Sarmat by the end of the year: eight years to the mine in Uzhur
On May 12, 2026, another launch of a heavy intercontinental ballistic missile took place at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. missiles "Sarmat." The commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, the branch of the armed forces responsible for the ground-based component of the strategic nuclear forces, reported to the president that the results allow the first missile regiment of the new system to be deployed in the Uzhur Missile Division of the Krasnoyarsk Territory by the end of the year. Vladimir Putin confirmed:
"At the end of this year, the Sarmat will indeed be put on combat duty."
The announcement formally closes an eight-year cycle: from the original deadline of 2018 to the current promise of December 2026. But behind this formula lies a more nuanced engineering and military-political reality, in which the line between combat testing and full-fledged combat duty has proven more fluid than expected.
Chronicle of one date: 2018–2026
In March 2018, while presenting six new strategic missile systems in his address to the Federal Assembly, the president named Sarmat as one of those ready for serial production. The initial plan called for its entry into service in 2018; the total program size was estimated at approximately fifty missiles. Subsequently, each announced deadline was pushed back.
- 2018 — initial date of deployment
- 2020 — shift to 2021
- 2021 — shift to 2022
- April 2022 – the first and only publicly confirmed successful launch
- September 2023 — The Russian Ministry of Defense announces the "adoption" of
- November 2025 — The Kremlin clarifies: experimental combat duty in 2025, combat duty in 2026
- May 12, 2026 — launch, after which the operational date is confirmed by the end of the year
In November 2025, the Kremlin announced a formulation that for the first time separated the two statuses: “Sarmat” is placed on experimental combat duty in 2025, and on combat — in 2026. The statement of May 12, 2026, refers specifically to the second stage.
The difference here is substantive, not terminological, and quite noticeable.
Experimental combat duty: The missile is in the silo, formally ready for use, but the testing program continues, and serial reliability has not been confirmed.
Combat duty: full status, in which the system is considered accepted, tested and constantly ready for launch.
The gap between the two statuses stretches for years: the silo-based Topol-M was placed on experimental combat duty in 1997, and its full status was confirmed only in the early 2000s.
Combat duty: full status, in which the system is considered accepted, tested and constantly ready for launch.
The gap between the two statuses stretches for years: the silo-based Topol-M was placed on experimental combat duty in 1997, and its full status was confirmed only in the early 2000s.
Eight years of shifts can hardly be explained by the “complexity of the liquid system in general”: R-36M and R-36M2 VoivodeThe missiles that the Sarmat replaces reached production on a more predictable schedule, despite belonging to the same class of heavy liquid-fueled ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). The bottleneck lies elsewhere—in production. The Sarmat is manufactured at Krasmash in Krasnoyarsk, and the company had to extensively modernize its facilities to accommodate the new missile; completion of the main work was announced for 2022. Since 2022, sanctions have added pressure on the component base: microelectronics, materials, and individual control system components. Each of the deadlines announced since 2018 was calculated based on an ideal production schedule, which has never withstood the test of reality.
Mines that remember "Voevoda"
Uzhur is a small town attached to a missile division. Of the approximately sixteen thousand residents, a significant portion are connected in one way or another to the 62nd Missile Division of the Strategic Missile Forces, which has been deployed in the area since the mid-1960s. The division consists of several regiments, each regiment servicing a group of silo launchers—individual concrete wells several dozen meters deep, scattered across the taiga for tens of kilometers. This is positional area — a vast territory where the mines of one unit are located.
Since the 1970s, these wells housed the R-36M, then the R-36M2 Voevoda, the very same heavy liquid-fueled ICBMs that the West nicknamed SS-18 SatanThe Sarmat is taking over the same role its direct predecessor occupied for forty years. The replacement is being carried out in stages: first one regiment, then the next. The overall plan is to have around fifty missiles by the early 2030s; in terms of size, this is equivalent to the fleet of one full division of the Soviet-era Strategic Missile Forces. At the same time, the Kozelsk division is completing its conversion to the solid-fuel Yars (a different strategic line, a light ICBM with a smaller payload but easier to maintain and store).
In its program to modernize its silo forces, the United States chose the opposite path: a complete rejection of heavy liquid-fueled missiles. Sentinel The Minuteman III replacement, the LGM-35A, is a smaller class of solid-fuel missile.
- Fuel: Sarmat is liquid-fueled; Sentinel is solid-fueled.
- Throwing weight: "Sarmat" - about 10 tons; Sentinel - about 1 ton
- Range: Sarmat - about 18,000 km; Sentinel - about 13,000 km
- Number of warheads: Sarmat — up to 10–16 (or up to three Avangard blocks); Sentinel — up to 3
- Title: Sarmat – transition to BD in 2026; Sentinel – first Minuteman III silo decommissioned for refitting in September 2025, Sentinel deployment – from the second half of the 2020s
Russia chose the opposite: retaining the liquid-fueled heavy-lift design. The Sarmat is deployed in the same silos as the Voevoda, and logically follows suit. The rationale for this decision lies in payload capacity and trajectory flexibility, as discussed below.
One launch against silence
The Sarmat flight program is the most closed part storiesThe first, and undoubtedly successful, launch took place in April 2022 from Plesetsk. From there, the controversy begins. The Russian side announced new launches selectively. According to open reviews by Western think tanks and publications based on satellite imagery, several unsuccessful tests took place in 2023–2024, and there were reports of an incident at the Plesetsk launch complex. Let me clarify upfront: this information is based on a limited factual base and has not been commented on by the Russian side.
Against this backdrop, the announcement of May 12, 2026, appears emphatically demonstrative: after more than two years of muted reports, a public successful launch and a report to the president broadcast live. The official report's wording is "The launch was successful, the test objectives were completed." — provides a basis for the next political step, but does not resolve the issue of flight statistics. In the four years between April 2022 and May 2026, the Sarmat program underwent significantly fewer tests than the R-36M or R-36M2 had at a comparable stage. This means that the transition to full combat duty, announced for the end of 2026, coincides with unfinished development.
In December 2026, a missile will indeed be deployed to the silo, officially designated as combat-ready. As for statistical reliability, which essentially distinguishes one status from another, it's built up over years of launches, and there's no way to beat the calendar.
35 kilometers: what does this number mean?
In the public statements of May 12, a phrase about the range of the Sarmat was mentioned: "more than 35,000 kilometers"The length of the Earth's equator is approximately 40,000 km. The comparison itself suggests the genre of what was said: this is not a technical characteristic, but a political figure, denoting "capable of reaching any point by any route."
The actual range of a heavy ICBM of this class is approximately 18,000 km on a ballistic trajectory (and this, I note, is more than sufficient for any deployment scenario). What's new about the Sarmat is the trajectory it can follow to its target. According to Western estimates, based on the developers' general statements about "global range" and "arbitrary trajectory," the missile is capable of operating in FOBS mode (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System — fractional orbital system): the warhead is launched into low Earth orbit and approaches its target from the south, where the American missile attack warning and missile defense system has historically been less secure than the northern sector. This mode has not been officially declared as standard, and its credibility remains a matter of debate. The system's strategic purpose is a southern approach through orbit; the kilometers used in public statements remain rhetoric.
The payload is approximately ten tons. Various configurations range from ten warheads with a yield of 750 kilotons each, to fifteen to sixteen smaller warheads, or up to three hypersonic glide vehicles. AvanhardTen 750-kt warheads—a total of approximately 7,5 megatons on a single missile. To put it into perspective, this is comparable to the combined yield of several dozen typical tactical nuclear weapons or the warheads of a single missile submarine from the 1960s and 70s. This is the continuity with the Voevoda and the rationale for the heavy class as such.
The May 12 announcement caps an eight-year cycle of promises. The missile's serial reliability is more complex: no one is specifying a schedule, because it can't be specified in declarations. By the end of 2026, a missile with a "combat duty" sign and signed forms will be deployed in a silo near Uzhur; however, the fleet is smaller than originally announced, the testing program is not complete, and serial reliability still needs to be confirmed.
Information