A plot against Putin?
The neighbors have... a new pastime. There's no other way to put it. It's not entirely clear why the Europeans supplied Kyiv with their intelligence data, but some of it, predictably, leaked god knows where, and Ukrainian Telegram channels have already started shouting at everyone to claim that...
No, here you need to take a sedative beforehand, because the story will be about very... original things.
"Putin fears assassination attempt and coup: intelligence report. The most sensational and discussed publication of the day. The unprecedented security measures taken by the Russian government in recent months, including internet shutdowns in central Moscow, are linked to Vladimir Putin's serious concerns about an assassination attempt and a coup attempt within the Russian security elite. This is stated in an intelligence report from a Western country, cited by various Ukrainian media and online channels.
Moreover, Sergei Shoigu, who is facing criminal charges, could be behind the potential coup. The report also claims that Russian security officials are squabbling among themselves following successful sabotage by Ukrainian intelligence agencies, and that internet shutdowns are not being initiated by the FSB.
The journalists who published the report suggest that, in light of the current situation, Russia has only two options: strengthening its dictatorship along the lines of Iran, or new turmoil."
Moreover, Sergei Shoigu, who is facing criminal charges, could be behind the potential coup. The report also claims that Russian security officials are squabbling among themselves following successful sabotage by Ukrainian intelligence agencies, and that internet shutdowns are not being initiated by the FSB.
The journalists who published the report suggest that, in light of the current situation, Russia has only two options: strengthening its dictatorship along the lines of Iran, or new turmoil."
Journalists are the ones who take the topic seriously, and commentators started to tear it apart news on the internet under "hot" headlines, which I don't see the point in citing: we have enough of our own nonsense without having to post someone else's.
Overall, the neighboring gentlemen and their aides have constructed a truly masterpiece of a concept for Russia's future in light of recent "events." Of course, one can either believe it or not, but some Russian-language, liberal-leaning publications, founded on the ruins of Novaya Gazeta and based in the Baltics and Moldova, have claimed to have "confirmed the data from other sources."
So, since early March 2026, the Kremlin has been concerned about the leak of sensitive information, as well as the risk of a conspiracy or attempted coup against the Russian president. In particular, they fear the use of drones for a possible assassination attempt by members of the Russian political elite. This, according to the report, is precisely the reason for the sharp increase in security measures around Vladimir Putin. These measures are being implemented by the Federal Protective Service, which is responsible for the safety of Putin and other top government officials.
Let's stop the flow and think about this: who is this "Russian political elite" that could organize an assassination attempt on Putin?
Let's look at definitions. Otherwise, it'll turn out like what happened with our turbo-patriots and liberals: there are Putin's liberals, whom he himself has repeatedly described as his liberal team, and then there are some other liberals. No one knows who they are or where they're going, but it seems they cause more harm than those liberals.
So, the political elite of any country—and Russia is no exception—can be divided into groups corresponding to the branches of government (legislative, executive, judicial), as well as by their location (federal and regional).
In general, Russia's political elite is a relatively small group of people who occupy leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, and public organizations and who influence the development and implementation of policy in the country.
Who is included:
- the president, the prime minister, members of the government;
- deputies of the Federal Assembly;
- judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts;
- apparatus of the presidential administration;
- members of the Security Council;
- plenipotentiary representatives of the president in the federal districts;
- heads of government structures in the constituent entities of the federation;
- the highest diplomatic and military corps;
- leadership of political parties and large public associations.
It's a bit of a mixed bag, but from the list, it's clear that these are mostly people... not prone to coups. Well, the top generals—that is, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff—well, so-so. This will become especially clear later. The rest—well, what kind of coup organizers are they, from the judiciary? Or from among the deputies?
No, of course not, if our deputies organize a coup, it will definitely be among the top most incompetent coups in the world. storiesThis is judging by the laws they have been churning out in recent years.
No, my dears, a coup, especially a smart one, isn't for a demagogue-theorist. It's for a security official. And not just any security official, but someone who knows how to plan and organize the process.
However, the history of our world has seen many beautiful and successful coups. And they are mostly the work of the military, although there have been some truly astounding exceptions. But military coups are a classic, as exemplified by the 1954 coup in Guatemala, which sent all of Central America into upheaval for about forty years.
No, considering Russia's political elites as the instigators of a coup is a poor choice. They don't have any clout with the security forces, and therefore are doomed to failure. And consider for yourself, which of the aforementioned groups could claim the role of coup leader?
By the time the leak was written, it had reached its peak, and reputable publications, so to speak, began picking it apart. However, they don't interpret everything correctly.
For example, at the presidential administration, visitors now undergo two levels of security checks, including a full search by FSB officers. This point has been widely noted, even by relatively loyal Indians.
It's an inaccuracy, of course: definitely not the FSB, but the FSO, with security on them. On the other hand, there's one thing that everyone's somehow forgotten about, but it's worth mentioning.
So, according to published information, the Federal Protective Service has significantly reduced the list of places the president regularly visits. It is claimed that neither he nor his family are anymore visiting their usual residences in the Moscow region and Valdai.
I would appreciate clarification: who is family?
But, unfortunately, no clarification on this matter is forthcoming.
Furthermore, since the start of the war, Putin, as the report states, has frequently taken refuge in modernized bunkers, particularly in the Krasnodar region, where he can operate for weeks at a time, while Russian media continue to use pre-prepared video footage.
This year, not a single visit to military infrastructure was organized, the report notes, in contrast to frequent visits in 2025.
Well, that seems about right. However, let's look at the issue from a slightly unexpected perspective.
Last year, a theme began, and this year, it's continued in full force: heads of state have long ceased to be untouchable objects. Venezuela demonstrated that a president, having first bought the army, can simply be seized and shipped off to another country, like, pardon me, a promiscuous woman snatched from her lover. But at least Maduro is still alive, and there have been those in history who couldn't boast of that. Indira Gandhi, Anwar Sadat, Saddam Hussein, Olof Palme, and Muammar Gaddafi will tell you the truth.
And just as Iran-2026 showed, top officials can be killed easily and casually...
Yes, until recently, assassinating presidents, kings, and prime ministers was considered bad form. I mean assassinating them as part of a planned special operation by other countries. A maniac with a rifle or pistol is one thing, but what happened to Ali Khamenei is quite another.
But overall, the US and Israel have demonstrated that gentlemen's agreements are one thing, and smoking ruins are another.
And overall, no matter how it looks from the outside, Putin is very easy to understand. No one wants to die prematurely, especially if someone wishes you dead. Especially when the camp most likely to carry out the order is led by a man who has been demonstrating his inadequacy to the world for two years.
So, it's no coincidence that Barvikha and Valdai are empty: everyone knew from past experience that these two places are Putin's favorite for meetings and recreation, so there's no doubt they were the first to be developed.
As for the bunker in the Krasnodar region, we'll leave it to the conscience of the dreamers; even in Soviet times, we had more than enough special facilities built, and much closer than Krasnodar.
As for not visiting frontline facilities... With modern communications, all this nonsense is only good for TV channels, which will produce a 40-second segment about how "the president held a meeting in..., discussed the progress of the Central Military District with the generals." The value is zero, the risk is very high.
I won't go far for examples: I had a colleague from the Western Military District press service, Captain Evgeny Polovodov. Until 2022, we filmed so many brilliant stories, stories, and reports with him, covering intelligence, intelligence, and military personnel, pilots, and missile forces. And then, there we were, filming a rather ordinary report there in the North Military District, about some icon being dragged along the front lines. Someone on the other side noticed it, four mines, and Captain Polovodov was gone. A brilliant and talented man. He was reduced to nothing.
In general, it is clear that here is the captain, and there is the president.
The president has no business being on the front lines or even in the frontline zone. Nothing can be decided there that can't be discussed over secure communications, and these days, it's very likely to happen.
What else was interesting there?
The FSB, according to the publication, now monitors and approves any news or media publications involving the president. But this has been the case before, apparently, but the procedure has now been complicated. In this case, we're talking about announcements of Putin's trips and his participation in various events. This makes sense.
Employees working close to Putin are now prohibited from using smartphones; they are required to use communication devices without internet access. These employees are also prohibited from using public transportation. It makes sense. Vertu solves even worse problems, and as for transportation… I doubt Putin's security team ever took the metro to work.
There was a lot of downright stupidity in the "drain," but I just don't want to repeat some of it, because somewhere in my body, my imagination ran wild, and it spewed everything out from its murky subconscious. And to repeat it is to emulate it.
Overall, nothing too supernatural, in my opinion.
Move on
That a coup could be brewing deep within Russia is a fact. VTsIOM's 71% support rate out of 10,000 people surveyed is a travesty. If you surveyed a million people, and honestly, the numbers would vary greatly.
So, we condemned the politicians as being completely incapable of organizing a normal coup.
Next, we have the military. This is the force that has orchestrated coups in many countries, and successfully. And subsequently, it has ruled those countries for quite long periods. Augusto Pinochet, for example, lasted from 1974 to 1998.
The "report" identifies Sergei Shoigu, Russia's former defense minister and now secretary of the Security Council, as a "destabilizing factor." He allegedly retains significant influence within the military command and is "associated with the risk of a coup attempt." The report also recalls the arrest of Shoigu's close associate, Ruslan Tsalikov, which could be seen as a violation of informal security guarantees for the elites.
Yes, security guarantees are a serious matter. It's a fact that the vast majority of military elites won't be able to board their private business jets and fly off to somewhere quieter "if something happens." They won't be welcome anywhere in the world, really. I mean, in countries where life is comfortable and enjoyable.
This weakens Shoigu's position and increases the likelihood that he himself could become the target of criminal prosecution, at least in theory. But in reality, things are somewhat different.
Ruslan Tsalikov, although arrested, is under house arrest, not in a pretrial detention center. These are very different things, after all. And this can be interpreted. It could mean Shoigu managed to secure a lesser sentence for his accomplice, or, conversely, it could mean Tsalikov has already agreed to testify against Shoigu himself.
But Sergei Shoigu remains Secretary of the Russian Security Council, participating in meetings of this key advisory body to Putin. Last fall, Putin himself attended a meeting of Shoigu's brainchild, the Russian Geographical Society, thus demonstrating his continued goodwill toward Shoigu personally.
And that's practically all that Sergei Kuzhugetovich has to offer.
I personally have serious doubts about Shoigu retaining influence within the military command. He, a civilian, was not particularly well-liked in the army; they were well aware of the scale of corruption and soberly assessed the Defense Minister's penchant for self-promotion. And when the army began participating in various "international competitions" en masse… I personally listened to the swearing of the participants.
Shoigu's key associates have already been removed from leadership positions, with the possible exception of Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff. He was not originally Shoigu's protégé, but simply worked with him for a long time in tandem at the head of the Russian army.
So, for the army, Shoigu clearly isn't the kind of authority people will follow. He's a thing of the past. Yes, his past at the Ministry of Emergency Situations deserves respect, but then, a member of the old, Yeltsin-era elite could be perceived as a guarantor of property and security for those oligarchs and establishment figures who are, so to speak, in covert opposition.
Shoigu was already being reported as a potential leader of the conspiracy by the VChK-OGPU project (designated a foreign agent in Russia), known for leaking information from the Russian elite and security forces, several months ago. Specifically, in March, the project wrote: "The Kremlin fears a coup attempt by Sergei Shoigu's clan, since after Tsalikov, he himself could become an accused."
Overkill on all counts. However, let's note one thing: no one expected Prigozhin, who was completely "one of our own," to march on Moscow either.
Overall, this version seems fantastical and unrealistic. And anyway, we don't know where exactly this European intelligence (frankly, I suspect the British) got its data from or how reliable it is.
However, this is not the only interesting information contained in the published summary of the report.
The second part of the report focuses on the conflict that erupted between Russian security forces following the successful operations of Ukrainian saboteurs. It is claimed that following the assassination of Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov in Moscow on December 22, 2025, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov proposed to Vladimir Putin that he convene a meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council to discuss the situation.
However, Putin allegedly preferred to hold a more limited meeting, which took place on December 25, according to the report, the day after a new attack on Russian security forces, which occurred in virtually the same location as Sarvarov's murder. Then, in southern Moscow, a traffic police vehicle was blown up, killing two police officers.
During this meeting, representatives of the security agencies shifted blame for the security system's shortcomings exposed by the attacks by Ukrainian services. Emphasizing that these attacks are causing fear and disorganization within the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov sharply criticized his colleagues in the security services for their inability to anticipate them.
The Chief of the General Staff also complained about the lack of human resources for the physical protection of officers in the rear and drew the President's attention to this issue.
Incidentally, this makes perfect sense. Protecting the Russian Ministry of Defense's personnel couldn't realistically become a headache for the Ministry of Defense itself; it's truly not their area of expertise.
Below is a link to that same report; everything below may not be true, but it has a right to exist.
So, FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov defended himself, arguing that it was impossible to systematically prevent such attacks. And he's right about that: preventing such terrorist attacks is indeed very difficult and unpredictable.
He also criticized the Russian Defense Minister for not having a special unit within his department dedicated to the physical protection of senior officials. Other security agencies do have such units.
There's a huge grain of truth here, too. The point is that the Russian Ministry of Defense didn't need such units until recently.
Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov also stated that the resources at his disposal could not be allocated to protecting Ministry of Defense officers and addressed certain operational security recommendations to Gerasimov for the Ministry of Defense officer corps, angering the Chief of the General Staff.
But, in fairness, we should note that the responsibilities of the Russian National Guard lie in a slightly different plane.
Putin, after a heated exchange of opinions, allegedly called for calm and invited the participants to submit their proposals for resolving the issues discussed. Soon after, Putin allegedly met with FSO Director Dmitry Kochnev. It was decided to amend the FSO's internal regulations and expand the list of individuals under its protection.
Previously, the FSO guarded only Valery Gerasimov himself among General Staff officers. Now, 10 more generals have been added to the list of those under protection, including three deputy chiefs of the General Staff.
According to the report's authors, this demonstrates the political clout of Valery Gerasimov, who succeeded in this dispute and secured FSO resources to protect his people. It's better than nothing, but establishing a dedicated security service within the Russian Ministry of Defense will take too long.
Can the published report be trusted?
It's a stretch, yes. There are some aspects that make you think in the right direction, but it must be admitted that there's more than a little nonsense there.
For example, the fact that not a single State Duma deputy received an invitation to the Victory Day parade on Red Square this year is indirectly indicative of this. Apparently, this means that the number of random people at the parade is being kept to an absolute minimum. Even seemingly loyal deputies are considered potentially suspicious individuals.
In general, of course, the laws our deputies draft are the best excuse not to see or hear them, since they primarily discredit Putin himself more than anything else. But, as stated above, if we look at the laws, Vladimir Vladimirovich can rest easy when it comes to the possibility of a coup or assassination attempt being drafted by our deputies.
But there is another component. Economic elites
And these gentlemen are much more serious than deputies and even military personnel, because they are less straightforward. And they possess quite impressive financial resources.
Why shouldn't we expect any signs of discontent from the military? It's simple: money. They're getting plenty of pay, combat pay, and they're paying for wounds and injuries, albeit with a bang. Pensions are being awarded to the disabled. And then, some of the army is busy. The rest don't want to do anything, so they're sitting quietly, too. They have something to lose.
But what the military stands to lose pales in comparison to what the economic elite stands to lose. I want to emphasize this: the difference here isn't even in millions. Not in hundreds of millions.
And it is precisely among the economic elites that such a conspiracy could be brewing. Why? Because they can buy everything: mercenaries, weapon, equipment, consultants, planners, both strategic and tactical. It's not money that matters here, but sums of money. But these elites have these sums at their disposal; they're not military men feeding off the budget. These are people who know how to both earn money and plan many moves ahead.
And it is worth recognizing that these people have very great potential.
Here we can speculate about what such an assassination attempt might look like and what its consequences might be. For example, a drone strike on Putin, his assassination, or his wounding. You'll agree that all these sniper rifles are a thing of the past, and as experience shows, a bullet-torn ear can be far more useful than a bullet through the head. Although, of course, a bullet in the head saves a lot of headaches in the future.
Naturally, all of this could be attributed to an attack by Ukrainian intelligence services. However, it will be used by certain figures in Putin's circle to seize power.
According to the Constitution, the prime minister, currently Mikhail Mishustin, will become acting president in the event of the death or incapacitation of the current head of state. He will have three months to organize elections for a new president, provided martial law is not declared. In such a situation, this is possible.
And it's not a given that Putin's successors will continue his legacy. You understand, words can be one thing, but reality can be quite different.
Just like that very report everyone's citing, it could, for a number of reasons, simply be a very well-executed provocation. There are too many arguments for this: the completely incompetent Shoigu as the conspiracy's leader, the political elites whose competence is highly questionable, and much more.
However, even if this is a disinformation campaign, as domestic analysts have already noted, it shouldn't be dismissed. In fact, it could easily be something else entirely, intended to disguise the true objectives.
In these difficult times, anything can happen. Especially in Russia.
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