"Sarmat" vs. "Minuteman": What's more profitable to destroy the world?

In the wake of recent publications about the Sarmat ICBM, which have caused certain emotions among a certain part of the country's population, the decision was made to talk about this weapons, which will be used once.
Of course, the fact that some of our politicians have taken it as good form to threaten half the world with these weapons not only doesn't do them any credit, but quite the opposite. No one in the world is openly afraid of Russian weapons anymore. missiles, and such statements simply fall into disarray. Indeed, if there had been the determination to launch, the transport hubs supplying Kyiv with weapons from all over Europe would have long ago been destroyed. And since this hasn't happened in the fifth year of the war, there's no point in even talking about Russian ICBMs going anywhere.
I recently read a resource, one of those "not ours," from a former Soviet chess player. The idiot (there's no other way to put it) was verbosely and furiously telling the world that Sarmat was an ancient Soviet design, with nothing new in it, and no comparison whatsoever to the third-generation Minuteman.

In general, of course, comparing such different missiles is silly, but we'll forgive it. However, since we're on the subject, it makes sense to discuss all aspects. The mere fact that the Minuteman's price was announced at $7 million, while the Sarmat's was at $100 million, makes it hard to sit back and relax. However, we'll discuss these figures below; let's go step by step.
Liquid or solid-fuel ballistic missiles: which is better? A comparative technical and economic analysis of solid- and liquid-fuel ballistic missiles could be taken from Taylor and Watson, but that's not the case here. Therefore, all comparisons will be based on the work of M.D. Evtifyev, A.A. Raskin, and A.S. Sukhanov.
The question of which technology is superior—liquid rocket engines (LRE) or solid rocket engines (SRE)—has remained a key issue in strategic missile development for over half a century. Both the USSR/Russia and the US have followed their own evolutionary paths, and there is no definitive answer: the choice of propellant is always determined by the specific tactical and technical task. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages; the only question is which one is more appropriate.
Solid propellant rockets (SRRMs)

It was with the gunpowder rockets of ancient China (13th century) that the story Today, solid-fuel technology dominates the ground-based component of US strategic nuclear forces (Minuteman III, Trident II) and is actively developing in Russia (Topol-M, RS-24 Yars, Bulava).
Advantages of solid propellant rocket motors
Simplicity of design and reliability. The engine has only two main parts: the combustion chamber and the nozzle. There are no turbopumps, valves, or pipelines, which minimizes the risk of mechanical failure and minimizes the maintenance crew. They lit it and... like 700 years ago: it took off with special effects.
Constant combat readiness. Unlike liquid-propellant missiles, which require lengthy and dangerous fueling (especially with toxic or cryogenic components), solid-fuel missiles can be stored fueled for years and are ready for launch in minimal time, something liquid-propellant ICBMs simply cannot achieve. The propellant components are too toxic and corrosive.
Solid-propellant ICBMs are the ideal first-strike weapon. Nothing is required—just the command is given, and the missiles are launched. The enemy, upon learning of this, goes to refuel their liquid-propellant ICBMs. The time difference can be such that the liquid-propellant ICBMs have only just been fueled and prepared for launch, while their solid-propellant counterparts are already, as they say, on the doorstep. Knocking on the silo hatches, so to speak.
Solid-propellant ICBMs have a faster acceleration. It's believed that a more energetic launch and acceleration shortens the boost phase of the trajectory, reducing vulnerability to enemy missile defense systems. In reality, it all depends on distance. That is, for the India-Pakistan pairing, this is the case, but not for the Russia-USA pairing. The distance is such that no missile defense systems can counter it. Defense They won't be able to work on the missiles during the active phase.
Mobility and vitality
Solid-fuel ICBMs are lighter and more compact than liquid-fueled ones. This allows them to be deployed on mobile ground-based systems (such as the Yars and Topol-M mobile ground-based missile systems), dispersed, and camouflaged from satellite reconnaissance, thereby increasing their chances of survival in a first strike.
It's worth emphasizing: the US doesn't have these problems, as the European air defense shield can be considered a defensive element, albeit at best. However, given this fact, Russian missiles will fly over the North Pole, not through Europe, which will negate all US maneuvers in Europe. Here, we can say the two countries are on par. Both Russia and the US will be firing missiles over the North Pole, leveling the playing field.
Operational safety
The absence of toxic and aggressive liquid components simplifies transportation, storage and maintenance.
Disadvantages of solid propellant rocket engines
Low specific impulse. The energy efficiency of solid-propellant rocket engines is inferior to modern liquid-propellant rocket engines. For a kerosene-oxygen pair, the exhaust velocity reaches ~3500 m/s, compared to the typical ~2500–2800 m/s for solid propellants.
Difficulty regulating thrust. The solid-fuel engine burns according to its own program. Changing the thrust, much less shutting it down or restarting it in flight, is extremely difficult. This is critical for the warhead deployment maneuver, and nothing can be done about it, at least for the next 10-20 years.
Design limitations on launch weight
The larger the rocket, the thicker the combustion chamber walls (also known as the fuel container) must be to withstand the high pressure. This leads to a heavier structure.
Liquid-propellant rockets (LPRE)

The world's first liquid-propellant rocket engine was created by American engineer R. Goddard (1926), while in the USSR, Academician V.P. Glushko made the primary contribution. The USSR long led the development of heavy liquid-propellant ICBMs (R-36M Voevoda, UR-100N UTTKh), and today Russia continues this trend with the latest RS-28 Sarmat system.
Advantages of liquid propellant rocket engines
The highest specific impulse in the chemical engine class. Over 4500 m/s for the oxygen-hydrogen pair and 3500 m/s for the kerosene-oxygen pair. This provides advantages in payload and range.
Thrust control. The liquid-propellant rocket engine can be throttled (thrust can be adjusted in flight), shut down, and restarted. This is crucial for complex deployment schemes of warheads to individual targets.
Weight advantage on large missiles. Liquid propellant is stored in separate thin-walled tanks under low pressure, with high pressure only being generated in the combustion chamber. With solid-propellant rocket engines, the entire body is a pressure vessel. Therefore, liquid-propellant rocket engines are more advantageous for heavy silo-based ICBMs.
Disadvantages of liquid propellant rocket engines

Complexity and cost. Liquid-propellant rocket engines are structurally more complex: turbopumps, hundreds of valves, and an automatic control system. Transportation and refueling are separate, highly hazardous technological operations, especially involving toxic components (heptyl/amyl).

Low combat readiness. A liquid-fueled rocket cannot remain fueled continuously (the components are corrosive, evaporate, and require thermostatting). Launch preparation time is measured in hours and even days.
Vulnerability to external impacts. The design is less tolerant of impact loads. In the event of a nuclear strike on a silo, the survivability of a liquid-fueled missile is lower than that of a solid-fueled one.
Development ceiling. Modern liquid-propellant rocket engines are close to the chemical limit of their fuel's energy potential, and further performance improvements require a transition to new physical principles of propulsion.
Practical Choice: Where Are Strategic Weapons Heading and What Are They Best Used For?

Solid-fuel ICBMs are designed for rapid global strike and mobile deployment. The United States fully transitioned to solid-fuel ICBMs back in the 1960s. Russia has been steadily increasing their share since the 1990s (Topol-M, Yars, Bulava), focusing on increased survivability, stealth, and a shorter boost phase.
Liquid-fueled missiles are used for heavy silo-based missiles with record-breaking throw weights. The RS-28 Sarmat (liquid-fueled), the successor to the Voevoda, is capable of carrying up to 10 tons of payload, including Avangard hypersonic maneuvering pods. This is a weapon capable of guaranteeing a massive retaliatory strike, where preparation time is less critical.
Modern science is seeking ways to combine the advantages of both systems. Gel- and ice-like fuels are being explored, which could combine the controllability of a liquid-propellant rocket engine with the simplicity of a solid-propellant rocket engine. However, for now, this is a laboratory-scale development.
Final conclusion
There is no "best" type of vacuum engine - the choice is dictated by the task.

For strategic deterrent forces, a mixed structure is optimal: mobile solid-fuel systems for a guaranteed retaliatory strike and survivability, and heavy liquid-fuel systems to overcome any missile defense system and inflict maximum damage. This is precisely the path Russia is currently pursuing, developing both the Yars and Sarmat missiles in parallel.
Economic comparison of solid rocket motors and liquid rocket engines: which is more profitable?

Now let's talk about money. The economic efficiency of rocket engines is a major issue. It's been the subject of years of debate in the defense industry. The superficial view that "solid fuel is cheaper, therefore the rocket is cheaper" is misguided. The economics of a rocket system is determined by many factors throughout its entire life cycle, and I'll venture to explain this axiomically.
The key paradox: fuel versus system. Liquid-propellant ballistic missiles are more expensive than equivalent solid-propellant missiles, despite the fact that 1 kg of liquid fuel is several dozen times cheaper than solid fuel.
This phrase captures the essence of the economic dilemma. Let's break it down by expense item.

Solid rocket propellant is a complex chemical composition, a composite fuel based on ammonium perchlorate, aluminum, and polybutadiene binders. Its production requires specialized chemical plants, sophisticated equipment, and strict control.
Liquid components, especially the cryogenic pair "kerosene-oxygen", are produced in a continuous industrial process and are incomparably cheaper.
The bottom line on fuel: liquid fuel is tens of times more cost-effective per unit of mass. However, fuel cost is not the primary factor in the economics of a rocket system.
Engine and rocket production

In general, while a solid-fuel engine is extremely simple in design—the combustion chamber and nozzle are the two main components—a liquid-propellant rocket engine (LPRE) consists of a turbopump assembly, hundreds of valves, and automation and control systems. Manufacturing a LRE is several times more expensive.
In addition, as the launch mass increases, the weight advantage of liquid-propellant rocket engines begins to make itself felt, but for most military missiles (especially mobile ones), a solid-propellant design is lighter and cheaper to manufacture.
Infrastructure. An important component of our conversation.
Solid propellant rockets:
- Do not require filling stations
- Stored fueled and ready to fire
- No need for special equipment to neutralize toxic components
- Can be placed on mobile ground complexes.
Liquid rockets:
- Stationary or mobile filling stations are required.
- When using high-boiling toxic components (heptyl/amyl), strict safety measures are required, including chemical protection for personnel and disposal of spills and containers.
- When using cryogenic components (oxygen, hydrogen) - complex cryogenic equipment, evaporation losses.
- Transporting fueled missiles is either virtually impossible or extremely dangerous.
Operating costs
Solid propellant rockets are easier to maintain:
- Minimum routine checks
- Long storage periods without fuel degradation (up to 20–30 years)
- Do not require highly qualified personnel.
Liquid rockets are more complex:
- Regular testing of components
- Replacement of gaskets, valves, leak testing
- Limited service life of a fueled rocket
- High requirements for calculation qualifications.
Comparison by missile classes
Small and medium ICBMs (mobile)
For mobile missiles like the Topol-M and Yars, solid propellant is significantly more cost-effective. The weight advantage of liquid rocket engines doesn't apply here (the turbopump assembly "eats" the gain), and the infrastructure costs of liquid rockets make them uncompetitive.
Heavy silo-based ICBMs
For heavy missiles like the RS-28 Sarmat, with a throw weight exceeding 10 tons, the weight advantage of the liquid-propellant rocket engine begins to offset its complexity. However, economics is no longer the primary criterion; combat performance (record throw weight, number of maneuvering units) takes center stage.
Summary table of economic efficiency

The main conclusion: solid propellant rockets (SRRMs) are more economically advantageous.
Although solid fuel itself is several times more expensive than liquid fuel, the total lifecycle cost of a solid-fuel rocket, from design and production to operation and disposal, is significantly lower. The reasons are as follows:
- simplicity of design;
- lack of complex infrastructure;
- no minimum operating costs;
- lack of constant combat readiness without additional costs.
However, this economic advantage only works up to a certain missile size. For super-heavy launch vehicles with record-breaking throw-weights, liquid-propellant rocket engines remain the only option, and in these cases, economics take a backseat to tactical and technical requirements. This is precisely why Russia is diversifying its strategic forces: the solid-fueled Yars and Bulava missiles are designed for mass production, mobility, and cost-effectiveness; and the liquid-fueled Sarmat missile is designed for a guaranteed penetrating strike with maximum payload.
But there is an economic nuance here.
The base production cost of a single LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is approximately $7 million. Some writers have become quite agitated, shouting that America's missiles cost $7 million, while Russia's cost $80 million or more.
And there are nuances here. The cost of the Sarmat was calculated very roughly, based on the Soyuz. The rockets are indeed similar, and it was said that, toward the end of its career, the Sarmat could very easily be used to launch artificial satellites into orbit. This "feature" was inherited from brilliant Soviet designers, from the very same R-7 to the present day. At least, the SS-19 Stiletto, a headache for the West in the 70s, is a true peaceful Rokot, which performed very well from Plesetsk: 31 of 34 launches were successful.

So, here's the cost of the Sarmat. Delivering one kilogram of cargo into orbit, according to official Roscosmos prices, costs between $15,000 and $17,000. The Sarmat's payload capacity is 10,000 kg. A simple calculation yields $150 million. Subtracting advertising, marketing, and the difference in the cost of the warhead and satellites, the figure comes out to around $80-100 million. It's a very rough estimate, but unfortunately, there's simply no other option.
And here, it seems, that's it: a Minuteman costs 7 million, a Sarmat 70. He deliberately lowered the figure, meaning that for the price of one Sarmat, you could build 10 Minutemen. Yes, the difference is very unpleasant, I agree. But... it's wrong!
One Minuteman cost the budget $7 million between 1970 and 1978, when they were in production. One million dollars in 1970 is equivalent in purchasing power to about $8,51 million today, so do you see the difference? So, a Sarmat costs $70 million today, but a Minuteman costs $60 million, not $7. But that's not all!
Minuteman missiles, like missiles, require investment: maintaining them in combat readiness requires constant outlays. What determines the real cost and inflation price? Over the decades (five decades) of service, the US has spent billions of dollars on service life extensions. For example, the Propellant Replacement Program (PRP) and Guidance Renewal Program (GRP) alone cost the US budget nearly $5 billion ($2,4-$2,5 billion for each program).

So if you divide that 5 billion by the 400 missiles the US has… That's only 12,5 million per missile. And the total gradually creeps toward $70 million per missile. And so, the Sarmat, with its price, doesn't seem all that bad. At least the Sarmat can throw 10 tons, while the Minuteman can, at most, throw 1.5 tons.
And if we now talk about the new LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM missile being developed to replace the Minuteman, it will cost significantly more: its projected cost is already estimated at $162 million per unit, and the total budget for the rearmament program exceeds $140 billion.
And that's it, really. The incredibly cheap American missile, which could be launched in dozens against just a few Russian ones, has somehow disappeared. So it turns out that our missiles and the American ones are on par in terms of cost. Which means the economic issue takes a backseat to the physical one.
Physically, the Sarmat can send 10 times more warheads to the US than the Minuteman can to Russia.
This isn't exactly encouraging; most likely, the vast majority of Russians won't care who finishes last (and in a nuclear conflict, the winner is the one who strikes first, meaning the last one at the finish line) and will survive, and no one will be happy. But purely hypothetically, the missile path Russia is on seems more certain. The Americans are betting that their first-strike missiles will be more effective, but the question here is how many warheads Russian missiles, launched using the "dead hand" principle, would deliver to US territory.
There is an opinion that both sides will face the same ending.
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