Anti-crisis policy: choosing the strong side

"Sheep" with a fuel oil tender
Publications about Russia's economic problems clearly display a pronounced bias toward hypercriticism—everything is bad, everything will fall apart, and so on. Proponents of this approach, albeit implicitly, somehow believe that all it takes is exaggeration, panic, and hysteria, for the problems to magically resolve themselves. Or that, just as magically, some "solvers" will appear who will resolve these problems.
Yelling and screaming have never solved a single problem, and, in fact, proponents of hypercriticism often, and I believe often intentionally, hinder the development of an effective anti-crisis strategy by shouting at anyone who starts looking for some kind of advantage in the current situation: “Nothing good can happen!” “Everything is lost!” and so on.
What I like about the Soviet economic experience is that it included numerous moments of struggle with various crises and difficulties, during which approaches to effective anti-crisis strategies were developed that can be generalized and developed into a theory. Specifically, this approach employed a method that could be called "the strength-based approach," which can be used to overcome any economic crisis that arose.
Let's look at this using the example of using petroleum fuel to solve the fuel crisis of the 1920s.
The forest is the head of everything
The fuel crisis occurred when, in the spring of 1918, Soviet Russia suddenly lost almost all its mineral fuel. Yes, as a result of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, under which German troops occupied Ukraine and the Donbas region—the main source of coal—in March-April 1918. In late July 1918, when the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) government in Baku fell and power passed to the British-aligned Central Caspian, oil supplies also ceased.
Large cities, industrial centers and railways of the RSFSR were left without fuel supplies.
Of course, there were reserves and stockpiles, there was the Moscow region coal basin (in 1917 it produced about 700 thousand tons, and in 1918-1919 production fell to 380-400 thousand tons), there was smuggling, but all this did not provide even the minimum fuel needs.
The situation was absolutely critical, enough to drive today's hypercritics into hysteria, to the point of unconsciousness. The Bolsheviks, however, in addition to the most obvious measures of centralizing fuel reserves and distributing them at the infamous Main Fuel Office of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, quickly discovered the one remaining strength, despite all the losses: firewood.
Firstly, most of the territory of the RSFSR in 1918-1919 was covered by forest. Only the south, where the fighting took place, had sparsely forested areas.
Secondly, logging did not require complex technical equipment, but it did require taking into account the labor costs of harvesting, transporting and sawing firewood and supplying firewood harvesters with food rations.
Third, a specific system for firewood procurement was developed, taking into account the proximity of procurement areas to cities, railways, and rivers; a system for the accumulation and distribution of firewood reserves was developed in accordance with the instructions of the Main Fuel Directorate and the priorities of consumers.
Fourth, unsaleable wood was used. Wooden houses, outbuildings, and fences were dismantled for firewood, especially in Petrograd. In 1920, the Palotop Main Directorate was established, responsible for collecting dead wood, brushwood, and pine cones from forests—incidentally, 1 billion poods in 1920.

This is roughly how Moscow residents were supplied with firewood at the peak of the fuel crisis.
A particular advantage was that, although firewood was the worst fuel for steam locomotives, the railways could nevertheless run on self-supplied firewood.
Firewood remained the main fuel for a long time, even after the end of the Civil War, which, however, led to the fact that in many areas logging areas were cut down for 15-20 years in advance or more, and to the depletion of local forest resources.
Turning to oil
After the Donbass was captured by the Red Army at the end of December 1919, and Baku was captured by the Red Army and local Bolsheviks practically bloodlessly on April 28, 1920, the preconditions for resolving the fuel crisis arose.
However, at this point, an interesting temporary shift occurred in favor of oil over coal. Oil proved to be the Soviet economy's strength at the time. The Baku oil fields, of course, suffered from the war and the British occupation. In 1920, oil production fell to 2,9 million tons and continued to decline to 2,4 million tons in 1921. But then there was a rapid recovery: 2,9 million tons in 1922, 3,5 million tons in 1923, and 4,2 million tons in 1924. By 1928, production had reached 7,7 million tons.
However, the situation with Donetsk coal was much worse. In 1920, production fell to 4,5 million tons (Donetsk coal consumption in 1913 was 25,3 million tons), with the basin's own consumption accounting for 27% of production. Recovery in production was slow: 5,4 million tons in 1921, 6,3 million tons in 1922, 8,1 million tons in 1923, and 11,8 million tons in 1924. Only in 1927 did Donbas exceed pre-war production levels.
If we exclude the basin's own needs for lighting, drainage, lifting, and similar needs, then Donbass supplied coal:
1920 - 3,2 million tons
1921 - 3,9 million tons
1922 - 5,4 million tons
1923 - 7 million tons
1924 - 10,2 million tons
1927 - 28,2 million tons.
As we can see, the first three years after the end of the Civil War were very bad, and Donetsk coal provided from 12 to 21% of the 1913 consumption level, which was considered normal in those years.
Therefore, much of the 1920s was marked by the increased use of oil and various petroleum products, primarily kerosene and fuel oil. They were used in all areas, from industry and railways to household lighting and cooking. It was during these years that the famous primus stove appeared, partially saving on firewood and coal in cities.
Fuel oil on railways
Fuel oil played a huge role in providing railways with fuel and in resolving the fuel crisis. It's worth noting here that a relatively little-known aspect of the issue is that before the Revolution, a significant portion of the steam locomotive fleet ran on fuel oil. Thomas Urquhart, an engineer at the Gryazi-Tsaritsyn Railway, built and commissioned the first fuel oil locomotive in 1874. In 1904, 5500 fuel oil locomotives, or 40% of the fleet, were in operation. Then, by 1913, the share of fuel oil locomotives had dropped to 25% of the fleet (to 5200 locomotives) due to a sharp rise in fuel oil prices, as well as increased coal production and a decline in coal prices. However, in 1913, the railways consumed approximately 3,3 million tons of fuel oil and petroleum residues. Coal was on the rise because it became cheap at the time, but fuel oil dominated on the roads of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Before the war, an infrastructure for supplying steam locomotives with fuel oil was built, and despite cutbacks, it remained in place. Along the mainlines served by oil-fired locomotives, systems were built for storing and draining the fuel oil into tenders equipped with steam heaters.
Steam locomotives were easily converted from coal to fuel oil or wood, and vice versa. For example, to convert to fuel oil, a fuel oil tank, usually box-shaped but sometimes cylindrical, was installed in the tender in place of the coal pit. A fuel oil pipeline was connected to the firebox. A system was installed to heat the tank and supply live steam to the injectors—they were steam-oil injectors, in which fuel oil atomization was provided by steam. The tender typically held 7 to 13 tons of fuel oil, which provided a range of 100-150 km. Steam locomotives of the "Shch," "Ch," and "O" series, as well as the Swedish "E" series, were converted to fuel oil.

Drawing of a fuel oil tank in a locomotive tender
In the 1920s, fuel-oil locomotives served almost the entire Transcaucasian, North Caucasian, Tashkent, Central Asian, and Yekaterininskaya (or Krivoy Rog) railways. They also served certain lines of the October Railway (passenger and express trains), the southern and eastern branches of the Moscow-Kazan Railway, and the Ryazan-Ural, Samara-Zlatoust, and Syzran-Vyazemskaya railways—all along the Volga region.

Map of the USSR railways
Fuel oil was used primarily in the south, where the fuel source was close, and also in the Volga region, where fuel oil was delivered by river tankers, mainly to Saratov and Samara.
Of course, fuel oil had its advantages. Fuel oil consumption was 40% lower than that of high-quality coal. Tender loading took just 10 minutes, compared to 40 minutes for coal loading. Oil loading facilities were much simpler and more economical than coal depots, especially if tender coal loading was done manually. Furthermore, while a coal-fired locomotive consumed up to 5% of its fuel on starting and maintaining steam, an oil-fired locomotive quickly built up steam, started up in 30 minutes, and when stationary, the fuel oil supply to the firebox could be reduced to a minimum, allowing for just a light fire. The labor-intensive and time-consuming process of ash pan cleaning was also eliminated.

Very few photographs of oil-fired steam locomotives survive. This photo shows an "E" series steam locomotive filling its tender with water; the water tank is located beneath the oil tank.
Overall, fuel oil reduced the cost of transporting a ton of cargo by 25-30%. Boiler capacity increased by 15-20%.
But running on fuel oil was a real art. If the engineer increased speed, the assistant engineer had to immediately add fuel oil and steam to the burner, otherwise the steam pressure in the boiler would drop rapidly. The fuel oil had to be heated constantly, but not above 80 degrees Celsius, otherwise the fuel oil would boil, the pumps would supply it intermittently, and the locomotive would begin to cough. To clear the fire tubes of thick soot, the assistant engineer would throw a scoop of dry quartz sand through the firebox inspection window into the burner flame; the sand would scrape off the soot, which would be carried up the stack. The assistant engineer had to keep an eye on the water, since a lack of water on an oil-fired locomotive would very quickly lead to a burnout of the firebox ceiling and could lead to a boiler explosion. In general, the hot torch of the injector, up to 1500-1600 degrees, quickly and significantly wore out the steam locomotive, which required frequent repairs of the firebox and fire tubes.
So, oil-fired locomotives had their advantages and disadvantages.
Without fuel oil there is no bread, meat, cotton...
Now, why fuel oil? There are obvious and non-obvious aspects here.
The first is obvious. There was too little coal. In 1921, the People's Commissariat of Railways consumed 2,6 million tons of coal (66% of Donbas production), while coal accounted for only 27,2% of the total fuel. The railways ran primarily on wood.
[Center]

Although the supply of firewood to the railways sometimes led to the collapse of stations[/ Center
In 1922, the People's Commissariat of Railways consumed 3,2 million tons of coal (59,2% of production), with a coal share of 36,2%. In 1923, railways used 4,8 million tons (68,5% of production), with a coal share of over 51%. In 1927, when the decision was made to sharply reduce fuel oil consumption by the People's Commissariat of Railways, a number of railways were converted to coal, and the design of fuel oil-powered locomotives was even banned, railways consumed 8,9 million tons (31,5% of production).
It should be taken into account that in the early 1920s, when the enrichment plants in the Donbass were not operating, the coal supplied to the railways was whatever was available, often with 20-30% ash content and an admixture of waste rock.
The second is less obvious. If we look at the region served by fuel oil-fired steam locomotives, we see that, with the exception of the special needs of the October Railway, fuel oil-fired locomotives served the South, the Volga region, the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia—regions either almost completely devoid of forests or with extremely limited forest resources. There simply wasn't enough firewood to power the steam locomotives. Due to the obvious shortage of coal, coupled with its poor quality, oil was the only alternative fuel for steam locomotives in these regions.
This region, served by oil-fired locomotives, accounted for up to 80% of the grain harvest, especially wheat, up to 45% of meat, 100% of cotton, as well as up to 70% of coal, up to 60% of steel, up to 25% of nitrogen fertilizers, and 100% of oil and petroleum products. Yes, coal and oil were transported primarily on oil!
Thus, it's perfectly clear that without oil-fired locomotives, it would have been impossible to ensure the very existence, let alone the rapid development, of the Soviet economy. Incidentally, I've never read about this factor in any book on transport economics or Soviet economics in general.
Fuel oil-fired steam locomotives, figuratively speaking, had reached the end of their service life. Before the war, they were used in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. After the war, with the restoration of transportation and the emergence of a new source of fuel oil in Bashkiria, the Kuibyshev Railway, parts of the South Ural, Ryazan-Ural, Moscow-Ryazan, and Moscow-Kursk Railways, as well as the October Railway for passenger service and the Baltic Railway for some of its steam locomotives, switched to fuel oil in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1956, the decision was made to build diesel locomotives, and after that, oil-fired steam locomotive traction began to decline, practically disappearing by 1975.
This is the "strength-based approach," one of its most striking examples. A strength is an element that can be relied upon to resolve an economic crisis. To leverage it, it must first be identified, as it may be little known, known only to a few specialists, or even undervalued.
Information