Fleet and Politics. The Circumstances of the Russian Fleet's Deployment to the Mediterranean Sea during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774.
Before we move on to stories Archipelago expeditions of the Russian fleet, I must offer my deepest apologies to my esteemed readers. I don't understand how this happened, but during the process of publishing previous article, the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 miraculously transformed for me into the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1744. The comment: "What, BC or something?" was spot on... I can't explain how this happened, even though I, of course, always reread the texts of the articles I publish. Unfortunately, while working on the material, my vision becomes so blurred that I can miss even the most epic gaffe—as happened in this case.
The number of armies at the beginning of the war
So, the war with the Ottoman Porte had begun, but the balance of power could not inspire optimism among the Russian Empire's leadership. The Turks, having assembled their armies, including the Crimean Tatars, could have fielded 350 soldiers, while the Russian armies deployed against the Turks had less than 130. Reinforcing the Russian forces was possible, but somewhat difficult: the Russian Empire was fighting in Poland, and there was also unrest along the Circassian border.
It's clear that the Russian commanders could only roughly estimate the number of troops facing them. The exact size of the Turkish armies was probably unknown even to the Turks themselves. But it was clear that in the war that had begun, the enemy would significantly outnumber us. Therefore, it would be quite a good idea to acquire an army somewhere capable of drawing off at least some of the Ottoman forces. But where to find such an army? There were no states on the political horizon willing to ally with the Russian Empire and wage war against Turkey.
All of this was clear to Count Alexei Grigorievich Orlov, who was in Italy at the time. And so, apparently, he was the first to come up with the idea of solving this problem with the help of the navy, which he immediately wrote to Empress Catherine II about.
The Count's idea was to send the Baltic Fleet to the Mediterranean to attack the Turks there. But, of course, ship crews alone, even with soldiers who could be taken on board, would not be enough to divert large Ottoman forces. Orlov understood this perfectly well and proposed inciting an uprising among the Christian peoples, Greeks, and Montenegrins: none of them were passionately attached to the Ottomans and were ready to revolt if they received support from Russia. From these people, if not an army, then at least large detachments could be formed. These detachments, while certainly far inferior to regular Russian troops, were quite comparable in combat effectiveness to some provincial Turkish garrisons. And with sufficient numbers and activity, such detachments could draw away significant Ottoman forces.
At first glance, Count Orlov's idea seemed brilliant. However, upon closer inspection, it became clear that sabotaging the fleet in the Mediterranean was a gamble with virtually no chance of success.
On the state of our Baltic fleet in 1768
Peter I created the Baltic Fleet and turned it into a formidable force, but after the Tsar's death, his brainchild quickly fell into disrepair. The Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia died in 1725, and just three years later, the Swedish envoy reported to his government:
Despite the annual construction of galleys, the Russian galley fleet, compared to its former size, is greatly diminished; the naval fleet is in utter ruin, because the old ships are so rotten that no more than four or five ships of the line can be put to sea, and the construction of new ones has slackened. The admiralties are so neglected that the fleet cannot be restored to its former condition in three years, yet no one cares about this.
Peter II reduced the active fleet to four frigates and two flutes, while the remaining ships were laid up to conserve the treasury. Things improved slightly under the reign of Anna Ioannovna, so regular naval exercises were resumed in 1731. Furthermore, the Arkhangelsk shipyard resumed operations, capable of building 66-gun ships from 1737 onward. This was important because Arkhangelsk had no shortage of building material, using larch, while in St. Petersburg, ships were built from oak, which was not grown in sufficient quantities in Russia.
Nevertheless, there was a shortage of funds for the navy. In 1731, the Baltic Fleet had 36 ships of the line, but only 8 were fully operational. By the start of the War of the Polish Succession (1733), it had 10 ships of the line and frigates ready for combat. The war, of course, forced investments in the Baltic Fleet, so that by 1734, 14 ships of the line and 5 frigates were at sea, not counting smaller vessels. But then the development of the Baltic Fleet was slowed by the Russo-Turkish War of 1735-1739. Nevertheless, the fleet gradually regained its strength, so that by 1739, 16 ships of the line were operational.
During the reign of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, the Baltic Fleet's fortunes were shaky. It performed poorly in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743, and then steadily declined until the accession of Catherine II. The ships fell into disrepair, and many were no longer able to sail. Even those that were able were short-handed, forcing the fleet to recruit soldiers before setting out. Funding for the fleet dwindled by the hour: while 1,200,000 rubles were allocated for its needs in 1757, by 1767 it was only 589,000 rubles.
All of this is, of course, very sad and seems clearly unreasonable, but there's no point in blaming our sovereigns and empresses too harshly. A navy is a very expensive undertaking, and its creation and maintenance under Peter the Great was extremely costly for the Russian Empire's economy. To create a powerful Baltic Fleet, Peter the Great resorted to measures that could, without exaggeration, be called mobilization, but the state cannot permanently exist in such a manner. The question of to what extent the post-Petrine weakening of the navy is due to objective factors and to what extent to the underestimation of the importance of naval power by the country's leadership is certainly interesting, but beyond the scope of this series of articles.
Let's note that by the start of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, the Baltic Fleet, on paper, consisted of 20 ships of the line, 8 frigates, and 21 vessels of other classes. Moreover, as I wrote earlier, Catherine II, in response to the Ottoman Porte's declaration of war, declared war on it herself on November 18, 1768. Clearly, the idea of sending Russian squadrons to the Mediterranean was not immediately approved by the Russian Empress, but it is known that by January 1769 she had already decided to do so.
So, it was necessary to prepare the fleet for the campaign and battle, which was done by July 1769, when Grigory Andreevich Spiridov left Kronstadt for the Aegean Sea.
Or, if you prefer, to the Greek Archipelago, as they called it back then, which is why this and subsequent Russian expeditions were often referred to as the Archipelago Expeditions of the Russian Navy. But even by this time, six months after the decision was made to send the Baltic Fleet to the Mediterranean, only seven battleships, one frigate, one bombardier, two packet boats, and four pinnaces—the latter essentially serving as supply vessels—were ready for departure.
Strictly speaking, they actually prepared eight battleships, not seven, as one of them, the Svyatoslav, was damaged early in the expedition and forced to turn back, its place taken by the eighth battleship, the Rostislav. But, of course, even eight battleships out of two dozen on the roster in six months is a meager result.
Moreover, the next expedition, which included 3 ships of the line, 2 frigates, 1 pinnace and 1 small vessel, left the Baltic only in October 1769. In total, 5 squadrons left the Mediterranean Sea, and the last one – as far back as 1773!
From this it was quite obvious that by the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet were in poor condition, some were not even operational, and there were not enough crews... But even among those officers and sailors that were available, there was a major flaw in their training.
The fact is that the Baltic Fleet's ships had virtually no experience with long-distance voyages. From Kronstadt to the Morea (Peloponnese), where the Greek uprising was planned, it was a distance of approximately 7,500 km, or almost 4,050 nautical miles. And the fleet had never left the Baltic, which is no more than 1,600 km, or 864 miles, long, even though our ships didn't sail that often.
The Baltic Fleet's first Mediterranean voyage after Peter the Great took place only in 1764, but only one frigate, the Nadezhda Blagopoluchiya, was sent on the expedition. It must be said that this voyage also yielded positive results—it became clear that the bottoms of ships sailing in the Mediterranean needed additional wormproofing, and the frigate's hydrographic maps of various ports and straits were certainly useful. However, a single-ship voyage certainly failed to impart long-distance experience to the Russian fleet.
So it's safe to say: the Baltic Fleet was completely unprepared for the expedition Count Orlov proposed. And Empress Catherine II couldn't have failed to understand this.
Do you take the political factor into account? No, you don't!
The dispatch of the Baltic Fleet's ships was obviously fraught with significant risks due to the balance of foreign political forces. Briefly, in my previous article I already described the main driving forces that led Turkey to war against the Russian Empire; here I will be brief.
In the south of the European part of the Russian Empire, war broke out with the Ottomans, with the Crimean Khanate, of course, siding with the Turks. To the west, there was a long border with Poland, where Russian troops were again fighting—again, against the Bar Confederation. Only the north was quiet, but the problem was that Sweden in 1768 could in no way be considered a friend. After the slap in the face it had received from Russia in the Seven Years' War, when the Russian Empire was initially an ally, then sided with Prussia and forced the Swedes to renounce all their conquests, the future of Russo-Swedish relations looked completely uncertain.
And it was perfectly clear that sending the entire combat-ready Baltic Fleet to the Mediterranean would weaken Russia's strength in a potential war against Sweden and could provoke the latter to join Poland and Turkey. If the Swedes were to seek revenge, when else but now, while the Russian Empire was fighting in Poland and the Black Sea, and only a light galley fleet remained in the Baltic?
That is, the departure of our fleet from the Baltic could provoke Sweden to enter the war against Russia – this should have been taken into account.
Then the good things started newsOur fleet had access from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea through the Kattegat Strait, as relations with Denmark were very good in 1768. Unfortunately, that was where the good news ended, as a serious problem arose further along the Russian expedition's route: France.
It was France that pushed Turkey into war, but in 1768 it was by no means alone. Following the Seven Years' War, France had already formed a coalition with Austria, which found itself in the role of junior partner. Then two more countries joined the Treaty of Versailles: Spain and the Kingdom of Naples.
Even France alone possessed a powerful navy. In the Seven Years' War, it undoubtedly lost the naval war to England, with the French navy suffering colossal losses. The French colonial empire suffered a knockout blow, losing Canada and several other territories.
However, the French considered it a matter of honor to rebuild their navy, and their efforts were not in vain. In 1768, the French fleet comprised 66 ships of the line and 41 frigates, not counting smaller vessels. It's quite clear that even if the Russian Baltic Fleet had been able to bring all 20 ships of the line and 8 frigates to sea, it would have stood no chance against the French, and the first Archipelago Expedition, with its 7 ships of the line and 1 frigate, was a mere match for the French. Not to mention that Spanish ships were ready to join the French fleet...
The French battleship Ville de Paris
The Russian Empire alone couldn't prevent the French from destroying our fleet. France and Russia lacked common borders to march an army on Versailles. Nor did the Russian Empire have any allies at the time willing to accept Russian troops and join forces against France. Even if they had, the Russian army was already busy enough with Poland and the Ottoman Empire to fight another power.
Thus, if France had destroyed Russian ships, Catherine II would have had no choice but to accept it.
There was only one power capable of reining in the Franco-Spanish alliance at sea—Great Britain, mistress of the seas. But the British always did only what was beneficial to the British, so how could they be persuaded to defend Russian interests?
England and the Northern Chord
At first glance, it might seem that England was Russia's natural ally against France in 1768. Indeed, in the Seven Years' War, Russia initially acted as part of the anti-Prussian coalition and fought against Prussia alongside France, Austria, Sweden, and Saxony. However, upon the accession of Peter III, it switched sides from the coalition to Prussia. Meanwhile, England initially supported Prussia and fought on its side, but there were no battles between the English and Russians in this war. Then, when Russia supported Prussia, it appeared that the Russian Empire was becoming an ally of England.
At the same time, France was England's main antagonist in those years, and the Franco-Spanish-Austrian alliance was formed against the English. This was well understood in Foggy Albion. Standing alone against an alliance of continental powers was, of course, utterly disadvantageous for England, and it needed allies.
This is where the idea of the “Northern Chord” actually arose – an alliance of England, Prussia, the Russian Empire and Denmark, with the neutrality of Sweden and Poland, against France, Austria and Spain.
It all seems simple and clear. Alas, politics is never simple or clear.
To begin with, it's unclear who actually came up with the idea for the "Northern Chord." Official Russian historiography usually credits Nikita Ivanovich Panin, the head of Russian foreign affairs, with it.
But not always: there is an opinion that the "Northern Chord" was invented by the Russian diplomat Baron Johann Albrecht Korff somewhere around 1762, and that N.I. Panin "adopted" his idea, supplemented it, and after the death of I.A. Korff in 1766, gave it its final form.
At the same time, the distinguished Russian (and later Soviet) historian E. V. Tarle believes that the "Northern Chord" was conceived in England and originated there during the Seven Years' War, when the contours of the Franco-Spanish-Austrian agreements were taking shape. In any case, there is no doubt that the alliance between England, Prussia, and the Russian Empire, directed against the French, had influential supporters in England, one of whom was William Pitt the Elder, Earl of Chatham, who served as Prime Minister of Great Britain until October 1768.
And so, it would seem, everything was going well for the alliance between England and Russia, but this was only at first glance. For an alliance will only be valid when the countries entering into it have common interests and are willing to make efforts to realize these interests. At the same time, the goals pursued by Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia were radically different.
What did England want? Basically, roughly the same thing that happened during the Seven Years' War. That is, a situation in which the armies of European countries, locked in conflict, bled to death on the continent, while sirs and peers seized foreign possessions. The English army avoided major battles in Europe at all costs, but the British managed to wrest Canada from the French and drive them out of India.
England was almost completely satisfied with the outcome of the Seven Years' War: the French, Britain's adversaries, were weakened, but no continental European power had gained a lead or improved its position to the point of threatening the British. Perhaps the only downside was that even in such a war, the British had run up some expenses, increasing their national debt. But improving their finances with new colonies was a matter of course. In short, the British wanted to continue fighting in this manner. So that the continental countries, squabbling among themselves, would remain in their current position, without increasing their influence and thus creating the preconditions for the emergence of a strong leader in Europe, while the British would sweep the rest of the world under their wing.
What did Russia want from the "Northern Chord"? Naturally, the exact opposite of what the British desired for the Russian Empire. Russia sought development and expansion at the expense of Poland and the Ottoman Porte, and to strengthen its position in Europe. This is clearly demonstrated by the treaty that sealed the Russo-Prussian Alliance of 1764. The treaty provided for territorial inviolability, military and financial support in the event of aggression by other countries, and freedom of trade. It also stipulated the prevention of the restoration of Swedish military power and joint action in Poland. The latter, of course, was in the interests of the Prussians and Russians, but certainly not the Poles.
Versailles prevented this, so the Russian Empire sought to befriend France. However, England had no interest in strengthening the Russian Empire; it had absolutely no use for it.
England saw Russia as an important and useful trading partner and a market for British goods, including colonial ones, in exchange for raw materials and grain. Therefore, England did not object to Russia's free use of the Baltic Sea and to Sweden's inability to interfere. However, this was the extent of Russia's beneficial development for Great Britain, and further strengthening of the Russian Empire in Foggy Albion was by no means desired.
Interestingly, I can't rule out that N. I. Panin understood this nuance. For a long time, he believed it was necessary to preserve Poland's statehood, seeing it as a useful ally—a junior partner. Such a state of affairs would probably have been more acceptable to England than the partition of Poland, and could possibly have increased the chances of Britain entering into an alliance with the Russian Empire, that is, the "Northern Accord." However, it was not Panin who ultimately determined Russian policy.
As for Prussia, it sought to escape the isolation it had found itself in at the start of the Seven Years' War and never again fall into it. Prussia was too weak to stand alone against the alliance of European powers, and the war's conclusion demonstrated this perfectly. In fact, during the Seven Years' War, Prussia found itself on the brink of collapse and could have been completely crushed. It was saved only by the fact that none of the countries opposing Prussia desired its complete downfall, as Prussia was an important element in the system of levers and balances of European politics.
So, Prussia needed powerful allies. But not excessively powerful ones, as Prussia, like England, considered Russia's further strengthening extremely undesirable. This is precisely why Prussia, a "supposed ally" of the Russian Empire, like France, encouraged the Turks to enter the war against Russia. The only difference was that the French did so quite openly and were proud of their achievements in dragging the Ottoman Porte into the conflict, while the Prussians acted secretly, so as not to provoke Russian reproaches. Later, Frederick the Great attempted to intrigue to reduce Russia's gains from the war with the Turks from 1768 to 1774. As for England, Prussia, it seems, saw no particular benefit in an alliance with it.
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the relations between Prussia, Great Britain, and Russia in those years were quite curious. On the one hand, these countries shared a common enemy—the alliance of France, Austria, and Spain. And the obvious means of successfully countering this alliance was an alliance. On the other hand, Russian, British, and Prussian interests diverged so greatly that any lasting alliance between them was utterly impossible.
In fact, this was the reason that by the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War, the “Northern Chord” for Russia had been reduced to a defensive treaty with Prussia in 1764 and a trade agreement with Great Britain in the form of the “Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the Russian Empire and the Crown of Great Britain,” signed in 1766. However, England categorically avoided a military alliance with Russia.
And this despite the fact that British Prime Minister William Pitt the Elder was quite favorable to an alliance between Prussia, England, and Russia. But only on his own terms... In which the obligation to protect the Russian fleet from Spanish and French encroachments "for nothing" was not included anywhere.
So, in order to send Russian squadrons against the Turks in the Mediterranean, Russian diplomacy had to find reasons why the Baltic Fleet's Archipelago Expedition would serve the interests of not only the Russian Empire, but also Great Britain.
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