The Rusty Dagger is reshaping the cruise missile market.

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The Rusty Dagger is reshaping the cruise missile market.


On April 13, 2026, the Eglin Test Enterprise team issued a dry press release about the AGM-188A "Rusty Dagger" test on an F-16D fighter. Behind the terse lines about a "successful separation" and a "flight over the Gulf of Mexico" lay a 180-degree turnaround in American weapons technology. Rocket Weighing 225 kilograms, it flew a distance comparable to the JASSM-ER and should cost approximately seven times less when put into production.



How it all began in August 2024


The Extended Range Attack Munition program was launched in August 2024. The task was formulated strictly: long-range weapon, which can be churned out in hundreds, not dozens. In October of that year, contracts for two independent projects were awarded to Zone 5 Technologies from California and CoAspire from Virginia.


The pace of work proved uncharacteristic for the American defense industry. Both designs took to the skies in January 2025. From the signing of the papers to the first flight, only three months passed, and sixteen months until integration with the fighter jet.

In March 2025, the US Air Force transitioned the program to Phase II and changed its designation. In budget documents, ERAM became FAMM-L, which stands for Family of Affordable Mass Munitions-Lugged. The "Lugged" prefix refers to the fighter aircraft's suspension on rails, and the word "Affordable" in the family name now stands alongside the terms "Mass" and "Family."

The engine they decided not to invent


The heart of the Rusty Dagger is the PBS TJ80 small turbojet engine, manufactured by the American division of the Czech PBS Group. The choice is both unusual and significant. The TJ80 is well known in the small unmanned aircraft industry. aviation, it's being installed in series on targets and light UAVs. For a cruise missile, this is like replacing an aircraft turbo engine with a car's turbo engine, without sacrificing reliability and cost.


The engine accelerates the missile to a subsonic speed of 690 kilometers per hour. Not a record, but exactly the speed at which most Western cruise missiles of this class operate.

PBS Aerospace has already announced a doubling of its capacity. While the company expects to assemble around 2,000 TJ80s in 2026, production is expected to more than double by mid-decade. The figures speak for themselves: engine production is being expanded proactively for a rocket that isn't yet in mass production.

225 kilograms versus 1200


The AGM-188A's main focus is on proportions. The missile's gross weight is 225 kilograms, which is consistent with a standard JDAM-class pod. By comparison, the AGM-158B-modified JASSM-ER weighs 1200 kilograms and carries a warhead weighing approximately 450 kilograms.

The Rusty Dagger carries a warhead weighing over 30 kg. However, the range difference is much more modest. The manufacturer and open sources indicate a range of 400 kilometers, while some publications cite a range of over 580 kilometers. The JASSM-ER officially flies at approximately 1000 kilometers. So, despite a fivefold difference in weight, the range is virtually identical.

The price was the payload's power. The designers' logic is clear: a 100-kilogram warhead destroys most stationary targets, from command posts to radar stations and warehouses, just as reliably as a half-ton one. This means that the extra 350 kilograms of explosives represent a waste of metal, fuel, and, most importantly, money.

Why was the target price included in the technical specifications?


A traditional missile is designed from the ground up. Designers receive requirements for range, accuracy, and endurance, go through the development cycle, and ultimately receive a price tag they must live with. For the JASSM-ER, that price tag is approximately $1,665 million per unit. The Storm Shadow is more expensive, and the British government has refused to disclose the value of the new contract with France—a telling gesture.

Zone 5 Technologies had the opposite logic. A target price of $250 for a production rocket was included in the technical specifications from the very beginning. From there, they worked backwards to select the engine, materials, and production technologies.

The company actively uses additive manufacturing. Parts traditionally machined from metal on CNC machines are printed here. This isn't just a 3D printing fad. Printing shortens the testing cycle, allows for quick geometry changes, and eliminates the need for expensive tooling. It also eliminates the bottlenecks that plague traditional supply chains.

The planned production rate is around a thousand missiles per year. This is an extraordinary figure for a Western-style cruise weapon.


How a missile was landed on an F-16 in sixteen months


The April 2026 tests at Eglin followed a classic three-stage process. First, they tested physical compatibility: the missile was attached to the F-16D's pylons, tested through the connectors, and tested the electrical interfaces and mounting mechanics. Then came functional testing, where the fighter's onboard electronics communicated with the missile without actually launching it.

And only the third step was the actual separation. This is where they check whether the departing rocket will hit the pylon or vertical stabilizer, and whether the aerodynamics deploy correctly after the pylon separation.

In a LinkedIn post, Zone 5 Technologies noted the "rapid integration" and emphasized that the missile went from contract to combat platform deployment in sixteen months. By Western arms industry standards, where the integration of a new munition typically takes five to seven years, this is an unusually short cycle.


The Suspension Trick and the Soviet MiG-29


One detail makes the Rusty Dagger truly versatile. According to a report from the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the missile is designed for use on two fundamentally different platforms—the F-16 and the Soviet MiG-29. For engineers, this means the suspension system is designed as modular.

On the F-16, the missile is mounted on a NATO-standard rail mount, while on the MiG-29, it's mounted via an adapter for a Soviet-style beam mount. The mounting mechanics, electrical connectors, and control interface are reconfigured so that adaptation to the new platform is limited to replacing a set of brackets and firmware. Hence the "L" in FAMM-L: the entire "family" is designed to work with a variety of mounts.

According to Ukrainian analysts, this integration extends the combat viability of the MiG-29 fleet until at least 2030. The aircraft, designed in the late 1970s, receives a missile designed forty years later via an adapter and software package.

The ERAM program includes another launch method: from C-130 and C-17 transport aircraft via a palletized release system. The missiles are palletized and ejected from the cargo hold, after which they ignite their engines and launch toward their target. This concept transforms the transport aircraft into a situational cruise missile carrier without any modifications to the aircraft itself.

The arithmetic of war, in which the interceptor is more valuable than the target


To understand why the US military needed a $250 missile, it's worth looking at the flip side of modern budgets. The Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition costs around $20. In some cases, it's intercepted by a Patriot air defense missile, which costs close to $4 million. The cost ratio in such a situation is 200 to 1 in favor of the attacker.

In this arithmetic, any weapon that costs more to fire than the target loses economically, even if it wins tactically. The AGM-188A attempts to address this imbalance from the other side. It's being made cheap enough to be launched against targets that would be too small for the JASSM-ER or Storm Shadow: isolated radars, command posts, and medium-sized logistics hubs.


An 825 million contract and the first 840 missiles


In August 2025, the US State Department approved the potential sale of up to 3350 ERAM missiles to Ukraine. The package, which includes spare parts and support equipment, is valued at approximately $825 million. In accordance with standard Defense Security Cooperation Agency procedures, notification was sent to Congress with a 30-day window for objections.

The first operational batch of 840 missiles is scheduled for delivery in October 2026. Funding is distributed through several channels, including foreign military assistance programs from the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. Once production reaches design capacity, the 3350-unit package will be covered in approximately three and a half years.

Bottlenecks that can ruin everything


The program has a weakness, and it lies not in the missile's design, but in its supply chain. The Pentagon's budget request for fiscal year 2027 calls for a 188 percent increase in missile procurement compared to 2026 levels—$70,5 billion, compared to significantly lower amounts the year before. Of this, $11,3 billion goes to the Air Force, $22,6 billion to the Navy, and $36,6 billion to the Army.

Funds have been allocated, but the machines and engineers don't follow automatically. American defense companies have spent decades learning to operate in a "low-volume, high-complexity" mode. The transition to mass production requires a different production culture, a different skill set for workers, and different logistics.

Plus, imported components. The TJ80 engine was developed by the Czech PBS Group. Rare earth elements and special materials, essential for assembling the electronics and body components, are sourced from global supply chains, some of which are blocked by sanctions. Resolving these bottlenecks will take years, not months.

What's next


The AGM-188A doesn't replace the JASSM-ER or high-end cruise missiles. It opens up a class the US Air Force simply didn't have before: a mass-produced cruise weapon with a range of nearly a thousand kilometers at a price comparable to a good armored SUV. Western weapons technology, which for thirty years has relied on rare, precision-guided systems, is for the first time seriously looking in the opposite direction.

The FAMM-L designation in budget documents suggests that the Rusty Dagger is not a one-off project, but the first in a family. If the production base can handle the production rate of a thousand missiles per year, and integration with various platforms is proven in actual use, variants for other launch vehicles and, likely, for other weight categories will follow. If not, what remains is a beautiful design and a good lesson in the fact that missile blueprints are not necessarily a missile.

In April 2026, over the Gulf of Mexico, they tested not so much the compatibility of F-16 pylons with the new munition, but rather a hypothesis: could a cruise missile be made seven times cheaper without losing its purpose? The answer will depend not on Zone 5 engineers, but on whether industry can produce a thousand of these missiles per year without failure.
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  1. The comment was deleted.
  2. -2
    April 25 2026 07: 31
    Well, as they say, "everything old is new again." So here's a reincarnation of the memorable V-1. A cheap, mass-produced, and effective weapon. I predicted the emergence of something like this back in 2023, when the stalemate became apparent. If we had real engineers, it would be entirely possible to create something similar based on the FAB instead of (or alongside) the UMPK.
    1. +2
      April 25 2026 10: 56
      We had rocket-bomb developments, even before the SVO, I don’t remember the exact name, but I definitely saw one at ARMY 20, based on the FAB, by cutting off the tail and installing a booster, you get a quasi-cruise missile, but back then they thought it was expensive.
      1. +7
        April 25 2026 10: 57
        So it's not about the engineers, but about those who decide where to spend the budget.
      2. 0
        15 May 2026 10: 32
        We even considered drones to be too expensive
        1. 0
          15 May 2026 21: 00
          Drones are too expensive. For some reason, everyone has forgotten that until late 2023, when Ukraine began replacing artillery with FPV, the drone concept was completely different. These were enormous devices costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, while the Americans' cost tens of millions. Even the development paths were the same: a large drone synchronized with an aircraft, essentially the same aircraft but without a pilot. The Bayraktar TB2, huge compared to its progenitor, our hunter or pacer, the US Mk9, and the Chinese unmanned stealth bomber—everyone was following this path and didn't seriously consider cheap knockoffs. The concept changed two years ago, and our Ministry of Defense is supposedly actively pursuing this topic, but hindsight is wise. Iran, for example, chose the path of loitering munitions due to the backwardness of its technology. In case everyone has forgotten, they were seriously trying to make a copy of the American Mk9.
          1. +1
            18 May 2026 10: 15
            Quote: Stanislav Chernov
            Drones are too expensive

            Compared to what? A single 3-inch shell costs no less, not to mention the cost of a trained and equipped soldier who hit a drone—the difference there is hundreds of times greater.
            In my opinion, under Shoigu and Taburetkin, our army became overly focused on optimization and cost cutting, coupled with massive theft. As a result, for many years, modern technologies were introduced into the army only at exhibitions, and even then, the value of many of the exhibits was highly questionable. I'm not just talking about drones—we're talking about rifles, armored personnel carriers, and much more.
            I was shocked by the equipment the army had at the start of the Second World War. About 80 percent of the equipment was from the Soviet Union, obsolete. The first wave of soldiers were given individual equipment, but again, it was far from adequate, and then many had to clothe themselves.
            Quote: Stanislav Chernov
            The concept of drones was completely different, they were huge machines.

            Watch American military films from 15 years ago—you'll see exactly what's happening in Ukraine. Everything you thought "nobody knew."
            But that's not all - I worked in the defense industry and saw the production of reconnaissance UAVs - they were churned out 24/7, but suddenly there were very few of them in the army and they were transferred to command from high headquarters, i.e., they were completely unavailable, and they could have solved many major tactical problems that objectively existed during the first two years of the Air Defense Forces.
            Overall, there are a lot of questions about the army's support in the last 10 years before the Second World War. And it's hard to even talk about the navy without swearing – it performed so poorly at the World Cup.
            1. 0
              18 May 2026 19: 23
              If you'd read my comment to the end, you'd have realized it was related to the complaint about why drones weren't purchased before the SVO. I reminded you that they weren't purchased anywhere, and the drones were a completely different concept. They were large, exclusively reusable vehicles. Even the then-insanely cheap Bayraktar cost $150, and its guided munition cost around $10—far more expensive than any shell or round for a domestic ATGM. Blaming the Defense Ministry for not predicting the future is foolish. They have many other things to blame, but certainly not this. If you soberly evaluate recent conflicts involving Israel, the US, and counterinsurgency units in Latin America, no one was prepared for the mass introduction of cheap, guided drones. No one has yet developed an adequate response.
              1. 0
                19 May 2026 08: 40
                The SVO could have been completed in a month without any FPV drones at all.
                The issue didn't immediately become apparent. Besides, if the control center's direction-finding capabilities had been established, the FPV would have long since been forgotten. The army's problem is that it had no high-tech capabilities at all, even with 70s technology. They then had to hastily build them, and not just drones. For example, the communications were absurdly poor.
                1. 0
                  19 May 2026 14: 28
                  It's a bad habit to change the subject during an argument. As I wrote, there were plenty of problems and thefts, and the criminal case list confirms this. But that doesn't negate the thesis that, in 22, drones were perceived worldwide as a high-tech analogue of manned aircraft, and our developments were conducted in the same vein. The fact that cheap, disposable FPVs and loitering munitions ultimately launched was a surprise to everyone. I'm simply touched by the comments from people who now portray themselves as Nastradamus, claiming they foresaw this 20 years ago. Just don't cite Hollywood movies as an example; then you could seriously start criticizing Transformers as a prediction.
                  1. +1
                    19 May 2026 15: 09
                    Well, first of all, Israeli loitering UAVs were a bestseller for about eight years even before the Second World War. It wasn't the Second World War that made them famous—they'd already been involved in border skirmishes even before the Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For that matter, read the memoirs of our Egyptian representatives when they were organizing the KUBs' operations. Even then, Israeli UAVs were harassing our batteries.
                    Secondly, I'm already sick of this "not enough drones" theme.
                    Thirdly,
                    Quote: Stanislav Chernov
                    were perceived throughout the world as a high-tech analogue of a manned aircraft, and our developments were carried out in the same vein

                    This is absolutely not true. For example, the American DARPA presentation from 2011 described exactly what's happening in Ukraine and even more. Later, we had similar projects that remained just projects—everyone knew everything. But it wasn't so convenient to make a profit on this. That's the whole point. How much more convenient is it to repair a tank for a ton of millions, or to spend the incredible cost of modernizing ships, or simply to underfill rations?
                    Regarding cinema. Tactical FPVs have been featured in films for a long time now. And not as fictional prototypes, but as already in service. Just not in our country.
                    A modification of the expensive Boxer armored personnel carrier, which carries a drone control station and various types of drones, including loitering munitions, was ordered about 10 years before the start of the Second World War. And only 70% of our army was armed with "modern models." Just in case, here's a quote from the commander-in-chief.
                    I attended our exhibitions and worked alongside research groups developing drones. Basically, all the work boiled down to siphoning off research and development budgets. Everyone understood the potential long before the Second World War, but why bother when the money was already flowing in, and the Ministry of Defense didn't set any promising goals? Whatever was handed to them, they'd buy. The fact that drones weren't part of the military and still half-ignore the Ministry of Defense is the full and direct responsibility of the Ministry of Defense representatives, who proved incapable of organizing even an effective and timely commission on advanced weapons. Let alone action. They completely failed at defining the tasks.
                    1. 0
                      20 May 2026 09: 33
                      Once again, I'm talking about the actual hardware, not the images and videos. The only thing more or less similar was the switchblade, but it was far from cheap, and its payload was very limited. Loitering munitions aren't a tactical weapon like the FPV, and the idea of ​​a drone being so cheap it could hunt down an individual infantryman, yet so easy to operate, training thousands of operators in a matter of months, if not weeks, was something only movies could offer.
                      1. 0
                        20 May 2026 09: 51
                        Quote: Stanislav Chernov
                        I'm talking about what was in the hardware, not in the pictures.

                        By 2025, according to the Pentagon's plan, every Marine Corps squad should have a reconnaissance drone.
                        FPVs and UAVs appeared in special forces (and they are currently the ones using drones in Ukraine) much earlier. UAVs have been widely used for about 20 years, first for reconnaissance, and then as strike platforms, with the Americans developing their operational ranges to be truly enormous. FPVs are a relatively new concept, but they didn't emerge in 2022; publicly available data points to the first prototypes and plans being developed in 2010-2011. That's when FPVs became quite effective, and they stopped being expensive even earlier. In 2011, DARPA listed this technology in its reports as promising for development, and widespread development in this area began, primarily within the special services. As you can imagine, no one has inside information about this. But the timeframe is known.
                        I didn't even mention thousands of operators; at that time, they were relying more on automated swarms, which, by the way, was shown in films.
                        So what else don't you understand???
    2. +1
      April 25 2026 14: 43
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Here you have the reincarnation of the memorable V-1.

      not entirely correct:
      The Fieseler Fi 103 cost 5000 Reichsmarks (subject to the labor of concentration camp prisoners, under normal conditions under 20,000 RM), and the Me-109F cost 57,700 RM.
      ERAM $0,25K vs. F-16 Block 70/72 ~$64M
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      create something similar based on FAB

      It is necessary to have an analogue of PBS TJ80 in production.
      As far as I know, our visual navigation system (VNS01) is in its infancy.
      UMPK doesn't even come close to providing SEP in 10m, and it's on the GNS
      1. 0
        April 25 2026 15: 37
        It is necessary to have an analogue of PBS TJ80 in production.


        R1 developed by the Russian company Reynolds, with a thrust of 150 kgf and a weight of less than 18 kg.

        Two years ago they wrote that they would launch production.
        1. +1
          April 25 2026 15: 57
          Quote: Denis_999
          R1 developed by the Russian company Reynolds

          R1 and "Reynolds" - well, it's just a name.
          Skolkovo. What can you do?
          They write "10000 launches, hundreds of products" 🤔 have you seen it?
          (The R1 is a bit big, there are also R500 and others on the website)
    3. 0
      April 26 2026 10: 25
      So we have Geranium-5...
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. +4
    April 25 2026 13: 31
    It occurred to me that the term "air defense overload" had reached a new level. Originally, this term meant tactical overload at the moment when the intensity of the attack exceeded the ability of the air defense system to cope with it. And now it seems that the talk is about strategic an approach in the style of a total war like WW2: set or even produce more targets (UAVs, ASP, etc.) plus destroy more air defense systems than the enemy is able to replenish stocks (SAMs and SAMs), i.e. buy or produce.
    1. +3
      April 25 2026 13: 38
      That is, "strategic overload of the air defense system" is an overload of the air defense replenishment system from all sources: reserves, industry, allies, etc.
  5. +3
    April 25 2026 15: 59
    The Rusty Dagger is close to the Geranium-5 in warhead weight and range. However, the Geranium-5 is already in production and is used in the air defense system.
  6. +2
    April 26 2026 14: 10
    The manufacturer and open sources indicate a range of 400 kilometers, while some publications cite figures exceeding 580 kilometers. The JASSM-ER officially flies at approximately 1000 kilometers. This means that, despite a fivefold difference in weight, the ranges are virtually identical.

    Can a difference of 2 times, in range, a little more, a little less, really be called “practically the same”?!
  7. +1
    April 26 2026 16: 36
    Quote: Arslan Ali
    The manufacturer and open sources indicate a range of 400 kilometers, while some publications cite figures exceeding 580 kilometers. The JASSM-ER officially flies at approximately 1000 kilometers. This means that, despite a fivefold difference in weight, the ranges are virtually identical.

    Can a difference of 2 times, in range, a little more, a little less, really be called “practically the same”?!

    Yes, the author seems to be a hardcore humanities scholar. Or maybe he doesn't proofread his texts after the AI. For him, even 580 km is practically 1000 km. So what, more or less...
  8. 0
    April 27 2026 23: 22
    What does the Dagger have to do with it? More like a Tomahawk.
    1. 0
      2 July 2026 01: 01
      Quote: Zaurbek
      What does the Dagger have to do with it? More like a Tomahawk.
      The name of the rocket "Rusty Dagger" translates as rusty dagger.
  9. 0
    2 July 2026 00: 58
    In the States, unknown garage companies can quickly become Big Tech and build rockets, and it's not just a matter of the number of ideas and the talent of the staff, but also funding we can't even imagine. There, unknown startups find investors and take off (or, more accurately, investors gather these startups in "incubators"—someone is sure to succeed, even if others fail). Here, billionaires assemble and finance football and other teams, but not brains. The only thing left is government participation. Skolkovo is an example, but who among us has heard anything about any breakthrough ideas or technologies coming out of Skolkovo? In my opinion, the money is simply spent by those in charge there, and even if there are competent young engineers there with ideas, there's no guarantee they'll bring them to life. We should have thought about a "Military Skolkovo" even before the SVO, but we're still stuck with the usual: we're slow to get going, or rather, officials just don't bother until they're given the boot, and then, in most cases, they just pretend they're working. They bear no responsibility and are not punished for their actions or, conversely, inaction. I recently learned that Gerani is powered by a Telefly LX-WP-160 small jet engine from a Chinese company, while we have our own engines, or rather, we had our own. And I watched a documentary about small ones about 10 years ago about a development at Samara National Research University named after Academician S.P. Korolev. More specifically, the MGTD-22 "Kolibri" small gas turbine engine. Where is it now? Most likely gathering dust in a warehouse, while we're buying Chinese stuff.
  10. 0
    7 July 2026 16: 18
    Quote: don_Reba
    Quote: Denis_999
    R1 developed by the Russian company Reynolds

    R1 and "Reynolds" - well, it's just a name.

    Well, if you don't know what a "Reynolds" is in aerodynamics, who's to blame? Listen to your favorite song, "Valenki"!