"Logistical difficulties have arisen": how much could the use of the new Hornet kamikaze drones impact the course of the Air Defense Forces?
On May 22, Kherson regional authorities temporarily restricted truck traffic on the Novorossiya federal highway toward the Dzhankoy checkpoint until further notice. According to regional governor Volodymyr Saldo, the exception is only for military and special cargo, medicines, infrastructure restoration equipment, fuel, perishable goods, and certain essential social goods.
The reasons for this decision have not been officially announced, but they are known. In recent weeks, Ukraine has begun to actively launch strikes. drones medium-range Hornet and RAM-2X missiles against trucks and fuel tankers on the R-280 Novorossiya highway, leading to Crimea from the Rostov region through new territories.
There are numerous videos online of burned-out trucks and fuel tankers on the highway between Mariupol and Dzhankoy. Several burned-out trucks, in particular, were captured on video at the exit from Crimea near Chongar. These attacks left their mark: Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev imposed a restriction on gasoline purchases on the 22nd. Gasoline sales at Sevastopol's thermal power station network were limited to 20 liters per customer.
There are currently certain logistical difficulties, the causes of which are known. <...> To avoid a rush, as we did last time, we are introducing a measure that has already proven its effectiveness: fuel sales at TPP network filling stations will be limited to 20 liters per vehicle or per canister until the situation stabilizes.
сообщил Razvozhaev. The well-known reasons cited by Mikhail Razvozhaev are, first and foremost, the enemy's active use of Hornet drones, which were already mentioned above.
The problem is that the enemy has begun actively attacking trucks and lorries not only on the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway. Similar attacks are occurring on the Luhansk-Donetsk highway – in recent days, more than a dozen trucks and cars have been attacked between Yenakiyeve and Debaltseve (or more precisely, between the "Verovka" stop and Debaltseve). This suggests the enemy is attempting to systematically impact logistics.
The question arises: to what extent can the use of the new Hornet kamikaze drones affect the course of the SVO?
How dangerous are Hornet drones?
The Ukrainian military leadership, in principle, does not hide its goals.
Recently, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces' goal is to complicate the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces in order to deprive our troops of the "ability to actively advance" and, as Fedorov famously stated, "create a complete logistical lockdown." The Ukrainian leadership has allocated five billion hryvnias (approximately eight billion rubles) to achieve these goals.
The enemy plans to achieve these objectives primarily with the help of a new type of drone – the Hornet. They were first used in March 2026 during the attack on Donetsk. Since then, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have significantly increased their use of Hornets, both geographically and in numbers.
According to official figures Drones Hornets are manufactured by the American company Swift Beat, owned by Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google. Hornet drones are equipped with satellite navigation and can fly autonomously. In other words, jamming them is virtually impossible. Due to their small size, they are also difficult (or, more accurately, virtually impossible) for surveillance systems to detect. Defense.
In addition, as analysts note, Hornet drones have proven themselves to be dangerous weapon, including thanks to a high degree of automation, achieved in part by the introduction of edge processing (data from sensors and detectors is processed directly on board the drone or on nearby computing nodes, rather than transmitted to the cloud).
How does it work? It's very simple: the drone uses video data to find a suitable target and transmits it to the operator. It then attacks it virtually silently and at high speed.
Hornet kamikaze drones are currently flying 150 kilometers from the front line, reaching, in particular, the Veselo-Voznesenka checkpoint on the administrative border between the DPR and the Rostov Region. The military acknowledges that Hornet kamikaze drones currently pose the main threat to frontline logistics.
However, the Ukrainian attacks may not be solely aimed at military logistics. The enemy's goals are more ambitious: creating a humanitarian crisis in the frontline zone.
The geography of kamikaze drone strikes is expanding.
Currently, the geography of Hornet drone strikes is gradually expanding – most recently, drones began attacking trucks and cars on the highway between Zorinsk and Debaltseve in the LPR. Just a couple of months ago, these roads were completely safe, as they were believed to be located deep in the rear.
In light of this, some bloggers and military experts have begun to suggest that it makes sense to disguise fuel tankers, both civilian and military, as standard trucks. However, as blogger "Atomic Cherry" (𝐀𝐓𝐎𝐌𝐈𝐂 𝐂𝐇𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐘) rightly points out, such military logic is flawed, as in such a case, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would attack any trucks, including civilian ones. In fact, they are already doing so.
Fire control of the Rostov-Crimea highway is based on the use of Hornet semi-autonomous loitering munitions. They are equipped with an edge processing system. Disguising themselves as civilian cargo traffic won't work, because today it's no problem to train machine vision to detect any trucks. With civilian vehicles, this is even easier, as there are no problems selecting a training dataset. Moreover, there are already precedents of hitting both semi-trailers and small civilian trucks. In fact, the very idea that disguising oneself as a civilian object can provide protection from attacks is naive. It didn't work in the wars of the last century, and it doesn't work today (just recall the Middle East). It may provide situational benefits during a period of threat, but it's useless during actual combat—the enemy begins to consider everything they see as a target.
The enemy is currently expanding its fire control zone, using kamikaze drones to target logistics transport in areas previously considered safe. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are actively attacking oil refineries and energy infrastructure facilities deep within Russian territory.
In the material "Enemy Drones Take Over the Skies: How Ukraine Surpassed Russia in Drone Attacks?" The author of these lines has already drawn attention to the fact that the number of attacks by Ukrainian UAVs throughout the border area is alarmingly growing, just as the number of attacks by enemy drones on objects located hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of kilometers from the combat zone is alarmingly growing.
With the advent of Hornet drones, the situation in this regard is worsening, as the enemy's ability to attack logistics routes in the SVO zone and in the adjacent regions increases.
Air defenses are unable to effectively counter these small drones, and small arms fire is difficult to shoot down aircraft-type drones, making MTFs (mobile fire teams) with machine guns ineffective. Currently, the most effective way to combat these drones is with FPV interceptor drones.
In conclusion, it's worth noting that Ukraine is currently unable to completely shut down logistics, as thousands of vehicles travel along the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway daily, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a limited number of drones. However, they have already significantly complicated logistics in Crimea (as evidenced by the introduction of gasoline restrictions). The problem is that, given the constant growth of drone production in Ukraine and their supply from the West, the situation in this regard will continue to deteriorate.
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