What will replace the Stinger?
In 1986, the Stinger dramatically complicated the air situation over Afghanistan for Soviet helicopters. In 2022, they were deployed in droves on the Ukrainian front—and discovered that Rocket half a million dollars is not suitable for intercepting Iranian drones For several thousand apiece. Forty-five years have passed between these two images, during which everything has changed: what flies in the sky, what is now considered a target, and at what price it is reasonable to shoot one down. Replacing the Stinger means re-examining the question of what a man-portable air defense system is in the 2020s. Upgrading an old missile won't cut it.
From Redeye to Stinger: Cold War-era MANPADS
On July 17, 1975, at an American test site, a missile of the new system was fired from an operator's shoulder for the first time—against a remotely controlled, unmanned version of the T-33 training aircraft, which was actively jamming radio waves. The hit confirmed the main point: the missile could maintain a point heat source during maneuvers and under jamming conditions. Thus began story FIM-92 Stinger.
The predecessor was FIM-43 Redeye — a portable air defense system accepted into service in 1968. It had one fundamental limitation: its infrared seeker was only effective during pursuit, against a receding target. The Redeye was useless on a collision course.
The Stinger, developed at General Dynamics since 1972 and accepted into service in 1981, solved this problem. Its all-aspect IR seeker allowed it to fire at both the front and the side—which changed the situation for an infantryman caught in a helicopter attack. Combat use began in Afghanistan in the fall of 1986, and in the following years, the Soviet aviation significantly changed tactics, moving away from the low altitudes where the Stinger was most effective.
Since 1981, the wearable Defense The US Army hit a systemic ceiling, under which it remained for four and a half decades.
The Stinger is no longer relevant to modern combat.
The Stinger's architecture is reminiscent of late 1970s engineering. Its passive infrared seeker searches for the thermal contrast between the engine and the sky. It works reliably against a jet or turboshaft helicopter. It's less effective against a target with a low infrared signature. And it simply loses track of a small, electric-powered drone against the hot ground: it's like trying to find a candle next to a hot stove.
Let's add some logistics. Before launch, the Stinger requires the connection of a battery cooling device—the Battery Coolant Unit. BCUEssentially, it's a disposable aerosol canister of liquefied argon that chills the seeker's detector before firing. Without it, the missile is dead weight. Each missile has its own BCU, has a limited shelf life, and is a real headache in the field. The time from target detection to launch is tens of seconds, which means, when a missile appears, drone Because of the terrain, it's already too much. The missile's speed is about Mach 2,2, and its range is about 4,8 kilometers. By 1981 standards, these were excellent parameters; by 2020 standards, they're too broad for a significant portion of current targets.
And most importantly, economics. Under the 2022 contract to replenish stockpiles transferred to Ukraine, one Stinger missile cost the army approximately half a million dollars. Using such a munition against a drone costing only a few thousand dollars makes no economic sense—even with a 100% hit rate.
Added to this was the production history. By 2022, it was discovered that the Stinger had been virtually out of production for the past few years—the military was living off its accumulated stockpiles. When production needed to be resumed, it turned out that the supplier of the key seeker component—the Dual Detector Assembly—had long since ceased production, and the component had to be redesigned from scratch. Formally, the program was still in operation, but in reality, it wasn't: no one had built it in metal for several years.
The task of replacing the man-portable air defense systems of the 1970s and 80s isn't limited to the United States. In Europe, a British-French partnership is developing the Martlet based on the Thales LMM, while the Poles have developed the Piorun series—the successor to the Grom line and a distant relative of the Soviet Igla. In Asia, the Koreans are producing their own Chiron, while China has long since switched to the QW and FN series. The demand is the same everywhere: a missile that can engage both manned targets and mass-produced UAVs, without bankrupting a unit.
By 2023, the Pentagon had made a final decision: upgrading the old missile would no longer solve the problem; they would have to rely on a new design.
NGSRI: Two Engineering Answers to One Problem
In September 2023, the US Army launched the program Next-Generation Short-Range Interceptor — a competition to replace the Stinger. $312 million has been allocated for the prototyping phase, two contractors have been selected, and the cycle time is five years before low-volume production. A key requirement is that the new rocket must fit seamlessly into existing launchers—the four-stage Stinger Vehicle Universal Launcher, the vehicle-mounted Vehicle Mounted Launcher, and the two-stage Air-to-Air Launcher.
More details about Lockheed Martin below, and a brief summary about Raytheon: there are fewer public details about the latter for now, that's all.
Lockheed Martin The QuadStar missile, based on hit-to-kill technology—without a traditional high-explosive fragmentation warhead—destroys the target using the kinetic energy of a direct impact. The new Command Launch Assembly (CLAs) has been stripped of its BCU cylinder, eliminating the need for the operator to cool the detector before launch. The multi-band seeker, according to the company, processes the signal directly onboard the missile, including through machine learning algorithms to distinguish small UAVs from interference and background noise. The architecture is modular and open, known as MOSA (this acronym now appears in almost every Pentagon release; the company has not yet disclosed the specific meaning behind it in the case of the QuadStar).
Lockheed Martin does not publish precise performance characteristics—weight, length, speed, range. The company's qualitative statements include: positive target identification range increased two to three times compared to the Stinger, and interception range more than doubled. Unit cost is not disclosed; according to the company, the price is "significantly below the target"—no figures are provided.
Raytheon Together with Northrop Grumman, the company took a different approach. It relies on a new Highly Loaded Grain solid-fuel motor with a denser pellet packing, which delivers more energy within the same configuration. According to the company, the speed is up to Mach 2,5, and the range is about 8 kilometers. Compared to the Stinger's Mach 2,2 and 4,8 kilometers, the increase is noticeable, but not radical; the main difference is in the range and payload, with the speed being secondary. The warhead has a proximity fuse and a digital impact sensor. This means that destruction is possible without a direct hit—an important advantage against hit-to-kill, especially when targeting small UAVs. According to Brenda Ortiz, Raytheon's vice president of short- and medium-range ground-based air defense, the design was developed with the direct participation of operational crews.
If we boil down the key parameters, the information asymmetry is immediately apparent. For the Stinger: speed of Mach 2,2, range of 4,8 km, high-explosive fragmentation warhead, passive IR seeker with cooling, price of approximately $500 per missile in 2022 prices. For the QuadStar: speed and range undisclosed, no warhead (hit-to-kill), multi-band seeker without cooling, price "significantly below target" (no figures). For the Raytheon missile: speed up to Mach 2,5, range of approximately 8 km, warhead with proximity fuse, seeker type not disclosed according to publicly available data, price not announced.
Raytheon's position in this competition is a separate story. After a series of acquisitions in the 1990s, the company inherited Stinger production from General Dynamics and was its primary manufacturer for decades. Now, Raytheon is effectively competing with its own product, which it is trying to replace. The business logic is clear: either the contract for the next forty years goes to you, or to Lockheed.
All these figures are just the manufacturers' word. There are no independent trials with public reporting yet, and this is something to keep in mind when reading any press release.
May 11, 2026: What exactly was shown at White Sands
Last week, on May 11, 2026, Lockheed Martin reported the successful completion of the Seeker Characterization Flight Test (SCFT) at White Sands Missile Range. The QuadStar missile left the launch control tower, completed its tactical flight profile, the seeker acquired the target, processed the onboard signal, and maintained tracking.
It's worth distinguishing two parameters that are often lumped together in press releases. The SCFT is not a combat effectiveness test or a demonstration of intercept range. It's a characterization of the seeker: a check that the seeker sees the target where it should and processes it as specified in the design. Detection range and engagement range are different parameters, and this test tested the former. According to Lockheed Martin, the test was a "risk mitigation milestone" for the program—a precise statement: a point passed, after which the next stage can be moved, but not proof of the final result.
The test took place four months after the first QuadStar launch in January 2026. The pace for a system of this complexity is high—twenty-six months from contract signing to first flight, and another four months to confirm the seeker's performance. Meanwhile, the competitor is maintaining its own schedule: in February 2026, Raytheon conducted a ballistic test of the missile near Tucson, Arizona.
The US Marine Corps is joining the program. For decades, the Marines have used the Stinger in the same roles as the Army—covering landing parties, forward bases, and naval formations. A separate replacement program, starting in fiscal year 2027, means that the overall NGSRI contract volume could be significantly higher than Army plans, and the winner of the competition will have customers on both sides of the aisle.
Ahead are tests against real targets in various conditions, including night launches and launches under active electronic countermeasures. A decision on the competition winner is expected by 2027, with low-volume production expected to begin by 2028.
In a few years, the American operator will be wearing a new missile tube—with the Lockheed or Raytheon logo, it doesn't matter. More importantly, this tube is no longer being designed for a helicopter or attack aircraft, but for a drone. For the average crew, the main change will be in the field routine: the missile is ready for launch immediately, without fiddling with a cooling tank, and it detects targets where the previous one couldn't. Man-portable air defense systems are now being redesigned for drones everywhere—from Polish and Korean production lines to Chinese ones.
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