The Battle of Jutland: A View from 1916
Translation of Bennett Copplestone's article "The Naval Battle of Skagerrak: What the Germans Claim," published in the British newspaper The Spectator on June 9, 1916.
Author: Bennett Copplestone
Translation: Slug_BDMP
Translator's Note
The text of the article is quoted in Georg von Haase's book "Two White Nations" (Georg von Haase, "Zwei weisse Völker"). This book was published in Russian in a greatly abridged form under the title "On the Derfflinger in the Battle of Jutland."
Bennet Copplestone is the pseudonym of the British publicist and writer Frederick Harcourt Kitchin (1867–1932).
This article is interesting because it was published just eight days after the Battle of Jutland, literally hot on the heels of the events. Nevertheless, the author also cites open German sources. The article clearly demonstrates how the personal observations and perceptions of those involved in the events can diverge from reality.
“As knowledge increases, so do doubts increase” (Goethe).
Hercules and Revenge, minutes before opening fire at the Battle of Jutland
It would be a grave mistake to ignore official and personal German accounts of naval battles, dismissing them as mere inventions for the sole purpose of deception. Even if they contained not a single word of truth, they would still be unconscious revelations of the enemy's spirit, worthy of study. German accounts vary greatly in quality. Count von Spee's letter about Coronel is the modest, unpretentious account of a brave and honest gentleman. The descriptions of the battles at Coronel and Falkland, provided by his officers, are equal in merit to the contemporary accounts of British officers who participated in these naval battles.
Few officers or sailors ever see anything of a naval battle as it really is; only a few vantage points offer a significant view; but if one were to examine personal accounts, even those of those in the most favorable positions, the contradictions would prove simply ridiculous. The error of personal perception leaves its mark on all accounts. Official reports, whether English or German, are a distillation of a mass of individual observations, abridged and curtailed by censors for political and military purposes.
The result is an English and a German distortion of reality, a clear contradiction of evidence based on observed facts, an undeniable English point of view and an equally undeniable German point of view.
The English accounts of the Battle of Jutland were written by disillusioned men; they were faced with the prospect of destruction Fleet open sea, thereby destroying the foundation on which the entire edifice of German naval plans rested. They were deprived of this opportunity due to poor visibility at the critical moment and the undoubted skill with which German Admiral Scheer took advantage of the fog and darkness to bring his fleet, incomparably numerically inferior and at a tactical disadvantage, to bear.
On the other hand, the German accounts are the testimonies of highly inspired men, de têtes montées [fevered heads], who saw themselves and their fleet on the brink of total annihilation and were saved only by a miracle. Their accounts, both official and personal, are full of rapture. But when the Germans call the naval battle of Skagerrak a victory, they don't mean that the English fleet was defeated in a military sense. They mean that the English fleet's goal—the destruction of the German fleet—was thwarted.
They had been in the lion's clutches, but they had managed to skillfully slip away before those fearsome claws could close. This is what the Germans mean when they celebrate Skagerrak (Jutland) as a "victory." They claim that the battle of May 31, 1916, confirmed the old maxim: "The battleship—the vessel that combines the greatest offensive and defensive power—dominates the seas."
The ratio of forces between the German and English fleets was, according to them, approximately 1 to 2. They make no claim that English superiority was significantly undermined by losses in battle, or that English ships of the line—admittedly larger, more numerous, and more heavily armed than their own—ceased to dominate the seas after Skagerrak. In fact, upon closer examination, they merely assert that, given the circumstances, their ships' escape was remarkably successful. And indeed, it was!
This feeling of jubilation, an almost inexpressible relief, permeates the entire official account published in German newspapers from June 1 to 5, 1916. It is no less palpable in the passionate description of Korvettenkapitän Scheibe, who served as first officer on one of the German battlecruisers during the battle. His work, "The Naval Battle of Skagerrak," interweaves the author's personal experiences with the official account of the Navy Office. I have checked both accounts line by line to separate the grains of truth from the chaff, which were generously scattered to delight the inhabitants of the "Fatherland."
In some respects, these descriptions are remarkably accurate. However, one obvious, almost inexplicable error has been made: Corvette Captain Scheibe, who was himself on a battlecruiser, accepts the official data that our 5th Battle Squadron had five Queen Elizabeth-class ships and that one of them (Warspite) was sunk. We know there were only four, the Queen Elizabeth herself did not participate in the battle, and not a single ship from this group was lost.
Apart from this misconception, Corvette Captain Scheibe and the official account accurately characterize our battleships and apparently have no difficulty indicating their positions during the battle. To this day, I have not seen a single British list of the five German battlecruisers under Hipper, which Beatty first encountered, that our authorities agree with. In contrast to this British uncertainty regarding the squadron, which was under observation from the very beginning, when visibility was still not so poor, the Germans are completely confident in naming and classifying our battlecruisers and battleships. They are remarkably good at identifying ships they have seen; however, their understanding of what they have not seen is incomplete.
The Germans divide the battle into four stages, much as we do. First, the collision and subsequent fight between six British and five German battlecruisers. Up until the end of this stage of the battle, during which the Indefatigable and Queen Mary were sunk, the German and British accounts are consistent. The unfortunate loss of the Indefatigable and Queen Mary, unfortunately, gave the Germans a tangible reason to boast.
Then the second phase of the battle began. Beatty turned north and advanced at full speed to envelop the head of the German column. The Fifth Battleship Squadron, too far away to intervene in the first phase of the battle, remained behind to engage all German battlecruisers and battleships within range. This distraction allowed Beatty's depleted squadron to execute a highly effective maneuver.
Here we encounter a serious contradiction between the English and German accounts. We know that Beatty carried out his dangerous attempt with extreme speed, succeeding in enveloping the head of the German line, thereby paving the way for the further deployment of Jellicoe's forces. For the Germans, however, Beatty and his battlecruisers simply disappeared from view: "They gradually disappeared into the distance and, as far as can be judged, no longer take part in the battle, probably due to the significant damage they have already sustained." This utterly absurd phrase appears both in the official account and in Korvettenkapitän Scheibe's brochure, and it vividly illuminates the enemy's mental confusion when assessing the crucial tactical situations of the battle.
The Germans refer to the third phase of the battle as "a battle with the assembled main forces of the British fleet." Visibility was poor, haze hampered both sides, and it was difficult to discern what was actually happening. The Germans deliberately gloss over their spiraling turn south—and thus toward home ports—from the encircling pincers of the Fifth Battleship Squadron, Jellicoe's Grand Fleet, and Hood's and Beatty's battlecruisers; however, this fact is acknowledged between the lines. Much is made of Scheer's decision, when faced with vastly superior forces, to "attack and persist in the attack." It is claimed that the German battlecruisers and destroyers, to cover the battleships' retreat, twice successfully attacked, and that the British fleet disappeared when they rushed to attack for the third time. "Where he swerved before the prepared third blow is impossible to determine."
We know that Scheer masterfully extricated his main fleet from Jellicoe's closing clutches. We know that he held Jellicoe at bay with exceptionally daring and skillful torpedo boat attacks, so that we could barely get within sight of the German battleships. In this limited sense, Scheer "attacked"—he fought a successful rearguard action—but retreating with battlecruisers and destroyers against superior forces is not the same as "engaging with the entire main body of the British fleet."
I am unable to explain how the opposing fleets, with their screens of light cruisers and destroyers, completely lost contact after the night's skirmish—it can hardly be called a battle—so that dawn found them out of sight of each other. Neither the English nor the German descriptions offer the slightest clue. It is probably safe to assume that the Germans, under cover of darkness, retreated to the safety of their minefields.
Their own presentation looks quite different:
When dawn broke in the eastern sky historical On June 1, everyone expected the rising sun to illuminate the English fleet deployed for another battle. These hopes were dashed. The horizon was empty as far as the eye could see.
Without admitting injustice, these "hopes" can be dismissed as utter nonsense. A battle fleet, which, by its own admission, lacks even half the strength of the enemy fleet, will not welcome a resumption of battle early in the morning on a long summer day. In fact, for the Germans, it was extremely fortunate that the sea was empty early that morning.
I consider it pointless to go into an assessment of the losses inflicted on each other by the British and Germans. Our own losses have been officially announced. The Germans have published a list of their own losses, and no matter how firmly one believes that German losses are understated, there is no irrefutable evidence of any other losses. Observations of the destruction inflicted on the enemy in the confusion of naval combat are extremely unreliable. Damaged ships are driven out of the frantically moving line and are often considered sunk, while, like wounded birds, they are trying to reach safe harbor. We will probably never know the damage we inflicted on the German fleet at Jutland.
Author: Bennett Copplestone. Translation: Slug_BDMP
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