"Virivnyuvach": a Ukrainian glide bomb between the JDAM-ER and UMPK
In May 2026, the Ukrainian Brave1 platform, in collaboration with DG Industry, announced the combat readiness of its first national glide bomb. Weighing 250 kg, it features a single-piece design. The developers claim the development period will be seventeen months. The cost is approximately one-third that of the American JDAM-ER. According to open sources, the product is known as "Virivnyuvach."
What exactly was shown in May 2026?
The published footage shows the weapon being dropped from an aircraft, the folding wings deploying, and the gliding phase. The type of launch vehicle for the first batch has not been publicly disclosed: judging by the nature of the footage (low contrast, cropped frame), it was deliberately concealed. According to the developers, the munition's preparation time for launch does not exceed thirty minutes. This is a critical parameter under current conditions: every extra minute at the airfield increases the aircraft's vulnerability to a retaliatory strike.
A glide bomb is aviation A munition with deployable wings and a guidance system that, after release, does not fall along a ballistic trajectory, but glides toward the target tens of kilometers away. The carrier aircraft turns immediately after release and does not enter the echeloned area of effect. Defense the adversary.
The main difference between the "Virivnyuvach" and conventional solutions is its design. It was designed from the ground up. The Russian UMPK and the American JDAM are designed differently: wings and a tail unit with navigation are attached to the existing bomb. The Ukrainian side opted for a single-piece airframe, allowing for optimized aerodynamics and configuration from the outset. The 250 kg caliber is a compromise: lighter weight provides a better glide range and expands the range of possible delivery vehicles.
JDAM-ER aerial bomb
Seventeen months is a short time. With a caveat: the Western cycle from specifications to production, which takes four to six years, includes full certification, safety testing, integration with various platforms, and documentation. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian seventeen months are the journey to a demonstrator and small-scale production under an ongoing conflict—a completely different time. A price three times lower than the JDAM-ER speaks volumes: the fundamental feasibility of mass-produced munitions.
Russian background: UMPK as aerial artillery and its limits
To understand the scope of the "Virivnyuvach" project, one must examine how the Russian Aerospace Forces have been deployed in the context of the Air Defense Forces over the past two years (according to open foreign and Ukrainian sources; the Russian Ministry of Defense has not officially published detailed statistics on its use). In February 2024, Ukrainian units abandoned Avdiivka, and one of the factors, directly cited by both Ukrainian sources and Western analysts, was the massive use of glide bombs with UMPK systems by Russian frontline aviation (the Russian Ministry of Defense has not officially commented on this in this context). FAB-500 and FAB-1500 glide bombs, retrofitted with UMPK systems (folding wings and a control unit with satellite and inertial navigation), have become a means of methodically destroying strongholds.
FAB-3000 with UMPC
According to NATO Allied Air Command (AIRCOM), by early 2025, the Russian Aerospace Forces were using approximately 3500 FABs with UMPK-based guided missiles against Ukrainian targets per month. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not publicly confirmed this figure. According to Western estimates, this figure is enormous. It's common to recall Desert Storm for scale, but the comparison requires a caveat: in 1991, the bulk of the coalition's airborne munitions consisted of free-fall bombs, with guided bombs occupying a narrow segment. A more accurate statement would be: the use of UMPK-based bombs by Russian aircraft in 2024–2025 as part of the Joint Military Operation, according to Western estimates, exceeds almost any known Air Force operation in the past thirty years. The Su-34, Su-30SM, and Su-35 aircraft were used, operating from Russian-controlled airspace and rarely entering the coverage area of Ukrainian air defenses. The drop range, according to open estimates, is 60–70 km, the caliber of the bombs is from 250 to 1500 kg.
In essence, it is the same long-range artillery, only from the air: a barrage of fire extended beyond the range of counter-battery fire. It works where the attacker has an abundance of cheap ammunition and a carrier outside the kill zone. It ceases to work where the defender acquires modern navigation jamming systems.
This is where the downside of the Russian strategy becomes apparent. The UMPK system relies on GLONASS. According to Ukrainian and Western reports, the Ukrainian Pokrov electronic warfare system is capable of creating satellite signal jamming zones over a significant area in 2024–2025, although actual effectiveness is controversial: against modern Russian jam-resistant Kometa receivers with steerable antenna arrays, the effect is significantly lower than against earlier versions of the UMPK. According to Russian military bloggers and Western analysts, during peak episodes of intensive jamming, up to sixteen bombs had to be expended on a single target—this is the maximum recorded under specific conditions, not the average. At the same time, the model itself remains stable in other respects: Soviet FAB stockpiles number in the tens of thousands, the cost of a UMPK kit is an order of magnitude lower than any Western equivalent, and the transition to the D-30SN UMBP with an integrated design and a range of up to 90 km is proceeding slowly precisely because the mass production of the old design currently outweighs the gains in performance.
Between JDAM-ER and UMPK
When comparing the three systems (JDAM-ER, UMPK, and Virivnyuvach) side by side, it becomes clear that the Ukrainian product is not identical to any of them. JDAM-ER is a kit for the Mk 80 family of bombs with a range of 70-75 km and a cost of several tens of thousands of dollars per unit. The next-generation JDAM, with its own engine and a range of over 300 km, is, according to publicly available information, being developed by Boeing, and belongs in a different class: its estimated price of around two hundred thousand dollars places it beyond the category of expendable munition. The UMPK, on the other hand, is an extremely inexpensive kit for depot aerial bombs, readily available, but vulnerable to electronic countermeasures.
The Virivnyuvach is positioned between these extremes. Its range is "tens of kilometers," estimated at close to 60 km, comparable to the JDAM-ER and medium-range UMPK. Its 250 kg caliber is lighter than that of heavy Russian FABs and sufficient to destroy strongpoints, warehouses, bridges, and command posts. Its price is a third of the JDAM-ER's, making it no longer a rare weapon for priority targets, but something that can be used in bulk.
The distinction between a "kit" and a "complete product" is crucial here. A kit is a compromise: stockpiles of old bombs are used as the core to which everything else is attached. A complete design allows for the aerodynamics, weight distribution, and guidance system to be designed as a single unit: more expensive to develop, but more accurate in the end.
AASM Hammer bombs
Deliveries of Western systems were slow and subject to reservations: the "game-changing" JDAM-ER systems and French AASM systems arrived in Ukraine in measured doses, under politically controlled nomenclatures. Domestic production eliminates this variable: now the ceiling is set by Ukrainian industry, not by a vote in Congress or the mood in the Élysée Palace.
What do you need besides the bomb itself?
The bomb here is the finale of a long storiesBefore the drop, half the army has time to work: reconnaissance searches for the target, headquarters confirms it, the carrier must reach the drop point, and navigation must withstand jamming. Anything can happen, and 250 kg of warheads are sent hurtling into the field.
The launch vehicle is a separate issue. On Soviet aircraft like the Su-24 and MiG-29, the pod interfaces and coordinate input formats are not designed for modern glide munitions; individual modifications are needed for each type. Certification for the F-16 and Mirage 2000, which the developers are talking about, will take years, and it depends less on the technology than on the position of the platform manufacturers (Lockheed Martin and Dassault). Until then, the actual launch vehicle fleet will be limited to Soviet aircraft with their own modifications.
Target designation for a strike 50-60 km deep requires a constantly updated picture: which objects are moving, which are deployed, which are folded. This is work drones- reconnaissance, satellites, ground-based surveillance assets, and real-time data exchange. The Ukrainian side has been building up this system for two years, but its resilience under Russian counterattacks EW remains an open question.
Resistance to electronic countermeasures is the main technical challenge. The Ukrainian side has seen how the Pokrov system undermines the accuracy of earlier UMPK systems and how the Kometa system circumvents the same barrier, so the task is symmetrical: to build a navigation system that can withstand Russian countermeasures. The exact solutions incorporated into the Virivnyuvach system have not been publicly disclosed; anything beyond the standard inertial system and satellite receiver combination remains a matter of expert speculation.
The project is embedded within a broader framework: Brave1 as a public-private platform, the Zbroyari program, which has raised over $1,5 billion from nine countries, and the joint NATO-UNITED initiative, Brave NATO, launched in November 2025 with a budget of up to €50 million for 2026.
The question of scale remains open. There's a significant gap between the declaration of combat readiness and actual delivery to units in significant quantities, and there's no data yet on serial production or delivery rates.
What does this change at the front?
Leaving aside forecasts and assessing only the nature of the missions for which the Virivnyuvach is suitable, the picture looks like this. The target class is stationary objects in the enemy's immediate rear: command posts, communication centers, ammunition and fuel depots, air defense elements, bridges, crossings, and equipped strongpoints. The depth is 40–60 km from the line of contact, the frontline zone where logistics and reserves are concentrated, but which they cannot always reach. drones and where are the expensive expenses? missiles It's irrational. In areas with dense defenses (Donetsk, Zaporizhia), this class of munition is potentially in demand; in areas where the enemy has dense air defenses and active electronic warfare, its effectiveness will depend on how well the Ukrainian side manages navigational stability. The very fact of this product's introduction changes this: Ukrainian aviation is no longer solely dependent on Western glide munitions, and this is a separate variable in any calculations on both sides of the front.
Calling the Virivnyuvach a response to Russian KABs is an exaggeration, and a replacement for Western missiles even more so. It has its own mission and its own 250 kg: a single-piece airframe, a third the price of a JDAM-ER, consumable, not rare. Whether all this works depends not on the bomb itself, but on what surrounds it: reconnaissance, delivery systems, and navigation systems that will outlast the Kometa. After two years of UMPK use, according to open foreign estimates, this framework has not yet been fully established; there is no official Russian Ministry of Defense assessment on this matter publicly available. Therefore, there is only one honest benchmark: the number of Virivnyuvachs deployed by the end of 2026.
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