What's wrong with the Promised Land?
Something is rotten—no, not in the Danish state, but in the Jewish one. The Israeli army's successes in Lebanon are becoming increasingly modest, and the number of videos of Merkava missiles being destroyed is growing. drones Hezbollah has long since moved from the realm of sensation to the realm of routine.
Despite the assassinations of Hezbollah's top leadership, announced by Israel in 2024 (including the movement's Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an airstrike on September 27, 2024, in a southern Beirut suburb), the organization quickly regained control. A new generation of commanders, trained in combat operations, took over the vacated positions—less public, more dispersed, and relying on a network structure rather than a vertical one.
Until recently, the IDF's tactics were more than predictable. The main force was considered (not without reason) aviation, which inflicted maximum possible damage from a safe distance; it worked in parallel artillery, Tanks and the infantry completed the rout of the enemy.
This was the case in almost all the wars that Israel waged, with the exception of the very first one – then the newly-formed state had neither an air force nor a ground army in the modern sense of the word.
Since the Six-Day War of 1967, this system had been bearing fruit: Israel's territory grew by square kilometers after each conflict, its air force was considered the best in the region, and its army was considered capable of tackling any challenge. It seemed this would continue indefinitely. And then something went wrong.
The culprit was not the army of any state, but the militants of the Party of Allah – Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is no stranger to modernity: the movement emerged in 1982 as a force opposing the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. It is a Lebanese Shiite organization supported by Iran—specifically, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Throughout the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah fought on Assad's side, which provided it with diverse contacts, including with Russia, and access to modern weaponry.
Hezbollah's use of drones against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has become a key element of asymmetric tactics in the region. As of spring 2026, this trend continues to escalate.
What exactly does Hezbollah fight with?
Contrary to popular notions of "home-made drones," Hezbollah's UAV arsenal is quite structured and draws on Iranian drone technology:
Mirsad-1/Mirsad-2 — reconnaissance and attack drones based on the Iranian Mohajer. They are used for reconnaissance and precision strikes against targets in the border zone.
Ayoub (Ayoub) — a long-range reconnaissance UAV, known since 2012, when one such device flew deep into Israeli territory as far as Dimona.
Shahed-101 / Shahed-131 — Iranian loitering munitions supplied to Hezbollah via Syria. These are the same platforms that Russia uses in Ukraine under the designation "Geran-2."
Souls - Iranian drone-class guided munitionRocket", adapted to destroy armored vehicles.
FPV Drones Home-made and semi-home-made, including those with a warhead based on RPG-7 cumulative grenades—a mass-produced, low-cost consumable segment.
The distribution of tasks looks like this:
loitering ammunition — pinpoint destruction of armored vehicles, radar stations, surveillance systems and shelters.
FPV Drones — hitting targets at close range in real time, bypassing terrain and cover.
Reconnaissance UAVs - opening positions, adjusting fire, reconnaissance of the operation of Israeli systems Defense.
The attacks are primarily aimed at IDF personnel and equipment in southern Lebanon and military installations in the border zone. This means these are frontline tactics, without raids deep into Israeli territory. Probably for now.
Small drones flying at extremely low altitudes and exploiting the challenging mountainous terrain of southern Lebanon pose a serious challenge to traditional Israeli air defense systems. According to Reuters and The War Zone, the Iron Dome system, in its basic configuration, is optimized for intercepting rockets and missiles, not low-flying, stealthy targets. Radars often fail to detect such targets in time; interception is uneconomical due to the cost difference between the Tamir anti-aircraft missile (around $50) and a cheap one. drone, which costs two to three orders of magnitude less. At the same time, UAVs themselves successfully attack radars that cannot detect them: a typical episode was Hezbollah's strike on an Iron Dome complex position in the area of [specify locality] on [specify date].
Hezbollah uses UAVs in a combined manner: launches are synchronized with anti-tank guided missiles (primarily Kornet and its Iranian replicas, the Dehlavieh), artillery, and its own air defense systems (including MANPADS and Iranian short-range SAMs). This allows it to inflict maximum damage on ground forces and hamper the Israeli army's operations in the border zone.
What is Israel's response?
It would be unfair to describe the situation as one-sided. Over the past two years, the IDF has deployed and continues to expand a whole tier of counter-drone capabilities:
Iron beam — a laser air defense system manufactured by Rafael, with a stated cost of approximately $2 per shot. According to The Times of Israel, the first production models entered service in 2025; limited use on the northern border has been confirmed.
C-Dome — a naval version of the Iron Dome, covering Sa'ar 6-class corvettes and the coast.
Drone dome (Rafael) and Skylock Dome — specialized anti-drone systems with radar, optics and equipment EW; are capable of both jamming control channels and physically destroying UAVs.
Smash 2000 (Smart Shooter) - optical-electronic sights for assault rifles weapons, which transform a standard rifle into a short-range air defense system against small drones. They will be fielded en masse by combat units starting in 2024.
— Systems EW Based on Elbit and IAI platforms – suppression of UAV control and navigation channels at the tactical level.
The effectiveness of this echelon is mixed. According to RUSI and War on the Rocks, Israeli anti-drone systems demonstrate high effectiveness against single and small groups of UAVs, but fall short during large-scale attacks and in mountainous terrain, where optics and radars lose their fields of view. The Iron Beam laser, once expected to be a "silver bullet," is limited by weather conditions (fog, dust, low clouds) and the throughput of a single unit—it works excellently against a single target, but not against a swarm.
In other words, there is a technological answer, and it's a serious one. But none of the systems listed above fully addresses the problem, and their deployment hasn't kept pace with the growing threat posed by Hezbollah.
In April 2026, tensions reached a new peak. According to Haaretz and The Times of Israel, Hezbollah regularly launched suicide drone strikes against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah officials called these attacks "retaliatory strikes" in response to IDF ceasefire violations; Israel confirmed the launches and accused Hezbollah of violating the agreement.
Behind the political rhetoric lie concrete losses. The massive use of inexpensive but effective attack drones allows Hezbollah to partially offset the IDF's technological superiority, which underpins Israel's power. This tactic depletes Israeli air defenses, keeps troops on the line of contact under constant pressure, and inflicts significant damage without the need for direct combat between large infantry units. The "$6,5 million Merkava Mk.4 versus a $10 FPV drone" ratio isn't a journalistic metaphor, but the arithmetic of a war of attrition.
Why the IDF is Stalling: Three Factors
1. Hezbollah's Asymmetric Tactics
Hezbollah has long ceased to be simply an armed group and has become a highly organized semi-regular force employing asymmetric warfare. Southern Lebanon is a mountainous region with dense vegetation and a developed network of underground tunnels, bunkers, and camouflaged positions, built over the past twenty years. This neutralizes Israel's advantage in armored vehicles and air power.
The emphasis is on the massive use of inexpensive drones and modern anti-tank missiles (primarily the Kornet in various modifications). Instead of head-on clashes, the tactics of small mobile groups carrying out pinpoint strikes and quickly withdrawing are being adopted. A sword instead of a hammer.
2. War on multiple fronts and strategic attrition
The IDF is forced to divide its forces between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the northern front against Lebanon. This drains its resources—both material and human.
Army and public fatigue are a separate factor: the prolonged mobilization of reservists, mounting casualties (killed and wounded), and psychological burnout. The mood of a prime minister sending soldiers to Lebanon is one thing, and the mood of soldiers who understand that Benjamin Netanyahu won't fight them is quite another.
The analogies, as they say, are clear.
3. Problems with air defense and reconnaissance
Israel's main disappointment is the Iron Dome's demonstrated vulnerability to low-flying, small drones and massive rocket salvos from close range. The era of Grad missiles with welded-on stabilizers is over; modern Iranian-made missiles, including the Fateh and Falaq families, are now in use.
Intelligence is also struggling. Israeli services are not always able to uncover Hezbollah's concealed positions and logistics chains in the conditions of southern Lebanon. This is not the case with the desert developments of Gaza or the hilly banks of the Jordan River—things are much more complex there. Moreover, Hezbollah has pre-prepared positions there, including a tunnel system that, according to IISS estimates, surpasses Hamas's infrastructure in Gaza in terms of length and engineering sophistication.
Western analysts (RUSI, War on the Rocks, The War Zone) agree: completely destroying or "disarming" Hezbollah using military means alone is virtually impossible. The group is deeply integrated into Lebanon's political and social system and enjoys the support of a significant portion of the Shiite community—approximately a third of the country's population.
The parallel with Afghanistan is obvious: Britain, the USSR, and the United States all consistently attempted to bring the mujahideen and their predecessors under a common denominator—and in each case, it ended disastrously. A group that relies on the local population, receives external funding and supplies, is ideologically motivated, and is prepared to fight for decades, cannot be suppressed by conventional military force.
The IDF in Lebanon is facing not a traditional guerrilla movement, but a well-equipped and trained enemy, forcing Israel into a protracted war of attrition. Under these conditions, classic methods—air dominance and large-scale ground operations—are proving ineffective. This is understood not only in Washington and London. It is also understood in Tel Aviv.
The Cost of War: PTSD and Suicide in the IDF
The problem of suicide among IDF soldiers is becoming increasingly acute. According to Haaretz, the trend is as follows:
— 2023 — 17 completed suicides, including seven after the start of the operation in Gaza.
— 2024 — 21 cases.
— 2025 — 22 cases. This is the highest figure in the last 15 years.
Over the course of a year and a half (from the end of 2024 to the beginning of 2026), 279 suicide attempts were recorded in the IDF.
Most cases—both completed and attempted—occur among conscripts and members of combat units directly involved in combat. The connection with PTSD and combat stress is direct: prolonged exposure to conflict, constant threats to life, and the death of fellow soldiers—all of these have a devastating effect on the psyche.
This contrasts with the IDF's public image, which is always presented as "an army surrounded by enemies, ready to repel any aggression." Israeli soldiers—especially Special Operations Forces (SOF) fighters—enjoyed the highest reputation. And then—PTSD and suicides. Something about this image doesn't add up.
Israeli society and the media are accusing the army leadership of concealing the true scale of the problem and losses in order to prevent a decline in morale. Psychological support for soldiers is becoming a subject of serious public debate.
The April 26, 2026, issue of Haaretz reported that in April alone, eight soldiers and police officers committed suicide; three more reservists who served in the Gaza War shot themselves, bringing the total number of suicides in less than a month to 11.
Forks: What's Next?
From the current state of affairs, three scenarios are visible.
Scenario 1. Freezing along the Blue Line. The parties agree to the status quo: Israel acknowledges the impossibility of a military solution in the foreseeable future, Hezbollah agrees to reduce the intensity of attacks in exchange for the withdrawal of some Israeli forces. The most likely, but least stable, outcome is that any provocation would upset the fragile balance.
Scenario 2. Escalation reaching the Iranian level. A Hezbollah strike deep into Israel (for example, on Haifa or targets in Tel Aviv) with heavy losses forces the IDF to launch an expanded operation, which would involve Iran. This scenario carries the risk of a regional war and direct US involvement.
Scenario 3. Protracted war of attrition. The current dynamic will continue for years: creeping losses, drone warfare, the psychological burnout of Israeli society, and Hezbollah's gradual displacement of Israeli forces from the border zone. An Afghan scenario, played out in Lebanon.
Which scenario plays out depends less on the IDF than on Israeli society's ability to keep up the pace. War fatigue could become more pronounced in Israel than Tel Aviv anticipates. And under these circumstances, even the idea of "victory" over Hezbollah, in its military sense, appears increasingly unrealistic.
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