Fast, strong, toothy… And still needed
Conclusion of the article Dear, blind and stupid. But that's not certain..
The Lun is a very seaworthy ship precisely because it is an ekranoplan.
It won't just drown. But that's not why.
While a low-wing monoplane in the air, the Lun missile ship was an outrigger trimaran on the water, meaning it had very high stability, one of the most important characteristics of seaworthiness. Its wing span, and consequently, its float spread of 44 meters, is, you know, the width of an aircraft carrier. Try capsizing that.
The flight deck is narrower, but there is no waterline.
Buoyancy was provided by the hull and floats, and unsinkability, in addition to division into compartments, was also ensured by a practically pontoon-like wing, also divided into compartments.
The large overall beam reduces roll, but the relatively narrow hull beam may impair wave climbing. However, the gentle contours of the bow, the presence of spray deflectors, and, most importantly, the ability to take off in force 5 waves and land in force 6 waves suggest that the Lun is at least as good in this regard as the Molniya, and perhaps even the Ovod, with their limited use. weapons 4–5 points.
They may be splash guards and crutches, but they work.
In general, a 5-point wave condition can be a limitation on the use of weapons even for frigates, and the Lun's ability to take off in such conditions and fly on the ground above a 8-point wave, and therefore use weapons, gives the ekranoplan a significant advantage over much heavier ships. However, for the Spasatel EP, flight and landing (in the n.i.) and being on the water are specified as "having no seaworthiness restrictions".
Here, probably, even the supporters of the EP will exclaim: “This can’t be, the ekranoplan was built according to aviation "It meets strength standards and will fall apart in a storm, but 'no restrictions' could mean a storm!" And they'll be right, but only about a storm...
This is where the second advantage of the Lun-class ekranoplan's heavy skin comes into play: thickness, and thus, basic strength. Compare the Lun's 4-12 mm of working skin with the Be-12's 0,8-3 mm (underbody) (I couldn't find any data for larger amphibians, but the An-124's wing skin thickness ranges from 0,6 to 10 mm at the wing root, and the Il-76's stabilizer skin ranges from 3 to 1 mm). Clearly, even taking into account the somewhat lower strength of AMg61 versus D16T, a four- to five-fold increase in thickness will provide both ship-like strength for the entire structure and the durability of the skin itself (for reference, 12 mm is no longer a sheet, but a plate). For example, the bottom plating (!) of the sea-going hydrofoil "Vikhr" is 5 millimeters thick, while the thickness of the hull plating of the Project 11451 micro-submarine did not exceed 8 mm.
Sectional view of the hull of the hydrofoil "Vikhr" along the midship frame
All this means that the Lun EP was sufficiently robust and seaworthy to meet the safety limits for ships of at least equal tonnage. For example, the Project 12411-M Molniya cutter ensures safe navigation in waves of up to 8 points at a speed of up to 7 knots.
And for the Project 903, even icing afloat isn't a mortal threat! Because ships and vessels don't perish from the weight of the ice itself, but from the loss of stability, which the EP has more than adequately. Even without countermeasures, such as electric heating or jet blast, the ice, in the worst case, will tear off the stabilizer tips.
Photos of small vessels with such icing at sea are a rarity, for obvious reasons.
The only obvious drawback of the ship is the risk of the turbines being flooded by a storm wave, but this risk can be significantly reduced by design measures combined with protection from birds.
By the way, thanks to commentator Sergey "solar" for an important remark about the incomplete accuracy of the calculations on bird collisions with aircraft as applied to ekranoplans.
The MiG-29 with such air intake protection was in production and flew successfully. Later, the protection was reduced to grilles. So, the MiGs never needed to be bombed.
However, all this extreme is not really necessary, since the EP, thanks to its speed, can easily avoid the storm.
Just for the information of those who believe that the EP "Lun" could operate anywhere other than the Caspian Sea, which is generally a sea with not the easiest wind and wave conditions, then at best for a couple of months a year.
According to the unified 9-point wave severity scale adopted in the USSR in 1953, a 5-point scale is considered strong swells with wave heights of 2 to 3,5 meters, and a 6-point scale is considered wave heights of 3,5 to 6 (six) meters. According to the 9-point scale developed by the World Meteorological Organization, a 5-point scale is considered wave heights of up to 4 meters, and a 6-point scale, as in our system, is considered wave heights of up to six meters.
The Bering Sea is the roughest sea in Russia. Throughout the year, the Bering Sea experiences predominantly swells with wave heights of up to 2 meters and a period of 6 seconds. In summer, the frequency of such swells is 80–85%, increasing to 90% near the coast and decreasing in winter to 45–55% in deep water and 70–80% in shallow water.
That is, even taking into account various meteorological nuances, given the wind and wave conditions, the Lun could confidently operate in the Bering Sea for a significant part of the year, while the other seas washing Russia are calmer.
There is no summary table for the Bering Sea, but there is one for the Barents Sea.
And one more thing. Deputy commander of the ekranoplan detachment, Alexander Vasilyevich Korobkin, said in an interview with the Roy TV channel:
The height of the screen is measured from the wave crest... With a wind wave length of 20, maybe 30 meters, at a speed of 350-400 km/h, this is a flat surface for the car <...> Problems arise during landing and takeoff, that's all! <...> If there's a swell wave, it's 2-3 km long, and the aircraft simply goes around it; if there's a wind wave, it flies as if over a flat surface.
-25th minute.
This also means that a random wave that is higher than the others does not pose a threat to an ekranoplan operating in the main mode.
Believe it or not, there's no publicly available confirmation or refutation of these words. But the person who uttered them doesn't seem like a fantasist.
Although, upon reasonable reflection, fully agreeing with Alexander Vasilyevich regarding the swell wave, when flying over a wind wave, it is worth placing the reference point for the effective action of the screen between the crest and the trough of the wave, i.e. in the middle of the height.
But I emphasize, it's precisely effective, because the screen's effect, although weakened, extends across virtually the entire wing chord. This means it's possible to fly above large waves, albeit with a significant loss of efficiency. However, efficiency and waves are also at odds with each other on surface ships.
Wave height is 3–4 meters, up to 5 on the Unified Scale, up to 6 on the Beaufort Scale. Obviously, unlike a powerboat, a small surface ship will not be able to reach full speed.
It's already clear that the Lun turned out excellent on the water and decent in the air, quite sharp and quite toothy, but it's certainly no golden boat. But what was the point of all the fuss about flight, wings, stabilizers, and eight turbines if the Lun is slower than an airplane and more expensive? rocket boats? Of course there were, and there still are!
Want to drown? Catch up first!
I will simply list the threats to boats and small and not so small surface ships: aircraft and helicopters with their guided aerial bombs, heavy and light anti-ship missiles, coastal and ship-based anti-ship missiles, submarine torpedoes, mines, attack UAVs and loitering munitions, SAMs and artillery surface ships.
And the self-defense capabilities of existing RK, MRK, and MPK against these threats range from zero to mediocre.
The cruising speed of the Lun EP will allow it to evade not only all helicopters without exception, but also the vast majority of attack aircraft. drones and loitering munitions. Even if a launch is made at the target's wing, the target speed limitations of existing anti-ship missile seekers and other surface-to-surface missiles, not to mention guided missiles, will prevent them from engaging a ground effect vehicle on the move.
Artillery and SAMs (except for long-range ones with ARLGSN and external target designation) of surface ships as a threat are not discussed at all due to the fundamental superiority of EP in speed.
A UAV with an explosive-launched guided missile will not pose a systemic threat to an ekranoplan due to its low speed, short horizon, and, consequently, short response time in the event of the accidental detection of an overflying ekranoplan. However, an ambush by the UAV at the exit from the naval base is not excluded, but this would mean a failure of the defense of the water area.
The mere fact that for a combat ekranoplan on the move, the torpedo and mine threats, which, as it turns out, have not gone away, are not a threat at all, significantly increases its chances of survival compared to any NK.
It turns out the torpedo threat hasn't gone away.
It turns out that at the present time, the only truly effective threat to the ekranoplan of the 80s is aviation with air-to-air missiles, and this, on its shores, means an encounter with an enemy aircraft carrier group, which is fatal for any single surface ship or even a small detachment...
So, considering the basic tactics of using small missile systems - moving into a patrol/waiting area, waiting for target designation or searching for a target using one's own electronic warfare systems, and, finally, launching missiles over the horizon, at a distance of up to 200 km (Moskit anti-ship missiles with a high-altitude flight profile), followed by withdrawal - we get two very likely scenarios.
There's a: MRK, even with a decent DefenseAn hour after the missile launch, the missile will be forced into a hopeless battle against enemy helicopters or UAVs that have caught up with it, attempting to escape at 60–70 km/h. This is not to mention the possibility that subsonic anti-ship missiles, in independent search mode, and even enemy aircraft could arrive 15 minutes after launch.
The Penguin Mk3 light anti-ship missile has a range at least 1.5 times greater than the Pantsir-M SAM system. And not only long-range anti-ship missiles, but also medium-range anti-ship missiles, are capable of independent target acquisition.
Or even worse, there will be no time to do anything at all due to destruction from torpedoes or submarine missiles, or mines, without even reaching the designated area, not to mention the use of weapons.
Second: the ekranoplan, in its original, ancient version, ignoring submarines and mines, will calmly reach the designated area, wait the required time, receive or generate target designation itself, and after launching missiles, calmly leave at a speed of 440 km/h.
Of course, the presence of enemy jet aircraft will significantly worsen the situation of the strike ekranoplan, but this will not make things any easier for a surface ship, if only because the EP will move 100-120 km from the launch site in a quarter of an hour, which may be enough for evasion, while for a ship - 15-20 km in the best case.
But even when confronted with an aerial threat, the EP has a reasonable chance of survival. More on this.
Got it? Try to knock it down.
A modern radar seeker for a VV missile can certainly acquire a very low-altitude, but large, target against a watery background. However, it's clear that the deployment of active jamming, the use of towed decoys, and the massive deployment of radar decoys and chaff will reduce this capability, and, combined with the extremely low altitude of the radar, could potentially be fatal.
In the case of using an IR-guided missile, the following factors come into play: low altitude, which means shorter acquisition range due to the IR-guided missile's characteristics; lack of UV contrast of the EP against the sky; the upper skin of the pylons, which shields the thermal radiation of the engines and their nozzles; the release of IR flares and a possible short-term, sharp reduction in engine thrust.
In both cases, it's possible to utilize the "generic feature" of a heavy-lift aircraft—a powerful plume of spray and water mist when directing part of the thrust under the wing. Furthermore, this measure will help, even in flight, prevent a possible fuel fire in the event of a strike.
Of course, the possibility of missiles breaking through the jamming is not excluded, but taking into account the basic tactics of using the missile system and the speed of retreat and maneuvering of the EP, the launch of air-to-air missiles at it will most likely be carried out in pursuit, which means that when approaching from above and behind, the first thing they will encounter is the tail and stern of the UKU-9K-50II, which has "fully automated firing mode using a radar sight after it has acquired a target for automatic tracking"The probability of shooting down a missile with cannons may not be high, but it's certainly not zero...
The much-criticized misalignment between the radar and guns is minimal.
More importantly, a radar-guided missile will likely lock onto a huge, high-mounted tail assembly, complete with jamming antennas, from any angle, while an IR-guided missile will likely trigger a proximity fuse on the tail. This is where the large tail and the added benefit of the heavy shell will play a role.
The large dimensions themselves provide greater resistance to damage to the structure, and the skin and framework, which are several times thicker than those of aircraft, are significantly, many times more resistant to deformation from a nearby explosion, to the cutting action of rod-shaped and penetrating fragmentation elements of the warhead.
That is, where an aircraft would suffer a ragged hole with tattered skin torn off by the high-velocity impact, a damaged structure, and the loss of the tail assembly, a heavy aircraft would suffer a completely different outcome: a dent, holes not significantly larger than the size of the submunitions, minor damage to the structure, and submunitions that have lost energy. And as experience has shown, even the loss of the tail assembly doesn't necessarily mean the end of a heavy aircraft, unlike an aircraft.
It's not just the armor that matters, but also the size. However, the size of the missiles also matters.
If a heat-seeking missile were to reach the engines, it would be countered by deflectable nozzles, which are not part of the engines, interengine bulkheads, and extensive cowling. Furthermore, although there's no mention of the Lun's armor, its takeoff weight would have easily allowed for local armor protection for the cockpit, control posts, and engines.
With cowlings like these and the space underneath them, you can create not only armor, but even spaced armor! Clearly, this isn't the case with the Su-25, and certainly not the Il-76.
The adoption by enemy aircraft of naval heavy and long-range SAMs with heavy warheads as explosive missiles will, of course, reduce the chances of an EP, but, for a number of reasons, it is not fundamental.
At firstFor air-to-air missiles, even with an ARLGSN, target designation is required, and it is significantly more accurate than for anti-ship missiles.
Secondly, such missiles are not classified as stealthy, and therefore vulnerable to destructive defenses.
Thirdly, such missiles can only be carried on external hardpoints, which means that stealthy fighters are excluded, which significantly reduces the number of carriers, which are even more vulnerable.
And, fourthlyFor small surface ships, such a missile is no less, and perhaps even more, dangerous than for EP.
In the absence of a Tomcat, we fly a Hornet. In the absence of a Phoenix, we fly Standards. Actually, both the Hornet with the "Super" prefix and the Standard with the SM-6 ERAM designation
Therefore, it can be confidently stated that even now, an ekranoplan built in the early 80s would have no less of a chance of hitting an enemy and a much better chance of surviving both during deployment and during withdrawal than any other ship, even one several times heavier.
What's good for a ship is great for an ekranoplan!
What makes a modern warship so good? Mainly, its vertical launch system. And the Lun's vertical launch system will literally lift the curse: the inclined launchers prevented the ship from realizing its most important advantage over aircraft—lift capacity—and also doomed the Lun to an almost complete inability to fight back against enemy aircraft, leaving it to flee and rely on jamming and the strength of its structure. The losses in aerodynamic performance and stealth are mere trifles in comparison.
What's the payload capacity? The fact is, 60 tons of missiles, launchers, and radar isn't the Lun's limit. The KM, with the same takeoff thrust and only 15-20 percent greater wing area, had a maximum takeoff weight 160 (one hundred and sixty) tons heavier than the Lun—544 tons versus 380! But even if we completely ignore the 160 tons, there was still some reserve, since, according to those who served on and tested ekranoplans, the ekranoplans were significantly overweight "thanks" to the internal equipment:
Yes, the machines were overweight: the Orlyonok weighed 40 tons, and the Lun 80-100 tons. Aviation didn’t give us anything, so we installed everything “ship-grade – cast iron” (even the start-stop buttons were in cast iron boxes).
So, dividing these figures by two (or even by three, it’s not my thing!), we still get a very significant increase in the lifting capacity of the EP.
80s aviation begins and ends in the Lune's control cabin and is faintly visible in the defensive installation operator's cabins. Otherwise, it's pure dieselpunk.
In general, 40 tons of this difference would make it possible to lift, for example, four more Moskit missiles with launchers and eight tons of fuel, or a complete Kinzhal 3K95 air defense system with 24 missiles, not to mention 80 tons...
However, three twin KT-215 launchers with deflectors covered almost the entire hull of the Lun, and not only increasing their number, but even reducing it to two would not have allowed for the installation of anything more serious than a small-caliber artillery mount, due to the impact of the jet stream of the launched anti-ship missiles.
It's not that inclined PUs are evil, but they are not appropriate everywhere.
But how everything changes with the placement of the UVP, given that the hull is practically empty! The UVP would have protruded upward from the hull by the same three, maybe four meters, just like the humps of the inclined launchers. But what wasn't there, wasn't there...
However, the current UKSK and naval SAM systems with vertical launch missiles fit perfectly into the Lun hull, certainly better than in conventional small ships. And even if we consider only the existing 50 tons for missiles and launchers, they allow for the installation of a Shtil-1 SAM system (25 tons – 12 missiles) or a conventional naval Tor (15 tons – 8-16 missiles), along with an AK-306 (1,1 tons), and the deployment of 6-8 Kalibr missiles of any type or 5-7 Oniks missiles. Even with the original reduced specifications, the ekranoplan with a vertical launch missile system reaches a level unattainable for ships of comparable tonnage!
Just to remind you what UVPs are and what can be launched from them
The Shtil launcher, for example, will fit in with ample space, while the Tor missile doesn't even need to be squeezed into the hull; it'll fit flush with the UKSK. And there's no need to twist anything; from the very first production runs, the Tor missiles have been turning toward their targets using autopilot.
A fully functional Lun could carry up to 16 UKSK cells alongside a fully-fledged self-defense air defense system, without compromising habitability. If the cells can accommodate SAMs, as in the announced UKSK-M or the American Mk41, then the EP air defense system could very well become layered.
The minimum UKSK module is 2x2 cells. However, nothing prevents it from being reduced to 2x1. Moreover, there is an inclined UKSK module with this configuration. Drawing by the author.
A bonus would be a reduction in radar signature, which was not at all a concern when creating the Lun, and improved aerodynamics, without any special measures - simply by replacing the impressive comb of the launcher a la the cruiser Project 1164 with a neat single-row ridge.
But abandoning special measures to reduce visibility would be foolish, even though they are useful. These measures are commonplace today—radar-absorbing/transparent (RA/TP) coatings and skins, as well as geometry selection.
In this regard, an ekranoplan is a much more rewarding object than an airplane, thanks to its ultra-low flight altitude, large payload capacity, and aerodynamic tolerance. However, it is more complex than a small NK, primarily due to its enormous vertical stabilizer, which forms a right angle with the stabilizer; secondly, due to the wing-to-body connection, also at 90 degrees; and thirdly, due to the surface area of the wing and stabilizers.
The "body-wing" pairing is fairly simple—a slight outward flare of the sides to preserve interior volume, combined with a wing coating. The entire wing can remain metal, and the body won't require coating for most of its height.
The stabilizer will require more extensive use of anti-roll/anti-roll materials, and a slight negative V-shape, similar to that of the F-4 Phantom but mounted upward, is desirable if it doesn't compromise aerodynamics. This, in addition to avoiding a right angle with the vertical stabilizer and reducing the radar cross-section in the upper hemisphere, will reduce the radar blind spot. The lower surface of the stabilizers can remain metal.
The keel is the most visible element, meaning it will require the greatest use of RP/P materials, without sacrificing strength and weight. However, its wide width allows for the use of metal as the core of the kit, and, consequently, the cost will not be excessive.
These measures will allow the heavy ekranoplan to have an RCS comparable to that of modern small ships/corvettes.
Equipping the ekranoplan with retractable thrusters/waterjets powered by electric propulsion (400–500 hp) will completely solve the problems of fuel efficiency and noise at low speeds (10–12 knots). Fortunately, there's space for generators, and we're not talking about two 40 kW auxiliary power units; it's a given that they need to be fueled by kerosene.
40 kW gas turbines in the bow, mainly for starting the engines, although they can also supply power to the general network, but the main power supply is on the stern generators
But the ideal solution would be to completely convert engines to diesel fuel, since gas turbines, including aircraft ones, easily allow this.
The deployment of the lightest, helicopter-class sonar system with sonar or buGAS would eliminate even the hypothetical possibility of a successful torpedo attack on a submarine at sea. Considering the small crew size—around 20 people in total—it's a true naval warfare machine!
Incidentally, a 20-person crew is half the required crew for the Project 22800 small missile ship, which is no more powerful than the hypothetical modernized Lun. A considerable boost to the claimed manpower savings...
Not just "Caliber"...
I think it's obvious that thanks to the UVP, an already decent ship will become a powerful strike ship for the close-in maritime zone, and thanks to its speed and full-fledged close-in air defense, it will be much more survivable than a simple boat/SMC.
But it is not entirely clear that the sharp increase in the number and range of missiles brings the strike EP to a borderline state between the three classes of ships, with only a change in the composition of the electronic weapons.
A small missile strike ship is fine, but what are those other two classes? Hold on tight, or better yet, sit down! Just kidding. Those classes are: arsenal ship and air defense ship.
Arsenal ship — This is a small missile ship completely unchanged, except for its missiles, and its probable sequence of operations is roughly as follows: the Lun catches up with a detachment of ships and, after refueling from supply vessels or even combat ships, follows the formation under auxiliary engines or at low thrust at some distance from the formation, or moves intermittently along the formation's course. Incidentally, the KM was once quite capable of refueling at sea, though not while underway, but that's what the model is for.
KM with a moored vessel - it's absolutely unclear who is refueling whom, but the refueling is ongoing!
With automated communications with the squadron's ships and their targeting instructions, the ekranoplan can deploy weapons as needed, whether SAMs, anti-ship missiles, or anti-submarine missiles. Once its endurance or ammunition supply is exhausted, the ekranoplan retreats to the nearest base, where it replenishes and, possibly, replaces its crew.
Thus, even a pair of replaceable EPs, let alone a larger number, will allow ships to either retain several dozen of their missiles or avoid being left defenseless with empty magazines. This could prove a decisive advantage, especially when repelling torpedo attacks, as, for example, the anti-submarine torpedoes and counter-torpedoes of the Paket-NK system are not interchangeable, and the system itself is practically impossible to reload at sea due to the large mass of the loaded EP.
Photo Package-NK
Moreover, this can be done, provided there is refueling, of course, at full cruising range from the base, and this is a distant sea zone!
Air defense ship The Lun version will require the deployment of advanced air target detection systems in addition to the Pozitiv radar, and the Mineral radar system will provide the space and weight for this. Combined with long-range SAMs, this will allow the Lun-PVO not only to participate in the defense of ships or vessels, which is obvious, but also to clear airspace over the sea, where the use of friendly fighters is difficult!
At a range of 500 miles (926 km), a fighter has only an hour and a half to patrol, while an EP, in addition to the possibility of a 5-day drift, will have fuel left not only for the return trip, but also for patrolling at low speed or for a 250-mile dash in any direction.
The Lun-PVO's deployment to the patrol area might look like this: our fighters take off at the same time as the EP's deployment, and by the end of the patrol, with the active use of radar and the aircraft's demonstrative departure, they are covertly replaced by an ekranoplan, only on the water, not in the air.
Its speed will allow the Lun-PVO to reach the front line undetected by reconnaissance satellites, and the use of passive radars will allow it to detect enemy aircraft and UAV radars before they detect the EP, which is up to 300-450 km away, and suddenly launch long-range SAMs against them, up to 40N6E (350 km). This clearly allows for the deployment of an air defense ambush with a single small ship.
The antennas for the detection, direction-finding, and analysis stations are domestic 85V6-E Orion antennas from the 85V6-A Vega system and Czech Tamara antennas. A couple of each could easily be mounted on the fin, with the stations themselves located in the hull.
Of course, the deployment of radars for detecting non-emitting targets at a distance of up to 20–40 km and, of course, active radar search, if necessary.
If necessary, or at the slightest suspicion of detection, the EP will be able to actively and with impunity use the radar for emission, since its speed, even in displacement mode, will allow it to quickly leave the threatened area. However, this must also be done after the passage of enemy reconnaissance satellites.
Thus, the EP will be able to cover an area of up to 380,000 square kilometers with passive means (with a detection range of 350 km) for five days, and at least 14,500 kilometers with active means against an air target at an altitude of 150 meters (the typical lower patrol altitude for UAV aircraft) (with a range of 68 km), while still being able to monitor the sea with sonar, albeit light. Even if aircraft could maintain such a watch, it would burn through many hundreds of hours of operational resources and even more tons of fuel.
A surface ship capable of something like this, meaning a class no lower than a frigate, would not be able to quickly and stealthily take up position from satellites, but what's much worse is that if it were to be detected, it would not be able to quickly leave the area, which would risk a strike even from helicopters similar to the Kh-35 anti-ship missile, not to mention aircraft.
The launch of such missiles from beyond the radio horizon, both by external target designation and for independent search, is more than possible
Well, I'll add to this diversity small tanker, a completely useful unit in general, and especially for supporting the operations of small ships, even ordinary surface ones. It could also be equally useful carrier of unmanned vehicles, especially underwater ones. Or patrol with the architecture of "Lun", but the dimensions of "Orlyonok".
However, all these subclasses and other air defense ambushes are just my own speculation. But using an ekranoplan as a small anti-submarine ship is no longer just speculation; it's a very serious argument in favor of reviving combat ekranoplans in Russia.
The fact is that within the near sea zone (NSZ) and a little further, the EP is capable, albeit not in all respects, of replacing an anti-submarine aircraft and will be head and shoulders above any anti-submarine ship, unless it carries anti-submarine helicopters, of course, but that's a completely different weight category.
The anti-ship missile was mounted on the ekranoplan much later.
Weak, but not hopeless
Yes, the Lun of the 80s is significantly inferior to anti-submarine aircraft in terms of flight range, fundamentally in flight altitude, and non-fundamentally in flight speed, but at the same time it is significantly superior in payload and many times superior in terms of time spent in the search area.
In the near-sea zone, range as such isn't necessary, but it will allow the aircraft to survey a larger area of the sea using a magnetometer and other non-acoustic means than an ekranoplan. The Lun's ability to remain in the search area for five days at low speed, compared to, for example, the Tu-142's 17 hours (with refueling), only partially offsets this advantage.
Flight altitude increases the radio horizon, which is important for detecting surface targets, but submarines aren't one of them. While submarines do have retractable radars, they are detectable at ranges significantly shorter (15–40 km) than an aircraft's radio horizon allows, at any altitude. Then there's the range of radio communication with sonobuoys, which is limited to approximately 80 kilometers at any altitude.
Very few people realize that it's precisely the buoys used as the primary means of submarine search by aircraft that prevent anti-submarine aircraft from being considered all-weather. After all, even the most advanced buoys have a wave limitation of at best 5, and more likely the upper limit of 4.
Anti-submarine warfare aircraft, with the possible exception of the Tu-142, have a significant advantage over surface-to-surface submarines: low acoustic signature for submarines operating at depth. While the submarine flies at extremely low altitude, I'd venture to suggest that, thanks to the advanced engine cowling, their low thrust at cruising speed, extended exhaust nozzles, and the sound-shielding capabilities of the low-mounted, wide wing, it could easily be as stealthy as an aircraft operating at a typical altitude of 150 to 300 meters. Until it lands on water, using underwing air pressure, of course.
At a cruising speed of 705 km/h, the Tu-142 is certainly faster than the Lun, but the Il-38 isn't quite as fast: 456 kilometers versus 440. So the Lun won't be too late to its duty station, especially considering the airfield's distance from the coastline.
Beauty. I'm afraid it's fading...
Modern anti-submarine aircraft still have the ability to detect submarines in a submerged position using radar based on a "standing wave," but are our aircraft capable of this, and is it even capable of this in significant waves?
In general, in a purely aviation sense, the ekranoplan is not very convincing in comparison with an anti-submarine aircraft, although it is capable of doing many things that an aircraft can, but the Lun is a ship, which means it can do things that an aircraft cannot.
It can do everything because it’s a ship, and something on top because it’s winged.
Here, for example, is the anti-submarine warfare system of a ship such as the Project 1145(1) hydrofoil craft with a full displacement of 475 tons, recognized by experts as the most effective coastal anti-submarine warfare ship due to its high speed:
The Sheksna sonar system for Project 1141 weighs 28 tons, of which the weight of the sonar system with a container, lifting and lowering device, cable and cable-rope for 150 meters of immersion is 15,6 tons.
Or the digital sonar system "Zvezda M 1-01" from 1988 for Project 1145, which already weighed about 16,5 tons (the complex included a rack of equipment for receiving and processing data from the Russian Geophysical Observatory).
Antenna and lifting and lowering device of the Zvezda M 1-01 sonar
The armament included two launchers of the then-promising Medvedka anti-submarine system with eight 5,8-meter-long rocket torpedoes weighing a total of 19 tons, or two TR-244 TAs with eight SET-72 400-mm caliber torpedoes, 5 meters long and weighing a total of about 12 tons.
Photo of TA and 3D model of PU
And the Lun, in its original, trimmed-down takeoff weight version, without the Moskit missiles, would naturally be perfectly capable of lifting all of this, with a weight reserve of 5 to 25 tons. And that reserve could be spent on air defense and/or other things, like a set of several hundred heavy radars or, if we're going for the exotic, a wake detection system (WDS).
In general, the physical possibility of deploying shipborne search-and-destroy capabilities for enemy submarines exists; technical and tactical nuances remain, such as what to mount—torpedoes, rocket-torpedoes, or both; where to mount the torpedo tubes, whether fixed or rotating; how to use the sonar system—through shafts in the bottom or hatches in the side, etc.
Lowering the sonar antenna through the lapel port
A large side hatch isn't a problem even for a passenger jet—it's just a matter of localized reinforcement. What can we say about a small ship?
Now, regarding the use of the ekranoplan as a surface anti-submarine warfare vessel. Naturally, the ekranoplan is capable of employing various types of sonar systems both at rest and at all permissible speeds, meaning it is fully capable of anti-submarine patrol.
However, this search method is ineffective against modern submarines and significantly negates the main advantage of the EP—speed. This is especially true given that submarines, not just nuclear ones, have a significant advantage in detection range over surface ships and, therefore, are capable of evading contact.
Don't let the submarine designation confuse you. These schemes are also used for surface ship searches.
A cyclic, or intermittent, or discrete method of submarine search appears much more effective for ekranoplans. It involves high-speed movements over one and a half to two times the sonar's range, followed by brief pauses to engage the sonar in either echo-direction-finding (active) mode for a single ship or combined noise-direction-finding (active-passive) mode when operating in pairs or squadrons.
There is a clear similarity with the actions of anti-submarine helicopters, hence the unofficial name "helicopter", but this method has been successfully tested for hydrofoil MPCs and allows for literally driving even enemy nuclear submarines, especially when operating in pairs/squadrons, which is absolutely inaccessible to conventional MPCs, even at maximum speed.
Discrete search scheme by a high-speed ship. Submarine designation - conditional
The Lun's ability to take off in force 5 waves at 100-120 knots gives confidence that it can easily achieve 30-50 knots in planing mode, even in these, and especially in lighter, waves. Therefore, when performing a high-speed search for a landing craft, it's not necessary to take off and land every time, and consequently, fuel consumption will be reasonable, especially considering that during a full takeoff, a significant portion of the thrust is spent on wing inflation.
The fuel efficiency and seaworthiness of a ground effect craft at high speeds may be somewhat lower than those of a ground effect craft, but this is offset by the advantage of planing craft over ground effect craft at speeds up to approximately 30 knots, due to the significant drag of the submerged hydrofoil before reaching its maximum speed. A ground effect craft can confidently navigate in this speed range without exhausting the crew and saving fuel.
Thanks to this, and the fact that, unlike the MPC PK, the ekranoplan lacks the obstructions of a winged structure and a cluttered stern, the ekranoplan can use not only a sonar but also a towed sonar, including one with a flexible extended towed antenna, up to maximum towing speeds. Overall, it's safe to say that the ekranoplan, as a ship, has significant advantages over a hydrofoil-based anti-submarine ship.
But an ekranoplan is a flying vessel, which gives it not just an advantage, but an ultimate superiority. An ekranoplan is much faster, has a greater range, and can reach the search site quite stealthily, simultaneously conducting a search with a magnetometer or other non-acoustic detection means. Before engaging an enemy submarine from the water, an ekranoplan can covertly deploy a barrier of radar-guided radar.
Types of barriers of the Russian State Archives of the Russian Federation
Finally, once its ammunition is exhausted, the EP can return to base and replenish very quickly, five or more times faster than any surface ship.
It is obvious that the ASW EP is superior to any surface anti-submarine ships not equipped with ASW helicopters, but under certain conditions, the EP will be more effective than anti-submarine aircraft.
I will analyze this statement using the example of actions to check the absence of tracking of SSBNs to ensure the combat stability of strategic missile carriers.
A similar operation in anti-submarine aviation was called "Lisichka," and it involved placing a buoy along the SSBN's route at a specific location and time. If the buoy is triggered after our submarine passes (approximately 15-20 minutes later), it means our submarine is being covertly tracked. According to experts, from 1983 to 1990, approximately 80% of Lisichka sorties resulted in the detection of a foreign submarine.
PL and NK can act in a similar manner, but without setting up a barrier, and they will have to take up a position well in advance to maintain secrecy.
An ekranoplan, having deployed a radar-guided aerial defense system (RGAB) at the expected contact point, can land on the water at a distance sufficient to ensure stealth from submarines but not interfere with radio communication with buoys. This distance, using only the antennas on the vertical stabilizer, can reach 17–20 km, which may not be sufficient to ensure stealth. However, even a simple tethered drone antenna with a 300-meter altitude will ensure communication with buoys at a range of 60–70 km.
A drone can be towed, and with aerodynamic design, it can be towed at high speeds, just like gliders once were.
So far there are few differences with the actions of anti-submarine aircraft, but everything changes when an enemy submarine is detected.
An EP, even a single one, having arrived at the contact point, lands within 15-20 minutes, immediately determines the position of the potential enemy submarine using echolocation, and begins active pursuit, which, as is already clear, can be sustained for an extended period. Such pursuit, using sound signals or even the release of explosive sound sources, as US antisubmarine ships did against our submarines during the Cuban Missile Crisis, will force the potential enemy submarine not only to abandon tracking our SSBN, but to leave the area altogether, even if it's not in Russian territorial waters. Furthermore, these actions will signal to our submarine that it has been detected by the enemy.
In peacetime, an aircraft cannot maintain any sustained pursuit of a detected submarine, either due to its remaining fuel or its radar exhaust, meaning it cannot force it to cease tracking our SSBN, even if it is no longer covert, much less leave the area. At best, the aircraft would be able to hand over contact to its replacement.
Moreover, even during the described operation, a ground effect vehicle (Ekranoplan) could easily retrieve spent radars from the water at low speed using something like a Fulton device, thereby significantly reducing costs. Because when searching for and maintaining contact with potential enemy boats, the main expense wasn't fuel or resources, but the consumption of radars, which could reach 20-30 per hour.
Accordingly, the rescued RGABs could be much more advanced than currently available, for example, with satellite communications and more capacious batteries, even small-sized BEKs, which could mean new tactical techniques and significant improvements in search capabilities.
The principle is clear. Obviously, the radio frequency antenna (RGA) will be received on board the EP using the antenna, in displacement mode, and at low speeds. Automating the reception, by today's standards, presents no difficulty.
But all of the above does not at all mean that ekranoplans are opposed to aviation; on the contrary, the ekranoplan- An airplane or UAV would be ideal, at least in the near sea zone, and maybe even further.
In this combination, the aircraft patrols the area using remote submarine detection methods, whether radar, magnetometer, laser, or a combination of these. The ekranoplan operates on call from a holding area, conducting a more targeted search and intervention, since, unlike any surface vessel, it can arrive at the suspected contact site with minimal delay.
Such interaction will allow the aircraft, while leaving a minimum of radar and anti-submarine weapons just in case, or getting rid of them altogether, to significantly increase patrol time in the case of UAVs.
Maneuver, factories and psychology
Well, that's it, it's time to finish this article. The most general, but perhaps fundamental, questions remain.
Production
The EP was and can be built at shipyards. All technologies have been honed over more than half a century of experience in building aluminum welded ships and hydrofoils in the USSR/Russia. Small series of vessels are still being built, so the issue is scaling up production, not recreating the technology.
Meteor-120
Valdai-45R
Project 903 architecture aircraft are distinguished by the fact that the same engines are used for underwing airflow during takeoff and cruise, mounted in two high-mounted pylons unconnected to the wing. This means that re-engining with any engines of suitable thrust by replacing the entire pylon will be quite simple, even for an existing aircraft.
Moreover, with excess thrust, the number of engines can be reduced, and, more importantly, vice versa. This means that the E-jet can use engines that are no longer suitable for aviation, maintaining their production, for example. This seems to be a good argument in favor of the E-jet.
In addition, I would like to thank the commentator Andrey - "Andrey from Chelyabinsk", for convincingly proving to me that even doubling the number of even completely new engines for the EP compared to an airplane will not increase the cost of the EP by 50%, but by 15-20% at most.
Inter-theater maneuver
For naval fleet In our country, inter-theater maneuvering by ships has always been a major weakness, and in wartime, it's often pointless due to the loss of time or simply impossible. Moreover, for small ships, such passages are very challenging in terms of endurance and seaworthiness, even in peacetime.
However, using inland waterways, it is possible to transport small ships from the Black Sea to the White Sea, bypassing the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and vice versa.
However, even the small missile ships cannot do without dismantling the masts and some of the radar equipment due to the height restrictions on bridge spans.
For the EP, things seem even worse - in addition to dismantling the air surveillance radar and stabilizer, at least one wing console will have to be detached, due to the width of the airlocks.
However, at least theoretically, the EP is capable of making this transition without such arduous procedures. The fact is that the civilian version of the 903rd project, the "Spasatel," had a standard "Search" mode—a prolonged flight at an altitude of three hundred meters. And there are references to the "Lun" performing such flights to test its calculations.
This means that without ammunition and with a minimal fuel reserve, the Lun could easily perform hops of several hundred kilometers to overcome narrow/low-lying areas, moving in planing mode along convenient sections of the route.
Increased fuel consumption can be ignored simply for the sake of speed, and this is guaranteed to be offset by the reduced installation/dismantling costs. In this case, the EP will be much more preferable to its surface counterparts.
The photo shows the small missile ship with its masts and radar dismantled for transport to the construction site, and at the completion of installation, after being transferred from the Black Sea to the Baltic.
And it's even more possible to navigate the Northern Sea Route during navigation, and at almost aviation speed, in no more than two days. Assuming a cruising range of 2500 km, the Severomorsk-Vladivostok voyage would require four to five refuelings from pre-deployed tankers or from shore.
It was a rare instance of an inter-fleet crossing being successful during the war, not least due to the lack of opposition along the route.
But this is so, not questions, but questions. Much more pressing questions for those who do not want to see the revival of ekranoplans in Russia are: "Why did you stop with us?" и "Why don't they do it here?"Although even for those neutrally minded, not to mention supporters, the first question and part of the second are usually clear; you just have to strain your memory a little and connect these questions to time.
In the USSR, development of combat ekranoplans was slowed, but not stopped, due to the transfer of funds to the construction of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.
And in the "new" Russia, they stopped developing combat ekranoplans for exactly the same reasons they stopped developing supersonic VTOL aircraft, small AWACS aircraft, modernizing mine and anti-submarine warfare systems, not to mention microelectronics, space exploration, civil aircraft manufacturing, and other aircraft carriers. They even stopped developing destroyers.
Due to a lack of understanding of Russia's interests, due to conflicts between Russia's interests and the interests of their own pockets, and due to the interests of Russia's "strategic partners" being prioritized by decision-makers in those and subsequent years. Lack of funding per se isn't even the third most important factor here.
An argument against ekranoplans, such as the technical and military foresight of the officials responsible for the development of the Russian fleet, is now simply laughable.
The second question is a bit more complicated and can be divided into two parts.
Sketches before KM EPs
In general, the US itself took up the topic under the influence of the USSR, and this is clearly evident in the diversity of projects by enthusiasts before the discovery of the KM and the subsequent almost complete unanimity in the appearance of sketches from leading companies after the discovery of the KM and the beginning of the development of the "Hundred-Knot Fleet" concept.
When the Monster Came
The subsequent cooling to the concept is explained:
- real, and not the gigantomania of the designers attributed to Alekseev and the corresponding high cost of development, in combination with a flight mode that is practically untested in the USA;
- transfer of naval resources to the nuclear aircraft carrier construction program;
- not least of all, the slow pace of construction of Soviet EP;
- and the lack of space for small ships in the concept of using the fleet.
A little later, the US completely abandoned the idea of continuing serial production of already developed models, such as the Sea Wolf, B-2, and others. Not to mention the numerous unfinished promising military projects with far greater investment than the EP, such as the Comanche, A-12, Abrams Block III, ADATS, FOG, and others. The incentive disappeared.
EPs weren't developed (sketches don't count) or built in countries that could afford them, because those countries abandoned small warships altogether in the 90s. After all, 500-1000-ton ships are ill-suited for operations overseas, off foreign shores, and it was precisely such reckless actions that became possible for the US and its main satellites thanks to the collapse of the USSR.
Thus, modern fleets of leading countries do not include ships with a displacement of less than 1500–2000 tons, with rare exceptions in the form of patrol ships with limited capabilities.
Well, you could stretch an owl to the ground and provide supplies from forward floating bases with fuel and even ammunition, but that would be too much, especially given the availability of ocean-going ships.
The same countries that need small ships often cannot even develop and build ordinary NKs, let alone EPs.
This is the first practical one, so to speak.
Now the second thing is psychological.
Countries—and especially the United States—that are capable of developing and building a heavy ekranoplan cannot afford it. The Project 903 architecture is the only one that can ensure effective use of the ekranoplan and acceptable seaworthiness in terms of water performance, strength, and takeoff/landing, all while maintaining a reasonable thrust-to-weight ratio.
I am confident that a repeat of the "Lun" by the Americans is unlikely, since this would mean an unconditional recognition of the priority of the USSR/Russia.
But they're interested in the wing, at least for transport; otherwise, where would all these modern concepts presented in the US come from? And the fact that these are essentially either banal flying boats with minimal ground clearance, or flying wings without the ability to inflate under the wing, and therefore no seaworthiness on takeoff, only underscores that the Americans aren't planning on replicating the Lun. Perhaps not yet.
And this is if we forget about the requirements for the ability to fly at an altitude of 3,5 kilometers, especially with cargo, when we will have to say goodbye to the ship's strength.
Modern sketches of EP - however, these are not ekranoplans
That leaves China. They're masters of copying, but if you look closely, they only copy Soviet/Russian designs from finished production models that they've gotten their hands on, either live or with the technology. As for general solutions, if they can't get their hands on a live model, the Chinese prefer to adopt Western ones. This is evident in both their aircraft and helicopters, as well as their navy. The Chinese won't dare build a heavy fighter jet themselves, but if I'm wrong, it will only increase my respect for China.
That's all for now, but I'll remind you once again that I took up the topic of combat ekranoplans not because I'm a fan of them, but only because their opponents are holding back too much, or don't know, or distort, or simply don't think things through.
Drawing by the author, background added by the NanoBanana neural network
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igor113.livejournal.com
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Anti-submarine Warfare: A View from the USSR
Information