The Rusty Dagger is reshaping the cruise missile market.

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The Rusty Dagger is reshaping the cruise missile market.


On April 13, 2026, the Eglin Test Enterprise team issued a dry press release about the AGM-188A "Rusty Dagger" test on an F-16D fighter. Behind the terse lines about a "successful separation" and a "flight over the Gulf of Mexico" lay a 180-degree turnaround in American weapons technology. Rocket Weighing 225 kilograms, it flew a distance comparable to the JASSM-ER and should cost approximately seven times less when put into production.



How it all began in August 2024


The Extended Range Attack Munition program was launched in August 2024. The task was formulated strictly: long-range weapon, which can be churned out in hundreds, not dozens. In October of that year, contracts for two independent projects were awarded to Zone 5 Technologies from California and CoAspire from Virginia.


The pace of work proved uncharacteristic for the American defense industry. Both designs took to the skies in January 2025. From the signing of the papers to the first flight, only three months passed, and sixteen months until integration with the fighter jet.

In March 2025, the US Air Force transitioned the program to Phase II and changed its designation. In budget documents, ERAM became FAMM-L, which stands for Family of Affordable Mass Munitions-Lugged. The "Lugged" prefix refers to the fighter aircraft's suspension on rails, and the word "Affordable" in the family name now stands alongside the terms "Mass" and "Family."

The engine they decided not to invent


The heart of the Rusty Dagger is the PBS TJ80 small turbojet engine, manufactured by the American division of the Czech PBS Group. The choice is both unusual and significant. The TJ80 is well known in the small unmanned aircraft industry. aviation, it's being installed in series on targets and light UAVs. For a cruise missile, this is like replacing an aircraft turbo engine with a car's turbo engine, without sacrificing reliability and cost.


The engine accelerates the missile to a subsonic speed of 690 kilometers per hour. Not a record, but exactly the speed at which most Western cruise missiles of this class operate.

PBS Aerospace has already announced a doubling of its capacity. While the company expects to assemble around 2,000 TJ80s in 2026, production is expected to more than double by mid-decade. The figures speak for themselves: engine production is being expanded proactively for a rocket that isn't yet in mass production.

225 kilograms versus 1200


The AGM-188A's main focus is on proportions. The missile's gross weight is 225 kilograms, which is consistent with a standard JDAM-class pod. By comparison, the AGM-158B-modified JASSM-ER weighs 1200 kilograms and carries a warhead weighing approximately 450 kilograms.

The Rusty Dagger carries a warhead weighing over 100 kilograms—more than four times lighter. However, the range difference is much more modest. The manufacturer and open sources indicate a range of 400 kilometers, while some publications cite a range of over 580 kilometers. The JASSM-ER officially flies at approximately 1000 kilometers. So, despite a fivefold difference in weight, the range is virtually identical.

The price was the payload's power. The designers' logic is clear: a 100-kilogram warhead destroys most stationary targets, from command posts to radar stations and warehouses, just as reliably as a half-ton one. This means that the extra 350 kilograms of explosives represent a waste of metal, fuel, and, most importantly, money.

Why was the target price included in the technical specifications?


A traditional missile is designed from the ground up. Designers receive requirements for range, accuracy, and endurance, go through the development cycle, and ultimately receive a price tag they must live with. For the JASSM-ER, that price tag is approximately $1,665 million per unit. The Storm Shadow is more expensive, and the British government has refused to disclose the value of the new contract with France—a telling gesture.

Zone 5 Technologies had the opposite logic. A target price of $250 for a production rocket was included in the technical specifications from the very beginning. From there, they worked backwards to select the engine, materials, and production technologies.

The company actively uses additive manufacturing. Parts traditionally machined from metal on CNC machines are printed here. This isn't just a 3D printing fad. Printing shortens the testing cycle, allows for quick geometry changes, and eliminates the need for expensive tooling. It also eliminates the bottlenecks that plague traditional supply chains.

The planned production rate is around a thousand missiles per year. This is an extraordinary figure for a Western-style cruise weapon.


How a missile was landed on an F-16 in sixteen months


The April 2026 tests at Eglin followed a classic three-stage process. First, they tested physical compatibility: the missile was attached to the F-16D's pylons, tested through the connectors, and tested the electrical interfaces and mounting mechanics. Then came functional testing, where the fighter's onboard electronics communicated with the missile without actually launching it.

And only the third step was the actual separation. This is where they check whether the departing rocket will hit the pylon or vertical stabilizer, and whether the aerodynamics deploy correctly after the pylon separation.

In a LinkedIn post, Zone 5 Technologies noted the "rapid integration" and emphasized that the missile went from contract to combat platform deployment in sixteen months. By Western arms industry standards, where the integration of a new munition typically takes five to seven years, this is an unusually short cycle.


The Suspension Trick and the Soviet MiG-29


One detail makes the Rusty Dagger truly versatile. According to a report from the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the missile is designed for use on two fundamentally different platforms—the F-16 and the Soviet MiG-29. For engineers, this means the suspension system is designed as modular.

On the F-16, the missile is mounted on a NATO-standard rail mount, while on the MiG-29, it's mounted via an adapter for a Soviet-style beam mount. The mounting mechanics, electrical connectors, and control interface are reconfigured so that adaptation to the new platform is limited to replacing a set of brackets and firmware. Hence the "L" in FAMM-L: the entire "family" is designed to work with a variety of mounts.

According to Ukrainian analysts, this integration extends the combat viability of the MiG-29 fleet until at least 2030. The aircraft, designed in the late 1970s, receives a missile designed forty years later via an adapter and software package.

The ERAM program includes another launch method: from C-130 and C-17 transport aircraft via a palletized release system. The missiles are palletized and ejected from the cargo hold, after which they ignite their engines and launch toward their target. This concept transforms the transport aircraft into a situational cruise missile carrier without any modifications to the aircraft itself.

The arithmetic of war, in which the interceptor is more valuable than the target


To understand why the US military needed a $250 missile, it's worth looking at the flip side of modern budgets. The Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition costs around $20. In some cases, it's intercepted by a Patriot air defense missile, which costs close to $4 million. The cost ratio in such a situation is 200 to 1 in favor of the attacker.

In this arithmetic, any weapon that costs more to fire than the target loses economically, even if it wins tactically. The AGM-188A attempts to address this imbalance from the other side. It's being made cheap enough to be launched against targets that would be too small for the JASSM-ER or Storm Shadow: isolated radars, command posts, and medium-sized logistics hubs.


An 825 million contract and the first 840 missiles


In August 2025, the US State Department approved the potential sale of up to 3350 ERAM missiles to Ukraine. The package, which includes spare parts and support equipment, is valued at approximately $825 million. In accordance with standard Defense Security Cooperation Agency procedures, notification was sent to Congress with a 30-day window for objections.

The first operational batch of 840 missiles is scheduled for delivery in October 2026. Funding is distributed through several channels, including foreign military assistance programs from the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. Once production reaches design capacity, the 3350-unit package will be covered in approximately three and a half years.

Bottlenecks that can ruin everything


The program has a weakness, and it lies not in the missile's design, but in its supply chain. The Pentagon's budget request for fiscal year 2027 calls for a 188 percent increase in missile procurement compared to 2026 levels—$70,5 billion, compared to significantly lower amounts the year before. Of this, $11,3 billion goes to the Air Force, $22,6 billion to the Navy, and $36,6 billion to the Army.

Funds have been allocated, but the machines and engineers don't follow automatically. American defense companies have spent decades learning to operate in a "low-volume, high-complexity" mode. The transition to mass production requires a different production culture, a different skill set for workers, and different logistics.

Plus, imported components. The TJ80 engine was developed by the Czech PBS Group. Rare earth elements and special materials, essential for assembling the electronics and body components, are sourced from global supply chains, some of which are blocked by sanctions. Resolving these bottlenecks will take years, not months.

What's next


The AGM-188A doesn't replace the JASSM-ER or high-end cruise missiles. It opens up a class the US Air Force simply didn't have before: a mass-produced cruise weapon with a range of nearly a thousand kilometers at a price comparable to a good armored SUV. Western weapons technology, which for thirty years has relied on rare, precision-guided systems, is for the first time seriously looking in the opposite direction.

The FAMM-L designation in budget documents suggests that the Rusty Dagger is not a one-off project, but the first in a family. If the production base can handle the production rate of a thousand missiles per year, and integration with various platforms is proven in actual use, variants for other launch vehicles and, likely, for other weight categories will follow. If not, what remains is a beautiful design and a good lesson in the fact that missile blueprints are not necessarily a missile.

In April 2026, over the Gulf of Mexico, they tested not so much the compatibility of F-16 pylons with the new munition, but rather a hypothesis: could a cruise missile be made seven times cheaper without losing its purpose? The answer will depend not on Zone 5 engineers, but on whether industry can produce a thousand of these missiles per year without failure.
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  1. The comment was deleted.
  2. 0
    April 25 2026 07: 31
    Well, as they say, "everything old is new again." So here's a reincarnation of the memorable V-1. A cheap, mass-produced, and effective weapon. I predicted the emergence of something like this back in 2023, when the stalemate became apparent. If we had real engineers, it would be entirely possible to create something similar based on the FAB instead of (or alongside) the UMPK.
    1. +2
      April 25 2026 10: 56
      We had rocket-bomb developments, even before the SVO, I don’t remember the exact name, but I definitely saw one at ARMY 20, based on the FAB, by cutting off the tail and installing a booster, you get a quasi-cruise missile, but back then they thought it was expensive.
      1. +6
        April 25 2026 10: 57
        So it's not about the engineers, but about those who decide where to spend the budget.
      2. 0
        15 May 2026 10: 32
        We even considered drones to be too expensive
        1. 0
          15 May 2026 21: 00
          Drones are too expensive. For some reason, everyone has forgotten that until late 2023, when Ukraine began replacing artillery with FPV, the drone concept was completely different. These were enormous devices costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, while the Americans' cost tens of millions. Even the development paths were the same: a large drone synchronized with an aircraft, essentially the same aircraft but without a pilot. The Bayraktar TB2, huge compared to its progenitor, our hunter or pacer, the US Mk9, and the Chinese unmanned stealth bomber—everyone was following this path and didn't seriously consider cheap knockoffs. The concept changed two years ago, and our Ministry of Defense is supposedly actively pursuing this topic, but hindsight is wise. Iran, for example, chose the path of loitering munitions due to the backwardness of its technology. In case everyone has forgotten, they were seriously trying to make a copy of the American Mk9.
          1. 0
            Yesterday, 10: 15
            Quote: Stanislav Chernov
            Дроны и есть слишком дорогие

            в сравнении с чем? 1 снаряд 3 дюймовки стоит не меньше, я уж молчу про стоимость обученного экипированного солдата попавшего про дрон - там разница в сотни раз.
            По-моему наша армия при Шойгу и Табуреткине очень сильно заигралась в оптимизацию и удешевление в сочетании с гигантским воровством, из-за чего много лет современные технологии в армию внедрялись только на выставках, да и там ценность многих экспонатов вызывала большие вопросы. Речь не только о дронах - стрелковка, бтр и многое другое.
            Я был шокирован тем, с какой матчастью армия начала СВО. процентов на 80 техника из советского союза устаревшая морально. Разве что индивидуальную экипировку поставили бойцам первой волны, но опять далеко не с достаточным комплектом, ну а потом многие сами себя одевали.
            Quote: Stanislav Chernov
            концепция дрона была совершенно другая,это были огромные аппараты

            посмотрите американские фильмы про армию лет 15 давности - там вы увидите как раз то, что происходит на украине. Все, что по вашему "никто не знал"
            Но и это еще не все - я работал в оборонке и видел производство разведывательных БПЛА - их штамповали 24/7 но в армии внезапно их оказалось очень мало и выведены под командование из высоких штабов, т.е. вообще не доступны, а они могли решить множество больших тактических проблем, которые объективно были первые 2 года СВО.
            В общем, вопросов очень много к обеспечению армии в последние лет 10 перед СВО. А про флот без матов даже говорить трудно - настолько на ЧМ он плохо себя показал.
            1. 0
              Yesterday, 19: 23
              Если бы вы прочитали до конца мой комментарий,поняли бы что он относится к претензии, почему до СВО не закупали ФПВ дроны, я напомнил,что их нигде не закупали и концепция Дронов была абсолютно другая, это были большие аппараты, исключительно многоразового применения, даже сверх дешёвый на тот момент байрактар стоил 150 тысяч долларов, и управляемый боеприпас для него стоил около 10 тысяч долларов,это гораздо дороже любого снаряда и выстрела к отечественному ПТРК, а винить руководство МО в том что они не предсказывали будущее глупо. У них вины очень много в чем, но точно не в этом, если вы трезво оцените последние конфликты Израиля, США, подразделений по борьбе с партизанами в латинской Америке,никто оказался не готов к массовому появлению дешёвых управляемых дронов. Адекватного ответа до сих пор никто не выработал.
    2. +1
      April 25 2026 14: 43
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Here you have the reincarnation of the memorable V-1.

      not entirely correct:
      The Fieseler Fi 103 cost 5000 Reichsmarks (subject to the labor of concentration camp prisoners, under normal conditions under 20,000 RM), and the Me-109F cost 57,700 RM.
      ERAM $0,25K vs. F-16 Block 70/72 ~$64M
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      create something similar based on FAB

      It is necessary to have an analogue of PBS TJ80 in production.
      As far as I know, our visual navigation system (VNS01) is in its infancy.
      UMPK doesn't even come close to providing SEP in 10m, and it's on the GNS
      1. 0
        April 25 2026 15: 37
        It is necessary to have an analogue of PBS TJ80 in production.


        R1 developed by the Russian company Reynolds, with a thrust of 150 kgf and a weight of less than 18 kg.

        Two years ago they wrote that they would launch production.
        1. +1
          April 25 2026 15: 57
          Quote: Denis_999
          R1 developed by the Russian company Reynolds

          R1 and "Reynolds" - well, it's just a name.
          Skolkovo. What can you do?
          They write "10000 launches, hundreds of products" 🤔 have you seen it?
          (The R1 is a bit big, there are also R500 and others on the website)
    3. 0
      April 26 2026 10: 25
      So we have Geranium-5...
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. +4
    April 25 2026 13: 31
    It occurred to me that the term "air defense overload" had reached a new level. Originally, this term meant tactical overload at the moment when the intensity of the attack exceeded the ability of the air defense system to cope with it. And now it seems that the talk is about strategic an approach in the style of a total war like WW2: set or even produce more targets (UAVs, ASP, etc.) plus destroy more air defense systems than the enemy is able to replenish stocks (SAMs and SAMs), i.e. buy or produce.
    1. +3
      April 25 2026 13: 38
      That is, "strategic overload of the air defense system" is an overload of the air defense replenishment system from all sources: reserves, industry, allies, etc.
  5. +3
    April 25 2026 15: 59
    The Rusty Dagger is close to the Geranium-5 in warhead weight and range. However, the Geranium-5 is already in production and is used in the air defense system.
  6. +2
    April 26 2026 14: 10
    The manufacturer and open sources indicate a range of 400 kilometers, while some publications cite figures exceeding 580 kilometers. The JASSM-ER officially flies at approximately 1000 kilometers. This means that, despite a fivefold difference in weight, the ranges are virtually identical.

    Can a difference of 2 times, in range, a little more, a little less, really be called “practically the same”?!
  7. +1
    April 26 2026 16: 36
    Quote: Arslan Ali
    The manufacturer and open sources indicate a range of 400 kilometers, while some publications cite figures exceeding 580 kilometers. The JASSM-ER officially flies at approximately 1000 kilometers. This means that, despite a fivefold difference in weight, the ranges are virtually identical.

    Can a difference of 2 times, in range, a little more, a little less, really be called “practically the same”?!

    Yes, the author seems to be a hardcore humanities scholar. Or maybe he doesn't proofread his texts after the AI. For him, even 580 km is practically 1000 km. So what, more or less...
  8. +1
    April 27 2026 23: 22
    What does the Dagger have to do with it? More like a Tomahawk.