A tour of China's first domestically built aircraft carrier, the Shandong

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A tour of China's first domestically built aircraft carrier, the Shandong

A view of the Shandong as it enters Victoria Harbour in Hong Kong (long shot)

When discussing the Shandong, it's important to first understand the background to its creation. China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (formerly the Varyag, Project 1143.6), was commissioned on September 25, 2012, and construction of the Shandong began just a year later. The Liaoning received the hull number 16—according to one popular theory, formed from the first and last digits of the Project 1143.6 designation, although officially it is simply a serial number within the PLA Navy's combat unit lineup. The Shandong received the next serial number, 17.



A curious dilemma arises here. From an engineering standpoint, such haste was unnecessary: ​​it would have been wiser to wait until the crew mastered the Liaoning, assessed its strengths and weaknesses, and provided feedback to the shipyard before designing the next ship. Moreover, by that time, both the steam and electromagnetic catapults in China were nearing completion, and building another ski-jump aircraft carrier seemed questionable in terms of cost-effectiveness. From a military-political standpoint, the decision reads differently: according to expert assessments, the PRC leadership was guided by the need to have two combat-ready aircraft carriers by 2020—this was seen as a response to the American "pivot to Asia" policy and a means of reducing military and political pressure from the United States. There is no publicly documented decision of the CPC Central Committee with this wording in open sources—the assessment is based on an analysis of construction rates and publications by Western and Taiwanese think tanks. The military-political agenda ultimately trumped the engineering one, which explains the choice of the serial STOBAR design despite the availability of resources for catapults.

By the time the third aircraft carrier was laid down (2017–2018), the external context had changed: the incoming Trump administration had complicated US relations with a number of allies, and the pressure on China had eased. There was now time to take technical risks—the third aircraft carrier was already being designed with electromagnetic catapults. But that's a separate topic.

The Shandong is similar in basic dimensions to the Liaoning: according to open estimates (Janes, IISS), its full displacement is approximately 66,000–70,000 tons, its length is approximately 315 meters, and its air group consists of up to 40 aircraft (fighters and helicopters). Its propulsion system is a steam turbine, with eight steam boilers and four main turbo-gear units producing a total capacity of approximately 150,000 horsepower. Its cruising range at cruising speed is approximately 7000–8000 nautical miles, and its endurance is approximately 45 days. This is the first aircraft carrier built entirely in China, while retaining the STOBAR (ski-jump takeoff, arresting gear landing) configuration.


Through the bow aircraft lift we get into the hangar


A panorama of the hangar. A large turning circle is visible at the bottom of the photo. The same turning circle, inherited from Soviet aircraft carriers, is also retained on the Fujian, complete with catapults. It is necessary for turning the large J-15 fighters in the confined hangar space and near the aircraft lifts: with their long fuselage and large wingspan, conventional towing in an arc is inconvenient, so the aircraft is placed on a platform and rotated around its axis.


We go up the plane lift to the flight deck


The island superstructure, rear view. Two Type 346A active phased array (AESA) radars are visible on the superstructure—the same as those on the Project 052D destroyers.


The island superstructure, front view. The bridge, unlike the single-tiered one on Soviet aircraft carriers, is now double-tiered, with separate command and navigation bridges.



The Shandong's aft mast is equipped with a directional broadband data transmission antenna. It is believed to perform functions similar to the American Cooperative Targeting Command (CEC) system with AN/USG-2/PAAA antenna posts. The exact architecture and parameters of the Chinese system are not disclosed, so it is more accurate to speak of a similarity in purpose rather than a direct analogy.


On the right are two Z-9S search-and-rescue helicopters, with searchlights and optronic sensors visible on the sides of the fuselage. On the left is the first Z-18Y AWACS helicopter, its radar antenna retracting under the fuselage. On the left is the second Z-18F anti-submarine warfare helicopter, with a surface-search radar and optronic sensor in the nose. The Shandong is currently undergoing modernization to carry J-35 and J-15T fighters; the KJ-600 AWACS aircraft, which requires catapult launch, will be based on the Fujian. This will eventually eliminate the main shortcomings of AWACS helicopters—short range, low ceiling, and limited field of view.


The J-15 fighter was developed by Chinese specialists based on the study of an unfinished Soviet T-10K-3 prototype developed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau, acquired from Ukraine (the aircraft remained at the NITKA complex in Saki) without a full set of design documentation. Part of the technological base, however, was developed in parallel—as part of the J-11/J-11B program, which involved reverse engineering and subsequent extensive modernization of the Su-27SK; it is from this program that the J-15 inherited a significant share of its avionics and powertrain. The nose of the aircraft features an air pressure sensor (APS), and the radar is a slotted antenna array with mechanical scanning.


The J-15T fighter (the "T" stands for "catapult") is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The nose cone is missing the IRST lens, the IRST lens is enlarged and equipped with a movable cover, and the radar radome is angled—this is due to the angled AESA mounting. The angled mounting is believed to reduce the radar cross-section in the forward hemisphere: the enemy's irradiating signal is reflected away from the source rather than back toward it, weakening the reflected signal. The actual effect depends on the antenna's angle, frequency, and design. A similar solution is used on the American F-22 and F-35, and the Chinese J-20 and J-35. Also noticeable is the reinforced nose landing gear with a towing hook for the ejection port, and the nose landing gear bay doors, instead of one large one, as on the Su-33, are made of two small ones. The key feature of the J-15T is its ability to take off from both a catapult and a ski-jump, meaning it is a single platform for all three Chinese aircraft carriers.

Regarding the distribution among ships: J-15Ts are gradually appearing on the Liaoning and Shandong as part of standardization and testing, but as of 2024–2026, the core of the air groups on both ships will still consist of serial J-15s of the basic modification (J-15A) – this is evident from open satellite images and publications by the Japanese Ministry of Defense.


The J-15T's head-up display (HUD) has a larger area and a thinner frame, resulting in less obstruction to the view.


The Shandong has a reduced number of ammunition hoists in its forward launch positions from four to two compared to the original Liaoning design, but their size has been increased, speeding up the simultaneous loading of squads on deck. An interesting detail: during the Liaoning's modernization in 2023–2024, its forward hoists were also rebuilt to Shandong standards—four old hatches were replaced with two larger ones measuring approximately 6 x 2 meters (according to publicly available data).


On American aircraft carriers, the landing sighting station (LSO) is completely open. On Soviet carriers, due to the harsh northern weather conditions, it was moved to an enclosed space. On the Chinese carriers—the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian—there are both open and enclosed stations.


Optical landing system


The carrier's flight deck is equipped with mooring ports throughout. The main external difference between the J-15 and the J-15T is that the J-15 has yellow and red stripes on its sides and a black radar radome, while the J-15T is painted entirely gray as part of a low-observability scheme. It's worth noting that ski-jump takeoffs inherently limit the fighter's combat load and fuel capacity, especially in hot, low-air-density climates. According to public estimates, payload can be reduced by 10-20% compared to design values ​​in unfavorable conditions (the exact figures depend on temperature, humidity, takeoff roll, and the specific launch site). This limitation was one of the reasons for the Fujian's transition to a catapult-based takeoff system.


Training Rocket PL-12 on a fighter jet's sling


The sponsons are equipped with an HHQ-10 short-range air defense missile system and fire hydrants. The HHQ-10 is a functional analogue of the American RAM (RIM-116): compact SAMs with IR/radio guidance and a range of approximately 10 km for intercepting anti-ship missiles at the last line of defense. Structurally, however, the HHQ-10 is closer to the Chinese TY-90 / FL-3000N line and inherits the logic of the MANPADS class missiles, while the RAM is a unified hybrid with Sidewinder and Stinger components. In addition to the HHQ-10, the ship's close defense is provided by a 30-mm multi-barrel anti-aircraft gun. artillery The Type 1130 complex, which has a rate of fire of approximately 10,000 rounds per minute.



Aero Finisher


Aircraft carrier orchestra


The tail number is on the bow. The flight deck is covered with a rough, non-slip surface.
42 comments
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  1. +3
    26 May 2026 05: 50
    Thank you for the tour, a very detailed and, most importantly, visual overview!
    Have a nice day, everyone!
  2. +7
    26 May 2026 05: 51
    Cool excursion, I would go on one too... I didn't know such things even existed)))
  3. +4
    26 May 2026 05: 54
    While studying at the National Research Institute, I did an internship at the Black Sea Shipyard, where our aircraft carriers were built. Looking through the photos in the publications, it all seems so familiar, only packaged in a beautiful Chinese wrapper. It's heartbreaking.
  4. +4
    26 May 2026 06: 00
    Excellent article good The photos are amazing! I'd love to go on a tour, plus thanks to the author. good
  5. +5
    26 May 2026 06: 17
    Looking at this, I think about the missed opportunities we had in the aircraft carrier business. We had it all. We had aircraft carriers. We had vertical takeoff aircraft. We had a lot of things.
    1. +2
      26 May 2026 07: 35
      Quote: Nikolay Malyugin
      There was a lot that happened

      What a waste of money it was.
      Quote: Nikolay Malyugin
      There were also aircraft carriers

      Kyiv, Minsk, Novorossiysk, and Baku aren't aircraft carriers. They're anti-submarine ships that were forced to use supposedly aircraft that couldn't solve any of their problems. Moreover, when creating such giants, they couldn't think of anything better than to ignore their bases. Therefore, your thesis is absolutely incorrect. The USSR didn't have aircraft carriers.
      1. +4
        26 May 2026 11: 17
        You were shown a Chinese aircraft carrier that the profiteers sold to China.
      2. +2
        27 May 2026 08: 58
        The development of Soviet aircraft carriers took a tortuous path primarily due to the leadership's misguided course, not to a lack of technical capability. Khrushchev opposed carrier construction and dismissed Kuznetsov, who insisted on their development. Ustinov took a peculiar path, relying on vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft, while Yakovlev, with his lobbying, pushed through the choice of the Yak-38—a worthless contraption with a shorter range than a helicopter. Had the Soviet leadership firmly committed to building catapult-based carriers from the outset, I believe the USSR could well have built carriers similar to the American Kitty Hawk-class by the 70s and 80s. Moreover, I believe the choice of the MiG-23 as the Soviet third-generation fighter may also have been made with an eye toward future carrier deployment.
        1. -1
          27 May 2026 12: 23
          Quote: Seaflanker
          and Yakovlev with his lobbying

          Come on, after Stalin's death, Yakovlev was forced into retirement, his factories confiscated, and all his dirty tricks recalled. He couldn't lobby for anything.
          Quote: Seaflanker
          If the Soviet leadership had firmly committed itself to building catapult aircraft carriers from the very beginning

          We would have received an aircraft carrier that, in ten years, would have become a wreck in the capable hands of conscripts and without a home base. It would have consumed the lifespan of all its systems right there at sea.
          Quote: Seaflanker
          similar to the American "Kitty Hawk" type.

          And where would they build it? The USSR probably didn't have such docks. And if it were in the south, then they'd have to negotiate passage with the Turks...
          1. 0
            27 May 2026 21: 58
            Are you talking about aircraft designer Yakovlev? What makes you think Yakovlev was sent into retirement after Stalin's death? In 1957 (four years after Stalin's death), he was again awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, becoming a Hero twice over. During his lifetime, he received eight Orders of Lenin, most of them after Stalin's death. In 1972 and 1984, he won the Lenin Prize and the USSR State Prize, respectively. And in 1976, he was happily elected an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Yakovlev first secured funding for the development by exploiting the threat of the British Harrier, then impressed the leadership at the 1967 Domodedovo Air Show with a Yak-36 display and successfully elevated the project to a state priority. Then, exploiting the tensions between the navy, which coveted aircraft carriers, and the government, which was reluctant to build them, he convinced Admiral Gorshkov to support him—and ultimately, he shoved that Yak-38 junk into the Soviet Navy, and then forced the Soviet Navy to build four cumbersome and useless aircraft-carrying cruisers around it. Is this some kind of secret sensation? You speak as if you only learned about it yesterday. If the Soviet Army has any widely publicized, bitter lesson, the aircraft carrier impasse is definitely one of them. Frankly, it's hard to imagine that more than thirty years after the collapse of the USSR, anyone still believes that abandoning the construction of real aircraft carriers was the right decision. The very situation you're referring to with the lack of a home port for Soviet aircraft carriers is precisely the direct result of the leadership's erroneous decisions (in fact, not just erroneous, but criminal in their actions against the country and its people). If there's no port, then build one! They found the money for seven aircraft-carrying cruisers, but not for a proper base for aircraft carriers? Did China really have a port for aircraft carriers before they even started building them? When party and state leaders oppose a great maritime power having aircraft carriers, that in itself is a monstrous mistake. If they had stood firm and simply not built anything, the mistake would have ended there, and the money wouldn't have been wasted. But no: on the one hand, they banned the construction of aircraft carriers, and on the other, they allowed the navy to smuggle them in under the guise of aircraft-carrying cruisers. And what were they fighting against? Not only had the navy secretly brought the matter to a fait accompli, but the government hadn't bothered to plan the necessary infrastructure, wasting public funds. If China had such leaders, every single one of them should have been shot.
  6. -4
    26 May 2026 07: 13
    I hope to see planes take off from the deck of this aircraft carrier someday to bomb Tokyo or California! Bomb them to smithereens! wink
    1. +2
      26 May 2026 07: 36
      Quote: Schneeberg
      Bomb to smithereens!

      Do you even realize how wet your dreams are?
    2. +1
      27 May 2026 09: 44
      I consider this comment by Wang Mengyuan on carrier forces to be extremely accurate and worthy of careful study and reflection by military enthusiasts:

      Aircraft carrier groups, depending on the balance of forces with the potential enemy, are divided into three different levels.

      The lowest level is the Carrier Escort Group. For example, Soviet aircraft carriers were primarily used to protect nuclear submarines from NATO anti-submarine aircraft. Defensive operations require only air superiority and shore support, so the requirements for the carrier's strike capabilities and air wing size are modest.

      When forces are sufficient to conduct offensive operations, such a force is called a Carrier Strike Group. Historically, the first carrier strike group was the Japanese Mobile Force (Kido Butai), consisting of six medium aircraft carriers with over 300 aircraft. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the first example of an offensive operation by a carrier strike group.

      The size of the air wing and the ordnance projection capabilities of a carrier strike force reach such a level that it is capable of inflicting heavy damage on a major enemy naval and air base with a surprise strike. However, when the enemy is prepared to defend itself, its forces are still insufficient to wage protracted combat and reduce the enemy to ruins by brute force. A force capable of direct forceful assault and still crushing a first-class enemy naval and air fortress is called a Carrier Battle Group. Historically, the first carrier battle group was formed by the United States in 1943, a force of six Essex-class heavy aircraft carriers (twenty-four were later built) with over 500 aircraft. With the appearance of this combat unit, the chain of fortresses that Japan had built with such difficulty in the Pacific Ocean could only wait to be razed to the ground one by one.

      For the foreseeable future, the Chinese Navy's carrier forces, relative to American forces, can only be considered carrier escort groups. To reach the US coast and strike the American homeland, it would be necessary to rise two notches. This would only be possible if China's combined power were to absolutely and overwhelmingly surpass that of the US. However, if things reached that stage, the problems of Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other matters would inevitably have long since been resolved, and China would essentially simply be openly bullying the US—just as the US is currently bullying North Korea. However, due to the enemy's nuclear retaliatory capability, the actual use of force would still be impossible.
      1. 0
        28 May 2026 00: 43
        Aircraft carrier groups, depending on the balance of forces with the potential enemy, are divided into three different levels.

        American structure.
        3. AUS - aircraft carrier strike group.
        2. AUG - aircraft carrier strike group
        1. The Sea Control Ship (SCS) is an idea by Zumvolt, which was initially implemented in Europe but not in the USA. It is currently being implemented in a modified form, if necessary, using a UDC with VTOL aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters.
  7. +3
    26 May 2026 07: 42
    I can only envy the Chinese. Well done. I'll keep quiet about ours, because it's all swear words... am
  8. +2
    26 May 2026 10: 19
    From an engineering standpoint, there was no need for such haste: it would have been wiser to wait until the crew had mastered the Liaoning, assessed its strengths and weaknesses, and provided feedback to the shipyard, before designing the next ship.

    From an engineering standpoint, shipyards needed to gain experience in designing and building ships of this caliber; completing the half-finished Liaoning was clearly insufficient to begin designing and building ships on par with American attack aircraft carriers.
    Overall, the article is interesting.
    1. +3
      26 May 2026 14: 48
      Quote from solar
      From an engineering standpoint, shipyards needed to gain experience in designing and building ships of this caliber; completing the half-finished Liaoning was clearly insufficient to begin designing and building ships on par with American attack aircraft carriers.

      They basically did the same thing by building Shandong, which is very close, but the article just spoke about it in an unfortunate way – in the quote you provided.
      1. 0
        26 May 2026 16: 00
        The author explains it differently
        From a military-political perspective, the decision reads differently: according to expert assessments, the Chinese leadership was guided by the need to have two combat-ready aircraft carriers by 2020—this was seen as a response to the American "pivot to Asia" policy and a means of reducing military-political pressure from the United States.

        Clearly, the key was the desire to gain experience. In terms of combat capabilities, the Chinese themselves consider the Liaoning a combat-training ship, and the second one is not far behind in this regard.
        1. +3
          26 May 2026 16: 47
          Quote from solar
          The author explains it differently

          I agree, and in my opinion, he's explaining it incorrectly. But I think the Chinese did the right thing.
          1. +2
            26 May 2026 17: 01
            Totally agree with you.
        2. +1
          27 May 2026 11: 00
          Since 1987, China has had a dedicated "carrier cadre training program." In the seven years between the commissioning of the Liaoning in 2012 and the Shandong in 2019, the Liaoning managed to train several full carrier air wings for China. While the Liaoning initially focused on training and troop preparation, the Shandong is clearly now focused primarily on combat power. Moreover, both carriers are now fully operational. According to Japanese and Taiwanese statistics, the maximum daily number of carrier-based fighter sorties flown by the Liaoning and Shandong reached 90. This means that a single J-15 flew three to four sorties per day—the Chinese Navy, through intensive training, literally squeezed the ski-jump carrier's combat capabilities to the limit. Incidentally, it's worth mentioning that the Liaoning's crew actively recruited pilots from the "Heroic Sea and Air Hawk Regiment" (10th Regiment, 4th Aviation Division, PLA Navy). At one point, this even led to this elite first-category regiment being demoted to a second-category rank—all because pilots selected for the carrier were required to have over 1000 flight hours on fourth-generation fighters, and they were primarily recruited from the Navy. Meanwhile, other J-11 regiments had only been formed a few years earlier, and candidates who met the standard were extremely rare. Only the "Heroic Sea and Air Hawk Regiment" had flown third-generation aircraft for the longest time—at that time, it was armed with Su-30MK2s and J-10s.
          1. 0
            27 May 2026 11: 55
            Yes, Liaoning initially did place a strong emphasis on training and preparation of personnel, but Shandong is clearly now focused primarily on combat power... one J-15 carried out three to four sorties a day...

            These are just takeoffs and landings; they haven't seen any actual combat. Even the most limited participation of the Russian sister ship in actual combat has highlighted the problems of aircraft carriers of this type.
            Excuse me, if it’s not a secret, are you a Chinese person living in China?
            1. 0
              27 May 2026 13: 36
              Of course, these weren't just takeoff and landing drills; otherwise, why did Japanese F-15 fighters attempt to approach the Liaoning's task force last year and be escorted by J-15 fighters, their fire-control radar locked, for an entire hour? Over the past few years, the Chinese Navy has repeatedly deployed to the Western Pacific with two aircraft carriers: sometimes practicing interoperability, and sometimes the carrier groups engaged in one-on-one combat training, conducting offensive and defensive exercises (last year, the Liaoning played the role of a US carrier near Guam, and the Shandong played the role of an interceptor, which was widely covered in the OSINT community). You seem to be suggesting that the Chinese Navy, having trained for over a decade, has only been practicing the most basic takeoffs and landings all this time. Doesn't that seem a bit of an underestimate of the Chinese? In peacetime, the simplest and most direct metric for assessing pilot combat readiness is annual flight hours. China has already surpassed the United States in this metric, while American performance continues to decline: last year, the US Navy eliminated the mandatory deck landing qualification requirement for carrier-based pilot training graduates. (Link: https://www.twz.com/air/carrier-qualifications-axed-from-graduation-requirements-for-new-navy-fighter-pilots). American think tanks estimate the combat effectiveness of Chinese ski-jump carriers at one-third that of the Gerald Ford, but this estimate applies to the average daily weight of ordnance dropped. The missions of US carriers are typically limited to massive bombing raids on Third World countries. In this regard, the combat effectiveness of a ski-jump carrier is indeed only one-third that of the Ford due to the smaller number of aircraft and their lighter payload. However, if we are talking solely about gaining air superiority, then since air-to-air missiles are relatively light, the combat effectiveness of the Liaoning and Shandong clearly significantly exceeds this third.
              1. 0
                27 May 2026 14: 15
                You seem to be suggesting that the Chinese Navy, having trained for over ten years, has only been performing the most basic takeoffs and landings all this time.

                The Russian aircraft carrier, similar to the Liaolin, had been in service since 1991 (and carrier-based pilots had been training even earlier). Separate ground-based systems were used for deck-based flight training, and the ship participated in numerous exercises. But when they tried to use it in a more or less realistic combat situation in Syria in 2016 (25 years later), problems arose. Exercises are exercises; a real combat situation is another matter.
                American think tanks estimate the combat effectiveness of Chinese ski-jump carriers at one-third that of the Gerald Ford, but this estimate applies to the average daily weight of ordnance dropped.

                It's known that exercises to study the intensity of deck-based flight operations were conducted on the US aircraft carrier Nimitz. The result was approximately 1000 flights, simulating primarily strike missions, over four days (a book about the exercises can be found online). This means that Nimitz is capable of maintaining an average of approximately 250 sorties per day on primarily strike missions for a considerable period of time. However, this has never been achieved in a real combat situation. The fact that a record 90 sorties were flown in one day during the exercises doesn't mean it can be sustained in a real combat situation.
                Why did Japanese F-15 fighters attempt to approach the Liaoning formation last year and were escorted and their fire control radar captured by J-15 fighters for an entire hour?

                And really, why? Was China planning to start a war with Japan, or Japan with China? You yourself understand that this is doubtful.
                However, if we are talking solely about gaining air superiority, then since air-to-air missiles are relatively light, the combat effectiveness of the Liaoning and Shandong clearly significantly exceeds this third.
                The same is true for American aircraft carriers.
                1. +1
                  27 May 2026 18: 50
                  Can the intensity of Russian pilot training after the collapse of the USSR be compared to the intensity of Chinese pilot training today? Chinese and Russian pilots interacted with each other during the international Aviadarts competition. Typically, on the Russian side, only the regiment commander has experience using guided munitions, whereas on the Chinese side, every pilot has used guided munitions—that's the difference. (Of course, now, during the Special Military Operation, the number of pilots dropping guided bombs has likely increased.) The average daily sortie rate of the Russian aircraft carrier in Syria, which was in the single digits, is simply unthinkable in the Chinese navy.

                  During the American Surge 97 exercise, 975 sorties were flown over four days, but 553 of these were under 100 nautical miles, 214 were between 100 and 200 miles, and only 64 were over 200 miles. This is what it means to truly "crank out the numbers" simply by taking off and landing. Furthermore, for these exercises, excess personnel were transferred to the aircraft carrier, and the munitions were specially replaced with lighter ones (15 technicians could only hang up two MK83 bombs in eight minutes, but managed to hang up eight MK82 bombs in nine minutes). Actual data should be assessed based on the average daily sortie rate of US Navy aircraft during the Persian Gulf War—50–70 sorties per day, or one sortie per aircraft per day. The Liaoning and Shandong have roughly comparable performance figures: based on a full seagoing cycle, the average daily sortie rate for carrier-based fighters is 30. If we're talking about pure fighter cover, even when taking off from a forward takeoff position, a full fuel load and sufficient combat load can be ensured. With a deck wind speed of 25 knots, the takeoff weight from a forward takeoff position is 28 tons. The J-15 weighs 17,5 tons empty (thanks to the use of more composite materials and a more advanced radar, it's significantly lighter than the Su-33; the J-15DT, lacking its fuselage brake, sheds several hundred kilograms), and its full fuel capacity is 9 tons, leaving a payload reserve of 1,5 tons. The PL-15 long-range missile weighs 210 kg, the PL-12 medium-range missile weighs 180 kg, and the PL-10 close-in missile weighs 100 kg, so the J-15 is fully capable of flying a mission with a full load of ammunition on all hardpoints.
                  1. 0
                    27 May 2026 21: 32
                    During the American exercise Surge 97, 975 sorties were carried out over 4 days, but of these, 553 sorties were at a range of less than 100 nautical miles, 214 sorties were at a range of 100-200 miles, and only 64 sorties were at a range of more than 200 miles.

                    Can you figure it out yourself? The bottom two diagrams in the first picture. For example, at a range of less than 100 miles—only 2 percent of 975 sorties. Mk82—only 11 percent. Mk83—31 percent. Compare with your figures.
                    The actual data should be assessed based on the average daily frequency of US Navy aircraft sorties during the Gulf War - 50-70 sorties per day, that is, one sortie per aircraft per day.

                    During the Gulf War, carrier-based aircraft spent most of their time serving as operational reserves and providing air patrols, so they flew relatively few sorties.
                    Liaoning and Shandong have roughly comparable performance indicators

                    You are confusing combat use and training flights.
                    1. 0
                      27 May 2026 22: 45
                      You provided a picture of the "theoretically achievable" range, but the actual target range is in this table. The same report admits that the exercise used an excessive number of MK82 bombs, while in real combat, far more MK83 and MK84 bombs would be used. During this exercise, the carrier and AOE supply ship carried 804 MK82 bombs, 900 MK83 bombs, and 200 MK84 bombs. The MK82 and MK83 bombs were quickly expended, and the air wing could have continued the exercise using MK84s, but this was decided against. Loading the MK84 requires additional equipment, which reduces its effectiveness. Even RAND stated that such a standard is untenable. In a combat situation where the enemy has a real ability to resist, it makes no difference whether 160 sorties per day are flown or 80. The aircraft carrier's capabilities should be enhanced by increasing the number of aircraft on deck and its strike range.
                      1. 0
                        27 May 2026 23: 49
                        You provided a picture of the “theoretically achievable” flight range, but in reality the target range is in this table.

                        Not "theoretically achievable", but one that was actually simulated during exercises.
                        You're not taking into account that these were exercises, so the targets were actually located at a different range, determined by the existing training ranges in the area. However, to simulate a flight to the stated range, the aircraft were held in the air for the required time, simulating a longer flight to the target. The range simulated by holding the aircraft in the air is shown in Figure 10.
                        Table 9 shows the number of combat sorties against targets, grouped by distance from the USS Nimitz. These distances do not indicate the maximum strike range of CVW-9 aircraft. Rather, the distances were determined by the proximity of the carrier's operating area to the Southern California training ranges. During Surge, aircraft often hovered over the USS Nimitz awaiting landing, time that in a real operation would have been spent flying to more distant targets and back. Figure 10 shows the maximum operational strike range that could have been achieved during each combat sortie.

                        A similar explanation applies to weapons.
                      2. 0
                        28 May 2026 19: 04
                        They didn't intentionally inflate the mileage by circling to simulate range, but simply factored the return latency into the range potential—no need to twist the meaning of what's written. The return latency of a strike group exists in its own right, and adding it entirely to the flight range is pure falsification. And how this latency can be tied to the use of weapons is something I'm completely curious about.
                      3. 0
                        28 May 2026 19: 16
                        They didn't intentionally inflate the mileage by circling around to simulate distance, but simply factored in the waiting time upon returning as a potential distance—there's no need to distort the meaning of what's written.

                        Yes, on a 100 mile flight the waiting time is equivalent to a 500 mile flight.
                        there is no need to distort the meaning of what is written

                        Even if you really want to.
                        The actual distances corresponding to the flight time (regardless of whether you flew in a circle or in a straight line) are shown in Figure 10. This is what you should start from.
                      4. 0
                        28 May 2026 21: 41
                        US aircraft carriers operate on a 1+15 cycle (i.e., 75 minutes) during which aircraft are launched and received. An aircraft that misses its cycle is forced to wait for the next one. Can this waiting time be converted into range? Minimally, because in the holding zone, the aircraft flies at minimum speed and without payload, while on a combat course, it flies at cruising speed with a full payload. Furthermore, it must maintain a substantial reserve for afterburners and for holding during the return (who knows if it will hit its cycle on return?). Simply multiplying the time in the air by the speed and calling it range is categorically impossible. Moreover, with a real increase in the distance to the target, the sharply increased need for tanker aircraft to ensure safety will have to be compensated for by a sharp reduction in the number of combat sorties. The Americans themselves, when talking about these exercises, always discuss the distance to the target as the combat radius, emphasizing that such a short distance is unrepresentative. Who even cares about this so-called "potential radius"? https://blog.usni.org/posts/2009/08/27/the-monster-myths-of-the-cvl-concept https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0399carrier/ A US Navy report indicates that the maximum combat radius of the F-18 in a 1+20 cycle (1+20 with external tanks) without the use of tankers is 225 nautical miles. When using S-3B tankers to increase range, due to the limited number of tankers themselves, the number of F-18 combat sorties will be reduced by half. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA359178.pdf
                      5. 0
                        28 May 2026 22: 34
                        Do you understand the difference between 100 and 500, and how exercises differ from real combat operations?
                        The Americans themselves, when talking about these exercises, always discuss the distance to the target as the combat radius.

                        You'll also read a lot on VO. But generalizing it as "what the Russians themselves say" isn't worth it.

                        By the way, what's up with the Chinese aircraft carrier test report?
                      6. 0
                        29 May 2026 18: 02
                        The author of the linked article previously worked at the RAND Corporation, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. If someone formerly employed by the Russian General Staff or the Ministry of Defense were to publish on this website, citing them as "that's what the Russians say" would be perfectly appropriate.
                      7. 0
                        30 May 2026 13: 32
                        The author of the linked article previously worked at the RAND Corporation, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

                        So what? It's his personal opinion. And Russians express it differently. Perhaps it's not customary in China, which is why there's misunderstanding.
  9. 0
    26 May 2026 17: 11
    Thanks to the author for the material. It was interesting!
  10. 0
    26 May 2026 20: 13
    Am I correct in assuming that civilians are allowed onto an active aircraft carrier? Is this a one-time event, or is it actually possible to take a tour?
    1. 0
      27 May 2026 09: 05
      Yes, the aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2017 and the aircraft carrier Shandong in 2025 were opened to the public in Hong Kong - each once.
  11. Des
    0
    27 May 2026 06: 55
    Article plus.
    Just like China). Rapid development of everything and everyone.
  12. +1
    27 May 2026 09: 13
    I thank the website editors for their editing of this article. This is my first time writing a piece of this kind and, frankly, I'm not very familiar with how to properly cite data, provide sources, and maintain an objective tone. What Chinese weapons and military equipment would you like to learn about next? Please let me know.
    1. 0
      31 May 2026 10: 27
      You can talk about Fujian, or their new UDC type 76.
  13. 0
    31 May 2026 10: 26
    Thanks for the article. By the way, if better quality images become available, J-35s have already been deployed to Liaoning. And the Chinese press itself has reported that J-35s are already in Liaoning.
  14. 0
    3 June 2026 06: 04
    好了我确定了,博主应该是中国人 laughing 难得在这个论坛还能看见中国人了