Koraev, tried to persuade the young Shah to cede not only Derbent and Baku, but also Shemakha.
Abbas I initially responded with general phrases, obviously not seriously considering his predecessor’s proposal to cede the aforementioned cities, which were also lost.
The Alamut fortress, once built by the famous Ismailis, where Muhammad Khudabandeh was imprisoned after his overthrow
In fact, the almost six-month ordeal of the Russian embassy, and the unacceptable demands of the Iranian side regarding the ceremonial, testified, I believe, to the unwillingness of Abbas I, unlike his predecessor, to enter into an alliance with Russia.
The Shah's maneuver
Why did the Shah negotiate at all then?
Apparently, P.P. Bushev believed, this was simply because he wanted to gain additional leverage in the difficult negotiations between the vanquished and the victor—Turkey. Especially since he promised to hand over what he didn't have (referring to Baku and Derbent—I.Kh.).
I think G. Vasilchikov himself understood that the Shah was negotiating with them in order to frighten Istanbul with the prospect of a Russo-Iranian alliance, which was practically unfeasible for a number of reasons.
First. In the realities of 1588–1589, communications between Moscow and Qazvin could have been cut by the ruler of the rebellious Gilan, Ahmad Khan of Lahijan, who, as we already know from the previous article, put a spoke in the wheel of G. Vasilchikov's embassy passing through the lands under his control.
Moreover, he entered into relations with the Ottomans and sheltered rebellious Qizilbash who were dissatisfied with the course adopted by Abbas I to limit the power of the nomadic aristocracy.
At the same time, Akhmad Khan, as T.K. Koraev notes, “sought to find out about the possibility of receiving assistance from the Muscovites.”
In general, like the Kakhetian king, he tried to pursue a multi-vector policy.
The second reason was the need to make peace here and now, to avoid even greater territorial losses and a war on two fronts. I think the Shah understood that Russia, even if it wanted to, would not provide significant military assistance to Iran.
However, the entourage of Abbas I apparently did not want a break with Moscow and “sent (to Russia – I.Kh.) as an emissary,” writes T.K. Korayev, “the Lithuanian renegade Haji Khusrau (Azi Khozrev) with assurances that this peace was temporary and was necessary only to restore order within the country and on its eastern borders.”
Ultimately, the parties reached a compromise that took into account each other's interests, perhaps even more so Russia's. This was expressed in the following way.
Undoubtedly and practically the most important achievement of Vasilchikov’s embassy, wrote P.P. Bushev, was receiving from Shah Abbas verbal and written confirmation of the cession of the cities of Derbent and Baku to the Muscovite state and consent to the construction of Russian military forts south of the Terek, Sunzha and Koysu rivers.
Accordingly, Russian troops stationed near the aforementioned rivers were supposed to prevent the invasion of Ottoman-Crimean troops into Iran.
The somewhat unexpected concession of the Shah of Derbent and Baku will be discussed below.
On May 28, 1589, the embassy, having received no food allowance for the journey, departed Qazvin. The return journey was not without perilous adventures: the ship was blown toward the Turkmen coast by the wind. There, it was attacked by Turkmens during the night.
Before us are lines of the document full of drama and heroism:
Grigory and the archers and all the people fought with the Turkmen.
The attack was successfully repelled. On August 14 of that year, the embassy finally arrived in Astrakhan.
I believe that, listening to or reading the report of the envoy returning from Iran, B. Godunov likely correctly assessed the balance of power in the region and chose not to interfere in the Iranian-Ottoman conflict, but he did not exclude Transcaucasia from Russia's sphere of geopolitical interests. Moreover, stability in this region, as well as in the northern and northwestern Caspian region, was essential for Russia to ensure the security of the Volga-Caspian trade route.
Here, we must take the following into account: until the defeat at Molodi in 1572, Bakhchisarai refused to recognize Russian conquests in the Volga region and northern Caspian region, demanding the restoration of the independence of Kazan and Astrakhan, hoping to draw them into its orbit of influence and then incorporate them into the khanate, thus taking a step toward the revival of the Great Horde. These dreams seem unrealistic from the vantage point of hindsight, but not from the Khan's palace in the reality of 1589.
I believe that this is why Moscow took steps to expand its sphere of influence in the Transcaucasus, in the north and northwest of the Caspian region, trying, as T.K. Korayev notes, to win over the local mountain princes to its side, as well as insisting on the transfer of Derbent and Baku under the tsar's scepter.
At the same time, the northwest became the priority direction of Russia's foreign policy: in 1590, it entered into a five-year war with Sweden and, as was mentioned in the previous article, returned the Russian lands lost during the Livonian War: Koporye and Ivangorod.
Meanwhile, by the early 1590s, Abbas I had sufficiently consolidated his hold on the throne and began restoring order in the country, forcing Ahmad Khan to flee to the Porte. Simultaneously with the consolidation of his power within Iran, the Shah grew increasingly concerned about Russia's growing position in Eastern Georgia, which he viewed as his sphere of influence. This became the recipe for future conflicts, this time between St. Petersburg and the Qajars.
A few words about the above-mentioned promise of the Shah to transfer Derbent and Baku to Russia.
The promise to cede these cities, which are of the utmost strategic importance, is so striking, writes Azerbaijani historian F. Huseyn, that it contradicts the general nature of the state and foreign policy activities of Shah Abbas I.
The same researcher emphasizes:
There are no direct written documents that would indicate that the proposal for a military alliance on the condition of ceding Derbent and Baku to the Russian side came directly from the Safavid Shah.
The head of the Iranian embassy that arrived in Moscow in 1590, Buta-bek, “tried,” notes F. Huseyn, “to refute the fact that the Iranian side initiated the issue of a military alliance against Turkey.”
The aforementioned historian provides interesting data on the Safavid ambassador's strategy during the negotiations in Moscow:
Butak-bek didn't hesitate to disavow the Shah's previous ambassador, his fellow embassy member, Andi-bek. Bushev notes: "He (Butak-bek – F.G.) accused the Russian translators of mistranslating his speech, saying that the envoy Andi-bek 'did not speak according to our sovereign's orders, or the interpreters did not know how to translate correctly.'"
In short, Abbas I’s promise to hand over Derbent and Baku to Russia probably became a diplomatic maneuver by the Shah in the context of the need to conclude peace with the Porte and resolve the Gilan problem.
Once both were accomplished, the Shah's embassy to Moscow in the spring of 1592 was aimed solely at concluding trade agreements. The question of transferring Caspian cities or an anti-Ottoman alliance was not on the agenda.
The Kremlin, however, saw the matter differently:
In 1595, the Russian court, writes F. Hussein, sent a highly representative embassy of 75 people to the Shah with the specific goal of securing a military agreement. In addition to the traditional letters from Tsar Feodor Ivanovich and Boris Godunov addressed to Shah Abbas I, the ambassadors also carried a draft anti-Ottoman military agreement between the Muscovite and Safavid states. The Russian side's strong desire to secure an anti-Ottoman alliance and the cession of cities from the Safavids is demonstrated by the fact that the aforementioned draft military agreement was drafted by the Russian diplomatic service not only in the name of Tsar Feodor under the title "The Final Charter – The Sovereign's Word," but also in the name of the Safavid Shah under the title "The Final Charter of Shah Abbas's Word." The draft military agreement, which discussed the details of the future military alliance, obliged Shah Abbas I to recapture the captured cities from the Turks in alliance with Russian troops and to cede Derbent, Shemakha and Baku to Moscow, and in the future, “the great sovereign Abbas’s Shah’s majesty will not enter those cities.”
In the mentioned year the war with Sweden ended with the success of the Russian weapons and diplomacy, which allowed Moscow to once again turn its attention to the southeast.
However, en route, the embassy's leaders, V.V. Tyufyakin and clerk S. Yemelyanov, died. The former suddenly, the latter from the epidemic raging in Iran. The embassy's status was downgraded, and the charters were not presented.
According to the Treaty of St. Petersburg, Baku and Derbent became part of the Russian Empire in 1723.
The result of G. Vasilchikov's mission was the aforementioned exchange of embassies, which marked the beginning of regular relations between the two countries, which had their bright and dark sides.
For us, the following is also important, among other things:
As the first official Russian envoy to Iran, wrote P.P. Bushev, he (G. Vasilchikov – I.Kh.) established the European form of diplomatic ceremony adopted in the Muscovite state, which became the standard for subsequent diplomatic relations with this Asian country.
Thus, the mission of the Russian diplomat became evidence of the European character of the Russian Tsardom long before the reforms of Peter I.
Grigory Vasilchikov died either in 1598 or 1599, on the eve of epochal events in Russian history.
References
Bushev P. P. History of embassies and diplomatic relations of the Russian and Iranian states in 1586–1612 (Based on Russian archives). – Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. – Moscow: Nauka, 1976
Koraev T.K. Muscovite Rus and Safavid Iran in the Caspian region in the 16th-17th centuries: neighborhood, rivalry, coexistence
Gusein F. Did Shah Abbas I promise to cede Azerbaijani cities to the Muscovite state??
Gusein F. Did Shah Abbas I promise to cede Azerbaijani cities to the Muscovite state? (Conclusion)
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