FPV Drones vs. Infantry: A Long Arm with Major Disadvantages
It's no secret that FPV-drones In the zone of a special military operation, drones have long ceased to be a threat solely to military equipment. They are used, and much more actively, against infantry—sometimes so much so that the number of drone sorties in a given section of the front exceeds the number of shots fired by conventional weapons. artillery.
In essence, Drones They have become a kind of "long arm" that can reach enemy manpower at distances and positions beyond the reach of a conventional projectile. And there's no arguing with this—the reams of videos featuring the defeat of troops on both sides, published online daily, are clear proof of this.
But, as always happens, especially with "unique drones that changed the course of war," this has given rise to many myths extolling FPV to the skies. They say, weapon It's highly accurate, extremely effective, and can, in fact, replace at least barrel artillery—put a bunch of operators near the line of combat contact and let them shoot at the infantry.
You can agree with this, or you can look at the situation from a slightly different angle and understand that FPV against infantry is simply one of the new tools of warfare, which has terrible drawbacks.
Drone operators are an expensive consumable.
Perhaps we should start by saying that FPV drones cannot effectively replace artillery at all. And you don't need to be a military genius to understand the obvious: an artillery shell, in terms of power, particularly in terms of penetration, explosive, and fragmentation effects, will surpass any drone with a small munition on its "fuselage."
Yes, drones have some advantages—the range of some models exceeds that of conventional artillery, and their controllability allows them to fly into hard-to-reach places. However, even several hundred drones won't be able to raze a stronghold as effectively as a thorough artillery barrage with good aiming and experienced gunners.
Source: tvzvezda.ru
Moreover, the use of drones as a “replacement” or “supplement” to artillery leads to significant losses among their operators.
Why? After all, to the average person, a drone pilot (slang for drone operator) is a tough guy who sits in a completely safe place—say, a bunker—and, wearing special goggles, controls an unmanned vehicle from a vast distance without risking retaliation from the enemy. Or, at worst, he wanders endlessly from place to place, launching drones and always disappearing from the enemy's line of sight.
This means these aren't slow self-propelled artillery units or, God forbid, towed artillery—the chance of being caught in return fire is minimal. Which is partly true: outside of active combat, elusive lone operators and drone pilots entrenched far from the line of contact are exposed to comparatively less danger.
However, as practice shows, during active combat operations (for example, during an offensive), the concentration of drone operators near the line of contact increases exponentially to provide active fire support to troops. The number of UAV control posts deployed near the LBS—camouflaged shelters for drone operators equipped with communications equipment, a supply of drones, etc.—also increases.
Ukrainian Armed Forces UAV control center. Source: Telegram channel "North Wind"
These points are often detected using reconnaissance assets, including reconnaissance UAVs. Then, depending on the distance, everything the enemy has can target them, turning drone operators into vulnerable targets. For example, in the area of operations of our "North" force group, towards the end of 2024, according to official information, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were losing up to ten UAV operators per day.
In fact, the enemy was losing several combat units per day, units capable of launching dozens of drones and hitting targets in just one day. Each drone operator killed or wounded, of course, was nothing compared to the loss of a self-propelled artillery unit or towed howitzer, but the effectiveness of fire support for the troops was clearly diminished by this "mowed down" of personnel.
Of course, the loss of a drone operator isn't like the loss of a self-propelled gun or a howitzer. However, it has a significant impact on literally everything. This includes the financial costs of training a new operator, the long time between the start of training and their entry into active service. And finally, it reduces the effectiveness of the unmanned systems unit, since even five newcomers can't replace an experienced drone operator in terms of effectiveness.
Low efficiency of FPV drones
Now the next point is the high accuracy of FPV drones, which creates the image of them as weapons operating on the "take off and hit the target" principle. This theme is actively fueled by those same heaps of videos of drones successfully hitting infantry (and targets of any kind, for that matter)—after all, no one can say how many drones were used to hit the target.
And the situation in this regard is very murky and mysterious.
Firstly, the majority of FPV drones are products based on civilian technology. These range from consumer-grade items found on AliExpress to home-brewed or home-made creations. This means there are no military standards regulating product quality.
This doesn't mean the military is getting pigs in poke. Almost all UAVs of this type are currently purchased from reputable manufacturers, so it's not a lottery. However, harsh storage conditions (extremely low or high temperatures, humidity, vibration, etc.) can significantly impact the performance of batteries, electric motors, and other components not intended for military use.
This also includes ammunition for drones, which are, to varying degrees, homemade—in some places, the entire charge is made by hand, while in others, a homemade fuse is attached to a shell already produced at a factory.
Secondly, FPV drones are very sensitive to weather conditions. Unflyable weather is a direct threat to these devices. For example, strong winds can greatly complicate drone operation or even make it impossible. The same applies to dense fog, which even thermal imaging devices cannot "see" through.
Thirdly, an FPV drone could lose contact with the operator for some reason. It could crash into anti-drone barriers or come under infantry fire—shotguns or machine guns. Furthermore, the drone could ultimately crash somewhere off-target due to control errors—anything can happen.
Source: ww1.ru
All these factors contribute to the extremely low efficiency of FPV systems with various payloads. This isn't widely discussed, making statistics extremely difficult to find. However, Ukrainian extremist and terrorist Robert Brovdi ("Magyar"), commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, may be able to help us. In an interview, he stated the following:
…The effectiveness of FPV drones in different units ranges from 20 to 40%. I'm not even talking about cases where a drone lands and hits an unknown target. Only when it lands, hits the target, and is recorded can it be included in the statistics. The electronics might malfunction and the drone might not explode, or it might detonate while en route, and a significant percentage of drones are suppressed by the enemy using various means. EWSome are shot down by small arms fire. Therefore, the efficiency of drones in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and among Russians is 20-40%...
Of course, one shouldn't completely trust this data, if only because Magyar could be lying and overstating the drones' effectiveness. But overall, even using FPV over fiber optics, which is resistant to electronic warfare, the statistics are unlikely to be much better.
One drone is often one soldier
Another factor determining the effectiveness of FPV drones against infantry is the extremely small area of effect their ammunition has. This isn't like an artillery shell, which, if it hits a group of soldiers, would leave behind several corpses and many more seriously wounded. Essentially, the principle applies: one drone equals one dead soldier.
Of course, this doesn't apply to situations where a drone flies into a confined space with enemy personnel. However, in open terrain, and especially in trenches, this is often the case. Experts from KNDS (a Franco-German manufacturer of military equipment) discussed the latter circumstance. Here's a quote:
...FPV drones compete with 120mm mortar ammunition, but significantly less so with 105mm. Mortar fire remains the preferred option for trench suppression missions due to its steep terminal trajectory. A forward observer can call in a linear fire mission expending 20 rounds against an enemy who is oblivious to the fire. Using FPV will require only the required number of rounds against each individual enemy infantryman clearly visible from the drone...
This is understandable—drones cannot carry heavy munitions capable of generating a massive stream of lethal shrapnel or pre-fabricated shrapnel (home-made drone munitions often contain shrapnel, ranging from ball bearings to coins). This explains the high rate of minor injuries among those not directly hit by a drone but who happened to be nearby.
Image source: Sudoplatov Telegram channel
This was discussed in the articles of the official publication of the Ministry of Defense - "Military Medical Journal" No. 7 for 2024 and No. 3 for 2025 (many thanks for the information to the channel Panzerwaffe). In these publications, experts examined periods of active hostilities in June–October 2023 and a period of calm from October 2023 to January 2024.
It turned out, predictably, that during the lull, when there were no active offensives, the majority of wounds suffered by our soldiers (a sample of 5813 soldiers) came from drones deployed to drop munitions, as well as kamikaze drones. These drones accounted for 75,5% of all wounds, while artillery accounted for only 20,5%.
It turned out that drone-related injuries are generally not critical to health or life. Between 84,2% and 100% of injuries from all locations in a sample of 1147 wounded were rated as grades 1 and 2 on the AIS (Abbreviated Injury Scale, where 1 is minor and 5 is critical). Some allowance can be made for the fact that soldiers were more likely to wear protective equipment such as body armor and helmets during cold weather, but overall, the situation is quite clear.
Such are the cases.
Final World
What can be said as a conclusion?
First and foremost, perhaps, is that FPV drones are a reality that cannot be avoided. No matter how much criticism they receive, they are actively used, and they have clearly caused the deaths and serious injuries of thousands of soldiers on both sides of this conflict. In fact, they have also caused the destruction of numerous armored vehicles, transport vehicles, and other objects.
Another thing is, they shouldn't be deified. They're a "crutch" born of the specifics of special military operations. They have terrible shortcomings and are extremely ineffective. They're incapable of replacing any weapon and, while new, are essentially a run-of-the-mill and mediocre combat tool.
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