When Friends Are More Dangerous Than the Enemy: Rear Admiral Elphinstone's Actions from Arrival in the Archipelago to the Battle of Chesma
As I mentioned earlier, the Russian expedition's situation deteriorated significantly after the defeat of Barkov's detachment, as the Greeks were only willing to join the troops while they were victorious. The Minots gradually began to disperse: having plundered the area around Misitra, they, having made a considerable profit, retreated back to their mountains. However, by the arrival of Count A. G. Orlov, some troops still remained, which is why the decision was made to attempt to hold Navarino.
But this would have been completely impossible as long as the Turks held the city of Modon, located no more than 10 miles from Navarino. With such a fortified base, they could always amass troops there for an attack on the Russian-held city and port. Therefore, it was decided to take Modon. For this purpose, on April 18, a detachment of 500 Russian soldiers and 2000 Greeks set out from Navarino under the command of Prince Yury Dolgoruky, who had arrived with Orlov.
The idea was to strike suddenly, but the Ottomans, through Greek spies, knew of the detachment's movement and were ready to meet it. A proper siege had to be arranged, which required artillery: Count A. G. Orlov was then forced to dispatch S. K. Greig at the head of a small detachment consisting of his battleship "Three Hierarchs" and the newly acquired frigate "Saint Nicholas." On April 26, they approached the fortress and, after exchanging a couple of salvos, entered the port of Modon, landing their artillery ashore.
Prince Yu. V. Dolgoruky wasted no time preparing battery positions from the very first day he arrived before Modona. Consequently, everything was completed on April 28, and the cannonade began the following day. Until then, the Turks had observed the Russian preparations with complete indifference, but as soon as cannonballs began flying, they began responding quickly and effectively with artillery fire. But the careful placement of our batteries decided the matter: virtually all the Ottoman cannons were knocked out, and a breach in the fortifications was made by the morning of May 4.
However, the day before, Prince Yu. V. Dolgoruky learned that a large Turkish force under the command of the Chief Morean Pasha was marching to the relief of Modon. The Greco-Russian detachment, due to its small numbers, was unable to engage it in the open. However, this was not necessary, as the Russians and Greeks had the mountains themselves on their side. The Turkish army could only reach Modon through a narrow mountain defile (as this landmark is named in S. K. Greig's diary), which could easily be held by creating Thermopylae for the Ottomans. To this end, A. G. Orlov dispatched a strong Greek detachment to the "defile."
And he made a mistake by not assigning even a small number of Russian soldiers to it, which is why Thermopylae never happened. No one knows what really happened, but judging by what happened next, the Greeks simply fled upon seeing the Turks, and, of course, none of them thought to report this to the Russian camp. As a result, Yury Dolgorukov only learned that enemy troops were approaching on the morning of May 4, when there was almost no time left to organize a meeting.
The Turks split up, attacking the Russian camp, where 250 soldiers led by the prince attempted to hold off a Turkish force of 2500-3000. Naturally, they were unsuccessful, and Yuri Dolgorukov, twice wounded by rifle bullets, was forced to retreat to Navarin. Our forces, roughly the same size, were attacked on the outskirts of the city by at least 2000 Turks. Seeing this, they were joined by about 800 more garrison soldiers. Naturally, it was impossible to hold out, so this Russian detachment, abandoning its well-equipped batteries, was forced to retreat to join the remnants of Prince Yuri Dolgorukov's detachment.
This was the Russian Expeditionary Force's darkest hour. Of the 500 of our soldiers who reached Modon, 150 were killed and 250 wounded. Almost all the artillery deployed to destroy the Turkish fortress had to be abandoned, and it fell into the Turks' hands. I find it difficult to say how many guns there were in total, since S.K. Greig indicates that 30 guns were brought ashore—18 24-pounders and 12 12-pounders—but there were 13 guns in the batteries near the town itself, and those were definitely lost. Another six were deployed on an island near the town, so these guns were recovered, but what happened to the remaining eleven is unclear.
It was also good that the Turks were so happy to have captured the batteries that they did not pursue our retreating soldiers, otherwise we could have lost the entire detachment.
Good news
After the failure at Modon, the Russian base in Navarino was doomed. The Greeks had once again demonstrated their unreliability, and now, after yet another defeat, they were fleeing even faster than before. The small Russian ground forces had suffered heavy losses, so it was impossible to even dream of dislodging the thousands-strong Ottoman corps from Modon. Now all that remained was to accept the inevitable and consider what to do next.
It must be said that Count A. G. Orlov, despite everything, felt his responsibility to the Greeks. Those who took part in the uprising, after leaving fleet An unenviable fate awaited them, so the Count took measures to rescue them. Some of the Greeks were transported on three transport ships (pinks) to Port Mahon on Minorca, then under British control; others were taken to the islands of the Archipelago, where there were no Turks. Interestingly, Empress Catherine II later granted pensions to those Greeks who were forced to abandon their wealthy "fazendas" (farmsteads) commensurate with their contributions to the failed uprising.
But let's return to the Russian fleet's situation. After May 4, it was absolutely clear that Navarin could not be held, so G.A. Spiridov's squadron once again found itself without a permanent base. Then the Greeks reported that a large Ottoman fleet with twelve ships of the line was approaching the Morea, compared to only five for our admirals. Count A.G. Orlov was preparing to blow up the Navarin fortress and take to sea to engage the Turkish fleet, but then, in a long string of setbacks, a cause for celebration finally appeared.
On May 10, D. Elphinstone's squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, a pinnace, and transports, arrived in Kolokynth Bay, located east of Cape Matapan in the Moray region. This was a very good thing, but the bad news was that this rear admiral of Scottish descent, instead of meeting with Count A.G. Orlov or at least receiving instructions from him, immediately upon arrival took matters into his own hands.
John Elphinstone
Almost immediately upon arrival, Elphinstone learned that the Turkish fleet was near Napoli di Romagna (today's Nafplion), and on May 12, a day after his arrival, he set out to search for it. This despite the fact that his squadron had just completed a long voyage from Portsmouth, after which Elphinstone hadn't stopped anywhere until the Morea. And so, without giving his ships time to recover, and with his forces clearly insufficient, he rushed into battle. One motive is apparent: Elphinstone was apparently seeking not only and not so much victory for the Russian expedition, but personal success, glory, and the laurels of a great naval commander.
Upon learning that Count A. G. Orlov's affairs were dire, he landed the soldiers he had brought with him at a place near Misitra and ordered a detachment to Navarin to his rescue. D. Elphinstone neglected to learn that this detachment would be unable to carry out this order, as the land routes to Navarin had been cut off, leaving the detachment itself in need of rescue. However, had Count A. G. Orlov not learned of this in time, the few land forces brought by D. Elphinstone would have been destroyed. Therefore, Count A. G. Orlov dispatched G. A. Spiridov with four ships of the line and a frigate with orders to pick up D. Elphinstone's detachment and only then join the newly arrived squadron to search for and destroy the Turkish fleet.
Actions of D. Elphinstone's squadron from 12 to 22 May 1770
D. Elphinstone set out to sea on May 12, and at 10:00 a.m. on May 16, after rounding Cape St. Angelo, he spotted two large ships to leeward. The position was favorable, and the rear admiral rushed to attack. The ships quickly closed in, as the Turks were sailing close-hauled (that is, against the wind). By around 3:00 p.m., the entire Turkish fleet had been sighted. Elphinstone's ships numbered 11 ships of the line, six caravels, and frigates, not counting galleys and other small vessels.
The Turkish fleet's numbers may have been somewhat exaggerated, but in any case, it was clearly and vastly superior to the Russian squadron. The Ottomans initially appeared determined to engage, their ships maneuvering to exit the bay, at the depths of which lay Napoli di Romagna. D. Elphinstone gave the signal for a general pursuit. The squadrons closed in: around 17:00 PM, the Russian 66-gun "Ne tron menya" (Don't Touch Me) came within cannon shot of the lead Turkish ship, flying the flag of the Kapudan Pasha, or commander-in-chief of the Turkish fleet, and exchanged fire. "Ne tron menya"'s sister ship, "Saratov," attacked the next Turkish battleship, which was seen flying the flag of a vice-admiral. The third to reach the Turks was the 32-gun frigate "Nadezhda." At the same time, D. Elphinstone, sailing on the most powerful battleship, the 72-gun (after refitting in England) Svyatoslav, and the second frigate, Africa, lagged behind and were unable to get within firing range of the Ottomans.
But three Russian ships were enough for the Turks: both admiral's ships showed no inclination to engage in a decisive battle and rushed back into the bay from which they had just emerged. Naturally, the entire Turkish fleet followed them, and they sailed there, accompanied by fire from the Ne tron menya, Saratov, and Nadezhda.
It's hard to imagine what would have happened, but nature intervened. Suddenly, a near-dead calm descended, giving the Turks the advantage of rowboats while the Russian squadron did not. That's how the battle of May 16 ended. I don't know the Turkish losses, but ours lost one killed and six wounded on the "Ne ton menya" (Don't Touch Me); the other ships suffered no losses.
The Russian ships lay idle for the evening and all night, as calm alternated with light winds, making sailing impossible, and light winds with calms, and so on until the morning of May 17. During this time, the Turkish galleys towed their ships of the line into the bay where the city of Napoli di Romagna was located, first the ships closest to the Russians, and then all the others. But in the morning, a wind arose, albeit not particularly strong, and D. Elphinstone's squadron rushed in pursuit of the Turkish fleet maneuvering in the bay.
The Ottomans again refused to fight and fled to the city of Napoli di Romagna, approaching it by 14:00 PM. Here, the Turkish fleet dropped anchor, turned broadside (i.e., crosswind), and, protected by coastal batteries, prepared for battle.
Well, D. Elphinstone reformed his force into a battle line and by 15:00 PM attacked the Turkish fleet. But the rear admiral noticed that the wind was dying down again. Fearing a calm, D. Elphinstone ordered the Russians to turn away and leave the bay. Alas, this order could no longer be carried out: the sea became calm, and the Russian ships were carried by the current straight toward the Turkish line.
This was completely unnecessary, so the flagship "Svyatoslav" and "Saratov" dropped anchor and, turning broadside to the enemy, engaged them in artillery combat. However, the range was great, so no serious damage could be caused to either us or the Ottomans. Our ships fired firestones, which managed to set one of the Ottoman ships on fire, but the Turks managed to put it out.
At 17:00 PM, a light wind blew again, allowing the Svyatoslav to cut its cable and escape. The Saratov, anchored closer to the Turkish city, was unable to catch the wind and remained stationary. According to S.K. Greig's log, it was towed by rowboats, but where D. Elphinstone got them from is unclear. Most likely, his squadron included some small Greek vessels that hadn't reached his main force on May 16 but arrived on May 17.
Be that as it may, the Russian squadron retreated and regrouped at a distance. After some serious consideration, D. Elphinstone decided to refrain from further attacks. The reason, he claimed, was the disparity in forces between his and the Turkish squadrons, as well as the fact that he had no ships that could be converted into fireships (and what about the rowboats that, according to S.K. Greig, had pulled the Saratov out?). Perhaps D. Elphinstone's greatest fear was the calm, which had already nearly led him to disaster... As it was, the matter ended, one might say, with nothing: the Svyatoslav lost three men killed and two wounded, and the Ne tron menya lost one killed and one wounded. The Turkish losses were unknown, but they had not suffered significant damage.
Napoli de Romagna from the sea, photograph circa 1880s
D. Elphinstone decided not to engage in further battle near Napoli di Romagna, but to wait for the Turks to put to sea. To this end, he retreated to the island of La Spezia, and simultaneously dispatched a light vessel with news to Count A. G. Orlov of what had happened there and a request for reinforcement of the squadron. All this was perfectly reasonable, but then D. Elphinstone committed another oddity: instead of remaining near La Spezia, he sailed for the island of Cerigo. This opened the way out of the Gulf of Nauplia, at the depths of which Napoli di Romagna was located, and the Ottoman fleet was able to leave unhindered.
Joining forces
Admiral G.A. Spiridov, having received the order, set sail on May 15, and by the 17th he was already there, taking over the detachment landed by D. Elphinstone. This took G.A. Spiridov two days, and then he was ready to search for the Scottish rear admiral, but unfortunately, a calm set in. Nevertheless, on May 20th, Elphinstone's envoy, Lieutenant Gololobov, arrived. Apparently, the small Greek vessel on which he had arrived was propelled by oars, making the calm unfazed. From him, G.A. Spiridov learned of D. Elphinstone's adventures and was ready to go to his aid.
The wind blew on May 21, and the following day, the ships of G. A. Spiridov and D. Elphinstone finally met off Cerigo Island. And now, with a combined force of seven ships of the line and three frigates, they set out to search for the Ottoman fleet.
The wind blew calmly all day on May 23, and the Russian squadrons moved very slowly. Only on May 24 did things improve, allowing G.A. Spiridov and D. Elphinstone to press on. Near the island of La Spezia, where D. Elphinstone had departed, they discovered the retreating Ottoman fleet.
The Turks heroically fled as fast as they could, and the Russian squadrons tried to catch up. D. Elphinstone's ships, which had been docked later than G.A. Spiridov's ships and were therefore less heavily fortified, pulled ahead. Matters were further complicated by G.A. Spiridov's reformation of his squadron into a battle line, which significantly delayed it. But D. Elphinstone was also unsuccessful: only the "Ne tron menya" and "Saratova" managed to approach the Turks, but the distance was too great for effective cannon fire, so their exchange of fire with the five Ottoman rear ships was inconclusive.
The Russian squadrons pursued the Japanese fleet on May 24, 25, and 26, but to no avail; the Turks were slowly but surely breaking away. This was due to the Ottoman ships' extremely large lower sails and topsails, which were also very light, being made of cotton. The Turks knew the seas adjacent to Ottoman lands well and understood how best to navigate them, which is why they designed such sails, while the Russian sailors had no comparable ones. Therefore, by the evening of May 26, only the last six Ottoman ships were still visible, and to see them, one had to climb to the topsail. There was absolutely no chance of catching the Turkish fleet.
The admirals dispatched their representatives: G. A. Spiridov to Yura Island and D. Elphinstone to Siro to discover where the Turkish fleet might have gone. Returning to the squadron on May 28, the envoys reported that the Ottomans, having passed between the islands of Tino and Mikoni, had disappeared in an unknown direction, but that a large Turkish ship, accompanied by two galleys, had been seen in the Strait of Negropont.
Then D. Elphinstone informed G.A. Spiridov that he only had enough fresh water for two days and needed to refill at the port of Rafti. He also suggested that G.A. Spiridov provide him with ships with which he could hunt the Turkish ship and galleys he had spotted while his squadron refilled its water supplies. G.A. Spiridov did not object, but D. Elphinstone was unsuccessful: he found no Turkish vessels, and it was doubtful that any were there at all. So, on June 2, D. Elphinstone's and G.A. Spiridov's ships reassembled.
Since the pursuit of the Turks, the admirals had been at odds with each other, especially since D. Elphinstone was completely unwilling to acknowledge G.A. Spiridov as his commander. Meanwhile, Grigory Andreevich Spiridov, a full admiral, demanded subordination from a rear admiral, especially one who had only just received his rank. Clearly, such duality was unhelpful, so Fyodor Grigoryevich Orlov, who was present with the squadron, suggested they join forces with Count Alexei Grigoryevich Orlov. He was the commander of both, a position D. Elphinstone did not dispute. The admirals agreed, and so it was done.
About Turkish reasons
What was the Turkish fleet doing, constantly fleeing from a weaker but more determined enemy? The point is that the first principle of Ottoman commanders was: "Protect and take no risks!" A Turkish admiral repeatedly stated, "The Russians risk losing only their flag, while the Turks risk an entire part of their empire." Simply put, D. Elphinstone and G.A. Spiridov risked only their ships, but the destruction of the Turkish fleet undermined the coherence of the Ottoman lands. Without the Turks' fleet, communications with Egypt, Syria, and so on would have essentially been severed, and Ottoman power there wasn't particularly strong. Therefore, the Turks were more interested in preserving their ships than in winning, and their actions must be assessed in this context.
Scouts correctly reported to the Turkish command that the Russians had only five ships of the line and one frigate in the Morea. Therefore, Kapudan Pasha, with a fleet at least twice the size of the Russians, risked an offensive spirit and prepared to attack the Russians at Navarino. In fact, he left Napoli di Romagna with this goal in mind. Kapudan Pasha wisely assumed that the Russians had disembarked some of their crews and unloaded a number of naval guns, which would further increase his numerical superiority. Thus, the Greek scouts who reported to Count A. G. Orlov that a powerful Turkish fleet was approaching him were not at all untrue.
But then, out of the blue, D. Elphinstone appeared on the Kapudan Pasha's head. The Turkish admiral couldn't have imagined that he would be attacked by three battleships, and he assumed they were merely the vanguard, followed by G.A. Spiridov's main force. Fear, as the saying goes, has wide eyes, so he mistook D. Elphinstone's frigates and transports for battleships.
Naturally, observing so many Russian battleships with his own eyes, Kapudan Pasha fell into a slight panic. He suspected treason: it appeared that the spy reports that the Russians had only five battleships were completely false. So Kapudan Pasha assumed he was facing a far stronger enemy than he actually was, and just how strong was unclear. And since the Turkish admiral was determined to preserve his fleet at any cost, he fled from D. Elphinstone under the cover of the shore batteries.
Only there, near the city of Napoli di Romagna, did Kapudan Pasha realize he was being attacked by only three Russian battleships. Realizing what a fool he had been, the Turkish admiral yearned for revenge and, as soon as the wind permitted, set out to sea to find and punish the insolent D. Elphinstone. However, he now faced not only Elphinstone, but the combined forces of D. Elphinstone and G.A. Spiridov. And since engaging in battle without a numerical advantage was not in the Turkish commander's plans, he fled.
On the actions of D. Elphinstone
Of course, D. Elphinstone led the second Russian squadron to the Archipelago with almost no losses along the way, for which he deserves enormous credit. But his actions in the Archipelago, in my opinion, were completely inappropriate and surprisingly irresponsible.
I've already mentioned that D. Elphinstone appears to have been motivated solely by a desire to gain personal glory and distinguish himself in the eyes of Catherine II. As soon as he learned of the Turkish fleet's arrival, he rushed to intercept it, without giving his crews a rest or taking steps to join up with G.A. Spiridov's main forces. He chose to quickly dispose of the landing force on board, sending it "to the rescue" of Count A.G. Orlov, without any reconnaissance or intelligence, via Misitra, unaware that it had already been captured by Turkish troops. In effect, in his haste to secure the laurels of a great naval commander, D. Elphinstone sent the Russian troops to certain death.
And just like that, D. Elphinstone led the ships entrusted to his command to certain death. Had the Turkish commander not been captivated by his own fears and instead managed to grasp the situation, he, with the aforementioned advantage in sails, which gave his ships greater speed in light winds, and an overwhelming numerical superiority, would have had every opportunity to defeat and destroy the Russian squadron, paralyzed by the windless conditions.
Most likely, in this case, our fleet's first Archipelago expedition would have been a fiasco. And this isn't just because A.G. Orlov and G.A. Spiridov would have been short a third of the fleet they actually had in June 1770. These two would have been able to attack and destroy the Turkish fleet at Chesma with just six ships of the line instead of nine. However, the destruction of the entire Turkish fleet at Chesma was a result not only of the talent of our naval commanders and the courage of our sailors, but also of the completely passive role voluntarily adopted by the Turkish squadron. However, if the Turks had destroyed D. Elphinstone's detachment, they might have regained their spirits and attempted to take active action. In such a case, it's unlikely that G.A. Spiridov would have been able to defeat the Turkish fleet with just six ships of the line.
In general, in my opinion, the irresponsible actions of D. Elphinstone jeopardized the success of the first Archipelago expedition, and only by a happy coincidence and the timidity of the Turkish admiral did we not suffer defeat.
The above criticism, of course, in no way applies to the ship commanders, officers, and enlisted men of D. Elphinstone's squadron. They, in fact, demonstrated the highest valor and courage, furiously attacking the enemy at such an unfavorable odds, fought skillfully, and rightfully earned honor and glory.
Actions of Count A.G. Orlova
It may seem strange that Count A. G. Orlov did not dispatch the entire Russian squadron, or at least all the ships of the line, to join D. Elphinstone. However, it should be noted that the Rear Admiral's swift actions from Scotland required an immediate response—the landing force he had landed had to be rescued immediately, and the main forces of the Russian fleet had to be assembled into a single unit just as quickly.
But it was equally important not to abandon Navarino to its fate. The wounded had to be evacuated, the fortress and any guns that couldn't be loaded onto ships had to be prepared for demolition. The remaining troops on land had to be taken aboard. For all this, ships were needed, and there was also a psychological factor. While the fleet was moored in Navarino harbor, the Turks were wary of storming it, but if the fleet left, they might well decide to do so, potentially destroying the entire garrison there. Even so, with only two large ships remaining in the port—the battleship Three Hierarchs and the frigate Nadezhda Blagopoluchiya—large Turkish detachments were approaching Navarino, and the evacuation of the last troops had to be carried out by pulling the battleship ashore and under the cover of its guns.
Only on May 23 was the fortress blown up, the last Russian soldiers boarded the ships' decks, and Navarin was abandoned to the enemy. The Turks occupied it and, discovering three unexploded guns, began firing at the Three Hierarchs. The problem was that the wind was blowing directly from the sea, and the battleship, having covered the troops' retreat, was now unable to move away from the shore. The Turks fired, the Three Hierarchs responded, and the Turks abandoned their guns, only to return after a while and open fire again, so the cycle repeated itself.
The Ottomans failed to inflict serious damage on the battleship, and on May 27, Count A.G. Orlov's detachment set out to sea. The frigate Nadezhda Blagopoluchiya departed for Port Mahon, escorting transports carrying troops, while the Three Hierarchs headed in search of the fleet. On June 2, it was joined by the Rostislav, which had finally reached the Archipelago. Only on June 11 did Count A.G. Orlov and his two battleships finally join up with the squadrons of G.A. Spiridov and D. Elphinstone.
Well, the Morea operation failed, and the Russian expeditionary fleet lost its base. But the Turkish fleet had fled, and Count A. G. Orlov now had at his disposal a powerful squadron of nine battleships.
The decisive battle was approaching - all that was needed was to find the Ottoman fleet.
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