Rocket for Storm
In accordance with the existing plan for the construction of the Soviet Navy at the end of the 1950-s, it was planned to build a series of special anti-aircraft ships 1126 and ships of the radar patrol 62 Ave. weapons which was supposed to be a universal anti-aircraft missile system M-11, designed to effectively deal not only with air, but also with surface enemies such as destroyers, torpedo boats and missile-carrying boats.
The main technical decisions taken during the creation of the rocket for this complex were predetermined by the fact that at the initial stages of the development of M-11 one of the requirements for it was to ensure its maximum continuity with the M-1 complex, and, if possible, unification with its elements. The assumed unification, along with the natural desire to fit into the limited volumes of the ship’s ammunition cellars, determined the length of the missile of the new complex, almost equal to that of the M-1 complex. On the other hand, the range did not have to yield the C-75 medium-range air defense missile complex - M-2 “Volkhov-M” with the B-753 rocket, the experiment on the installation of which on the Dzerzhinsky cruiser was conducted at the end of the 1950-s.
The final parameters of the M-11 complex were defined in the government resolution of 25 July 1959, and a year later, 22 July 1960, the need to expand this work was confirmed by another decree, which also expanded the list of carriers of the 1123 pr.
The M-11 complex was supposed to hit air targets flying at speeds up to 800 m / s, at altitudes from 250 m to 20 km and at ranges from 3 to 25 km from the ship. At the same distances, the M-11 was supposed to hit surface targets as well. At the same time, the most stringent requirements for the size and weight of the rocket were made - its length should not exceed 6 - 6,5 meters, wingspan should be no more than 1,7 meters, weight - less than one and a half tons.
The lead developer of M-11, which received the provisional name "Storm", was determined by the Scientific Research Institute-10 (hereinafter referred to as NPO "Altair"), the chief designer - G. Volgin. The development of the launcher was entrusted to the design team led by TD.Vylkostom.
The creation of a rocket for the M-11, which received the designation B-611, was assigned to be headed by P. D. Grushin of the OKB-2 (hereinafter, ICB Fakel). The first analysis of the requirements for a new rocket showed that the characteristics of B-753, which were considered the limit of attainable in the middle of 1950-s, should be implemented in a rocket with almost half the size. Not less rigidly, customers from the Navy insisted that only solid-fuel engines were used as part of the new rocket .. There was no question about all sorts of liquid fuels based on highly efficient hydrocarbon compounds and acids. The only thing that could have worked to facilitate the solution of the problem was time. The reserve of several years was then considered more than realistic, especially since the very first estimates showed that using solid fuels, the production of which was mastered by the end of 1950, would achieve the required characteristics rocket with its single-stage performance will be extremely difficult. However, the two-stage version of the B-611 also did not provide significant advantages - by obtaining the required range, the developers were simultaneously faced with the problem of finding means to protect warrant ships from falling accelerators.
To cut the tightly knotted knot of problems was to be achieved through the implementation of a whole range of measures, including the development of a rational method of radio command guidance of the missile at the target, choice of the aerodynamic design of the missile and, naturally, creating the most efficient propulsion system.
In the final version, the B-611 rocket weighing 1833 kg, of which 125 kg accounted for the warhead, was made in the normal pattern with an X-shaped arrangement of aerodynamic surfaces. The most rational for the rocket was recognized as a dual-mode engine, which ensured its intensive start from a short guide and maintaining a high average flight speed.
The rocket body consisted of five compartments. The first compartment housed the radio and contact fuses, as well as the fuse antenna, in the second — the main elements of the control system, and in the third — the warhead. The fourth compartment was a solid rocket engine housing. The tail section of the rocket was made in the form of a truncated cone, in which elements of the steering actuator were placed, located around the engine nozzle with an elongated gas duct.
Such an arrangement allowed to get a number of advantages. Thus, the solid-fuel charge was able to be positioned closer to the center of mass of the rocket, and its burnout had less effect on the change in the centering of the rocket during the flight. At the same time, the engine operation time was commensurate with the flight time of the rocket to the maximum range, which means that the rocket could do without the use of the passive portion of the flight trajectory and the attendant effects of reducing maneuverability and controllability. No less important was the preservation of the performance of the engine housing when the rocket performs intensive maneuvers in the target area.
Another novelty, proposed by OKB-2, was an on-board source of electricity for powering the rocket's equipment with alternating and direct current. In contrast to the predecessors, the new source of electricity worked on solid fuel.
On December 15, 1962, almost simultaneously with the release of the draft design for B-611, the first anti-submarine cruiser of Project 444, the future cruiser “Moscow”, designed in TsKB-1123 for the TsKB-17, was laid on the slipway of the Nikolaev plant No. XNUMX (hereinafter the “Black Sea Plant”) the leadership of A.S. Savichev, then A.M. Marynich. In its purpose, architecture, weapons, technical means and tactical and technical data, it was fundamentally different from all the ships that were ever built for the Soviet fleetand therefore attracted the closest attention of the country's leadership. The initial schedule of work was planned to be completed in two and a half years, by mid-1965. This required to significantly accelerate the pace of work on the creation of the B-611 missile.
By the summer of 1964, the first B-611 missiles were prepared for throwing tests from a ground-based launcher, since by that time the equipment of the test ship OS-24 was not fully equipped for testing the Storm, the 30 of July was launched. After that, it took a number of necessary improvements and research, which took almost six months. However, not only missilemen, but also shipbuilders lagged behind the work schedules. By the summer of 1964, it became clear that the completion of the construction of "Moscow" was postponed for about a year and a half. Ultimately, the ship was launched only on 14 on January 1965 of the year, and the end of its construction was planned for 1967 on the year. Following him, literally the next day after the launch of the “Moscow” into the water, the second cruiser, the 1123 avenue, was laid, later called Leningrad.
The first launch launch of the modified B-611 was performed from the pilot ship OS-24 14 on January 1966. This series of tests continued until the end of January. Their results were also not perfect, because by the beginning of 1966, they hadn’t yet been able to complete a bench test of the rocket’s propulsion system — its burnouts occurred, the dimensions were adjusted and the thermal protection increased.
At the same time, to solve another identified problem — screening the passage of radio signals from the hot gas torch station — four additional launches were performed, during which the effect of the engine torch on the operation of the control radio link with different locations of the on-board antennas was clarified. As a result, a decision was made to install double antennas of the command channel and the response channel on the pylons in the tail of the rocket. Now, at any mutual position of the rocket and the ship, the torch no longer prevented the rocket from receiving the necessary control commands.
27 February 1966 of the year completed the first launch of the B-611 in a closed control loop, and soon the first target that flew over the distance of 26 km and altitude 10,3 km was hit by a rocket. Another launch was made on a target boat moving at high speed, located at a distance of 20 km.
The following year, the tests of the M-11 continued, not only on the OS-24, but also on the anti-submarine cruiser Moscow. Unlike the trial vessel, two B-189 two-beam launchers with storage and feed devices capable of receiving 48 missiles were installed on it. Moscow was also equipped with two Grom guidance stations. But since both anti-aircraft missile complexes were placed sequentially in the bow, with the launch stations and antenna posts of the second complex exceeding the first, the huge mast-tube superstructure covered the aft corners, starting at about +/- 130 degrees, from the nose. As a result, a significant “dead zone” was formed behind the ship, in which the “Moscow” was defenseless against enemy air attacks. To some extent, this deficiency could be compensated for by the possibility of maneuvering the ship in case of timely detection of targets.
State tests of the M-11 with B-611 missiles were to begin simultaneously with the testing of other systems of the future flagship of the Soviet Navy and the ship itself. When preparing for them, the technology of firing anti-aircraft missiles, developed by the previous shipboard air defense systems, was carried out using target aircraft launched from the ground, which were accompanied by two interceptors under security conditions. They were supposed to finish off the target aircraft in the event that it deviated from the course, as well as if the missile missed or the shooting was canceled. To ensure these tests, a squadron of fighter planes based at an airfield near Feodosia was identified.
However, the first firing of "Moscow" anti-aircraft missiles, even prepared in all respects, did not work. Fighters had to kill targets in the air several times. Soon the shipbuilding plant director A.V. Gankevich arrived at the ship, who appointed a special award to the shooting participants for each effective launch. Indeed, without the successful completion of tests of the missile complex, there could be no question of the completion of state tests of the ship. And the matter began to gradually straighten out.
By mid-August 1967, just before the start of state trials, it remained to carry out the last shooting. And again the plant director had to connect. Unexpected Day was an impending obstacle aviationBefore which, in order to avoid accidents or catastrophes, all flights of military aircraft were forbidden, Gankevich managed to make his way to an appointment with Army Commander A.I. Pokryshkin, who entered the position of shipbuilders and missile officers and gave permission for fighter flights.
All this so increased the tension among the sailors, workers and testers, that before the last shooting on the flight deck and the cruiser superstructure, everyone who only could, genuinely worried about the result of such an important launch, gathered. And when the target was hit by the very first pair of missiles launched from the 611-x, the crowd was jubilant with the 1. The state tests of the M-11 began at a given time.
In the course of state tests of “Moscow”, 20 missile launches were conducted, including nine telemetry. About a third of them failed. Once there were flaws in the documentation, in three cases the ship’s control system let down and in three cases the onboard rocket control system. Four launches were carried out on simulated targets, the same number on parachute targets PM-6, which descended from a height of 8 km at distances of about 30 km. In addition, they carried out two two-missile volleys on targets La-17, flying at the same height, but at a distance of slightly more than 20 km, and two more - on a barge set at the same distance. In general, the tests confirmed the ability of the complex to hit targets at ranges from 6 km to 33,5 km in the altitude range from 100 m to 25 km.
It should be noted that the launches of anti-aircraft missiles from the "Moscow" set as their main goal the testing of a specific model of the ship’s armament, and not the M-11 complex, which continued to be worked out at OS-24 even after the first 25 December 1967 anti-cruiser was put into service. In the final form of the M-11 with missiles that received the naval designation 4K60, was adopted by the 6 September 1969.
Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the Storm, the fleet and the Leningrad anti-submarine cruiser Leningrad of the same type with Moscow were put into service, during the tests of which eight B-611 missiles were launched, including two with a simulated target, and a couple with a boat 199, and the rest - two two-barreled volleys on targets La-17. Despite the fact that one of the missiles after the launch did not begin to be controlled, both targets were shot down and the tests were considered quite successful.
In the future, the M-11 with the B-187 launchers was installed on the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev" and 1143, the air group of which was no longer helicopters like the "Moscow" and "Leningrad", but the Yak-38 vertical take-off and landing aircraft The almost threefold increase in displacement compared with helicopter carriers made it possible to more efficiently place anti-aircraft missile systems one in the nose and the second in the aft, avoiding the presence of a dead zone. When testing the ship on the Black Sea, which lasted from 6 in May to 24 in October 1975, successfully conducted seven launches of B-611 missiles on parachute targets M-6 and the target boat.
Almost two years later, on October 15 of 1977, the tests of the same type of “Kiev” of the Minsk ship began, ending on February 18 of the year 1978. In this case, eight successful launches of B-611 missiles on the ship's shield, targets La-17 and M-6 were carried out. The last of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers with the “Storm” type complex was equipped with the “Novorossiysk”, built according to the improved 11433 project, which had a number of noticeable differences from its predecessors. With his tests conducted from 20 to 27 in May 1982, 11 launches were performed on the ship's shield, targets La-17М and M-6.
The M-11 complex was upgraded twice in 1969, the Storm-M was equipped with advanced multipurpose stations Grom-M, and in the 1986 year - the Storm-N, the characteristics of which provided damage to aerodynamic targets at low altitudes .. Except Moreover, in the beginning of the 1970-s, attempts were made to deeply upgrade the Storm, bringing its maximum range to 50 km. But by this time its main developers had been loaded with work on the C-ZOOF created for its replacement and, in order not to distract the designers from this work, they had abandoned the radical modernization of Storm.
In general, over the years of service, Storm has shown itself on the positive side, becoming, according to the characteristics of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, S. G. Gorshkov, the backbone of the air defense of the fleet. Moreover, since the Storm was installed mainly on ships deprived of attack missile weapons, it also became the most important anti-ship weapon of the largest surface ships of the fleet built at the end of 1960 and 1970, with the exception of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers.
In general, 44 of the Storm complex, installed on the OS-24 and 22 warships, was manufactured. But by the beginning of the XXI century in the ranks of them there were only two ship carrier M-11 pr 1134B - "Kerch" and "Ochakov."
M-11 anti-aircraft missile system
The main technical decisions taken during the creation of the rocket for this complex were predetermined by the fact that at the initial stages of the development of M-11 one of the requirements for it was to ensure its maximum continuity with the M-1 complex, and, if possible, unification with its elements. The assumed unification, along with the natural desire to fit into the limited volumes of the ship’s ammunition cellars, determined the length of the missile of the new complex, almost equal to that of the M-1 complex. On the other hand, the range did not have to yield the C-75 medium-range air defense missile complex - M-2 “Volkhov-M” with the B-753 rocket, the experiment on the installation of which on the Dzerzhinsky cruiser was conducted at the end of the 1950-s.
Launch of 4K60 rocket of the shipboard M-11 anti-aircraft missile system Storm
The final parameters of the M-11 complex were defined in the government resolution of 25 July 1959, and a year later, 22 July 1960, the need to expand this work was confirmed by another decree, which also expanded the list of carriers of the 1123 pr.
The M-11 complex was supposed to hit air targets flying at speeds up to 800 m / s, at altitudes from 250 m to 20 km and at ranges from 3 to 25 km from the ship. At the same distances, the M-11 was supposed to hit surface targets as well. At the same time, the most stringent requirements for the size and weight of the rocket were made - its length should not exceed 6 - 6,5 meters, wingspan should be no more than 1,7 meters, weight - less than one and a half tons.
The lead developer of M-11, which received the provisional name "Storm", was determined by the Scientific Research Institute-10 (hereinafter referred to as NPO "Altair"), the chief designer - G. Volgin. The development of the launcher was entrusted to the design team led by TD.Vylkostom.
The creation of a rocket for the M-11, which received the designation B-611, was assigned to be headed by P. D. Grushin of the OKB-2 (hereinafter, ICB Fakel). The first analysis of the requirements for a new rocket showed that the characteristics of B-753, which were considered the limit of attainable in the middle of 1950-s, should be implemented in a rocket with almost half the size. Not less rigidly, customers from the Navy insisted that only solid-fuel engines were used as part of the new rocket .. There was no question about all sorts of liquid fuels based on highly efficient hydrocarbon compounds and acids. The only thing that could have worked to facilitate the solution of the problem was time. The reserve of several years was then considered more than realistic, especially since the very first estimates showed that using solid fuels, the production of which was mastered by the end of 1950, would achieve the required characteristics rocket with its single-stage performance will be extremely difficult. However, the two-stage version of the B-611 also did not provide significant advantages - by obtaining the required range, the developers were simultaneously faced with the problem of finding means to protect warrant ships from falling accelerators.
To cut the tightly knotted knot of problems was to be achieved through the implementation of a whole range of measures, including the development of a rational method of radio command guidance of the missile at the target, choice of the aerodynamic design of the missile and, naturally, creating the most efficient propulsion system.
In the final version, the B-611 rocket weighing 1833 kg, of which 125 kg accounted for the warhead, was made in the normal pattern with an X-shaped arrangement of aerodynamic surfaces. The most rational for the rocket was recognized as a dual-mode engine, which ensured its intensive start from a short guide and maintaining a high average flight speed.
The rocket body consisted of five compartments. The first compartment housed the radio and contact fuses, as well as the fuse antenna, in the second — the main elements of the control system, and in the third — the warhead. The fourth compartment was a solid rocket engine housing. The tail section of the rocket was made in the form of a truncated cone, in which elements of the steering actuator were placed, located around the engine nozzle with an elongated gas duct.
Such an arrangement allowed to get a number of advantages. Thus, the solid-fuel charge was able to be positioned closer to the center of mass of the rocket, and its burnout had less effect on the change in the centering of the rocket during the flight. At the same time, the engine operation time was commensurate with the flight time of the rocket to the maximum range, which means that the rocket could do without the use of the passive portion of the flight trajectory and the attendant effects of reducing maneuverability and controllability. No less important was the preservation of the performance of the engine housing when the rocket performs intensive maneuvers in the target area.
Another novelty, proposed by OKB-2, was an on-board source of electricity for powering the rocket's equipment with alternating and direct current. In contrast to the predecessors, the new source of electricity worked on solid fuel.
cruiser "Moscow"
On December 15, 1962, almost simultaneously with the release of the draft design for B-611, the first anti-submarine cruiser of Project 444, the future cruiser “Moscow”, designed in TsKB-1123 for the TsKB-17, was laid on the slipway of the Nikolaev plant No. XNUMX (hereinafter the “Black Sea Plant”) the leadership of A.S. Savichev, then A.M. Marynich. In its purpose, architecture, weapons, technical means and tactical and technical data, it was fundamentally different from all the ships that were ever built for the Soviet fleetand therefore attracted the closest attention of the country's leadership. The initial schedule of work was planned to be completed in two and a half years, by mid-1965. This required to significantly accelerate the pace of work on the creation of the B-611 missile.
By the summer of 1964, the first B-611 missiles were prepared for throwing tests from a ground-based launcher, since by that time the equipment of the test ship OS-24 was not fully equipped for testing the Storm, the 30 of July was launched. After that, it took a number of necessary improvements and research, which took almost six months. However, not only missilemen, but also shipbuilders lagged behind the work schedules. By the summer of 1964, it became clear that the completion of the construction of "Moscow" was postponed for about a year and a half. Ultimately, the ship was launched only on 14 on January 1965 of the year, and the end of its construction was planned for 1967 on the year. Following him, literally the next day after the launch of the “Moscow” into the water, the second cruiser, the 1123 avenue, was laid, later called Leningrad.
Anti-submarine cruiser "Leningrad", autumn 1981 of the year
The first launch launch of the modified B-611 was performed from the pilot ship OS-24 14 on January 1966. This series of tests continued until the end of January. Their results were also not perfect, because by the beginning of 1966, they hadn’t yet been able to complete a bench test of the rocket’s propulsion system — its burnouts occurred, the dimensions were adjusted and the thermal protection increased.
At the same time, to solve another identified problem — screening the passage of radio signals from the hot gas torch station — four additional launches were performed, during which the effect of the engine torch on the operation of the control radio link with different locations of the on-board antennas was clarified. As a result, a decision was made to install double antennas of the command channel and the response channel on the pylons in the tail of the rocket. Now, at any mutual position of the rocket and the ship, the torch no longer prevented the rocket from receiving the necessary control commands.
27 February 1966 of the year completed the first launch of the B-611 in a closed control loop, and soon the first target that flew over the distance of 26 km and altitude 10,3 km was hit by a rocket. Another launch was made on a target boat moving at high speed, located at a distance of 20 km.
The following year, the tests of the M-11 continued, not only on the OS-24, but also on the anti-submarine cruiser Moscow. Unlike the trial vessel, two B-189 two-beam launchers with storage and feed devices capable of receiving 48 missiles were installed on it. Moscow was also equipped with two Grom guidance stations. But since both anti-aircraft missile complexes were placed sequentially in the bow, with the launch stations and antenna posts of the second complex exceeding the first, the huge mast-tube superstructure covered the aft corners, starting at about +/- 130 degrees, from the nose. As a result, a significant “dead zone” was formed behind the ship, in which the “Moscow” was defenseless against enemy air attacks. To some extent, this deficiency could be compensated for by the possibility of maneuvering the ship in case of timely detection of targets.
State tests of the M-11 with B-611 missiles were to begin simultaneously with the testing of other systems of the future flagship of the Soviet Navy and the ship itself. When preparing for them, the technology of firing anti-aircraft missiles, developed by the previous shipboard air defense systems, was carried out using target aircraft launched from the ground, which were accompanied by two interceptors under security conditions. They were supposed to finish off the target aircraft in the event that it deviated from the course, as well as if the missile missed or the shooting was canceled. To ensure these tests, a squadron of fighter planes based at an airfield near Feodosia was identified.
However, the first firing of "Moscow" anti-aircraft missiles, even prepared in all respects, did not work. Fighters had to kill targets in the air several times. Soon the shipbuilding plant director A.V. Gankevich arrived at the ship, who appointed a special award to the shooting participants for each effective launch. Indeed, without the successful completion of tests of the missile complex, there could be no question of the completion of state tests of the ship. And the matter began to gradually straighten out.
By mid-August 1967, just before the start of state trials, it remained to carry out the last shooting. And again the plant director had to connect. Unexpected Day was an impending obstacle aviationBefore which, in order to avoid accidents or catastrophes, all flights of military aircraft were forbidden, Gankevich managed to make his way to an appointment with Army Commander A.I. Pokryshkin, who entered the position of shipbuilders and missile officers and gave permission for fighter flights.
All this so increased the tension among the sailors, workers and testers, that before the last shooting on the flight deck and the cruiser superstructure, everyone who only could, genuinely worried about the result of such an important launch, gathered. And when the target was hit by the very first pair of missiles launched from the 611-x, the crowd was jubilant with the 1. The state tests of the M-11 began at a given time.
In the course of state tests of “Moscow”, 20 missile launches were conducted, including nine telemetry. About a third of them failed. Once there were flaws in the documentation, in three cases the ship’s control system let down and in three cases the onboard rocket control system. Four launches were carried out on simulated targets, the same number on parachute targets PM-6, which descended from a height of 8 km at distances of about 30 km. In addition, they carried out two two-missile volleys on targets La-17, flying at the same height, but at a distance of slightly more than 20 km, and two more - on a barge set at the same distance. In general, the tests confirmed the ability of the complex to hit targets at ranges from 6 km to 33,5 km in the altitude range from 100 m to 25 km.
It should be noted that the launches of anti-aircraft missiles from the "Moscow" set as their main goal the testing of a specific model of the ship’s armament, and not the M-11 complex, which continued to be worked out at OS-24 even after the first 25 December 1967 anti-cruiser was put into service. In the final form of the M-11 with missiles that received the naval designation 4K60, was adopted by the 6 September 1969.
Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the Storm, the fleet and the Leningrad anti-submarine cruiser Leningrad of the same type with Moscow were put into service, during the tests of which eight B-611 missiles were launched, including two with a simulated target, and a couple with a boat 199, and the rest - two two-barreled volleys on targets La-17. Despite the fact that one of the missiles after the launch did not begin to be controlled, both targets were shot down and the tests were considered quite successful.
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev"
In the future, the M-11 with the B-187 launchers was installed on the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev" and 1143, the air group of which was no longer helicopters like the "Moscow" and "Leningrad", but the Yak-38 vertical take-off and landing aircraft The almost threefold increase in displacement compared with helicopter carriers made it possible to more efficiently place anti-aircraft missile systems one in the nose and the second in the aft, avoiding the presence of a dead zone. When testing the ship on the Black Sea, which lasted from 6 in May to 24 in October 1975, successfully conducted seven launches of B-611 missiles on parachute targets M-6 and the target boat.
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Minsk"
Almost two years later, on October 15 of 1977, the tests of the same type of “Kiev” of the Minsk ship began, ending on February 18 of the year 1978. In this case, eight successful launches of B-611 missiles on the ship's shield, targets La-17 and M-6 were carried out. The last of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers with the “Storm” type complex was equipped with the “Novorossiysk”, built according to the improved 11433 project, which had a number of noticeable differences from its predecessors. With his tests conducted from 20 to 27 in May 1982, 11 launches were performed on the ship's shield, targets La-17М and M-6.
Shooting UZRK "Storm-M" TAVKR "Novorossiysk" pr.11433
The M-11 complex was upgraded twice in 1969, the Storm-M was equipped with advanced multipurpose stations Grom-M, and in the 1986 year - the Storm-N, the characteristics of which provided damage to aerodynamic targets at low altitudes .. Except Moreover, in the beginning of the 1970-s, attempts were made to deeply upgrade the Storm, bringing its maximum range to 50 km. But by this time its main developers had been loaded with work on the C-ZOOF created for its replacement and, in order not to distract the designers from this work, they had abandoned the radical modernization of Storm.
In general, over the years of service, Storm has shown itself on the positive side, becoming, according to the characteristics of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, S. G. Gorshkov, the backbone of the air defense of the fleet. Moreover, since the Storm was installed mainly on ships deprived of attack missile weapons, it also became the most important anti-ship weapon of the largest surface ships of the fleet built at the end of 1960 and 1970, with the exception of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers.
In general, 44 of the Storm complex, installed on the OS-24 and 22 warships, was manufactured. But by the beginning of the XXI century in the ranks of them there were only two ship carrier M-11 pr 1134B - "Kerch" and "Ochakov."
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