Berezina: a slandered victory
The Berezina's place in the Patriotic War of 1812
The Patriotic War of 1812 can hardly be called a forgotten war. Its artistic projections can be found in such classics of Russian literature as Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov and Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy. Therefore, our perception of those events is inevitably distorted by the prism of literature. The most celebrated battle is Borodino, and Napoleon's ultimate victor is Field Marshal Kutuzov, whose almost Taoist inaction contributed to the enemy's defeat.
However, Napoleon did not suffer defeat at Borodino. Western historians (for example, Stéphane Béraud) even attribute a "Pyrrhic victory" to the French. The Grande Armée's eastward advance continued, and a week after the battle, Napoleon occupied Moscow (September 14).
"The cudgel of people's war," as Leo Tolstoy aptly put it, did indeed cause much trouble for the French invaders, but it did not put an end to Napoleon's Russian campaign. For example, Spanish guerrillas (partisans) resisted the French occupation for nearly six years and only gained the upper hand after Russian troops captured Paris in 1814.
The final battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the Battle of Berezina. Academician Tarle attributes this event to the "final demise of Napoleon's army." However, the emphasis on the apparent victory of the Russian army is often shifted to Napoleon's skillful maneuver to deceive the Russian Admiral Chichagov, or to Kutuzov's fear of attacking the remnants of the French army, or (citing the British representative at the Russian court, Robert Wilson) his simple decision to allow the invaders to escape, creating the so-called "Golden Corridor" in order to "wisely" pit them against the British.
In any case, in French, the word "Berezina" became synonymous with complete defeat (C'est la Berezina). It's important to note that this defeat occurred not before, but during the Battle of Berezina.
Background to the battle
Retreating from Moscow, Napoleon occupied Smolensk, but on November 13, 1812, he abandoned it and advanced toward Orsha. The Battle of Krasnoye (November 18) took place on this march, where Field Marshal Kutuzov's Russian forces managed to inflict significant damage on the French army's rearguard. However, comparing the forces of the two sides, Denis Davydov, an eyewitness to those events, still likened Napoleon's army to "a hundred-gun ship among fishing boats." They looked nothing like a pitiful gathering of deserters.
Napoleon was battered, but not defeated. He retreated to Belarus, where the traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the strong Polish (or Polonized) gentry remained. There was no significant Russian partisan movement here, and, in Tolstoy's words, the "cudgel of the people's war" could no longer harass the French as much as before.
During the Patriotic War of 1812, the "collaborationist" (as we would now call it) Polish division of Dąbrowski operated in Belarus, besieging the isolated Russian garrison in Babruisk. Dąbrowski's march would later become the national anthem of Poland. In the north, near Polotsk, Marshal Oudinot's 2nd Corps operated, reinforced by Marshal Victor's 9th Corps. In the west, near Brest, significant forces (up to 50,000 men) were concentrated under Marshals Reynier and Schwarzenberg.
In Minsk, as Academician Tarle writes, "enormous food and ammunition reserves awaited Napoleon." Furthermore, Marshal MacDonald's corps could have arrived from Riga, although it would have taken him at least 10 days to do so.
Peter von Hess. Crossing the Berezina
The forces of the parties
Each corps in Napoleon's army consisted of an average of 20,000 men. The French historian Georges de Chambray estimates Napoleon's army at Berezina to have 40,000 combat-ready soldiers out of a total of 70,000. This figure already includes the corps of Oudinot and Victor, but ignores the corps of Reynier and Schwarzenberg, as well as MacDonald.
On the eve of the battle, Napoleon had not yet considered fleeing Russia. While in Orsha (November 19-20), he hastily reorganized his army and increased its combat effectiveness. Napoleon also destroyed the bridges across the Dnieper to slow Kutuzov's pursuing army. With his rear in Minsk, he would have been well-positioned to organize not only effective resistance but also a counteroffensive.
Field Marshal Kutuzov's army, pursuing the French, was exhausted—this explains its "slowness" and reluctance to engage in significant battles in the final stages of the Patriotic War of 1812. Kutuzov's desire to spare his soldiers during the Battle of Krasnoye is more a reflection of limited resources than of his notorious sentimentality.
Kutuzov's main army numbered approximately 50 soldiers. In addition, there was General Wittgenstein's corps, numbering 35 men, which covered the distant approaches to St. Petersburg in the Western Dvina region. His forces were even fewer than Kutuzov's. The slightest misstep or misjudgment, and the capital of the Russian Empire would have been under attack.
All hope rested on Admiral Pavel Chichagov's corps, which at the start of the Patriotic War of 1812 was stationed in Moldova to counter the Turkish threat. Fortunately, the Treaty of Bucharest had been signed with the Ottoman Empire, and Chichagov, on the orders of Emperor Alexander I, moved north to the rear of Napoleon's army, which was then advancing on Moscow. In October, he reached western Belarus.
According to some estimates, Chichagov's army numbered as many as 50 soldiers. This force had to be divided into two equal parts. One, under the command of General Osten-Sacken, confronted the corps of Reynier and Schwarzenberg, while the other, directly commanded by Chichagov himself, prepared to meet Napoleon's army retreating from Moscow.
In the mind of Emperor Alexander I, a rather beautiful picture was drawn of three Russian armies (Kutuzov, Wittgenstein, and Chichagov), with a total of 135 soldiers, surrounding from three sides and destroying the remnants of Napoleon's retreating army.
However, the reality was different.
Pavel Chichagov
It's often written that Napoleon deceived the "land admiral" Chichagov, but this is undeniable. The French philosopher and writer Joseph de Maistre described Pavel Chichagov as "intelligent and original." The son of the celebrated Catherine the Great admiral Vasily Chichagov, he had a meteoric career, achieving the rank of rear admiral at age 32 (in 1799), and becoming the Minister of the Navy of the Russian Empire at 35.
The future hero of Berezina detested embezzlement and courtly obsequiousness, earning him the reputation of being practically a Jacobin. Russian elite dismissed his marriage to the daughter of an English captain as a sign of his Anglomania. Chichagov was an experienced administrator, capable of soberly assessing the situation and making the right decisions.
Indeed, one might wonder why Admiral Chichagov was appointed commander of the southern group of forces. Was there really a shortage of experienced combat generals of the Suvorov school? It seems that Alexander I, for some reason, distrusted the generals and needed his own reliable man at the head of the army. Perhaps he feared a palace coup, the kind that led to his father's death. French fashion was bringing Jacobin ideals to Russia, and Chichagov's "Anglomania" might have seemed like immunity to them.
January Sukhodolsky. "The Crossing of the Great Army across the Berezina"
The course of the battle
While Field Marshal Kutuzov was harassing the retreating French troops at Krasnoye, on November 16, Chichagov drove General Bronikowski's Polish garrison out of Minsk. In fact, the Battle of Berezina should have begun from this date. Chichagov was catastrophically short of forces to effectively oppose Napoleon's army, which had reorganized in Orsha. 24 men against at least 40. The capture of Minsk by the French would have significantly strengthened Napoleon's army. The only possible line of defense was the Berezina River, northeast of the city.
On November 21, Chichagov's army captured Borisov, a city on the Berezina River, driving out Dombrowski's Polish division. In this fierce battle, the Russian general of French origin, Karl Lambert, was wounded. A day later, on November 23, Pavel Palen's Russian vanguard was caught in a forest clearing. artillery Oudinot's corps fired at him and suffered losses. This moment demonstrates how quickly Napoleon was able to rebuild his forces, although just recently, during the Battle of Krasnoye in the Smolensk region, it seemed the French army had lost all its artillery. However, Marshal Oudinot's corps did not participate in the march on Moscow and, as we know, did not leave Belarus throughout the Russian campaign.
Meanwhile, Chichagov destroyed the bridge over the Berezina at Borisov and took up defensive positions on the western bank. It should be noted that the Berezina, as a tributary of the upper Dnieper, was not a wide river, and there were many places where the French army could ford it. By holding his position near the former Borisov bridge, Chichagov risked being outflanked. Anticipating this, he dispersed his troops over a considerable distance north and south of Borisov. The most likely breakthrough was toward Minsk, south of the former bridge.
On November 26, Napoleon launched a breakthrough, not toward Minsk, but northward near the village of Studenki, toward Vilna (Vilnius). Chichagov also had a screening force there, led by Colonel Pyotr Kornilov, but it was swept away by the 40-gun French artillery of Oudinot's corps and the cavalry that had forded the river. The pontonniers, standing in the frigid water, began hastily constructing a bridge to transport artillery and supply trains.
A day later, after a forced march, Chichagov's advance detachment attacked the French, who had already established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Berezina. In this fierce battle, Marshal Oudinot was wounded and was replaced by Marshal Ney. That same day, November 28, units of General Wittgenstein's Russian army, which had previously crushed Marshal Victor's French rearguard, arrived at the crossing.
The French held the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Berezina for another day, after which the decision was made to burn the bridges, abandoning the remaining part of the army to its fate.
It was a complete rout. The maneuverable defense gave way to panic and disorderly flight, especially on the part of those who managed to cross to the west bank.
The further pursuit of the enemy was carried out by Chichagov's army together with the Cossack cavalry of Ataman Platov from the vanguard of Kutuzov's army, which had forded the Berezina.
Lawrence Alma-Tadema. "The Crossing of the Berezina"
Stolen Glory
The strained personal relationship between Chichagov and Kutuzov led to a downplaying of the Russian army's achievements. Berezina's hero was accused of "losing" Napoleon. In his reports to the Tsar, Kutuzov constantly pointed out "mistakes," which Chichagov later justified in his memoirs. The Russian public wanted everything at once, so Berezina's hero was practically blamed for "saving" Napoleon.
Particularly depressing was Krylov's popular fable "The Cat and the Pike" (1813), which allegorically blamed Chichagov for his admiral's past, which supposedly prevented him from operating effectively on land. Meanwhile, the modern historian N. A. Troitsky notes that it was Pavel Chichagov who inflicted the greatest losses on the French in the Battle of Berezina.
In this regard, the Battle of Berezina can be compared to the Battle of Gaugamela, during which Alexander the Great defeated the Persian army but "lost" King Darius. This moment did not diminish the Macedonian victory in the least. The objectives of an army operation cannot be reduced to the capture of a particular individual.
The slandered victory at Berezina and the stolen glory of Admiral Pavel Chichagov demonstrate that, beyond real battlefield successes, it is important to preserve and protect their memory. Embittered by public opinion, Chichagov, after Napoleon's expulsion from Russia, requested his resignation and went abroad for medical treatment, where he lived a long but inglorious life far from his homeland.
However, when the great Russian explorer and discoverer of Antarctica, Thaddeus Bellingshausen, mapped the Russian Islands (Tuamotu) in 1820, he dedicated one of them (Tahanea) to Admiral Pavel Chichagov.
Information