Georg von Haase: Reflections on the Battle of Jutland
A full broadside from the battlecruiser Derfflinger
Translation of the epilogue to Georg von Haase's book "Two White Nations" (Georg von Haase "Zwei weisse Völker").
Author: Georg von Haase
Translation: Slug_BDMP
When the sun rose on the morning of June 1st, the German fleet was at the latitude of Horns Reef, that is, at the same degree of latitude where the Danish city of Esbjerg is located. And when we could not detect the enemy anywhere around, at that moment, I confess frankly, it was as if a stone had fallen from my heart: with our ship shot at, and especially with our thinned artillery, we couldn't have fought a successful battle with a large warship whose artillery remained intact. I had already expended almost all the ammunition in the Anna and Bertha turrets, and the remaining ammunition in the Caesar and Dora turrets was inaccessible, as the turrets were still filled with toxic gases and the magazines were flooded.
But for the sake of our fleet and our fatherland, I deeply regret that a decisive battle did not come. And undoubtedly, this circumstance was a great pain and a dashed hope for our fleet commander, Admiral Scheer. It would have been easy for the British to engage us in battle early in the morning. After all, their cruisers and destroyers remained in contact with us all night. Consequently, the British commander-in-chief received continuous radio updates on our every move. And it would have been the greatest fortune for our fatherland if a battle had finally come to pass at Horns Reef, not far from Heligoland. Judging by the experience of May 31, more than one British ship would have been destroyed, and a colossal expenditure of ammunition would have been required to completely disable the German battleships.
Had Jellicoe engaged in a decisive battle at Horns Reef on June 1, the British fleet would undoubtedly have been forced to cede its place as the world's most powerful navy to America. I readily admit that the complete destruction of Jellicoe's fleet on June 1 was out of the question. But as someone who knows our ships and our naval gunnery well, as well as British ships and their gunnery, and based on my gunnery experience gained in the Battle of Skagerrak, I can confidently assert that a naval battle between the British and German battlefleets, if fought to its conclusion, would have cost the enemy a very large number of capital ships.
On May 31, after his withdrawal from the "lion's claws," Admiral Scheer no longer had the opportunity to reorganize his fleet into a new, tactically advantageous formation before nightfall. A night battle between two such powerful fleets was impossible. Despite all the necessary markings for a night battle, a wild melee would inevitably ensue, with ship-to-ship collisions, with no certainty as to whether it was enemy or friend. But even if we, as "daring gamblers," had attempted to force a night battle, the British fleet was to avoid it! In a night battle, they would have lost all the advantages of their numerical superiority, greater speed, and long-range artillery, leaving everything to chance.
Jellicoe did quite right when he broke away from us in the evening and during the night led his squadrons away so skillfully that our destroyer flotillas, systematically combing the battlefield area, were never able to detect them.
And strategically, he acted absolutely correctly by not accepting battle again on June 1st. By using the English fleet as a "fleet in being," that is, simply by its existence, he had fully accomplished the task assigned to him up to that point. The Battle of Skagerrak did not interrupt the pressure exerted by the English fleet's mere presence for a moment. If Jellicoe had not accepted the Battle of Skagerrak on May 31st and, wishing to preserve his fleet intact, had instead withdrawn to the protected harbor of Scapa Flow, we would have been able to fulfill our assigned mission—conducting cruiser warfare in Skagerrak and Kattegat—and thereby, for a time, gain supremacy in the North Sea. However, it was the Battle of Skagerrak that prevented our accomplishment.
But by refusing to attack our fleet on June 1st, heading for German minefields and home ports, Jellicoe never for a moment relinquished command of the sea. Why should he have to trade pieces again in this strategic chess game, if his position was such that checkmate was inevitable?
Jellicoe returned to Scapa Flow. Later, when he ceded his position as Commander-in-Chief to Beatty and the King elevated him to Lord, he received the title "Viscount Scapa." At the time, many in Germany, and probably in England as well, scoffed at the admiral's willingness to be named after the desolate place where his fleet had been anchored for nearly four years. Yet it was precisely this four-year anchorage of the English fleet that decisively contributed to the fact that our entire navy had to be brought there, where it now rests at the bottom of Scapa Flow. What a triumph for "Viscount Scapa"! When England's faith in victory was greatly shaken after the Battle of Skagerrak, Churchill published a series of articles on the war on land and at sea in the October issue of the London Magazine. What he said there about the naval war and the Battle of Skagerrak is, in my opinion, correct. Unfortunately! We should have learned the following lesson from this: the English fleet engages only outside our minefields and at a respectful distance from our submarine bases and coastal fortifications. And yet, we absolutely had to strive for a decisive naval battle if we were to ever try to break free from the iron grip with which England strangles us. Consequently, we had to seek out the English fleet on its own shores and engage it there.
It was objected that submarine warfare could only be waged with an intact high-seas fleet, since our naval ports would be hopelessly blockaded if we lost our fleet. To this, it must be said: firstly, a battle with an enemy fleet by no means meant the a priori loss of our entire fleet. Skagerrak, perhaps, proved this. And secondly, our remaining naval forces—cruisers, old battleships, and torpedo boats—combined with our submarines, minelayers, minesweepers, airships, aircraft, and coastal fortifications, would have been sufficient to continue submarine warfare. Moreover, we still had the Kattegat as an outlet for our submarines. In Flanders, submarine warfare was waged without a fleet at all and under far more difficult circumstances than those we experienced in the North Sea. And the decisive battle of the fleets was supposed to make submarine warfare unnecessary, putting an end to the war with a quick outcome.
I don't want to dampen our joy at our partial victory over the English fleet at Skagerrak with these reflections. But what ultimately happens with this victory is what ultimately happens with every single victory we have at sea and on land: it failed to lead the German people to final victory. And yet, at the time, it acted like a font of steel for the fleet, giving the German people new strength and confidence in the future and doing much to enhance Germany's prestige. It was a difficult day for England when we sent 10,000 English sailors to the bottom of the sea along with the pride of the English fleet, while just over 2,000 German sailors had to give their lives under the victorious flag.
An extract from Churchill's articles in the London Magazine (Autumn 1916), printed separately in the Foreign Press of the Imperial Naval Office, is appended.
I conclude my account of the greatest day at sea that we Germans have ever lived through with the wish that my little book and Churchill's article may make many Germans more aware of the enormous influence that command of the sea had on world affairs. history and will continue to do so. And I express the hope that in the coming years more than one German, proud to be a German and a sailor, will feel the breath of the sea breeze.
Yes, we have become a poor people. Yes, our national honor has been grievously humiliated. But we must not lose the courage to undertake new endeavors because of this. Let us remember these words:
Lost money - lost nothing!
Lost honor - lost a lot!
Lose courage - lose everything!
Information