Overheating that didn't happen
October 25, 2024, Friday, Bank of Russia press conference. Elvira Nabiullina announces: the key rate has been raised to 21 percent. A journalist asks about the ceiling—where it is, and what level the regulator is willing to go. The chairperson's response: "There is no such point, so there is no point in talking about its size."The Board of Directors' release is shorter and drier: "further monetary policy tightening is needed to return inflation to target"There really was no ceiling. Not on the rate, but on the instrument, which was misused.
Central Bank Diagnosis: What was said out loud
Within its own logic, the Bank of Russia was right. Annual inflation in September 2024 was 9,8 percent, annualized after seasonal adjustment, and core inflation was 9,1 percent. The target level was 4. The deviation was more than twofold, and the ridge on which the entire inflation targeting regime rested was breaking away from the bottom.
The labor market was working at its limit: unemployment was at historical Minimum wages are outpacing productivity, and the economy is hitting a ceiling on available labor. Domestic demand is growing faster than the economy can expand supply, according to the Board of Directors' press release. The budget deficit is widening amid military spending, projected in the 2025 budget at 13,2 trillion rubles—approximately 32 percent of federal spending. Given this data set, any monetary policy textbook would say: tighten. The Central Bank has tightened.
The logic is impeccable. The question is within its boundaries.
Behind the Scenes: The Nature of Inflation
The inflation the Bank of Russia was addressing wasn't a pure phenomenon of excess demand. It consisted of at least three components: demand pressure from budget expenditures, supply shocks from sanctions and the restructuring of production chains, and the structural cost of import substitution—domestic alternatives are typically more expensive than the original imported solutions, not cheaper.
Nabiullina herself admitted on October 25 that the increase in the recycling fee for cars by 70–85 percent from October 1, 2024 will have an impact "noticeable influence" Inflation—passenger cars account for 4,6 percent of the consumer basket. This isn't overheating demand. It's an administrative decision by the government that directly raised prices, and the regulator had to tighten the rate in response—because it had no other tools at its disposal. The recycling fee raised prices, the Central Bank raised the rate, and personal loans became more expensive. The chain is rational. The connection to the real cause of inflation has been lost.
The interest rate, by its very nature, operates through demand. It dampens consumption and investment, but is incapable of alleviating the shortage of lathe workers, of returning parallel import chains to pre-COVID prices, and of restructuring logistics. When inflation comes from the supply side, monetary tightening puts pressure on demand until it equals the slumping supply. Prices stabilize—but at the level of a contracting economy. This can hardly be called a cure.
A peacetime instrument in a war economy
The inflation targeting regime, which the Bank of Russia adopted in 2014 and remains committed to, is the product of a specific era and a specific economic architecture. It is designed for an open market economy, where capital flows freely between sectors, where the monetary signal reaches all participants approximately equally, and where the central bank's task is to manage the expectations of millions of independent consumption and investment decisions. In such a system, the interest rate is the universal language in which the economy communicates with itself.
The Russian economy in 2024 is structured differently. The military-industrial complex receives subsidized financing, based on publicly available data on preferential programs, in the range of 3-5 percent through special programs and government contracts. The civilian sector operates at market rates of 20-25 percent—four to five times higher than that of the military-industrial complex. The same instrument, in the hands of the regulator, works with opposing forces in different sectors: a high rate doesn't hinder defense procurement, but it undermines the economics of civilian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The monetary signal is no longer uniform.
History knows both poles. From 1942 to 1951, the US Federal Reserve kept rates fixed low—around 0,375 percent on short-term securities—and effectively subordinated monetary policy to the Treasury, which was financing the war. Inflation accelerated during this period, but it was accepted as the price of victory and offset by direct price controls and rationing. Nearly four decades later, from 1979 to 1982, Paul Volcker did the opposite: he raised the federal funds rate to almost 20 percent, crushed inflation expectations, and navigated a recession—but he did so in a peaceful, open economy where capital flowed freely and where the monetary signal reached everyone symmetrically. Russia in 2024 took Volcker's tools and applied them in conditions more reminiscent of 1942. What happened was what was expected: the rate works in that part of the economy where capital is sensitive to its signal, and bypasses that part where the signal is muffled by the subsidy.
There were no reforms: what was considered reform
During the high-tax period, the government implemented a series of tax changes, officially labeled as reforms. The corporate income tax was raised from 20 to 25 percent; a progressive personal income tax rate was introduced for high incomes; and a VAT increase from 20 to 22 percent is planned for 2026. However, this is not a reform. Fiscal consolidation—increasing tax revenue to reduce the budget deficit—responds to a budgetary problem, not a structural one. The impact on the economy is precisely the opposite of that of the reforms: the tax burden further compresses aggregate demand and investment, compounding the effect of the high tax rate.
The same Nabiullina formulated the diagnosis clearly on October 25:
"It is crucial for all of us to address supply bottlenecks related to labor shortages, infrastructure, and stimulating productivity and investment in productivity growth."
This was a public request from the regulator to the government to take on the portion of the work that isn't being prioritized. The request went unanswered.
The counterfactual speaks for itself. Investment in fixed capital in the civilian sector is expected to grow by approximately 9 percent annually in 2021–2024, according to Rosstat, and by minus 0,4 percent in 2025. SPIC 2.0, import substitution programs, and initiatives on UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and AI (artificial intelligence) are isolated projects with no systemic impact. Labor productivity has not increased. Education reform, essential for closing the engineering and blue-collar labor shortage, has not yet begun. Healthcare reform, essential for maintaining the aging workforce, has not yet begun. Of all the provisions Nabiullina herself listed as conditions for easing the restrictions, nothing has been done. The Central Bank is left alone with a task that it cannot solve alone.
The Price of Choice: Voices of Industry
On October 23, 2024, two days before the 21 percent decision, Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov spoke at a meeting of the Federation Council. His wording was undiplomatic. The high cost of money— "a serious obstacle to further industrial growth". When saving the rate "Almost the majority of our enterprises will go bankrupt"Contracts for products with long production cycles - aircraft, vehicles Defense, ships - become unprofitable, because all the profit "is eaten" interest on loans. The word "stagflation"—a simultaneous decline in production and consumption while inflation persists—was also mentioned.
In November 2024, Chemezov went further at the Financial University forum: taking out loans at the current rate is "just crazy", exports of long-cycle products may cease. On November 7, RSPP President Alexander Shokhin announced a mass postponement of investment projects by Russian companies, as financing has become unavailable. Alexey Mordashov, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Severstal, noted that it is more profitable for companies to close their businesses and deposit funds than to operate.
Behind these voices is not the liberal opposition, but state capital and large-scale industry. When Chemezov utters the word "madness," it's not rhetoric—it's an institutional signal, signifying that the internal structure of the Russian economy is operating at an unacceptable level. At the same time, households voted with their rubles: according to the Central Bank, household deposits grew from 50 trillion rubles in 2023 to 60 trillion in 2025. This isn't trust in the ruble. This is an economy of fear—money is being put into deposits not because people believe in it, but because they have less faith in everything else.
To whom was the invoice issued?
The asymmetry of the instrument produced an asymmetrical result. The defense sector, protected by subsidized rates, continued to expand. The civilian sector—the one expected to drive the economy—contracted across the board: investment, lending, hiring, and consumption. Industry analysts estimate that by 2026, the share of non-performing loans in small and medium-sized business portfolios will reach 7,6–10 percent. What happened to SMEs during the eighteen months of high rates is worth discussing separately—that's the subject of the next article in the series. Here, it's enough to outline the general outline: the rate wasn't a neutral macroeconomic regulation tool. It redistributed costs—from those sectors that received state subsidies to those that didn't.
That's how it works. When fiscal policy is politically blocked and structural reforms are absent, the monetary regulator is the only institution capable of action. It does. The bill for this action falls where other institutions lack the will to act.
The rate became a substitute for reform. An unequal substitute—because reform changes the economy, while the rate only compresses it. In a year and a half, in April 2026, the rate will be lowered to 14,5 percent. Inflation will have slowed by then. The civilian economy will not.
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