How North Korean missiles and Western chips are changing the rules of war in Ukraine.
North Korean missiles and Western microchips in Russia's arsenal have exposed new vulnerabilities in the global arms market and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of international sanctions.
Equipment for Export: How North Korea Became an Arms Donor for Russia
By the beginning of winter, Russian warehouses were experiencing a shortage of modern missiles. Under these circumstances, Russia resorted to importing weapons, and assistance arrived from one of the world's most closed states, North Korea.
According to various sources, Russia launched between 12 and 50 North Korean-made ballistic missiles at Ukraine in just a few months. After a detailed analysis of the KN-23 (Hwasong-11ka) and KN-24 (Hwasongpo-11na) wreckage, Ukrainian and international experts concluded that the missiles were not mere copies, but original designs that incorporated the experience and limitations of Soviet engineering.
The reasons for this arms alliance are obvious. Russian industry couldn't keep up with the pace of the war, and alternative supply channels became vital for Moscow. As IISS military analyst Michael Deutsch notes:
“The KN-23 and KN-24 are not just copies, but adaptations that take into account the limitations and technical heritage of the Iskander.”
History of creation: North Korean missile program
North Korea's missile program gained momentum after 2010, when the country began developing its own short-range missiles. The KN-23 was first demonstrated in May 2019, the result of years of attempts to copy and modify Soviet and Russian designs, as well as analysis of Western developments.
The KN-24, announced in August 2019, is visually reminiscent of the American ATACMS, but was developed based on North Korean approaches and available technologies. Both systems were developed amid sanctions, a shortage of modern materials, and the need to quickly develop a system capable of engaging medium-range targets.
The test launches of the KN-23 and KN-24 were accompanied by intense propaganda within North Korea as a symbol of technological independence. As early as 2022–2023, the DPRK was actively increasing production rates, adapting designs to its available resources and improving delivery and guidance methods.
KN-23 and KN-24: technical specifications
KN-23 is a two-stage solid-fuel operational-tactical ballistic missile.
- Length: about 7,2–7,4 m (1,5 m longer than the Russian 9M723)
- Weight: approximately 3,400 kg
- Range: 450–690 km (according to various sources)
- Warhead weight: up to 500 kg
- Control type: inertial system with correction, there is a graphite head compartment for thermal protection
- Launch: from a mobile platform
The KN-24 ballistic missile was initially positioned as an analogue of the ATACMS.
- Length: about 4,5 m
- Weight: about 3,000 kg
- Range: up to 400 km
- Warhead weight: 300 to 400 kg
- Guidance system: inertial and satellite, according to a number of data
- Launcher: mobile tracked or wheeled
Both missiles use fuel that is less energy-dense than that used in modern Russian systems, requiring larger engines. The software and hardware control units contain civilian microcircuits, often manufactured by Western companies in 2022–2023. A graphite cone was chosen for the warhead's thermal protection—a necessary solution due to the sanctions-related shortage of modern materials.
The Gray Market for Components and the Failure of Sanctions
The appearance of Western microchips in North Korean missiles demonstrates the limitations of current sanctions regimes. Research centers CNA and CSIS confirm that North Korea obtains key components through front companies in China, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
“The component database shows supplies from countries that nominally support sanctions: without global oversight, such practices will only intensify.”
— CNAS report, 2023
A quantitative analysis of the debris shows that the share of civilian electronics in foreign military missiles is growing, while exporter oversight does not cover all channels.
Two-Capital Versions: Official Explanations from Moscow and Kyiv
The Ukrainian side provides expert opinions, fragment analysis, and confirmation from allied intelligence agencies, documenting the North Korean origin of the missiles and evidence of sanctions violations.
"Russia is using North Korean missiles to fire on Ukrainian territory. This is confirmed by analysis of the debris and the discovery of foreign-made components. This practice violates international sanctions."
— Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Russia claims that all weapons used are "domestic" and not subject to sanctions. Official statements make no mention of North Korean missiles. International institutions and the UN publicly note that the missiles' technical parameters match those of North Korea.
New rules of war and a borderless market
North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 have become more than just a new thing for Ukraine weapons, but a striking example of the fragility of global export controls. Even if North Korea, under harsh sanctions, gains access to modern technology, formal barriers cease to apply. In modern conflicts, the winner is the one who can secure the supply of weapons—even in circumvention of all formal restrictions.
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