How Scientists Become Traitors
Scientists come in different types
On May 5, 2026, the Novosibirsk Regional Court sentenced two physicists: Valery Zvegintsev, chief researcher at the S. A. Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics (ITAM) of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Vladislav Galkin, associate professor at Tomsk Polytechnic University. Both were found guilty of treason under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Each received twelve and a half years in a maximum-security penal colony. This is still a lenient sentence. In fact, the sentences were handed down at the lower end of the sentence.
The basis for the criminal case, which led to one of the harshest sentences in stories A scientific article became a milestone in Russian science. A joint study by two physicists on gas dynamics, published in the Iranian Journal of Applied and Computational Mechanics, described a design method for high-speed air intakes—a technical solution that is significant for the development of civil aviation, as well as for defense technologies. The work was purely theoretical.
Colleagues of the convicted scientists from the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences published an open letter to the court. In it, they pointed out a circumstance that, one would think, should have closed any claims against the scientists: before being sent to the editors of the Iranian journal, the article underwent not one, but two mandatory reviews to ensure it did not contain information constituting a state secret. Both reviews were conducted in accordance with established procedures. A state commission consistently checks publications for state secrets and conducts so-called export control. The reviewers check whether the article contains information on dual-use technologies. weapons mass destruction or military-grade products. According to the convicted men's colleagues, both commissions gave a definitive negative: no classified information was found in the work. This didn't help.
Valery Zvegintsev is eighty-two years old. Vladislav Galkin is slightly younger, but still old enough to spend a significant portion of his remaining life behind barbed wire.
To understand how world-class physicists ended up in the dock, we need to understand the structure of the Russian scientific system. The Russian system for evaluating scientific performance is built on publication activity. Federal grants from the Russian Science Foundation, salary bonuses, performance evaluations of research teams and institutes, and competitive selection of development programs—all of this directly depends on the number of articles published in journals indexed in the two main global catalogs of scientific publications: Scopus and Web of Science.
Scopus is owned by the Dutch-British publishing company Elsevier. Web of Science is owned by the American company Clarivate. Both systems index tens of thousands of journals from around the world and are used as a global standard for measuring scientific impact. Publication in a Scopus journal is essentially the "currency" of the scientific world. Without it, it's impossible to secure a significant grant, advance your career, or secure decent funding for your team.
Until 2022, Russian scientists published in journals all over the world—in Europe, America, and Asia. This was the norm and actively encouraged at all levels. After February 2022, the situation changed dramatically. Russia's environment was divided into friendly and unfriendly states. Scientific collaboration with scientists from countries in the latter category virtually froze. Many Western journals stopped accepting papers from Russians. International conferences closed their doors. The collaborative networks that had linked Russian researchers with the global community for decades began to fray.
What choice did the scientists have? Publish in journals from friendly countries. China, India, Iran, Turkey, and the UAE—these are the countries with which collaboration wasn't automatically considered suspicious. The Iranian Journal of Applied and Computational Mechanics, an international peer-reviewed journal indexed in Scopus, was precisely such a publication. Zvegintsev and Galkin chose it because it was a rational and logical choice under the current circumstances. This choice resulted in 12,5 years in prison for each.
Valery Zvegintsev
Logic dictates that it would be a good idea to verify the competence of the experts who issued their opinions on Zvegintsev and Galkin's article. If the article contains materials classified as state secrets, why aren't the "experts" still under investigation? This is not the first time the process of assessing state secrets and export control has been discredited.
Sentence for disclosure
In recent years, Russian courts have handed down several guilty verdicts against scientists, whose prosecution was allegedly primarily related to their publications in foreign scientific journals and participation in international conferences. Meanwhile, in the global academic community, such activities are traditionally considered a normal part of scientific work. A characteristic feature of such cases is that the investigation and the court often focus not on the transfer of officially classified information to foreign intelligence agencies, but on the very fact of publishing research results in the public domain and presenting them at international scientific forums. Moreover, in many cases, according to colleagues and the defense, the relevant materials were previously internally reviewed by the institutions to ensure they did not contain state secrets.
One of the most notable of these cases was that of 64-year-old scientist Alexei Dudarev, an employee of the Northwestern Scientific Center for Hygiene and Public Health of Rospotrebnadzor in St. Petersburg. On January 14, 2026, he was detained on his way to work and remanded in custody for two months on charges of treason. The case is unique due to the nature of his research: Dudarev was researching the health of Arctic indigenous peoples and their exposure to environmental pollutants. According to colleagues, his work was analytical in nature and focused on the impact of both the Soviet industrial legacy and global pollutants spread by air and ocean currents on the health of Arctic populations. However, investigators believe that materials he published in the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) journal, published in Norway, contained information that could have been of interest to Norwegian intelligence.
Interestingly, this concerns publication in a scientific journal in a country that is considered an unfriendly state and a NATO member. Naturally, the final conclusions must be reached by the investigation and the court. However, the very fact of choosing such a publication platform in the current circumstances inevitably raises questions. Formal indicators of scientific activity, including publication reporting, can be ensured through other foreign publications, including those in countries with which cooperation does not entail comparable political risks. However, even this does not always guarantee safety.
The experience of the aforementioned S. A. Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in Novosibirsk is also indicative in this regard. In September 2024, the institute's director, Alexander Shiplyuk, was sentenced by the Moscow City Court to 15 years in prison on charges of treason. Official details of the case were not disclosed, but according to unofficial reports, the charge was related to the transfer of information about hypersonic developments to a foreign party and, presumably, to the scientist's presentation at a scientific conference in China in 2017. Shiplyuk himself, like his colleague Valery Zvegintsev, denied the charges and claimed that the information discussed was publicly available.
Anatoly Maslov, another employee of the same institute and professor in the Department of Aerohydrodynamics at Novosibirsk State Technical University, was sentenced in May 2024 by the St. Petersburg City Court to 14 years in a maximum-security penal colony. Maslov was arrested in June 2022, but his case gained widespread attention after the publication of an open letter from colleagues in defense of Zvegintsev. According to media reports based on information released by government agencies, Maslov was accused of transferring information related to hypersonic technologies to China as early as 2014.
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that work in sensitive scientific fields, especially those related to defense and advanced technologies, requires extreme caution in Russia. This applies not only to the content of the research, but also to the choice of publication venues, the format of international collaboration, and participation in scientific events abroad. And that's to put it bluntly.
If you criticize, suggest something. Firstly, it's impossible to create a completely sovereign science. It's impossible to shut yourself off from the scientific world, even if it's not the friendliest. Here are a few examples. The Soviet atomic project would have been impossible without the fundamental discoveries of foreign scientists: the Britons Chadwick and Rutherford, the Dane Bohr, the German Heisenberg, the Italian Fermi, and the Americans Oppenheimer and Fermi. Soviet physicists relied on the work of these people. They read their articles, corresponded with them, and used their results. Without this exchange of knowledge, the atomic bomb would never have been created.
Soviet rocket The program is the same. Korolev studied the work of Goddard, Oberth, and von Braun. He used captured German V-2 technology. Without the international exchange of knowledge—even in the form of war trophies—the R-7 rocket that launched Yuri Gagarin into space would not have existed. Modern hypersonic physics—the field in which Zvegintsev and Galkin worked—is developing according to the same principles. Fundamental research in this field is conducted worldwide: in the USA, China, India, Iran, Japan, and Germany. Scientists read each other's work, reference it, criticize it, and build on it. Without this exchange, progress is impossible.
These are facts that are futile to dispute. But publishing everything abroad is also unacceptable. Hence the second conclusion: the publication approval procedure must be streamlined. Criminal cases against scientists under the grave and shameful charge of "treason" indicate a lack of expert review. And the review process should involve not only competent scientists but also law enforcement officials responsible for maintaining state secrets. The third conclusion, and at the same time a controversial issue, is how important is it in Russia to rank research success using Scopus and Web of Science catalogs? Grant support for projects that ensure national security can be based on the results of purely internal reviews. Russia currently has enough scientists for this.
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