Armored cruiser Bayan. Construction and testing. When speed matters.
The French projects were considered by the ITC on December 12, 1897 and, for the reasons listed in previous articleA. Lagan's design proved to be the clear winner. The corresponding MTC journal was promptly provided to the Director of the Naval Ministry, who just as quickly reported it to the Admiral-General. Thus, the very next day, December 13, 1897, the MTC received instructions to develop the design and conclude a contract with Forges et Chantiers.
Construction of the Bayan
History The construction of the "armored reconnaissance aircraft" is quite interesting, but I think it is possible not to go into it in depth, limiting myself to just a few comments.
The approval process took a considerable amount of time, which was generally acceptable, but it resulted in the contract not being signed until June 25, 1898. This can be explained by the need for numerous approvals, but it remains unclear why the French only began construction five months after the contract was signed, i.e., in November 1898. However, the reasons for this could have been quite objective. The fact is that the contract price included the ship itself, including the turrets, but without the armament, which was to be provided by the Russian Empire.
The development of the 8-inch turrets could only be completed after receiving the gun drawings, and whether they were submitted on time is a big question. At the very least, it's known for certain that the MTK delayed the transfer of information on the Tsarevich's guns considerably, which is why I can't say for sure that the nearly six-month delay in starting work on the Bayan is entirely the French's fault. But it's also difficult to blame the MTK—given the massive orders for ships from foreign shipyards, the workload of its departments has increased exponentially. The project doesn't care whether it's building one ship or five—that doesn't shorten the time it takes to review and approve.
From the start of construction to delivery the fleet Four years and one month passed since the Bayan's construction, as the acceptance certificate was signed only on December 16, 1902. Here, I would like to remind the esteemed reader that the start date of construction and the keel-laying date of the ship are not the same. A keel-laying is an official event, and it usually took place several months after the start of construction. Thus, the Bayan, whose construction began in November 1898, was officially laid down only on June 26, 1899. By this time, the cruiser's bottom had been installed, and the frames had risen above the armored deck.
It must be acknowledged that the pace of warship construction in France was anything but astonishing. The Bayan was built just eight months faster than the Pobeda, a battleship-cruiser 1,6 times heavier, which took the Baltic Shipyard four years and nine months to complete. Three years and five months elapsed between the official laying of the keel and the delivery of the 7805-ton Bayan, while for the 12360-ton Gromoboi, this period was a year shorter. This is all the more surprising given that the Baltic Shipyard is located in St. Petersburg, the northern capital of the Russian Empire, with a rather harsh climate, while the Forges et Chantiers shipyards were located in the south of France, where snow and frost, let alone heavy rain, are rare.
All this gave naval history buffs reason to accuse Forges et Chantiers of neglecting its responsibilities. They also suspected that this attitude was due to bribes paid to the Admiral General by the French to ensure his "understanding" of the construction deadlines. But in fairness, it should be noted that Forges et Chantiers, like any foreign or domestic shipbuilding company, was dependent on its suppliers. And in France, they operated in a very specific manner.
For example, the cruiser's armor was ordered from the French firms Châtillon-Commentry and Saint-Chamond. According to the contract terms, the side armor plates were supposed to arrive at the end of 1899, but due to workers' strikes in the Loire, they arrived for acceptance trials in January 1900. This, of course, was not a fatal delay, but 16 Châtillon-Commentry armor plates failed the trials, and four of them had to be remade. Therefore, the entire batch did not arrive at the shipyard until August 1900. The delay amounted to almost a year.
Saint-Chamond distinguished itself even more: the company delivered the upper belt plates only in September 1900, a month later than Chatillon-Commentry. And the turret armor was a particularly unpleasant affair. Saint-Chamond was supposed to deliver it in January 1901, and it did so within the contractual deadline. However, this armor failed testing miserably: the shell it was supposed to deflect penetrated it clean through. Repeated tests were conducted two months later, and, alas, with equally disastrous results. Ultimately, the contract with Saint-Chamond was terminated and renegotiated with other suppliers. However, since armor manufacturing is a lengthy process, the armor for the Bayan turrets was delayed by one year and one month, arriving only in February 1902.
The "Bayan" was launched without propellers. Why? Because the propellers, cast integrally with the hub, were ordered from England, but arrived not only with improper geometry (blade pitch and thickness) but also with cavities, even though they had been skillfully repaired. This shoddy work was rejected and sent back, and the English had to recast the propellers, which, of course, wreaked havoc on the ship's construction.
The launch of the armored cruiser Bayan. The photo shows the propellers missing.
Assembly of the Bayan's main mechanisms at the Forges et Chantiers workshops also proceeded very slowly due to numerous defects. For example, one crankshaft arrived in such a state that it was beyond repair, forcing the supplier to rebuild it. Another interesting fact: when they began installing the steam engine on the cruiser, it was discovered that its frame didn't fit the foundation, so it had to be removed and returned to the workshops. However, in this case, I can't say who exactly was to blame for this incident—the suppliers or the workshop workers.
In general, we often tend to criticize domestic shipbuilding in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and in some ways, quite rightly so. But it's worth remembering that France, which possessed the world's second-largest navy at the time, was far from perfect.
"Bayan." Who will we compare it to?
Usually, when I begin to describe a ship, I provide the reader with its general performance characteristics, design features, and armament, and only then move on to a comparison with contemporary "classmates." But this time, I'll deviate from this rule and examine the individual performance characteristics and design elements of the armored cruiser Bayan, immediately comparing them with its "competitors."
Among naval history buffs, the Bayan is widely viewed as a failed cruiser. It is compared to Japanese armored cruisers, including not only those built to Japanese specifications—the Asama, Izumo, Yakumo, and Azuma—but also the "Italian" Nisshin and Kasuga.
I will compare "Bayan" with "Izumo".
This cruiser fits the construction start date better than the Asama, given that the Izumo was clearly superior to the Azuma, and the Yakumo was a one-off Japanese cruiser. I'll use the Nissin as the second cruiser for comparison, but when comparing artillery I won’t forget about the ten-inch Kasuga.
Of course, such a comparison is inappropriate, as the Bayan, Izumo, and Nisshin were designed to fulfill completely different missions. The Bayan was conceived as an armored reconnaissance vessel capable of dealing with armored cruisers serving the same role. Meanwhile, the Japanese and Italian armored cruisers, according to their designers, were intended to engage enemy battleships.
The characteristics of Japanese cruisers were shaped by the naval battles of the Sino-Japanese War. In these battles, according to the sailors of the Land of the Rising Sun, the speed of armored cruisers, combined with rapid-fire medium-caliber artillery, played a decisive role. Therefore, they considered an armament of 6-8 inch caliber guns necessary and sufficient for their future cruisers.
Of course, the Japanese were well aware that the armored cruisers that formed the backbone of their fleet at the Battle of the Yalu would themselves be vulnerable to rapid-fire artillery fire. Therefore, they wanted cruisers that would be well protected against both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells of the same 6-8 inch caliber. As for speed, it had to be superior to that of battleships, so as to be able to engage them from a favorable position.
As for the Italian cruisers of the Garibaldi class, represented by the Nisshin and Kasuga, the ideas for their use were formulated as follows:
1. Carrying out the tasks of an armored cruiser and a squadron battleship, which could operate both alone and as part of a squadron;
2. Fighting against cruiser formations, including armored cruisers;
3. The ability to avoid combat with superior combat units, which requires a speed superior to that of squadron battleships.
Therefore, when comparing the Bayan's characteristics with the cruisers listed above, I will always take into account the differences in the ships' missions. I'll start with speed.
On sea trials of warships in Russia and around the world
It must be said that the Russian Imperial Navy's sea trials requirements for warships were far more advanced than those of many other leading naval powers. Russian sailors were less concerned with record speeds a ship could achieve and maintain for only a short time. They were more interested in the speed a ship could maintain over the long term.
This is why trials were conducted with a normal displacement, while other countries often sought to lighten the ship. If, for any reason, a domestic ship was launched with a lighter weight than the designers intended, this fact was always taken into account when determining whether the contract speed had been achieved.
In addition, the Russian Imperial Navy tested its ships under natural draft, not artificial draft, that is, without forcing (forcing) the boilers, while abroad this was a common practice.
What's the difference between natural and artificial draft? In its most simplified form, artificial draft can be observed when a fan is swung over a smoldering fire, thereby fanning the coals. On ships of that era, artificial draft was often achieved by forcing air into the boiler room, from where it entered the open firebox. For example, during trials of the Japanese battleship Fuji, described below, the pressure in the boiler rooms was increased to 1.5 atmospheres.
Why did the Russian Empire avoid testing with forced draft? The answer is simple: such draft represented an extreme operating mode for boilers, dramatically increasing their wear and tear and posing a risk of accidents. The purpose of a steam boiler was to generate heat, using steam as the working fluid. Accordingly, the boiler was designed for a certain steam output, but forced draft resulted in boilers significantly exceeding this output. Of course, the designers incorporated a certain "safety margin" into the boilers, which allowed them to withstand forced draft. However, this mode was by no means intended to be constant; it was only permitted to be reached occasionally and for short periods. Forced draft is a mode reserved for force majeure situations, when the risk of damage to the boilers is justified by the prevailing tactical situation.
It should also be noted that the practice of using artificial propulsion during trials creates considerable confusion when comparing the speed characteristics of foreign- and domestically built ships. For example, we all know that the Poltava-class battleships, laid down in 1892, had a top speed of 16 knots, while the Japanese Fuji, laid down two years later, reached 18 knots. But if we look more closely at the descriptions of these ships' trials, we discover that the Poltava averaged 16,29 knots during a 9-hour run (it should have been 12 hours, but a storm began)—under natural propulsion, of course. The length of the route was obviously 9 hours * 16,29 knots = 146,6 miles. And the Fuji achieved its record-breaking 18,5 knots. Under artificial propulsion, the Fuji achieved this speed only over a 10-mile run (or rather, it was the average speed over six 10-mile runs). However, over a 40-mile run under natural propulsion, the Fuji achieved a speed of 16,8 knots, not that much faster than the Russian battleship. And it remains to be seen how much the Japanese "speedboat" would have achieved over the Poltava's test distance, which was nearly four times faster than the Fuji's natural propulsion.
And again, we all know that Poltava-class battleships in the Russo-Japanese War generally couldn't sail faster than 13-14 knots. But the fact is that a ship's speed in everyday life is influenced by the reliability of its mechanisms—which might work well during trials but fail later—and the qualifications of its engineers and stokers, the timely maintenance of its engines and boilers, and the quality of its coal. Therefore, the superior speed of Japanese battleships cannot be reduced solely to the merits of their designs.
Another advantage of the Russian testing system was its duration – 6–12 hours, which, again, is in sharp contrast to the same Fuji – its “forty-kilometer” tests took less than 3 hours.
Sea trials of the armored cruiser Bayan
According to the Ministry of the Navy's requirements, the cruiser had to average 21 knots over a 24-hour run. However, at the insistence of the French company's representatives, this requirement was relaxed to two 12-hour runs, no more than 24 hours apart. However, this requirement was also not met—almost 30 hours elapsed between the end of the first run and the beginning of the second.
The trials took place on October 14 and 16, 1902, with a design power of 16,500 hp. The Bayan developed 16,848 hp, and the average speed over the two runs was 20,9 knots. The acceptance committee deemed the company's obligations fulfilled, since "during the last test, many turns were made." Subsequently, there were further trials in which a speed of 20,97 knots was achieved, but much remains unclear. How long they were conducted, or what power the machines developed—I have no data. R.M. Melnikov indicated that 20,97 knots were achieved during a 100-mile run, but, given that, in his opinion, this speed was reached on October 14 and 16 (in fact, on December 11), I cannot vouch for the reliability of this data.
I also have no information about the displacement at which the Bayan sailed for trials on October 14–16. However, given that there were many trials in general, and the cruiser usually sailed at her normal displacement of 7,816–7,844 tons, there is no reason to assume that this time things were any different. Furthermore, when the Bayan sailed underloaded during factory trials—which was perfectly acceptable, as such trials were not acceptance tests but rather a private matter for the shipyard—she would sometimes achieve speeds in excess of 21 knots. For example, on July 31, 1902, the Bayan, with a displacement of 7,406 tons, reached 21,3 knots.
The speed of the cruiser "Bayan" in everyday operation
According to the data I have, the Bayan could confidently maintain a speed of 20 knots during its service in Port Arthur. This was confirmed by Admiral N.K. Reitzenstein, who knew firsthand the capabilities of Port Arthur's cruisers. He wrote in his report to the Viceroy about the Battle of the Yellow Sea, when the Askold and Novik broke through enemy cruisers:
If the cruiser Bayan had been with us, things would have taken a completely different turn. Although the Bayan had a slower speed, she would still have made 20 knots...
And we weren’t talking about a short-term spurt, but about a speed that needed to be maintained for hours.
It's also worth recalling two episodes from the Bayan's combat service that indirectly confirm its speed. On February 12, 1904, a trio of Russian cruisers—the Bayan, Askold, and Novik—found themselves in a tight spot: they were attacked by Admiral Kh. Togo's entire main force, including six battleships and an equal number of armored cruisers. The engagement was brief, but the Novik's logbook indicates that speed was increased to 20 knots during the battle.
The second incident occurred on March 31, 1904, when the Bayan was on its way to the rescue of the destroyer Strashny. The cruiser was in such a hurry that it overtook the destroyer Serdity, which was on duty alongside it. The destroyer's commander, Kluifel, reported this: "The Bayan was probably going at a very high speed, since it quickly caught up with me and overtook me." This was achieved by the Bayan, as Serdity was unable to reach its full speed. A little later, on April 2, the commander reported that even a speed of 20 knots was difficult to achieve, as the refrigerator pipes were leaking, and the stokers, with their extremely insufficient staff, were unable to cope with the required consumption of 4 tons of coal per hour for a speed of 20 knots. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that to quickly overtake a destroyer traveling even at 17-18 knots, at least 20 knots is required.
Moreover, according to the report of Viren, the Bayan's commander, he spotted the Strashny at 06:00 a.m. and approached the site of its wreck at 06:30 a.m. I would guess that at the time the destroyer was spotted, the distance between the Bayan and the Strashny was about 10 miles, as the Smely, having spotted the Strashny at the beginning of the fifth hour (when it was already light), saw it from a distance of 7-8 miles. However, the destroyer's bridge is low, and from a cruiser one can see much further. Covering 10 miles in half an hour is only possible at a speed of 20 knots.
None of this information, of course, constitutes definitive proof that the Bayan sailed at the speed I've indicated in Port Arthur, but there's no reason to believe otherwise. Much has been written about Diana-class cruisers not operating at their rated speed. This fact is mentioned in the memoirs and documents of several officers who served in the 1st Pacific Squadron, but there's no information about the Bayan that would undermine its speed.
Comparison of the Bayan's speed with Japanese cruisers
I would like to immediately draw the esteemed reader's attention to the fact that the speeds for all cruisers are given during tests under natural thrust.
I would like to point out that the Nissin entered trials underloaded – 7347 tons, while its design displacement was apparently 7628 tons or, perhaps, 7700 tons. Recalculation using the Admiralty coefficient shows that with a displacement of 7628 tons, the cruiser would have developed 18,62 knots.
On the speed of Nissin and Italian cruisers
As mentioned above, when designing the Garibaldi-class cruisers, the Italians aimed for heavily protected and well-armed ships. Something, of course, had to be sacrificed, and that "something" was speed.
This solution fit perfectly with the design of these cruisers. By 1895, when the Garibaldi was laid down, the speed of battleships typically amounted to 16 knots under natural propulsion and 17-18 knots under artificial propulsion. The Garibaldi-class cruisers were intended to exceed these speeds, which required them to achieve 18 knots under natural propulsion and 20 knots under artificial propulsion. Thus, at the time of construction, these Italian ships were fully suited to their intended purpose.
But the Italians completely failed to take into account the speed of scientific and technological progress—just a few years passed, and the development of propulsion systems meant that battleships could reach 18 knots under natural, rather than artificial, propulsion. This led to the speed of battleships and Garibaldi-class cruisers under natural propulsion becoming equal. The Garibaldi-class cruisers could outrun contemporary battleships only by forcing their boilers, meaning in exceptional circumstances and for short periods.
Thus, by the end of 1897, the Garibaldi-class armored cruisers had become classic "poor man's battleships." Their speed was perfectly adequate for fighting alongside modern battleships. But serving as a "fast wing" with an armored squadron, let alone as scouts, was no longer an option.
The Nissin was a classic example of a cruiser of its type. As shown above, when underloaded for trials, it reached 18,74 knots under natural draft. During other trials, with the boilers forced, it achieved 20,15 knots with a power output of 14,896 horsepower, but, again, underloaded, its displacement was 7,413 tons.
That's precisely why the Garibaldi-class cruisers could never even be considered as a prototype for the Bayan. Our admirals were experiencing a severe shortage of modern cruisers for squadron service, which a ship with the speed of a battleship could not possibly fulfill.
Incidentally, the same applies to the "progenitor" of the "Asam" - the armored cruiser "O'Higgins", which, as far as I know, also produced only 18 knots with natural draft.
About the speed of Izumo
The Japanese cruisers were a completely different story. Initially, when the Asama was being designed, the British proposed building a ship with a speed of 18 knots under natural propulsion and 20 knots under artificial propulsion. But the Japanese refused, insisting in July 1896 that the speed of the future Asamoids be increased to 20 knots under natural propulsion—and they were, of course, absolutely right.
The British met the customer's requirements. Izumo achieved a speed of 21,74 knots under natural propulsion with 16,078 (according to other sources, 15,709) horsepower. According to the design, it was supposed to be 20,75 knots with 14,500 horsepower, but the engines performed better, resulting in a correspondingly higher speed. Unfortunately, I couldn't find the displacement at which Izumo (and other Japanese armored cruisers) were tested, but the underload couldn't have been many thousands of tons. Even if we assume that Izumo's displacement during trials was only 8,500 tons, not 9,500, it still turns out that the British-built cruiser, although larger than Bayan and with less powerful engines, still managed to achieve a higher speed. I want to especially highlight the mastery of British naval architects, because the Izumo's hull lines are exemplary. This assertion remains valid and does not challenge what I will write about Japanese cruisers later.
It should be noted that not only the Izumo, but all four Japanese cruisers built in England at the Armstrong shipyards, demonstrated excellent results during sea trials. All of them demonstrated speeds under natural draft well in excess of 20 knots. The Iwate even managed to reach 22,04 knots! An excellent result—but only if the English-built Japanese cruisers could prove their performance in everyday service.
But they didn't confirm it. I have no information that any of these cruisers could reach 20 knots for any length of time. However, I do have evidence that even when the Japanese admiral desperately needed it, the ships of the 2nd Battle Division couldn't reach speeds above approximately 18 knots.
On the speed of Japanese cruisers in battle
It is well known that the Japanese public was quite displeased with the actions of the Vladivostok Cruiser Detachment (VOD) of the Russian Imperial Navy. And, of course, Vice-Admiral H. Kamimura had no intention of playing along with the Rossiya, Gromoboi, and Rurik—he was supposed to destroy this Russian detachment as quickly as possible and join H. Togo's main forces near Port Arthur. Nevertheless, the VOD managed to avoid encounters with the Japanese armored cruisers for a long time.
When, on the morning of June 17, 1904, H. Kamimura received word of the VOK's discovery, he naturally launched his cruisers to intercept it. I'll recount the story of this pursuit in all its details another time, when I begin a series dedicated to the Vladivostok cruisers. For now, I'll describe it briefly.
The detachments met on the evening of June 18, sighting each other at approximately the same time. Our forces reported sighting the Japanese ships at 6:20 p.m., the Japanese at 6:35 p.m., but given the 12-minute time difference at the rendezvous point, that puts the time at 6:23 p.m. In other words, both sides spotted each other almost simultaneously. However, the Russian ships didn't immediately identify the enemy, so Vice-Admiral P.A. Bezobrazov spent another 10 minutes leading his force toward H. Kamimura's advancing Japanese armored cruisers.
The Japanese, however, "immediately after the meeting, changed course and headed for NO 60; they increased speed and, pressing the enemy towards Okinoshima Island, wanted to block his path... The enemy, apparently, was initially unaware of our squadron's presence in the strait and went straight ahead in the same direction, and only when our squadron went to meet him, did he change course to NO and, increasing speed, sailing in the order Rossiya, Gromoboy, and Rurik, began to leave."
According to the Japanese, the distance to the Russian detachment was 22,000 meters when they spotted it. However, because our ships didn't immediately identify the enemy and were on converging courses, the distance between the detachments decreased. Then, as the Russian cruisers lost time and speed while turning, the distance continued to decrease.
What happened next? The official Meiji history describes it this way:
Even before this, while our squadron was catching up with the enemy, heading to cross its course, the distance had gradually decreased, and, furthermore, the Rurik had fallen far behind its leading ships, lying at a distance of 2000 meters by eye. But then both squadrons took the same course, and the distance to the enemy barely changed, and, in fact, the lagging Rurik seemed to have returned to line. Our squadron again increased speed, but the enemy, too, apparently, had gone full speed ahead, and the distance did not decrease.
The parallel pursuit began a little after 18:30 PM and continued until approximately 20:00 PM, when the sun set and visibility sharply deteriorated, so that the Russian ships, by then (according to Japanese estimates) 13-15 km away, became almost invisible. Thus, Kamimura followed the Russian cruisers for between an hour and a quarter and an hour and a half, but during this time the Japanese were unable to close with the Russian squadron, instead traveling at approximately the same speed. This is the Japanese belief.
At what speed did the Russian detachment move?
When P.A. Bezobrazov realized the force confronting him, he turned away from the enemy and increased speed to 18 knots. But as soon as he did this, the Rurik immediately began to fall behind, which was noticed by the Japanese, so speed was reduced (around 7:00 PM), first to 17 knots, and then at 7:20 PM to 16 knots! However, to be fair, according to our sailors, once the detachment reduced speed, the Japanese did begin to slowly catch up, but this only happened after the detachment's speed had slowed to 16 knots. While they were traveling at 17-18 knots, the distance to the Japanese remained unchanged.
Perhaps the Japanese weren't even trying to catch up with our detachment—perhaps they were planning to leave it to the destroyers, who were supposed to attack the FOC after sunset? This theory is unlikely to be true, and here's why.
Firstly, H. Kamimura had over an hour before sunset, and during that time, if his speed allowed, he could easily close in on our cruisers and attempt to knock out at least one of them. Waiting at a distance made no sense to him.
Secondly, according to modern Russian authors (N. Pakhomov, S. Nesolyonny), our sailors noted the presence of flares above the funnels of the Japanese cruisers. A quote from Midshipman G. Kolokolov of the Rossiya is cited: "It was already beginning to get dark, and behind us, the Japanese cruisers were throwing out sheaves of flame."
But I have some doubts about the latter, as I don't have the original source, and this quote is presented differently by our authors. Including in such a way that one might assume the flames were actually salvos from Japanese guns, which fired at our cruisers for some time, although the range was prohibitive, and the shells fell significantly short.
However, there is a historical fact: during the more than hour-long race, the Japanese were unable to close the distance. Their speed was somewhere around 18 knots, and if our authors are correct in their interpretation of the documents, it's possible that even this speed was achieved by forcing the boilers.
As for the Battle of the Korea Strait on August 1, 1904, it's not indicative of the speed of Japanese cruisers. Firstly, the Japanese cruisers cut off the naval air defense system from Vladivostok, and secondly, K. P. Jessen's flagship, Rossiya, suffered damage to some of its boilers, limiting the Russian force to no more than 15 knots during the approach to the Japanese and for part of the battle. Rossiya was subsequently accelerated to 17,5 knots—but 18 knots was undoubtedly within Kamimura's armored cruisers' reach.
The respected A.S. Alexandrov and S.A. Balakin pointed out that, in the opinion of the British naval attaché, British-built cruisers “could hardly maintain a speed of more than 18 knots for an extended period.”
What was wrong with H. Kamimura's armored cruisers?
I can surmise that the actual performance of Japanese cruisers is to some extent related to the ship delivery and acceptance procedures in England. Here's how Lieutenant D. Golov described the latter in his article "On Ship Engines and Boilers," published in the "Maritime Collection" in 1905:
Until now, in England, as in all other countries, only the duration of the test was prescribed, which would result in a certain engine power or ship speed; for some tests, coal consumption per 1 ind. horsepower per hour was also limited; everything else was left to the discretion of the manufacturers handing over the engines, who, of course, took advantage of this and carried out acceptance tests under conditions that were impossible to replicate during the ship's service, not only in wartime but even in peacetime. Thus, a specially trained engine crew was recruited for the tests, and in unlimited numbers; the freshest and choicest fuel was used; without sparing the durability of the engines, excessive slack was allowed in bearings and other rubbing parts, and they were not only generously lubricated, but also liberally doused with oil and water. This, of course, was taken into account by the designers when designing the engines, which were calculated so that they could develop their maximum power only under the extraordinary conditions allowed by the manufacturers for the acceptance trials. As a result, the maximum speed for which a vessel is ordered is fictitious, unachievable under normal operating conditions. After the vessel is accepted, the manufacturer requires further trials if they want to know what maximum speed can be expected.
Moreover, the vast discrepancy between the British aircraft's design power and the actual output achieved during testing is striking. For example, the armored cruiser Bayan's aircraft exceeded their design power by 348 hp, or 2,11%, while the British aircraft's output was 1,578 hp, or 10,88% (incidentally, the Nissin's output was 2,188 hp, or 25,74%!). It's quite possible that such records are a consequence of the procedures described in D. Golova's article. If so, it's not surprising that aircraft designed in this manner, while demonstrating championship results in testing, might not even reach their design levels in everyday use.
I can also assume that if the Naval Ministry of the Russian Empire had approached the British with a proposal to build for our fleet an "Asamoid" with a speed of 20 knots under natural propulsion, confirmed by tests under Russian conditions, the British would have refused.
Conclusions
Overall, it can be concluded that our Naval Ministry, having ordered the Bayan, received a cruiser capable of serving as a reconnaissance vessel for a squadron of modern battleships. Moreover, its daily speed of 20 knots, which the cruiser could maintain for extended periods, can perhaps be considered minimally adequate. Meanwhile, Japanese cruisers had a maximum speed of 18 knots, roughly equivalent in this regard to the Russian Diana-class armored cruisers. There is absolute unanimity among sailors of the time and among modern naval history enthusiasts that the speed of the latter was insufficient for cruisers.
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P.S. An interesting thought was raised in the comments to my previous article: what if the Ministry of the Navy had ordered Garibaldi-class armored cruisers, but with lighter Belleville boilers instead of fire-tube boilers? This would have increased engine power and speed. I'd like to remind you that this idea didn't work out for the Italians. They built two such cruisers, but, for example, the Varese's propulsion system with Belleville boilers was only 500 hp more powerful than that of the Garibaldi, while being only 13 tons lighter.
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