The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba: What's Left of the Army of the Island of Freedom
Military systems Defense Cuban army. In the foreground is a BTR-60 chassis and a turret with a pair of 57mm guns. Behind are fully-fledged Osa-AK air defense systems. Photo: Bmpd.livejournal.com
Against the backdrop of Washington's escalating rhetoric toward Havana—statements about the possibility of a military scenario and increased US naval activity in the Caribbean—interest in the state of the Cuban army has resurfaced. The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR, Spanish) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR) have a small number of regular troops and very outdated equipment, but the emphasis on the concept of a “people’s war” - mass paramilitary formations and asymmetrical means - partially compensates for the gap with a potential adversary.
General indicators
The Russian Military Forces is a multi-component structure responsible for protecting the country's maritime and land borders, as well as its airspace. Border troops and territorial militias are involved in these defense tasks.
The list of the RVS personnel is approximately 49 thousand people:
- Revolutionary Army (ground forces) - about 38 thousand people;
- Revolutionary fleet — about 3 thousand people;
- Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Forces (DAAFAR, Spanish) Defensa Antiaérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria) - about 8 thousand people.
The following are also involved in the defense:
- Border troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - about 6,5 thousand people;
- Army of working youth - 70 thousand people in reserve;
- Civil Defense Forces - 50 thousand reservists;
- Territorial People's Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales, MTT) and Production and Defense Brigades (Brigadas de Producción y Defensa, BPD) — in total, according to official data, more than 1,1 million people. This figure reflects the list of mobilization resources, not the number of trained and equipped fighters; the real combat value of such formations is limited to guerrilla and urban operations.
The RVS is staffed primarily by conscription. Men aged 17 and older are liable for military service for two years, followed by enrollment in the reserves. Women are offered voluntary enlistment in certain specialties.
The defense budget has been estimated at 75–80 billion pesos in recent years. Converted at the official exchange rate, it comes to $3–3,3 billion, but this figure is largely arbitrary: the real exchange rate of the Cuban peso is significantly lower than the official one, and in dollar terms, military spending is significantly more modest. The declared level—3–4% of GDP—allows for maintaining overall indicators but does not ensure equipment upgrades: capabilities are limited not so much by the official budget as by foreign currency shortages, sanctions restrictions, and a narrowing pool of suppliers.
Logistics is also a systemic weakness. Cuba is under long-standing US sanctions and experiences chronic shortages of fuel and spare parts; a significant portion of its reserves is maintained by "cannibalization"—the dismantling of some units of equipment to repair others. This limits the pace of any military exercises and prevents sustained high-intensity combat.
Cadets of the Naval Academy of the Russian Military Council, 2014. Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Ground troops
The ground forces are the largest and, in fact, the main branch of the armed forces. The Revolutionary Army is focused on conducting combat operations exclusively on its own territory.
The country's territory is divided into three military districts—the Western, Central, and Eastern Armies. Following the reforms of the late 2000s and 2010s, the RMF finally transitioned to a brigade-based structure. tank the unit is a separate tank brigade of the Western Army (official name - Gran Unidad de Tanques "Rescate de Sanguily", named after General Ignacio Agramonte's 1871 cavalry operation). In addition, the ground forces include mixed mechanized and light brigades, a special forces brigade, and anti-aircraft brigades of the army's air defense.
The armored vehicle fleet is characterized by a large gap between its listed strength and its actual combat-ready numbers. According to publicly available data, up to 600–900 T-54/55 and T-62 tanks are listed on paper and in long-term storage; industry analysts estimate that approximately 110–120 vehicles, primarily modernized T-55M and T-62M, are maintained in combat readiness. Later modifications of the PT-76 and T-34 tanks have either been decommissioned or converted into carriers of non-standard weapons.
The armored vehicle fleet consists of several hundred units. The newest are the Soviet-era BTR-70 and BMP-1; the bulk of the fleet consists of the long-outdated BTR-152 and BTR-60.
The artillery units have at least 1300 Soviet-designed systems in calibers ranging from 57 to 152 mm, primarily towed. There are at least 40 self-propelled guns, some built by Cuban industry on readily available chassis, including those of obsolete tanks. They also have 82- and 120-mm mortars, specialized anti-tank guns (ZIS-2, D-44), and early Soviet-model ATGMs. Rocket-propelled missiles artillery BM-14 and BM-21 Grad are represented – a total of at least 170 units.
One of the improvised Cuban air defense systems, equipped with rockets R-13. Photo: Bmpd.livejournal.com
The army's air defense system includes towed and self-propelled systems with calibers ranging from 23mm to 100mm. In recent decades, MANPADS from the Strela and Igla families have been actively purchased. The Kub and Osa-AK air defense systems remain in service.
Air component
The DAAFAR fleet is small in number and significantly outdated. The technical integrity of a significant portion of the fleet is questionable.
Classic fighter aviation The MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29 fleet has effectively lost its combat readiness. Of the MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29 aircraft delivered during the Soviet era, the vast majority are either mothballed or unfit for flight. According to satellite monitoring and industry analysts, at the country's main airbase, San Antonio de los Baños (southwest of Havana), where the 2nd Air Defense and Fighter Brigade "Playa Girón" is stationed, only 1-3 MiG-29s (including one MiG-29UB combat trainer) of the 12 initially delivered are maintained in conditionally airworthy condition. The number of pilots authorized to fly the MiG-29 is estimated at 5-8.
The stated standard flight time for this group—200–250 hours per year—is achieved primarily through simulator training and flight time on the L-39; actual flight time on the MiG-29 is considered minimal and is maintained for the purpose of demonstrating combat readiness. Flight personnel formally assigned to the MiG-21 maintain their qualifications largely through flights on the company's civilian aircraft. Aerogaviota, closely related to the RVS.
The Air Force also operates up to five Mi-35 attack helicopters. The training squadron operates L-39s; military transport units operate a variety of aircraft (including An-26s and up to two heavy Il-76s), as well as Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters. The Air Force's total "flying" fleet, according to industry estimates, does not exceed 20-30 aircraft—almost exclusively auxiliary aircraft.
The majority of the Strategic Missile Forces' anti-aircraft weapons are DAAFAR. Soviet-era S-75 and S-125 air defense systems remain in service. According to industry sources, the S-125 was upgraded to the Pechora-2BM standard—including replacement of its electronic components, upgraded radars, addition of optoelectronic channels, and jamming protection—by Belarusian companies (including ALEVKURP) in cooperation with Cuban repair plants. Some systems were equipped with self-propelled chassis (T-55 tanks, KrAZ trucks), which increases their survivability on the move.
Unmanned component
According to Western media reports (the original source being an Axios publication citing US intelligence sources, subsequently republished by several outlets), Cuba received over 300 reconnaissance and attack UAVs in mid-2026. Russia and Iran are cited as the primary suppliers, with military-technical consulting accompanying the deliveries. There is no official confirmation of this information.
If the scale of deliveries corresponds to the declared ones, the unmanned component is capable of becoming the most modern part of the arsenal of the Strategic Missile Forces and significantly changing the logic of coastal defense: even a limited number of strike drones Allows for work on coastal vessels, landing groups, and rear facilities. A final assessment is possible only after confirmation of the nomenclature, pace of development, and sustainability. EW the adversary.
Aircraft of the Revolutionary Air Force, early 1990s. In the foreground are the then-new MiG-29s. Photo by Urrib2000.narod.ru
Naval capabilities
Despite its island status, Cuba lacks a developed naval force. The Revolutionary Navy's size and combat capabilities are limited.
The largest combat units are two patrol ships/frigates of the type Rio Damuji, converted from trawlers. They carry several types of artillery systems and a pair of P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles. Up to six Soviet Project 205 missile boats, originally equipped with the same Termit, are in service; according to available information, the missiles were removed and transferred to land-based launchers.
Anti-submarine missions are assigned to one Project 1241.2 Molniya-2 small anti-submarine ship (NATO reporting name: Spider). According to open sources, the ship's sonar system has been removed and it is currently used as a border patrol vessel. The fleet also has up to five Soviet-built minesweepers.
The fleet includes one midget submarine of the type Dolphin with torpedo armament. According to publications by USNI News, hisutton.com, and GlobalSecurity, the submarine was designed and built by Cuban companies beginning in the late 1990s, drawing on North Korea's experience in small sabotage submarines. Its stated parameters are a length of approximately 21 meters, a displacement of approximately 100 tons, a crew of 5-7, and presumably two 533-mm torpedo tubes. The submarine was first spotted on satellite imagery around 2008, based in the Havana-Cabañas area; it was only officially unveiled in 2020-2021.
The Navy has transport vessels, as well as motorboats and cutters for marine units. Coastal defense is provided by towed artillery guns of 122–152 mm calibers and up to four Rubezh missile systems with P-15 missiles.
Weak sides
The missile-armed frigate Rio Damuji, converted from a trawler. Photo: Wikimedia Commons
The condition of the RCS is far from ideal, and the reasons for this are systemic.
Limited economic resources prevent the country from maintaining a large army and upgrading its equipment. Long-outdated models, such as T-55 tanks and MiG-21 fighters, remain in service. Cuban industry partially compensates for this with local solutions (old artillery on readily available chassis, improvised air defense systems based on aircraft-launched missiles), but such measures do not close the gap.
Logistics and supplies are the island's critical vulnerability under sanctions. Fuel shortages limit the intensity of exercises and the combat effectiveness of equipment; ammunition supplies are finite, and replenishing them in wartime requires sea lanes that a potential adversary can control.
Cyberdefense and electronic warfare are areas where public data is scarce. Cuba is not a leader in these areas and, according to available information, does not have specialized units comparable to developed armies. In the event of a conflict, this means that command and communications systems are vulnerable to modern countermeasures.
Cuba is home to the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, an enclave controlled by the United States since the late 19th century (formally since 1898, under a 1903 lease). This is an obvious geographic factor: in the event of a conflict, the base can be used as a staging point for reconnaissance, logistics, and evacuation, and its existence means that Cuba effectively has no control over part of its "own" territory.
The main potential adversary is the United States. The military capabilities of the two sides are incomparable. The US Navy's 4th Fleet is deployed in the Caribbean; air bases in Florida and on the East Coast provide a flight time of tens of minutes to Cuba; a typical strike force is capable of carrying out both precision cruise missile strikes and large-scale amphibious operations supported by carrier-based aircraft.
Strengths and conclusion
Despite the obvious rupture, Cuba still has factors that could complicate a military operation against it.
Geography. The island, over 1200 kilometers long, with mountainous regions in the east (Sierra Maestra), center (Escambray), and west, and dense urban development along the coast, is unsuitable for rapid offensive action and suitable for concealed defensive positions. This was noted by American military planners during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Coastal defense. The combination of Rubezh anti-ship missiles, cannon artillery, army air defense, and remaining tank units, when deployed correctly, can increase the cost of an amphibious landing. Effectiveness depends on the quality of reconnaissance, concealment, and communications—those components that make the RAF most vulnerable.
Reserves and territorial militia. Even with the conventionality of a million-strong figure, the country's mobilization potential is significant. Organized resistance can lead to losses that become a political, rather than a military, factor. American society's sensitivity to personnel losses has repeatedly manifested itself in local conflicts: in Somalia (1993), the battle in Mogadishu, famous from the film "Black Hawk Down," with the deaths of 18 American service members, led to the closure of the operation; in Iraq, cumulative losses became a factor in the shift in strategy.
The unmanned factor. Confirming the delivery of hundreds of UAVs creates an asymmetrical weapon capable of inflicting targeted damage on coastal vessels, landing groups, and facilities at Guantanamo Bay. The final assessment depends on the type of weapon, the pace of its development, and its resistance to enemy electronic warfare.
External context. Cuba has historically relied on political and military-technical support from Russia, China, and Venezuela. The scope of such support is limited in the current circumstances, but the political umbrella and potential supply channels remain factors that a potential adversary must take into account.
Scenario dependence. The assessment of the combat readiness of the Strategic Missile Forces varies significantly depending on the scenario. For a naval blockade, naval forces and coastal defense are essential; for a cruise missile strike, air defense and dispersal of targets are essential; for a full-scale invasion, all defense components and mobilization potential are essential.
In total, this allows us to speak of an asymmetric defensive strategy: the emphasis is not on the ability to repel an attack by regular army forces, but on a combination of prepared coastal defense, dispersal, mobilization reserves, and targeted use drones and the political cost of the conflict. Only a real conflict can reveal how viable this approach will be; in the public sphere, its effectiveness remains a matter of judgment, not verified data.
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