Fleet and Politics. The Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean, or How to Enlist the Support of the British
So, in 1768, the French were determined to prevent the Russian Empire from winning the war against the Turks, a war they had largely unleashed. Consequently, France and its ally Spain turned out to be hostile to the Russian Empire and would not tolerate its squadrons in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Baltic fleet was too weak to challenge French naval power.
Sending Russian squadrons to the Mediterranean was only possible if the British interceded on their behalf. They alone could protect our ships from the encroachments of the French and Spanish fleets, but the British were never known for their selflessness. Therefore, to secure this support, it was necessary to understand what British interests our Archipelago Expedition could serve and how the Russian fleet could safeguard these interests—and then "sell" the expedition to the British.
Naval rivalry between France and England in the Mediterranean
The aspirations of Great Britain and France in the eastern Mediterranean were, of course, completely contradictory, but I would like to highlight two points of intersection of their interests.
The first was, of course, maritime trade with territories that were part of the Ottoman Empire. The British were particularly interested in the Levant.
It's not that the British were barred from the Levant, but the French had outpaced Great Britain, becoming the Ottoman Empire's first trading partner. This, of course, didn't sit well with the British. The profits from maritime trade were enormous, so the British desire to push aside the Franks and focus their trade operations on the Levant and the peoples inhabiting the shores of the Mediterranean is entirely understandable.
The second point was, as strange as it may sound, Egypt.
No, there was no talk of building a Suez Canal back then, although it wasn't impossible in the 18th century. A little later, in 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte considered this possibility and ordered preliminary surveys. But even without a canal, Egypt was of great interest to both France and Great Britain.
The trade route linking Europe and India was very, very long in those days—ships had to circumnavigate the entire African continent, past the Cape of Good Hope. A combined land-sea route would have been quite a different matter: across the Mediterranean to the Nile Delta, then down the Nile to Cairo, from there overland to Suez, and from Suez again by sea to India.
Britain would have gladly seized such a route for itself, but it absolutely could not allow the French to use it. Not only would Versailles then gain a significant advantage in trade with Asian countries, but having secured Egypt, the French could continue their expansion by moving overland to India. And what would happen to British rule in the land of elephants and sacred cows?
France also understood Egypt's strategic importance and wanted to establish its dominion there. Moreover, so as not to spoil relations with the Turks, it wanted to do so peacefully. At one point, a highly original theory circulated in France: to acquire Egypt as a gift for its services in containing the Russian Empire, for France's extensive efforts to prevent Russia's expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. This was also taken into account that, although Egypt was nominally part of the Turkish Empire, it was in fact very little dependent on it. Thus, an anonymous author published an article in "Considérations Politiques" asking:
Would it be surprising if the Porte, as a sign of gratitude, agreed to cede to us a country already separated from the (Ottoman) Empire, or at least to grant us the right of free navigation on the Red Sea?
True, this was written in 1783, but even before that the French had been racking their brains over how to “grab” territories that were so advantageous to them.
How could the Russian fleet help Great Britain?
Could Britain have achieved its goal by force? weaponsBy defeating France at sea? It's a difficult question, because the English could certainly destroy the French fleet, but would that be enough? It would be necessary to blockade the French coast to prevent merchant ships from passing through. This, of course, would greatly disrupt trade between France and the Ottoman ports, but it would no less anger the Levantine merchants against England, whose actions had caused such turmoil. How could they then negotiate with them? In any case, if it were possible to intercept trade by force of arms, it would only be through a long and difficult war, something England was not at all eager to undertake. As one English historian wrote:
England, a country of merchants, needed peace to ensure that trade would go well.
Therefore, it would have been absolutely wonderful for Foggy Albion if not its sailors, but someone else’s fleet had interfered with French trade.
What did the Russian fleet plan to do? First, to organize a Greek uprising, as well as a Montenegrin one. Second, to destroy the Turkish fleet. And finally, third, to seize the islands of the Archipelago, that is, the Aegean Sea, the key to the Dardanelles Strait, thereby cutting off maritime transport to Istanbul.
If our naval commanders hadn't succeeded, Great Britain would have gained nothing, but also lost nothing. Relations with the French were already dire, so pressuring France to allow Russian ships through wouldn't have made matters worse. But if the Russian fleet had succeeded...
In this case, Turkish maritime transport in the Mediterranean would be paralyzed, which would have a profoundly negative impact on the prosperity of Levantine merchants. They would, of course, blame France, which had drawn the Ottoman Porte into the war against the Russian Empire. The British, of course, would also suffer for forcing the French to allow the Russian fleet to pass, but the British would be far less compromised than the French. This, in turn, offered excellent opportunities to draw some merchants into the orbit of British trade.
Moreover, it was absolutely clear that if the Russian squadron had established itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, it would have dealt such a crushing blow to France's prestige in Turkey that there would have been no talk in the coming years of any kind of cession of Egypt or of providing France with any other opportunity to implement a combined land-sea route there.
The Russian squadron's actions could well have disrupted the Anglo-French "status quo" in the eastern Mediterranean, which was extremely valuable to the British. But no less important was the fact that by disrupting the French game, the Russian Empire had no chance of profiting from this confusion. Catherine II could not possibly redirect trade with the Levant or Egyptian affairs to her own advantage. The Russian squadron was insignificant compared to British naval power, and the Russian Empire had virtually no merchant navy, much less one in the Mediterranean.
Thus, the benefits for England from the successful operations of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean were undeniable. Russia, for its part, received from them exactly what it had hoped for: a diversion that would draw away Ottoman troops, thereby improving its chances of victory in the main theater of war.
This was certainly a promising basis for a mutually beneficial agreement. But it was clear that, by gaining ground in the Levant, Great Britain would have to neglect its interests in Europe. As stated earlier, the British had no desire to see the Russian Empire's influence grow, and a victorious war against the Ottomans would undoubtedly have strengthened Russia.
In short, the sirs and peers were weighing the undeniable benefits of Mediterranean trade on one side of the scale, and the danger of an unnecessary strengthening of the Russian Empire as a result of the war with Turkey on the other. To nudge Britain toward the right choice, it was necessary to explain to the British that the Russian Empire was fully aware of the circumstances and had no intention of interfering in trade with the Levant.
Catherine II was also well aware of another point. Britain might currently view the Russian expedition favorably, but if it were to succeed and benefit the British, their position might change. Therefore, the Empress wrote to N. I. Panin for the Russian ambassador in London, asking him, in turn, to do everything he could to reassure the British government:
According to the well-known Jalousie (jealousy - author's note) of all Englishmen towards any maritime enterprises of other powers, it cannot be guaranteed, however, that they will look upon our expedition internally without envy, especially since some fear regarding their Levantine trade will also encourage them against it...
The Russian Empress's political calculation proved correct—she managed to secure the support of the British. As D. Stoker later wrote, though not about this incident:
The nation had clearly shown that the sure and immediate advantages of trade outweighed the distant hopes of political advantage.
Thus, the diplomacy of the Russian Empire paved the way for the Baltic squadrons to enter the Mediterranean. But this was only the first step, only a prerequisite for success. The Russian squadrons had to not only defeat the Turks and stir up rebellion among Christian peoples, but also navigate the thin ice of diplomacy without stumbling. On the one hand, they had to achieve military victories, and on the other, they had to do so in a way that would not provoke the "Jalousies" of the British or succumb to possible French provocations.
Appointment of Count A. G. Orlov as commander of the expedition
No matter how good the Russian sailors were, they lacked diplomatic experience. But for the Archipelago Expedition to be successful, it needed to be led by someone who understood when it was appropriate to plunge headlong into the thick of things, and when not to. E. V. Tarle described the choice of commander as follows:
In equipping an expedition from the Baltic to the eastern Mediterranean, Catherine needed the intelligence, cunning, resourcefulness, and ingenuity of Alexei Orlov, combined with the ability to take risks where necessary and exercise caution where necessary.
Sometimes, one reads online that Count Orlov's choice was made out of gratitude and a desire to elevate a participant in the conspiracy against Peter III, which led to Catherine II's accession to the throne. This is precisely why she managed to entrust command of the Russian squadron to a man who was neither a sailor nor, indeed, well-educated.
But in reality, of course, this was completely untrue. Following the coup, Catherine came to know Alexei Orlov as a ruthless and unstinting man, yet also intelligent and cunning—exactly the kind of man needed for the "sabotage" in the Mediterranean.
Sending emissaries
Naturally, Count Orlov received all the powers he needed, as well as the funds, to organize a Greek uprising in the Morea (Peloponnese). But Catherine II also dispatched emissaries, and not only to the Mediterranean countries. N. Karazin went to Moldova and Wallachia, I. Petushin to Albania, and Evdemirovich and Belic to Montenegro.
At the same time, the Empress wanted Orlov to act as a coordinator, so that the uprising of the Balkan peoples would be simultaneous and universal, rather than degenerating into isolated, disparate uprisings. Catherine II quite rightly pointed out to the Count that "the uprising of each nation separately" useless and unprofitable,
for none of them by themselves is strong enough to be able to do anything other than make one raid and, so to speak, devastate a part of the neighboring land in passing.
The Empress also proposed that Orlov negotiate with the Venetian Republic and win it over to the Russian side, promising the return of the Morea, once held by the Venetians. However, she did not place much emphasis on Venice's involvement, as she believed the latter was too fearful of the Turks, and would therefore only intrigue without providing any assistance.
Ban on corsairism
Knowing Alexei Orlov's extremely versatile nature, Catherine II expressly forbade him from engaging in piracy or issuing charters of corsairship (armatory) permitting him to attack merchant ships of European powers or Christians living under Turkish rule. This was done in order to:
1. Not to turn France against itself, which was already held back from attack only by the threat of the British fleet;
2. Not to give England any reason to think that Russia intends to somehow affect its trade with the Levant;
3. Do not spoil relations with the trading circles of Greece and the Levant.
The latter was important, again, for two reasons. First, Greek merchants could greatly facilitate the Christian uprising, but if offended, they could, on the contrary, hinder it. Second, it was quite obvious that the Archipelago Expedition could continue for several years, and while the war continued, it would need to be supplied somehow. In this regard, friendly ties with the merchants would be very important and useful.
Instructions to the admirals commanding the squadrons sailing to the Archipelago
In total, the Russian Empire dispatched five squadrons to the Archipelago, under the command of G. A. Spiridov, D. Elphinstone, I. N. Arf, V. Ya. Chichagov, and S. K. Greig. Each commander received detailed instructions, specifically outlining the danger posed by France and Spain. Having secured England's support, Catherine the Great understood that the French might nevertheless attempt to provoke the Russian ships, making it appear they were seeking a quarrel and, under cover of a formal pretext, destroy them. Another option was to deliberately dispatch suspicious merchant ships, and then, once the Russians had detained them, attack them. On this point, N. I. Panin wrote to the Russian ambassador in London:
...for this very purpose, perhaps, they will even send French vessels to meet our ships, vessels that, by virtue of their cargo, could cause confusion and delay them during their voyage. From Choazel (French Foreign Minister – author's note), whom we hate, given his dark character, we can expect not only such tactics, but, of course, all manner of lawlessness that could be detrimental to us...
The instructions also stated that the British would be friendly to the Russian Empire, and therefore they could safely stop at their ports and request assistance. However, they specifically stipulated that strict maritime protocol was to be observed with the British and that under no circumstances were they to be offended by inappropriate greetings, improper salutes, etc. In general, they were to keep a low profile with the British and act proactively.
Interestingly, however, while so preoccupied with ensuring her admirals were fully aware of the political situation, Catherine II nevertheless overlooked some important nuances, which led to some friction. For example, after appointing Alexei Grigorievich Orlov as commander of the expedition, she failed to specify the admirals' seniority in her instructions. As a result, G. A. Spiridov and D. Elphinstone had a heated argument during their meeting, and their bickering continued until Count Orlov arrived, which was detrimental to the outcome. However, A. G. Orlov quickly reconciled them. When they appealed to the Count to arbitrate their dispute, Orlov categorically declared that he had no intention of settling the dispute between the venerable admirals, but that they would henceforth obey his orders without question. That, in effect, was the end of the quarrel.
But with I. N. Arf, whose squadron departed for the Archipelago third after G. A. Spiridov and D. Elphinstone, things turned out far more comical. Firstly, I. N. Arf was a foreigner, and so Catherine II gave him a particularly detailed description of the political situation in each of the countries his detachment was supposed to pass through. Then, knowing that I. N. Arf was Danish, and that the ships entrusted to him also contained many Danes, both officers and sailors, the Empress handed the admiral a rescript ordering him to remain commander of his detachment even after it joined G. A. Spiridov and A. G. Orlov.
But the fact was that Catherine II was only concerned with the welfare of the matter, believing that I. N. Arf, unfamiliar with the politics of the Russian Empire, needed more detailed explanations than other admirals, and that he would be more comfortable commanding his fellow countrymen. I. N. Arf, however, was completely intoxicated by such attention, deciding that from now on he was accountable only to the Russian Empress and that neither G. A. Spiridov nor A. G. Orlov could command him.
As a result, upon arriving in the Archipelago, N. I. Arf began to behave openly boorishly, arrogantly not only to Rear Admiral Yelmanov, who had taken the place of the temporarily absent G. A. Spiridov, but even to Count Orlov. To N. I. Arf's perfectly reasonable demands, he responded "impudent" letters, and even threatened to present copies of the correspondence not only to Catherine II, but also to her minister N. I. Panin... Which, given the enmity between the Orlov brothers and this minister, was especially unwise.
Naturally, the situation suddenly became acrimonious, and Aleksey Grigoryevich Orlov quickly brought the overzealous admiral to his senses. It wasn't difficult: Orlov stopped issuing N. I. Arf's "table money," and in return, heaped demands on him, even initiating an investigation into the reasons for the late arrival of N. I. Arf's squadron. And thus, very quickly, he escalated the situation to the point where N. I. Arf requested a return to St. Petersburg, a request A. G. Orlov immediately granted. And at the same time, he himself addressed the following request to Catherine II:
If Your Imperial Majesty is pleased to order a new squadron to be sent here from Russia... I accept the liberty to most humbly ask Your Majesty for the highest favor, that such a squadron be composed of Russian sailors and officers, and that the commanders be entrusted not to foreigners, but to Russians; for from one's own countrymen one can expect not only with the best hope all that the duty of zeal and love for the fatherland demands of them, but also in the bearing of labors, worries and military difficulties, a great difference has already been observed between Russian people and foreigners, and moreover, the lack of understanding of a foreign language creates innocent (involuntary) disagreement and difficulty.
It can therefore be concluded that sending Russian squadrons to the Mediterranean was an extremely complex undertaking given the state of the fleet in 1768, but it also required serious political preparation, without which the Russian ships would have been doomed to fail to reach the Archipelago. Catherine II handled these matters remarkably well, minor shortcomings involving N. I. Arf notwithstanding.
Let us now see how our fleet’s expedition went and what results it led to.
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