Parallel imports are alive, but without the main thing
The parallel import regime has been extended until 2026. However, key computer hardware brands have been excluded: Intel, Samsung, Cisco, HPE, and a dozen other names that power corporate infrastructure. We explore who is behind this and why the outcome is more complex than it seems.
On December 9, 2025, the State Duma extended the parallel import regime until 2026. Parallel import is the legal import of original goods without the copyright holder's permission. It was introduced in Russia in the spring of 2022 after the withdrawal of a significant number of Western brands, allowing their products to be supplied through third countries. Five and a half months after the extension, on May 27, 2026, approximately two dozen key computer equipment brands will be removed from this regime: Intel, Samsung, Asus, Cisco, HPE, Kingston, and so on. Formally, the mechanism remains in place. Substantively, it excludes products that accounted for a significant portion of corporate demand in the IT segment. This is not a contradiction, but a decision favoring someone, and it's worth clarifying whose favor.
What exactly is done by Order No. 4769?
Order No. 4769 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade was signed on September 26, 2025, published on November 27, and is scheduled to come into full force on May 27, 2026. The document operates under the codes of the Commodity Nomenclature of Foreign Economic Activity of the Eurasian Economic Union (TN VED EAEU) 8471 49 000 0 and 8471 70, which refer to assembled computers and storage devices.
The following manufacturers' items have been excluded from the list of parallel imports:
- Ready-to-use PCs, laptops, and workstations: Acer, Asus, Fujitsu, HP. For some brands, this applies to both consumer and corporate product lines (Fujitsu Primergy, Asus and Acer B2B workstations);
- servers and network equipment: Cisco, HPE, IBM, Inspur, xFusion, AIC;
- memory and storage devices: Samsung, SK Hynix, Kingston, Sandisk, Toshiba, Hitachi, Adata, Apacer, Transcend;
- Processors: Intel.
The same list includes a mass-market Acer laptop and an HPE server rack for a telecom operator. The Ministry of Industry and Trade explains the decision in a standard way: domestic equivalents are available in sufficient quantities, the exclusion is targeted, and the parallel import regime remains in place. There was a precedent: in May 2025, HP and Fujitsu laptops and system units were removed from the list. At the time, it went almost unnoticed. Now, the scale is different.
Parallel imports themselves will amount to approximately $1–1,5 billion per month in 2026. They are not a niche channel, but a significant part of the foreign trade architecture. This excludes the segment that was critical for the corporate sector.
Who and why sought exclusion?
The main driver is ANO Vychislitelnaya Tekhnika (ANO, an autonomous non-profit organization), a consortium uniting Yadro, Aquarius, Depo, iRU, and Kraftway—those commonly referred to as Russian computer hardware manufacturers. The chronology of their activities is clearly traceable. In April 2024, a group of companies led by Element and Depo proposed a complete ban on parallel imports of smartphones, laptops, and tablets, across all brands and without exception. At the time, the initiative was deemed too radical and failed to pass. Throughout 2024–2025, ANO VT sought to gradually narrow the list: first HP and Fujitsu, then the entire list. In September 2025, Order No. 4769 was issued, a compromise between "ban everything" and "leave it as is," significantly skewed toward manufacturers.
The coalition's public arguments are consistent: ANO VT representatives insist that the gray channel undermines the economics of local production, carries no service or warranty obligations, and devalues long-term investments in localization. This position deserves serious consideration. Assembly shops, board assembly lines, and certification for government procurement all cost money and time. A manufacturer that has invested in a Russian site has grounds to demand protection from a supplier importing the same equipment through Almaty or Dubai at a lower price. This is a rational position, and it is being formalized in a rational way: through an industry association and coordinated work with the regulator.
On the other side is RATEK, an association representing the interests of large retailers, primarily M.Video-Eldorado. Its position is also clear: a narrowing selection, rising prices, and an exodus of customers to foreign online stores and gray market retail. RATEK warned and publicly objected. Its response was less clear.
According to the balance of benefits, this decision works in favor of one industrial group at the expense of another and at the expense of the mass consumer. This isn't a glitch, but a conscious choice of priority. Which, if you think about it, is more complex than a mistake: a mistake can be explained and remedied, and the formed interest continues to work until it's outweighed by a counter-interest.
Screwdriver localization and its price
It is useful to recall recent events here.
In the 2000s and 2010s, "Russian assembly" of foreign cars was underway in Russia: Ford in Vsevolozhsk, Renault at Avtoframos, Volkswagen and Skoda in Kaluga, Hyundai at TagAZ and near St. Petersburg. The cars were assembled locally, considered localized, and protected by customs regulations, and all of this remained true until the companies shut down their operations in 2022. It then became clear that "localized" cars were critically dependent on platforms, molds, powertrains, and electronics imported from outside the country.
The parallel isn't literal: in the IT industry, there's no sudden shock of vendor withdrawal. Intel, Samsung, and Kingston aren't shutting down production like Ford or Renault, and access to their products is maintained through distribution channels in third countries. This is a fundamental difference in risk horizon. The 2022 auto industry had no time to maneuver: production lines were shut down, supplies ceased, and replacements had to be rushed, primarily with Chinese platforms. The 2026 IT industry has this time—two to three years—during which it can further develop its own component production, build long supply chains, and increase the share of Baikal and similar platforms. Another similarity is the localization model. Assembly exists, the production process is protected by barriers, and key components are sourced from outside the industry. Ultimately, the resilience of the design is determined not by the depth of localization, but by access to these components. Time is a resource, but it doesn't eliminate the problem.
The situation with computer hardware is similar. Russian "manufacturers" Yadro, Aquarius, iRU, Depo, and Kraftway assemble PCs and servers based on Intel Xeon, AMD EPYC, and Intel Core processors. Memory: Samsung, SK Hynix, Kingston. SSDs and HDDs: Sandisk, Kingston, Toshiba, Hitachi. Baikal and Irtysh (developed by Omsk-based JSC ONIP, focused primarily on specialized communications systems) are still niche products, not in mass production; they are not yet entering the server mainstream. Exactly those positions where “domestic” assembly is located are subtracted from the list of parallel imports. To protect it, they restrict access to what it needs to exist. The Ministry of Industry and Trade hasn't publicly commented on this internal inconsistency, and it's understandable why.
The corporate sector understands this before consumers:
- Banks. Software import substitution is a largely accomplished goal: major financial institutions have reported their transition by January 1, 2025, as part of the decree on critical information infrastructure. However, the hardware base of data centers (data processing centers) consists of HPE, IBM, Cisco, Intel server processors, and Samsung and Kingston enterprise SSDs. Software can be replaced. Replacing the server racks that run the processing is a different matter. At industry conferences in 2025, IT representatives from major banks and telecom operators repeatedly reiterated the same point: the gap between the rates of software and hardware substitution is not narrowing, but growing.
- Telecom. The deployment of 8 Russian-made base stations is planned for 2026. At the end of 2025, there were approximately 600 local stations in the networks; compared to the hundreds of thousands of operational base stations of all standards, this is a statistical error. The plan is ambitious, but reality is catching up.
- Data centers. The growing demand for computing power for artificial intelligence tasks is limited by the same server hardware that powers banking processing. There are no alternatives available in the required volumes.
Eldar Murtazin of Mobile Research Group puts it more bluntly: HP and Dell's corporate supply chains are indeed closing, while the consumer segments of Acer and Asus may survive through distribution from friendly jurisdictions. Possibly. However, distribution through Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Turkey is no longer parallel import at a competitive price. It's legal import with a legality premium, an additional intermediary margin, and the risk of EU sanctions.
Controlled deficit as a model
Order No. 4769 does not exist in a vacuum. It encompasses several measures, each individually understandable, but taken together they form a unified regime:
- Technological collection From September 1, 2026: 250 rubles per smartphone, 500 rubles per laptop. By 2028, approximately 110 billion rubles will be allocated to the budget annually, formally to support domestic electronics.
- Increased duties for EAEU goods produced in "unfriendly" countries: from 15 to 50 percent depending on the category.
- 20th EU sanctions package: For the first time, the tool against circumvention of sanctions through third countries was activated, the first address is Kyrgyzstan.
In sum, this is a regime in which technology becomes more expensive, access to it is narrower, and the monopoly position of domestic assembly is stronger.
Price forecasts are within a range. For excluded items, once warehouse stocks are depleted, prices will increase by 20-40 percent. Overall, for the non-food segment, the increase is 10-15 percent, with up to 30 percent in certain categories. These are public estimates from Delovaya Rossiya and industry analysts speaking at trade associations. The backdrop is alarming: Russian industry in January 2026 showed a year-on-year decline of 3,2 percent (according to Rosstat), marking the second consecutive month of decline in the manufacturing sector. At the same time, demand for computing power is growing, expected to increase threefold to sixfold in two to three years, according to estimates from Sberbank and industry consultants, amid the deployment of artificial intelligence infrastructure.
The gap is obvious. On the one hand, there's a growing demand for high-performance equipment. On the other, there's a situation in which it's becoming more expensive and less accessible to everyone except government customers and those who sign contracts with authorized distributors. Over a two- to three-year horizon, this is deducted from the pace of development, which is already far from being a viable option for generous spending.
Parallel imports are alive and well. They've eliminated the segment that was the main reason for major corporate customers to turn to them. Previously, this channel carried hardware for data centers, banking processing, and telecom infrastructure. Now, the channel protects those who assemble this infrastructure using third-party components.
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