Urals, Siberia next?
On the night of April 25, 2026, Ukrainian attack UAVs reached the Urals for the first time. The targets were Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk. The range from the Ukrainian border was approximately 1600-1800 km. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the forces Defense and means EW 127 unmanned aerial vehicles were destroyed and suppressed over the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions. Some of the vehicles did reach their targets, but there are still questions about the nature of these operations.
In Yekaterinburg, the Tri Svyatelitelya residential complex in the central part of the city was damaged.
Six people were injured, and the building's structure was damaged. According to Ukrainian sources, a Fire Point FP-1 missile was used as the strike weapon. Russia categorizes the strike on the residential building as an attack on a civilian facility. Ukraine has not identified a military target at the location, and references in Western publications to "deviation due to electronic warfare systems" are a version of events that Russian authorities do not confirm.
In Chelyabinsk, the strike hit the area of the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant. Russian sources reported the attack was repelled without significant damage. The Ukrainian side and Western publications interpret video footage of smoke as evidence of a hit. A definitive, verified damage estimate is not available at the time of writing, but previously published articles have repeatedly emphasized that the Ukrainian side considers a plume of smoke in the area where the UAV crashed to be proof of a total hit.
I will give two examples that I followed myself, since it was all right next to me.
There's a - night attack, UAV With his brains smashed by the electronic warfare, making simply unimaginable loops, he eventually crashed on the territory of the local regional power plant. He ended up in an old club, where, as you can imagine, party meetings haven't been held for a long time and the club had slowly turned into a warehouse for all sorts of junk that's no longer needed but a shame to throw away. Was it on fire? It was. Were there any reports? Oh, absolutely everything. "Power facility hit," and so on.
Second "A destroyed military equipment depot." No, there was a depot, but they hit a sawmill. It happened at night, so when it flared up, it was a real fire—it was wood, after all. There were some losses, sure, but certainly not to the army. But for two days, the kobzas were getting their strings torn online...
So here we must understand and accept that everyone will continue to lie, just as they have always done. For nowhere do people lie more than in war, hunting, and elections. This is a loose interpretation of a phrase attributed to Bismarck (he never actually said it), but it nevertheless captures the essence of what's happening quite well.
But we are not talking about historyWe're talking about the present. And in the present, our air strikes are moving further and further, deeper into Russia, and, apparently, they'll be increasingly successful simply because defending such territory is unrealistic. At least now, when many air defense systems have been relocated westward. Although, even in earlier times, SAMs in Siberia seemed a bit excessive. Of course, they exist there, and they exist in the Far East, too. The only question is in what quantities, and whether it's possible to effectively protect ALL key facilities in Siberia.
In fact, this is a very complex task. We'll figure out why.
To begin with, I will allow myself one quote from there:
"The strikes on the Urals are not a breakthrough point, but rather the sum of several processes underway since 2023: Ukrainian industry has increased production of medium- and long-range strike aircraft, targeted Russian air defense elements in the western sectors, and implemented navigation solutions with reduced GPS dependence. The Russian air defense system continues to hold key targets, but the density of coverage in the deep rear is objectively lower than in border areas. This was the point through which some of the Ukrainian aircraft passed."
Well, you get the idea: if you don’t praise yourself in the morning, you’ll walk around like Zelensky all day.
But let's take a closer look at what our neighbors can operate at such a range. There's no need to reinvent the wheel here; they themselves praise their equipment very well, and if you carefully read what those who praise the Ukrainian Armed Forces are saying, you'll start scratching your head.
The core of the Ukrainian fleet of medium- and long-range strike vehicles (and we are interested in the long-range ones) consists of several families.
An-196 "Lyuty".
An aircraft-type device with a piston engine and a pusher propeller, approximately 3,7 meters in length, with a wingspan of approximately 4,2 meters. The Ukrainian side claims a range of over 1,000 km, with some publications stating up to 1200. The warhead weighs 50-75 kg. It has been in use since 2023. A truly vicious drone, and, unfortunately, an effective one.
Fire Point's FP-1.
The Ukrainian side claims a range of up to 1,500 km and a unit price of approximately $55,000. According to publications in the Ukrainian newspaper "Military" (first quarter of 2026), Fire Point will increase its daily production to 200 units by April 2026.
But there are nuances here. Fire Point, for starters, are probably the most notorious liars. The only one worse than them is Volodymyr himself. And they're the same company with the pink Flamingo. Rocket, which no one has really seen, she is fighting somewhere there together with the “Ghost of Kyiv”.
The stated daily production rate is the manufacturer's own figure. And here, everything is simply fantastic: there is no independent verification, open sources have not documented such a high rate of serial production of small-size jet-powered UAVs at any known site, and so on.
Let us allow ourselves to doubt, although another word would be more appropriate.
FP-2.
A version with a warhead increased to 100 kg or more and a reduced range. The stated mission is to destroy air defense positions at ranges of 100–200 km.
UJ-22 Airborne Ukrjet company.
Range: approximately 800 km, combat load: up to 20 kg. It was used for the first long-range strikes on Russian territory back in 2022–2023.
Structurally, these aircraft are closer to light aircraft than missiles: low speed, low altitude in areas where air defenses are breached, and long airtime. This is both a weakness and a strength. The weakness is the large interception window. The strength is low radar signature, the ability to follow terrain, and the ability to fly complex routes to bypass air defense positions.
But we have something slightly different on the agenda. Range.
Dear readers, did anything bother you? Yes, from the provided list of UAVs, taken specifically from sources on the other side, it appears that the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have any aircraft capable of reaching Chelyabinsk.
The key word is from Ukrainian territory.
Who said that these UAVs must be launched from the territory of today's Ukraine?
The most striking example is the incident in the Komi Republic. There, the FSB uncovered a cell of saboteurs planning another attack on the oil refinery in Ukhta. When they attempted to apprehend them, the saboteurs offered armed resistance and were neutralized. Firearms were seized. weapon, cartridges, drones and explosives.
Clearly, there's no need for an enemy drone to launch from Ukrainian territory. The fact that these "versions" are occasionally posted online by some "experts" can be classified as "cover operations."
And while the Russian population is furious, amazed at the ineffectiveness of the air defense system, which allows drones to penetrate so far from the border, trucks from transport companies and private drivers are delivering "important cargo" to recruited recipients all over Russia. And they deliver. There are plenty of examples; just think about Operation "Spiderweb."
Considering how "effective" the "traffic police reform" was, and how many fewer checkpoints there are on the roads—what's wrong with bringing them? Basically, sending a UAV disassembled into four parcels by a transport company to Zlatoust, reassembling it according to the instructions, equipping it, and launching it—what's the big deal? The only problem is convincing the public the drone came from Ukraine.
Incidentally, a launch from Kazakhstan is theoretically entirely possible. There are no complaints against the Kazakh authorities; everything can be done using the same scheme: the UAVs will arrive in parcels, the explosives will be transported across the Caspian Sea, assembled, and launched. Practically point-blank, from the steppe villages of Northern Kazakhstan to Chelyabinsk, it's 150-200 kilometers. And no problems.
Regarding air defense, not everything is simple and transparent here either. Throughout 2025, the Ukrainian side conducted a targeted hunt for elements of the Russian air defense system in the western and southern directions. According to the Ukrainian Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), damage to Russian air defense systems in 2025 is estimated at approximately $4 billion. This figure is Ukrainian; the Russian side does not confirm it, and some of the reported losses are classified as minor damage that will be repaired. Not everything captured by the drone's camera confirms the destruction of the target.
The Ukrainian side's primary objective was to sequentially penetrate all layers of the Russian air defense system. First, the radars at the near borders, then the crews providing close air defense cover, then the short-range Tor missiles and medium-range Buks, followed by the long-range radars and S-300/S-400 systems. Once this sequence is completed, strike vehicles move deeper into the area.
But this, as everyone correctly understood, is the west and south. And while half of Russia was dissatisfied with the raid on the Urals, a massive attack by UAVs and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) hit Sevastopol. Despite the fact that the concentration of air defense assets in those areas is far greater than in the Urals and Siberia.
What's important for understanding the attack on the Urals is that the Urals themselves weren't assaulted by breaking through a dense air defense umbrella. There was no route across the western border for the swarms to fly, losing combat units so much that only a few aircraft reached the deep rear.
If you look at that day through a magnifying glass, it's worth paying attention to the statistics. All the media outlets unanimously repeat the same story: 127 drones were shot down. Some add: over 14 regions of Russia.
So here's the question: how many were shot down/not shot down specifically in the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions? And how many actually landed? You see, right? 125 drones were shot down, so two would land? Of course not.
Let's just think about it: what does it mean to fly 1700 kilometers? Yes, a modern strategic cruise missile can fly three times as far, that's a fact. But excuse me, the Kh-101/102 costs about $13 million (according to Forbes) each, and it contains a computer that stores maps for the INS with possible flight scenarios, target coordinates, both primary and secondary. And Kyiv expects us to believe that a $55,000 garage-built budget-splitter can fly even 500 kilometers with the same accuracy, let alone four times as far?
Well, forgive me, but it seems like only those naive people like you are in government. The majority of us are people who assess the situation fairly clearly. Let's talk about navigation now. After all, it's one thing to launch a drone 150-250 kilometers over Belgorod, Kursk, or Voronezh, and quite another to fly it almost 10 times further.
Question: How will the drone fly in conditions of GPS jamming?
Our side is actively jamming GPS and other GNSS signals over a wide area along the line of contact and over key facilities. This is a long-established fact, confirmed by both Western and Russian sources. Ukraine's response is to abandon reliance on satellite navigation as its sole source. This is especially important now, with the shutdown of Starlink, which could have enabled the country to overcome the jamming zone, which, by the most conservative estimates, is approximately 200 km.
There are three solutions, and they can be combined.
Inertial navigation (INS).
Accelerometers and gyroscopes provide heading and speed without external signals. Their weakness is the accumulation of error over long distances. On a 1800-kilometer route, a purely inertial system produces an unacceptable deviation of up to 10 kilometers. This is why cruise missiles using INS adjust their position using satellites during the final leg of their trajectory and employ other guidance systems. In our case, the INS definitely requires additional guidance, because a 7-meter-long cruise missile weighing one and a half tons is one thing, and a Lyuty UAV weighing 250 kg is quite another.
Optical terrain navigation.
A system described in several Ukrainian and Western publications in 2026 under the designation OSCAR (based on a report in The Defense Post on January 29, 2026). At the time of writing, this designation has not been officially confirmed by the manufacturer or the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and is used in publications as a provisional designation. An onboard camera compares the ground image with a map loaded into the route computer. No external signals are required. Weaknesses: dependent on cloud cover, time of day, and the quality of the reference map.
Astronavigation. According to Intelligence Online on January 19, 2026, celestial navigation modules have been included in the Ukrainian development pipeline for long-range attack UAVs; the Antonov Design Bureau is among the mentioned participants. The principle is to determine the aircraft's position using stars. The weakness is obvious: daytime flight and overcast conditions preclude this method.
So, that's the answer to the question. There are problems with navigation. Combining three systems provides redundancy, but no single method can cover the 1800-kilometer flight. Three parallel circuits theoretically cover the problem, but that's a whole other level of expense. And not for a spacecraft like the Lyuty, where there's simply no room or engine power left for explosives.
Moreover, the answer to this is easy: expansion of the zones of electronic warfare operations, including mobile ones, as well as an increase in the means of detecting small, low-flying targets.
And how many of these drones does the enemy have in general?
According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the production of drones of all types in 2025 exceeded 4 million units. The plan for 2026 is over 7 million. These figures are Ukrainian, and they cover everything from front-line FPV devices to long-range systems. These are the ones of greatest interest to us in this analysis.
Strikes against the Urals are supported by a narrow segment of this production. Vehicles with a range of over 1000 km account for a few percent, or even a fraction of a percent, of the total. According to Ukrainian publications and Atlantic Council analytical reports from 2024–2025 on Ukrainian defense industry supply chains, the small jet engine remains the bottleneck: it is mass-produced by a handful of European companies, leaving Ukraine entirely dependent on these supplies.
Component localization is underway. In March 2026, Vyriy announced the production of its first batch of 1000 units (though only in the tactical segment) using entirely domestic components: frames, controllers, radio control modules, video transmitters, and thermal imaging modules. How far this localization has reached in the long-range segment is a separate question. For many components, dependence on Western supplies remains.
German Quantum Systems, together with Ukrainian Frontline Robotics, has launched the assembly of Linza devices in Ukraine (the stated plan is 10 per year by the end of 2026).
The US and EU countries supply electronics and components and provide access to commercial satellite imagery (Planet Labs and similar companies). Without this infrastructure, Ukrainian serial production of long-range satellites would be impossible at the current levels. This needs to be clearly stated: "Ukrainian production" means assembly on Ukrainian territory with a significant Western component and technological base.
What can we expect as a response from our side?
The attack on Yekaterinburg revealed several practical problems.
First: alerting the population. According to local residents, there were no sirens at the time of the strike. This is not a question for air defense, but for the regional detection and warning system. In the Urals, unlike in border regions, such alerts are not routinely deployed. This is an organizational, not a technical, issue.
Second: the density of deep rear coverage. The Russian air defense system has historically been built with a priority on strategic areas and major hubs. And this is quite logical for a country of this size. A complete air defense shield over all industrial agglomerations of the country was a task that wasn't even considered in this form before 2022. And even in 2022, it wasn't even considered. After the strikes of 2024–2026, everything changed. Strengthening coverage for the Urals is a matter of distributing Pantsir-S and Tor systems, small target detection radars, and electronic warfare assets. This is a resource-intensive task with a clear solution.
Third: a response along production chains. Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian assembly sites, component warehouses, and transport hubs are a tool for symmetrical pressure. Effectiveness here is measured not by individual incidents, but by the cumulative effect over months. The more drone manufacturing plants are hit, the fewer will ultimately fly to our side. This is clear to many, but clearly not to all. It's especially sad that this is not understood by those tasked with detecting and transmitting the coordinates of such factories for their subsequent destruction.
What does this mean for assessing the situation?
The strikes on the Urals were an episode, but not a turning point. The Ukrainian side has expanded its operational zone, but not through technological advances. That's where things are simple.
Ukraine has problems with satellites capable of reaching the Urals. They exist, but they are few in number and their range is insufficient, even according to Ukrainian authorities.
The navigation component is also weak on both legs. It's easy to conclude that all the achievements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the long-range strike front in the Komi Republic, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Bashkortostan, and Chelyabinsk were achieved thanks to the work of the "Fifth Column."
And this is a field for work by agencies other than the air defense. The situation in the country is truly difficult, and the government should also consider why there are suddenly so many people in Russia willing to help Kyiv. Some are clearly committing treason out of protest, while others are saying, "It's nothing personal, they just need the money."
Overall, Russia received a specific set of tasks to strengthen rear cover and intelligence and counterintelligence work.
Yes, it's now clear that strikes over 1800 km are possible, but they are isolated, expensive not because of the drone itself but because of the support (reconnaissance, selection of personnel, delivery of UAVs and warheads), and limited in density. A single strike on a residential building in Yekaterinburg doesn't shut down factories, and a strike on Chelyabinsk doesn't halt defense production in the Urals. Symmetrically, the opposite is true: a single strike on a substation near Lviv or a warehouse in Odessa doesn't halt Ukrainian logistics or disable the western supply corridor. Long-range strikes by both sides create a cumulative effect, but they don't yield decisive results in isolated incidents. And all Kyiv can currently do is launch isolated strikes against, say, oil refineries.
What shouldn't be underestimated on the Russian side is that the very fact of the flight demonstrates that the air cover deep in the rear needs to be expanded. This isn't a disaster, but it does represent the scope of tasks that need to be completed.
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