Fleet and Politics. Preconditions for the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1744
The Battle of Chesma, which took place on July 5–7 (June 24–26, old style) 1770, resulted in the complete defeat of the Turkish forces participating in it and, without a doubt, crowned the Russian Imperial Empire with glory. fleetJuly 7th is revered today as one of Russia's military glory days—and deservedly so.
However, the brilliant victory of the Russian weapons Overshadowed the enormous diplomatic work without which the Battle of Chesma would never have happened. It turns out that the Russian sailors' heroism is on everyone's lips, but the reasons why it was possible and the consequences that followed are usually discussed only briefly.
The series offered to the esteemed reader will not be so much about naval battles or even about the navy, but rather about the results that the navy can achieve when used within the framework of the wise policy of the country's leadership.
But first things first. And we should begin with the political balance of power at the start of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774.
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It so happened that on November 25, 1768, the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Porte summoned the Russian ambassador to Turkey, Alexei Mikhailovich Obreskov. Moreover, at the minister's request, the ambassador was accompanied by 11 members of the embassy's key staff. At the meeting, A.M. Obreskov was presented with an ultimatum, which the Russian Empire could not accept, nor did it intend to, and therefore the Turkish proposal was categorically rejected. The Russian embassy, along with the ambassador, was immediately arrested and imprisoned in Yedikule (Seven-Tower Castle)—this, in effect, became a declaration of war on the Russian Empire.
The then reigning Empress Catherine II did not shy away from the challenge, and as soon as these events became known in Russia, on November 18 of that same year she declared war on Turkey.
But why did it start anyway?
On the events in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
By the time the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 began, Poland was, to put it mildly, in turmoil. As is well known, Poland was a bone of contention, with everyone willing to fight against everyone else for the liberties of the nobility and beyond, and the events of the 60s further confirmed this.
In 1764, Stanisław II August Poniatowski became King of Poland. This occurred because, after the death of the previous king, Poniatowski was promoted to the throne by the Czartoryski party, which wielded enormous political influence in Poland at the time. However, it is unknown whether this would have brought Poniatowski the Polish crown had it not been for the strong support given to him by Catherine II. Examining the reasons for the Russian Empress's support would take us too far from the topic of this series, and therefore they will not be discussed here.
The newly crowned king's position proved extremely precarious. Stanisław Poniatowski pursued such policies that within three years he had lost all support among his fellow countrymen, and even the Czartoryskis, who had nominated him, had turned their backs on him. However, Poniatowski's policies were strongly pro-Russian; he insisted on equal rights for Polish Orthodox and Catholics, which maintained his favor with the Russian Empire.
This favor was very tangibly embodied in the 20-strong Russian army that entered Poland's territorial borders. Relying on this force, the Russian ambassador, Prince N.V. Repnin, established confederations for the Greek Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Orthodox faiths—the Slutsk Confederation for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Toruń Confederation for Poland.
Prince Nikolai Vasilievich Repnin
In response, the Catholic nobility organized the Radom Confederation. However, N.V. Repnin made no attempt to crush it; on the contrary, he gained influence over it and set it on Poniatowski. This move, while seemingly odd, in reality made the Polish king even more dependent on the will of the Russian Empire.
At the time, Russia was seeking to bring Poland under its control. N.V. Repnin's goal was to recognize Russia as the guarantor of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's political system, which required convening the Sejm. It was convened, despite the fact that Repnin had already won over a significant portion of the sejmiks through various negotiations. But an equally important argument was the Russian troops that, at the direction of the Russian ambassador, had approached Warsaw.
In short, everything should have gone off without a hitch, especially since the European powers this time avoided meddling in Polish affairs. But at the last moment, Pope Clement XIII intervened, arriving urgently in person and calling on the Poles to resist the demands of the Russian Empire. Well, if by hook or by crook, then by crook, decided N.V. Repnin, he simply arrested his most ardent opponents. The matter immediately moved forward, and when it stalled over Russia's guarantee of the Polish constitution, N.V. Repnin again resorted to this well-deserved "diplomatic" tactic. And he finally got his way: on February 27, 1768, the Sejm approved the decisions imposed on it.
But, of course, a significant portion of the Poles remained deeply dissatisfied with all this and were prepared to hinder Russia in every way possible, even resorting to armed resistance. The Bishop of Kraków, Kajetan Sołtyk, is considered the founder of the Bar Confederation, so named because it was formed in the city of Bar. Many noblemen joined him, including those who had previously been at least relatively loyal to Russia. N.V. Repnin, by terrorizing the participants of the Sejm, certainly achieved his goal, but such drastic measures could not win him popularity among the Polish aristocracy.
In March 1768, Confederate troops opened military action, attacking Russian garrisons in Podolia. This began the war between Russia and the Bar Confederation, which ended in 1772 with its defeat, along with the first partition of Poland. Although the Bar Confederation's war was a civil war, it would probably not be wrong to view it as a national liberation war on the part of the Confederates. But let's not forget that the Bar Confederation advocated the restoration of noble liberties and demanded the abolition of equality between Catholics and Orthodox. In short, the Bar Confederation fought in the best Polish traditions—for its own freedom and against the freedom of all others.
"Kazimierz Puławski near Częstochowa" - painting by J. Chełmoński
The King of Poland predictably ended up on the side of the Russian Empire in all of this, as he was completely dependent on it. In general, if we consider this history In Shakespeare's paradigm, "All the world's a stage, in which men and women are all players," then Poniatowski is, of course, the puppet, and the Russian Empire the puppeteer. But the Bar Confederation primarily opposed those Poles who approved the results of the 1768 Sejm—that is, the puppets, even though they didn't initially declare the Polish king their enemy. However, Poniatowski, fully aware of where things were heading, immediately requested Russian assistance, which was quickly granted.
In short, civil war broke out in March 1768, with Russian troops siding with the king. But Poland, of course, wouldn't be Poland if things had been that simple, so in May 1768, the Haidamak Uprising, known as the Koliivschyna, broke out.
And this Koliivshchyna rebellion became a highly controversial event. On the one hand, the Orthodox rebelled against economic and religious oppression by Polish Catholics. Moreover, the Koli also opposed the forces of the Bar Confederation. In this sense, it seemed the rebels shared common goals with the Russian Empire and could ostensibly count on its support. But on the other hand, empires don't exactly approve of such popular initiatives and self-activity, unless, of course, they are led by aristocratic families amenable to compromise. Moreover, the Koli literally drowned non-believers in blood, killing Catholics, Jews, and Uniates without mercy. The number of victims of the Uman massacre is impossible to determine, but various estimates place the death toll at between 5 and 20, with the Haidamaks sparing neither women nor children. “Entertainment” such as a Jew, a nobleman, and a priest hanged on the same tree with the inscription “A Pole, a Jew, and a dog are all the same faith” was found everywhere.
But perhaps the most unforgivable sin of the Koliys was that their views and agitation were so attractive that even the royal Polish troops sometimes defected to the rebels. No government would ever tolerate such behavior. Ultimately, the Koliys' rebellion was suppressed, with Russian troops playing a very active role, capturing many of the rebels and then handing them over to the Polish government. There were many executions.
And here, the esteemed reader has the right to ask: what did all this Polish unrest have to do with the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774? The answer is very simple.
Russo-Turkish agreements obligated Russia not to introduce troops into Poland, but this was violated in 1767. Then, in 1768, the Koli, pursuing a detachment of the Bar Confederation, followed them into the city of Balta, slaughtering the local population, and then set fire to the city of Dubossary. All in the best traditions of a war of faith, except that both these cities were located within the territory of the Ottoman Porte.
Balta and Dubossary - a reason or a pretext?
It must be said that after the victorious Russo-Turkish War of 1735-1739, which ended with the loss of Azov and Zaporizhia from the Ottoman Porte, the Russian Empire, on the one hand, sought to maintain peace with the Turks. The Ottomans, however, as if in retaliation for the lost war, intensified their persecution of Christians, prompting them to seek refuge and migrate to Russia. However, under Elizabeth, it went so far as to ban them from entering the Empire, so as not to irritate the Turks; however, migrations did occur. Ottoman claims regarding the fortress Russia was building near the border were not ignored, but were resolved through an international arbitration tribunal, including British and Austrian envoys, and construction was suspended.
On the other hand, Russia periodically violated the terms of the peace agreements. For example, in 1763, Russia ceased to recognize the sovereignty of Circassia, in 1767, troops were sent into Poland, and in 1768, into Balta and Dubossary. But why, precisely in response to Balta, did the Ottoman Porte decide to declare war on the Russian Empire?
The incident with Balta and Dubossary, when examined impartially, turned out to be a sham. The border trespassers and criminals were not regular Russian troops. Moreover, Russia had captured the Koliys who had participated in atrocities on Turkish territory. The Koliys were tried "as rebels, disturbers of the peace, robbers, and murderers," and if the death penalty was prescribed, it was commuted to corporal punishment: whipping, branding, the ripping out of nostrils, and exile to Nerchinsk, shackled on the spot. Moreover, both the trial and the corporal punishment were carried out in the presence of Turkish representatives.
In other words, the Balts and Dubossary didn't force Turkey into an impossible position, from which only war was possible, and before that, the Ottoman Porte had "overlooked" at least two good pretexts for war. So why did the Turkish ultimatum come not in 1763 or 1767, but only in 1768?
There were several reasons for this.
First, the At the time of the events described, the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III had a very large army: today, including Crimean Tatars and others, its numbers are estimated at 350 or even more. The Turks outnumbered the Russian army almost three to one, and although they couldn't know this for sure, they certainly recognized their overall superiority. However, the Turkish army had very serious shortcomings that significantly reduced its combat effectiveness compared to the Russian forces, something Mustafa III apparently didn't realize.
Sultan Mustafa III himself
SecondlyThe Russian Empire, no matter how you look at it, entered the fighting in 1768. Although it was only confronted by the Bar Confederation—a force too insignificant to defeat Russia—an ally in war is always a good thing.
ThirdlyThe leadership of the Bar Confederation was well aware of the limitations of its capabilities and its inability to achieve its goals by armed force alone. Therefore, it turned to Turkey, attempting to shower its representatives with appropriate gifts. The Poles were not entirely successful: the nobles valued their liberties too much to deliver the gifts to the Turks without pocketing most of them along the way. However, in addition to bribes, the Poles also offered the Sultan territorial acquisitions—Podolia and Volhynia. Such a jackpot looked quite tempting.
Fourthly, the Ottoman Sultan was tirelessly and diligently pushed towards war with the Russian Empire... No, not by the British. The French.
The role of France in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774
The question may arise: why did France need this at all? The answer is simple: Turkey in the 18th century was an extremely significant trading partner for Voltaire's homeland. The French government estimated Turkish foreign trade, including both exports and imports, at 110 million livres per year, of which France accounted for 60 million livres—more than the combined total of all other countries trading with Turkey. These figures refer to a time when Turkey was not at war, and are from a later period (1783), but they nevertheless provide some idea of the scale of French trade with Turkey.
At the same time, the benefits the Russian Empire would gain from seizing and consolidating its position on the Black Sea coast were perfectly clear to France. Accordingly, Versailles considered expansion in this direction a completely normal and natural aspiration for Russia. It was also clear that Russia's expansion would come at the expense of the Ottoman Porte, which would, of course, weaken the Turkish economy and foreign trade. This, in turn, would directly harm French businessmen and the treasury.
Given the above, it's easy to understand that French industrialists and merchants viewed any threats to Turkish possessions as a direct and serious threat to economic interests—both their own and those of France as a whole. And this should be seen as one of the most important reasons for the efforts Versailles made in the second half of the 18th century to hinder Catherine II in every way possible in Turkey, Poland, and Sweden.
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duke d'Aiguillon, formulated the reasons for French diplomacy in a very remarkable manner in a conversation with the Russian ambassador in Paris, Khotinsky, which took place long after the start of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774:
The European balance could easily be upset if you (the Russians) were to manage to impose peace on the Turks on the following three conditions: free navigation of the Black Sea, a port on the Black Sea, and Tatar independence. Having secured such advantages, you would soon find yourself in Constantinople, and who could remove you from there?
The French themselves admitted that France played a major role in inciting Turkey against Russia. The same Duke d'Aiguillon, shortly before the conversation I quoted above, responded to Khotinsky's proposal that France encourage the Turks to reconcile:
How do you expect us to give Turkey such advice when we ourselves pushed the Turks to start the war?
It should also be noted that Versailles led the Turks into war with exceptional elegance, something its agents were justifiably proud of. Of course, the Grand Vizier and Reis Effendi (Minister of Foreign Affairs) were showered with gifts, but in high-level politics, this is a completely insignificant expense. Of course, France sent its officers and engineers to teach the Turkish army and navy a thing or two and to assist them with materiel. But, by and large, that was all—the Ottoman Porte received no hard cash from France for entering the war.
Of course, France supported not only the Ottoman Porte but also Poland, represented by the Bar Confederation. The French sent General Dumouriez there with officers and money, although this only happened in 1770, and even before that, they openly supported the rebellious Poles.
The French plan was quite simple. They didn't expect much from the Bar Confederation, but they believed it would serve as an excellent pretext for drawing the Ottoman Porte into a war against Russia. However, the French clearly overestimated the might of Turkish arms, believing that Mustafa III's troops would be successful on the battlefield. It must be said that the French saw other opportunities in the Russo-Turkish standoff, but we'll discuss that later.
From a French diplomatic perspective, the situation that developed in 1767-68 could be considered quite favorable, but still not ideal. The French believed that the best option would have been to create a situation in which Russia would be under attack from the Ottoman Porte, along with other coastal states along the Danube and the Black Sea, while being constrained by the Scandinavians in the north.
However, Sweden was not ready for revenge for the losses of previous years, and it was not possible to involve it in a war with Russia in 1768.
A little about Sweden
In 1768, the political situation in Sweden was quite peculiar. It must be said that for a long time, from 1738 to 1765, the so-called Hat Party ruled this northern country, whose foreign policy was based on revanchism: the "hatters" wanted to get even with Russia for the Great Northern War. Even the lost war with Russia in 1741-1743 did not shake the Hat Party's position. But then a rather comical incident occurred.
Despite their special relationship with the Russian Empire, the "hatters" eagerly seized the opportunity to participate in the Seven Years' War on the same side as Russia. Sweden's interest here was to snatch some of Prussia's Pomeranian possessions. However, to be fair, these belonged to Sweden until 1720, so who snatched whom and when is debatable. The situation seemed quite favorable, as the coalition forces opposing Prussia appeared far stronger. But things went awry when, in 1761, Empress Elizabeth died of a throat hemorrhage, and Peter III ascended the Russian throne.
Peter III
Not only did this restless sovereign immediately make peace with Frederick and return all the lands that Russian soldiers had taken at bayonet point, but he also forced Sweden to do the same. Sweden found itself in a deplorable situation: the Swedes had fought for many years, having acquired part of the Prussian possessions at great cost, but their economy was severely depleted. Now, under the threat of war with their former ally, Russia, they had to give everything back to the Prussians. Sweden, of course, could not even dream of surviving a war with Russia in its current state, so it had no choice but to submit.
And so, by all the laws of political theory, such an affront would seem unlikely to contribute to the normalization of Swedish-Russian relations. Yet, strangely enough, it did: the war, lost, albeit not on the battlefield, led to the Hat Party losing power in 1765-66. It was replaced by an opposition party, the Kolpaks, who initially advocated peace with Russia. Under Peter III, advocating for normalization of relations with the Russian Empire would have been difficult, but since that sovereign's reign was short-lived, with the accession of Catherine II, the Kolpaks began to seek rapprochement with their eastern neighbor.
At the same time, during those years, and even in 1768, Sweden was ruled by King Adolf Frederick, who had been in a bitter struggle with the Cap Party for power and therefore should not have been sympathetic to them. Therefore, on the one hand, France should not have even dreamed of involving Sweden in a war against the Russian Empire. But for Russia, things were not so clear-cut: Adolf Frederick had proven himself a very weak ruler, and the position of the Cap Party was not all that strong. In short, there was no reason to expect any nastiness from Sweden right now, but it was necessary to consider that the situation could change very, very quickly.
In general, according to the remarkable Russian historian E. V. Tarle:
Not only Catherine herself but even states hostile to Russia acknowledged that, beyond a shadow of a doubt, Turkey not only formally declared war on Russia and attacked it first in 1768, but in fact, had in every way provoked it and resolutely sought to initiate hostilities. And the French minister, the Duke of Choiseul (later succeeded in this post by the aforementioned Duke d'Aiguillon—author's note), unashamedly boasted of having so cleverly incited the Turks to begin military action.
So, the French pushed the Turks into war, and it began, with a balance of power unfavorable to the Russian Empire. How could the navy help?
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