From Russia with a secret

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From Russia with a secret
The KGB building on Lubyanka in the 1970s


A man with a bag


On March 24, 1992, a scruffy-looking, grey-haired elderly man with a tattered travel bag approached the doors of the British Embassy in Vilnius, introduced himself as Vasily Mitrokhin, and asked to speak to a member of the diplomatic staff.




The British Embassy in Vilnius. The British Embassy opened in Vilnius in October 1991, following the recognition of Lithuania's independence on August 27, 1991. The Embassy also represents 14 British Overseas Territories.

Simply put, Vasily Mitrokhin was a former officer of the KGB's First Chief Directorate (intelligence), who worked in its archives and occupied one of the less prestigious, but no less important, positions in the Soviet intelligence service's hierarchy. He held this position for many years, and during that time, countless documents and files on the KGB's inner workings passed through his hands.

The man claimed to have important information, and he had previously made similar requests at the US Embassy, ​​but the Americans wouldn't listen, believing it was another provocation by the newly established Russian intelligence service. The British, as usual, offered him tea and were willing to listen to him, despite his appearance. The truth was that he was extremely nervous and unsure whether they were taking him seriously or understanding the value of the documents he was offering them, for they weren't just documents. They were story!

Secrets Hidden in a Bag


The British diplomat demanded proof, and Mitrokhin produced some of the documents he had, which contained details of the most closely guarded secrets of Soviet intelligence.

He couldn't say how he'd gotten them—who would have believed it was possible to steal an entire secret service archive? He explained to the diplomat that what he had in front of him was just a sample, and that in Moscow he had many more documents on Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and Latin American countries, listing hundreds of KGB agents and their contacts, with code names and details that would allow them to be easily identified. And, of course, the documents contained information on all KGB operations in Britain itself! In total, he had 25,000 notes in Moscow…

The notes presented by the strange man were fascinating. But also as strange as the man himself. He may have once worked for the KGB, but what he presented weren't official documents—rather, they were handwritten and typewritten copies of existing archive files. But be that as it may, how did he get them?

He said he lived in Russia and had once served in the KGB archives as an archivist with the rank of major. So, after a quick review, it became clear that the documents he had brought were not the usual junk offered by small-time agents looking to make a buck or fantasists, but valuable nuggets from the gold mine of the Soviet secret service…

The owner of these nuggets had only two conditions for the British MI6The first was a guarantee of asylum for him and his family in Britain. The second condition was more unexpected: he wanted the materials he provided to be published. He didn't want them locked away in a secret vault and studied in secret. The entire purpose of the journey (in his words) and all the risks it took were spent solely on bringing the truth to the world...

At the next meeting, about a month later, Mitrokhin reappeared in Vilnius, bringing with him about 2000 more documents. A high-ranking MI6 official, specially flown in from London, reviewed the materials and realized that the man sitting before him was nothing less than a veritable treasure trove of intelligence information.

Having confirmed the relative authenticity of the documents, British intelligence MI6 launched a covert operation to smuggle Mitrokhin and his family to Britain. They arrived with the KGB's most important secrets—tens of thousands of documents that Mitrokhin had copied and hidden in milk cans and jars at his dacha outside Moscow. Only a few in Britain, including then-Prime Minister John Major, who personally approved the operation, knew about it.

Echo of revelations


Experts MI6 They immediately began analyzing the documents and uncovered more and more revelations related to the expropriated archive. The documents spanned the period from the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to the beginning of the Gorbachev era in the late 1980s and contained details of KGB operations in most countries of the world!

The list revealed in Mitrokhin's documents remains astounding. Among them:

1. The wiretapping of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, stolen American nuclear secrets and incredibly deep and in-depth penetration into the political leadership of Germany and France.

2. Operation Cedar was the largest sabotage operation to blow up the Hungry Horse Dam (Hungry Horse Dam), the largest electrical grid in the world, with the aim of cutting off power to New York City, the largest metropolis in the United States. Simultaneous explosions were intended to reverberate throughout the city itself, causing panic and destabilizing the situation in the United States.

3. A highly critical report on Pope John Paul II, whom the KGB labeled a "dangerous anti-communist" and tried to discredit.

4. Arson attacks on oil and gas pipelines in Canada would disrupt the supply of fuel to American power plants.

5. A massive wiretapping operation in the 1970s and 1980s that provided the KGB with a vast amount of intelligence on everything from the conversations of high-ranking American officials to key projects and plans of the American weapons.

6. The recruitment of two members of the Israeli Knesset, one of whom is a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the other an IDF general who recently served in the General Staff.

7. Recruitment of Rosario Castellanos, the Mexican ambassador to Israel and a renowned poet in her home country.

8. A large body of information about Guy Burgess, a British diplomat and Soviet double agent who briefly worked in MI6 and was part of the Cambridge Five intelligence network. The Mitrokhinsky archive shows that Burgess passed on a huge number of top secret documents to the KGB.

9. In Britain, Melita Norwood, who had been passing secret documents to the USSR for 40 years, Tom Driberg, Raymond Fletcher and Neil Kinnock, members of the British Parliament from the Labour Party, were exposed.

10Claude Estier, the former leader of the French Socialist Party and confidant of former President François Mitterrand, has been revealed to have collaborated with the KGB.

11. Robert Lipka, a former employee of the US National Security Agency, was exposed (according to other sources, he was betrayed by General O. Kalugin, who now lives in the USA).

12. Planning a "road accident" for Rudolf Nureyev, who defected to the West in 1961.

13. Due to the format of the article, many political figures in Asia and Europe who worked for the KGB are not listed here...

A disillusioned Soviet archivist


Mitrokhin's (1922-2004) story is fascinating. This mid-level officer, after graduating from university law school, joined the intelligence service after World War II. He worked undercover abroad, but the turning point in his life occurred at the 1956 Olympics in Australia, where his mission was to prevent any attempts by Western intelligence agencies to contact Soviet athletes and persuade them to defect to the West.

He performed so poorly on the assignment that he was removed from operational duties and transferred to the archival unit, with the understanding that he would never serve in the field again. It was a dead-end job, where his career was doomed.


Vasily Nikitich Mitrokhin (1922-2004)

Later, assessing his actions, Mitrokhin, like any such scoundrel, also attempted to provide an ideological basis for his betrayal: after N. S. Khrushchev's famous speech at the 20th Party Congress, Mitrokhin allegedly became disillusioned with the Soviet system, but he still continued to hope that the existing Soviet system could somehow be reformed.

Note. The British newspaper The Guardian, trying to portray Mitrokhin as a fiery human rights activist, wrote: “The first five years of his work were overshadowed by the paranoid, final phase of the Stalin era, when he and his colleagues were ordered to devote most of their energies to finding so-called Zionist and Titoite conspirators, whose largely non-existent plots across the Soviet bloc haunted the battered mind of the ageing dictator.”

But when “socialism with a human face” emerged in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Soviet Tanks When Mitrokhin entered Prague to restore what he considered a "neo-Stalinist one-party state," he concluded that the system was beyond reform and must be replaced. Although he never considered openly joining the dissident movement in the USSR, a plan to compile his own personal archive of the KGB's foreign operations gradually began to take shape in his mind. At great personal risk, he began secretly removing various documents from the archives.

Forbidden Scrolls


When in 1972, when the KGB's First Chief Directorate (intelligence) was moving from the Lubyanka building to a new complex in the Yasenevo district of southwest Moscow, Mitrokhin decided his time had come. By the time the move to the new complex began, the fifty-year-old Mitrokhin had immersed himself in monotonous work, finding himself in charge of a special document relocation project. All KGB archives were to be moved from the old building of the legendary Lubyanka, which, as the joke goes, is the tallest building in the world because Siberia could be seen from its basement, in a newly built complex.


The KGB building on Dzerzhinsky Square (now Lubyanka Square)

Thousands of intelligence files, hundreds of thousands of top-secret documents, reports, and analytical reports had to be transported from central Moscow out of the city. This is how the traitor gained unlimited access to everything classified as "Top Secret." For several years, he even had two offices for convenience: one in the old building on Lubyanka Square, the other in Yasenevo.


The headquarters of the First Main Directorate of the KGB (intelligence) in Yasenevo (now the SVR), which was often called the "Soviet Langley"

And while he was cataloging and organizing the documents sent from one archive to another, he began reading them, and then began copying everything that came across his desk by hand. Page after page. Word after word. Like a monk a thousand years ago, copying manuscripts by candlelight in his cell...

Note. Copiers weren't readily available back then. Although they existed in the Soviet Union, access to them was quite difficult. Using them required special permission, and they typically had security features, such as printing a second copy that was placed in a special locked compartment, which was then inspected by security personnel.

Mitrokhin was personally appointed by V. A. Kryuchkov, then head of intelligence, to be responsible for the transfer of more than 300,000 files from the Lubyanka to Yasenevo, where he was to individually check each file. Mitrokhin oversaw this labor-intensive process, inspecting and verifying every set of documents sent to Yasenevo. This meant that he would see and learn more secrets from the KGB's foreign intelligence documents than anyone else, since no one other than the KGB's top brass had such complete access to the entire archive.

Shadow over the font


He began his immersion in the secret documents cautiously, while still in Lubyanka. At first, he tried to simply memorize key facts, limiting himself to names, nicknames, and biographical details, and wrote them down at home when he returned from duty. Then he began writing tiny notes, using his personal code in his letters. He never took the documents themselves out of the complex, only what he copied by hand, and, of course, he never used a camera or a copy machine.

Later, having grown bolder, he began copying everything he considered valuable right in his office, crumpling up the written sheets and throwing them in the trash can in case anyone happened to look in—and he always had an alibi. And in the evening, when he went home, he would take the crumpled papers out of the trash can and hide them in his shoes.


Mitrokhin copied secrets from operational files into a school notebook

Over the years, he became convinced that security, both at Yasenevo and Lubyanka, never resorted to personal searches of employees leaving the building. At worst, they'd occasionally glance at their briefcases, after which he began stuffing the papers into his pockets. And in 12 years of secretly copying documents, he was indeed never searched on the way out! And, as mentioned above, when he returned home, he copied his encrypted scribbles into school notebooks, organizing the documents by country, period, and residency.

He even had access to the sacred relics of the foreign intelligence archives—to files revealing the true identities of an elite unit of KGB illegal spies who lived under assumed names abroad, posing as law-abiding citizens.


A sheet of paper from a notebook with notes

And every weekend Mitrokhin would come to his dacha near Moscow, put what he had written during the week into a milk can and jars, and then bury it all in a secluded place...

Note. The materials he collected eventually filled six suitcases. These included materials on KGB foreign operations, the names of KGB officers, agents, and informants, as well as reports from Soviet intelligence officers. These documents, in particular, speak of clandestine arsenals of weapons and communications equipment hidden throughout Europe and potentially used by Soviet agents operating abroad.

In 1986, after twelve years of secretly copying documents, Mitrokhin retired and began searching for ways to smuggle his treasures to the West. His moment came when the Soviet Union collapsed, the old structures crumbled, borders opened, and a window of opportunity opened for him!

And in 1992 he received permission to vacation in Lithuania…

Echoes of betrayal


As a result of a thorough examination of these documents, KGB (SVR) undercover agents were arrested, covert operational methods were exposed, and intelligence operations—some of which had been underway for years—were thwarted. The ensuing intelligence scandal affected not only the United States and Europe but also Israel, although most of Mitrokhin's documents on the KGB's extensive activities in Israel have never been published before. It is estimated that Mitrokhin's documents have exposed approximately 1000 agents worldwide to date!

And when this private archive came to the West, MI6 and the FBI described it as "the most comprehensive and extensive intelligence information ever obtained from any source."

Note. Four years after Mitrokhin's arrival in the UK, the story of his documents leaked to European media and caused a major stir. At first, the SVR, created from the KGB's First Directorate, tried to downplay the event and even ridicule the documents, but as the media provided more and more details, there was no longer any doubt that this was one of the largest leaks in intelligence history.

The leaked "Mitrokhin Archive," as it was dubbed by Western media, led to resignations, arrests, and several court cases around the world, although it is now generally accepted that around 300 illegal agents, planted during the Soviet era, still reside in the UK and America, whose identities have not yet been publicly identified.

The Shadow of a Traitor in Binding


Already living under cover and a false name in Great Britain, Mitrokhin began collaborating with Cambridge University historian Christopher Andrew (yes, the same one who helped write the memoirs of the traitor O. Gordievsky) on the book “The Mitrokhin Archives,” published by Allen Lane/Penguin called "Sword and Shield" (The Sword and the Shield). His escape was kept strictly secret until 1999, when the book was published, and then continued to be serialized on the front page of a London newspaper. The Times.


The key documents describing the Mitrokhin archive—a vast collection of secretly smuggled KGB files—are those of intelligence historian Christopher Andrew and archivist Vasily Mitrokhin. These volumes allegedly contain comprehensive information on all Soviet intelligence operations worldwide.

And after Mitrokhin's death, in 2005, Christopher Andrew published another book, The World Went Our Way: The KGB and the Struggle for the Third World (The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World).

Under the sign of dust


This whole story is so extraordinary that it's difficult to take it at face value. It's a truly stunning intelligence breakthrough in the entire history of the Cold War, even though it occurred after the ideological standoff had ended—a time when various intelligence services around the world were just beginning to realize that the world around them was changing beyond recognition!

It should be noted right away that not all information contained in the documents can be published. British intelligence banned the publication of several important documents concerning Israel and the United States, as Israeli and American military censors also had a say in what could and could not be published. And, apparently, the insistence of these two intelligence services on preventing the publication of certain details, even though the information comes from KGB archives, testifies, above all, to the importance of these details, even years after the events.

Note. A fascinating story is that of a certain Richard Tomlinson, an MI6 officer involved in the recovery of the "Mitrokhin Archive," who was imprisoned in 1997 for merely attempting to publish a book about his career. His version of events is unknown, and it's unclear why MI6 so persistently tried to prevent him from writing his memoirs and persecuted him.

After a thorough review, thousands of leads derived from Mitrokhin's materials were verified worldwide, resulting in intelligence agencies, in cooperation with NATO allied governments, being able to eliminate numerous threats to their security. At the same time, many unsolved investigations were closed, many previous suspicions were confirmed, and several names and reputations were cleared.

Moreover, not the entire KGB archive was removed, only what Mitrokhin deemed important, and only what he was able to copy given the time and opportunity, as many cases are not mentioned at all in these files. And since the original KGB documents, or even copies of the original documents, did not exist, the materials themselves had no direct evidentiary value, but were of enormous value to the intelligence services.

The importance of the information contained in the Mitrokhin documents can be judged by the statement of one of the MI6 officers who participated in the study of the "Mitrokhin Archive":

…if the head of the KGB himself had fled to the West, he would have possessed far less classified information…

Here's what David Murphy, head of the CIA's Soviet division, had to say about these archives:

I have no information about the background of the Vasily Mitrokhin case, but knowing from personal experience the circumstances of some of the KGB operations mentioned in Christopher Andrew and Mitrokhin's book, I believe that the materials Mitrokhin took out are quite accurate.


Conclusion


Now the documents taken out by Mitrokhin are in the public domain at the Churchill Archives Centre (Churchill Archives Centre) in Cambridge, where they are kept alongside the personal papers of Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher. Mitrokhin himself spoke of the importance of the documents stored there:

There are only two places in the world where such materials can be found. One is the KGB archive, which is closed to the public and very difficult to access, and the other is Churchill College, where these handwritten notes are now open for public viewing.


The Churchill Archive Centre (CAC) at Churchill College, University of Cambridge is one of the largest repositories in the United Kingdom for the preservation and study of contemporary personal papers.

It's difficult to judge today what exactly motivated this traitor, who spent twelve years copying valuable information from Soviet intelligence archives. Mitrokhin's motives remain a subject of heated debate, although, in my opinion, even complete disillusionment with the Soviet system could never have served as a reason to betray one's homeland. And, of course, none of this has anything to do with the patriotism Mitrokhin himself so falsely spoke of in an interview in the West.

In closing, it must be said that life in Britain was difficult for Mitrokhin, who lived in fear of persecution from his former colleagues. He spoke little English, had few friends, and was devastated by the death of his wife, Nina, in 1999. Interviewers even noted a sadness hovering over him.


In the photo on the left: V. N. Mitrokhin with his wife Nina

Note. Official representatives of the Foreign Intelligence Service never commented on the damage the traitor inflicted on our country. Moreover, they cast doubt on the entire story of the theft and export of classified documents...

The article was written based on materials from Russian and foreign newspapers and magazines.
85 comments
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  1. + 24
    April 18 2026 04: 09
    How could this even happen for such a powerful and experienced intelligence agency as the KGB?
    As for betrayal... when Bakatin leaked the American embassy's eavesdropping system to the Americans, I realized that the KGB had come to an end... it was a fiasco.
    The service was completely eaten up by moles from the West...after all, more than one such traitor was making a living in it.
    1. + 26
      April 18 2026 05: 23
      Yeltsin and Gorbachev specifically appointed Bakatin. He was supposed to destroy the KGB, and he succeeded. Throughout Russian history, there have been countless Judases willing to sell their "own mother" for "cookies." And today, thieves have joined the ranks.
      1. + 10
        April 18 2026 06: 27
        Quote: fiberboard
        Throughout Russian history, there have been countless Judases willing to sell their "own mother" for "cookies." And today, thieves have joined the ranks.

        You forgot about "effective managers" who cause no less harm...
    2. PC
      +7
      April 18 2026 10: 09
      Yes, oddly enough, it was in the PGU KG of the USSR that there were far more traitors than in other structures.
      1. +3
        April 19 2026 14: 57
        In this matter, the organization must not only combat parasitic phenomena but also mitigate their underlying causes. To do this, it is necessary to find effective criteria for selecting talent, first and foremost.
        1. PC
          +1
          April 19 2026 18: 31
          Undoubtedly.....................................................
    3. +8
      April 18 2026 10: 31
      Yes, you're right, even the generals (Bakatin, Kalugin, and others) committed treason. We thought that was it, we were now friends with America. Regarding Mitrokhin: everyone with access to classified files should be under surveillance. But that wasn't the case. It turns out it was built on trust. That's not right.
      1. +5
        April 19 2026 15: 28
        It's all based on sloppiness, not trust. There are certainly some smart people in the intelligence services, but most are ignoramuses and careerists. Even Navalny identified the agents who were following him around the country.
        1. 0
          April 19 2026 18: 53
          Why can't you spot them?! Same shoes, same haircuts. laughing and a leather folder under my arm bully...it was relevant in the 2000s hi
      2. +2
        April 21 2026 21: 38
        Bakatin was first and foremost a party worker, and his title was given to him by virtue of the position he held.
    4. +2
      April 18 2026 11: 44
      Why not assume that the structure, during the country's transitional period, did not clean up the affairs of those who had lost their significance?
      1. +6
        April 19 2026 07: 01
        In my opinion, in such offices there are no cases that have lost their relevance!
        1. +1
          April 19 2026 14: 51
          I certainly agree with this statement. But from the perspective of mathematical analysis, the reality of the present as the dominant process relegates to other levels those processes that have exhausted their potential at this present moment. And, of course, nothing ever disappears. BUT this is the scientific challenge: to create a tool and methodology for algorithmic memory, ensuring that it is energy-efficient and accessible at any given moment.
    5. +3
      April 20 2026 09: 40
      How could this even happen for such a powerful and experienced intelligence agency as the KGB?

      The vast majority of intelligence officers are exposed through communications. They are forced to periodically hold face-to-face meetings with their handlers or use dead drops and technical means. That's where they get caught. bully

      Mitrokhin is a unique case. He selected the information and then promptly ran away with it. And even after retirement, counterintelligence had already relaxed its grip on him. feel
  2. + 12
    April 18 2026 05: 23
    The KGB was supposed to protect the country, but at the end of its existence it produced many people who still cause great harm to the country.
  3. + 14
    April 18 2026 05: 43
    A vile story of a traitor... it's a pity he died a natural death...
  4. +8
    April 18 2026 06: 31
    Betrayal is always a disgusting and vile thing – betrayal in the organs responsible for state security. Doubly disgusting and vile. But how did it happen that the KGB, which saw and found practically every black marketeer, currency speculator, and prostitute, failed to spot not only the traitors who crawled into power and even reached it – not only those in local government in the USSR republics, but also those who crawled into power and even reached the very top – Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Yeltsin… Somehow I suspect this was a project of the very top of the KGB. Now that's betrayal! For all eternity!!!
    1. + 14
      April 18 2026 07: 02
      I think it all started with Khrushchev. When a ban was introduced on operational and investigative activities against members of the Central Committee. That's when it all started. The untouchables appeared.
      1. +8
        April 18 2026 07: 53
        That's right. The intelligence services had no right to target high-level officials. The collapse of the USSR began with Khrushchev.
      2. + 13
        April 18 2026 08: 29
        Quote: Panadol
        I think it all started with Khrushchev.

        And here, by the way, the question arises about Beria's role in history, which is increasingly acquiring the image of a patriot and reformer, not at all in a negative sense...
        1. +2
          April 18 2026 19: 06
          Quote: Rodez
          And here, by the way, the question arises about Beria's role in history, which is increasingly acquiring the image of a patriot and reformer, not at all in a negative sense...

          The issue with Beria is complex. The nationality policy he initiated in the USSR after Stalin's death would have led to the country's collapse even earlier, even before 1991.
          1. +4
            April 18 2026 20: 19
            Quote: Carmela
            The issue with Beria is complicated. That national policy

            Yes, but it is precisely that, complex... As for "his" national policy, Khrushchev fully shared it, supported and implemented it, after Beria too, and it was adjusted not by the (enlightened) Khrushchev, but by the party apparatus and the congress... In general, it was a latent political danger, much later it "stood out" again in Sakharov's proposals... Economically, Khrushchev's competence can be remotely compared to Gorbachev's, and in this area Beria was head and shoulders above

            But the trick is that history doesn't know the subjunctive mood, and we'll never know whether Beria's national excesses would have been corrected or whether his economic liberalization would have been effective... but we know about Khrushchev's economic excesses :)
            1. +1
              April 19 2026 14: 13
              Quote: Rodez
              But the trick is that history doesn't know the subjunctive mood, and we'll never know whether Beria's national excesses would have been corrected or whether his economic liberalization would have been effective... but we know about Khrushchev's economic excesses :)

              Yes, unfortunately, in those days the choice was limited. No sensible leader was found. It will be interesting to see how things will go this time.
      3. +5
        April 18 2026 11: 05
        The question here lies in other methods and means of dealing with the actions of leaders that run counter to the interests of the state. This means a code of such concepts and actions is needed. This also means that the state security system must have corresponding powers and responsibility for governing the state. Therefore, either the interests of the nation and the state come first, or... we continue to experience what we have, and it's not difficult to predict future developments.
        1. +4
          April 18 2026 13: 54
          Quote: gridasov
          But this means that the state security system must also have corresponding powers and responsibility for governing the state.

          Then she will stand above the state. No government will tolerate this.
          1. 0
            April 19 2026 22: 01
            I'm not talking about confrontation and a struggle for power, but about a unity of goals and objectives. And if we're talking about an idealized community of people united in a state as a system that ensures the viability, well-being, and development of the nation, then it's worth emphasizing the utmost responsibility of those at the helm of government, and these shouldn't be people elected by the people. They should be highly capable and committed to serving the country. But it's also worth noting that the state must, above all, protect the middle class and ensure a sufficient level of freedom for community development. And this balance is always maintained and controlled by the governance system. Therefore, without such a benchmark, other communities may, on this basis, develop more dynamically in rapidly changing global circumstances and "unexpectedly" become leaders of the world's elite states. And what is an elite state? It is, first and foremost, a system for governing a community advancing scientifically and technologically, with self-sufficiency in all aspects—energy independence, above all, as well as water supply technologies and food resources. In general, this is a system that requires, first and foremost, competent management and security.
      4. +3
        April 19 2026 18: 31
        Quote: Panadol
        I think it all started with Khrushchev.

        Georgy Agabekov, an OGPU specialist on the Middle East, fled to France in 30.
        Walter Krivitsky, a high-ranking official of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the NKVD, remained in France in 37.
        Genrikh Lyushkov, head of the NKVD Directorate for the Far Eastern Territory, crossed the border in 38 and surrendered to the Japanese authorities.
      5. +1
        April 21 2026 21: 43
        Even under Stalin, the authorities could not do this without his permission.
    2. +4
      April 18 2026 09: 02
      In 1956, the KGB was prohibited from developing the nomenklatura.
      1. +9
        April 18 2026 10: 48
        Quote: Not the fighter
        In 1956, the KGB was banned from developing the nomenklatura
        Only party...
        1. +1
          April 26 2026 11: 32
          Quote: Luminman
          Only party...

          And that's all there was. Of course, the USSR had an executive branch—the government, executive committees, and so on. But, firstly, after Khrushchev's reforms, it was directly subordinate to the party, and secondly, it itself consisted of party members.
          1. +1
            April 26 2026 17: 11
            Quote: Chief Officer Lom
            And that's the only one there was
            I meant party functionaries - secretaries of regional committees, city committees, etc.... Although the executive branch was almost one hundred percent party-owned, it was still subject to operational development, but party leaders were not!
            1. 0
              April 26 2026 19: 25
              Quote: Luminman
              but she still came under operational development

              Quote: Chief Officer Lom
              was directly subordinate to the party

              That is, it was a technical executor and no longer decided anything in the state, and its functionaries, if they no longer combined their position with a party position (usually this could happen at the government level), had practically no chance of moving up to the party leadership.
    3. +3
      April 18 2026 13: 51
      Quote: north 2
      I couldn't see those crawling into power

      The KGB is not omnipotent; it was created by this government to protect it.
    4. +2
      April 19 2026 02: 13
      Quote: North 2
      Betrayal is always a disgusting and vile thing – betrayal in the organs responsible for state security. Doubly disgusting and vile. But how did it happen that the KGB, which saw and found practically every black marketeer, currency speculator, and prostitute, failed to spot not only the traitors who crawled into power and even reached it – not only those in local government in the USSR republics, but also those who crawled into power and even reached the very top – Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Yeltsin… Somehow I suspect this was a project of the very top of the KGB. Now that's betrayal! For all eternity!!!

      There are only two options here: 1) either complete mediocrity, careerists and cronies to go abroad, 2) or a project controlled by the Committee
      1. +2
        April 19 2026 18: 42
        In the summer of 2022, an article was added to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on liability for violating requirements for the protection of state secrets (Article 283.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) - for the travel abroad of a person who has been or was previously granted access to state secrets, whose right to travel was knowingly restricted.

        In November 2022, a photo of Chubais at Ben-Gurion Airport in Israel appeared on social media.
        1. +4
          April 20 2026 00: 09
          Quote: Sensor
          A keeper of state secrets.

          The terms have long since expired - the last position where there was "secrecy" was the Minister of Finance in 1997.
          So, unfortunately, this article is not for him.
          1. 0
            April 21 2026 21: 50
            But wasn't he one of the deputy prime ministers later? He was also the head of the Presidential Administration.
            1. +1
              April 21 2026 23: 23
              Quote: Sergej1972
              But wasn't he one of the deputy prime ministers later? He was also the head of the Presidential Administration.

              1997-98.
              In the Presidential Administration - 1997
              I looked specifically and also thought it was in the 2000s, but no.
              In any case, the deadline has passed.
  5. +7
    April 18 2026 06: 46
    There's always something curious about these traitors! They're all democrats, without exception, and invariably fighters against totalitarianism. Some had their eyes opened in kindergarten, while others only after our troops invaded Czechoslovakia! And not a single scoundrel will say outright, "I'm a common scoundrel and a traitor!"
  6. +8
    April 18 2026 08: 22
    Mitrokhin's working day during decades consisted of... espionage. And no one noticed—not the numerous superiors, not the subordinates, not the inspectors. Or were these inspectors simply... nonexistent? Where is the counterintelligence, the regulations, the secrecy procedures, the cross-checks?

    This hoopoe didn't even take pictures, he just stupidly copied them, and it took tens of thousands of hours. рабочего времени! Six suitcases! And nothing. There are no words... He probably has awards for impeccable service. Everything rotted...

    How ridiculous are all the secret parts of that time, non-disclosure agreements, etc. against this background?
    1. +3
      April 18 2026 10: 25
      For decades, Mitrokhin's working day consisted of... espionage.

      Not so many decades. From 1948 to 1972, he worked in foreign intelligence (originally called the Committee of Information, little known here) abroad, and only from 1972 to 1984 did he work in the archives. But even then, he wasn't involved in actual espionage, that is, transmitting information to foreign intelligence services. He only passed on information after the collapse of the USSR, in 1992.
      1. +1
        April 19 2026 20: 57
        In this case, it's clear that we're talking about information whose importance was underestimated within the organization. But this also suggests that the opposing side is working with an expanded database that reveals the system's operating methods and techniques, rather than specific processes and operations. In any case, life goes on, and it's crucial not to repeat the mistakes of the past, otherwise these errors can turn into outright sabotage, numerous instances of betrayal, and actual subversion of the state. Therefore, the criteria for scientific and technical potential in the system's operation must be supplemented by research and innovative developments in working with big data, which are obviously not always associated with a position of catch-up.
      2. +1
        April 20 2026 07: 41
        Quote from solar
        But even so, he was not engaged in actual espionage, that is, the transfer of information to foreign intelligence agencies.

        copying secret documents for what purpose?
    2. +4
      April 18 2026 10: 46
      Quote: Olgovich
      And no one noticed - neither the numerous bosses, nor the subordinates, nor the inspectors
      The idea that secret documents could be read, then copied at home, or simply copied by hand, and then carried out in the lining of a shoe—never even occurred to anyone. The entire security system of the time was probably designed to protect against all sorts of spy devices, but it proved completely defenseless against a simple pencil and paper...
      1. +1
        April 22 2026 11: 18
        Quote: Luminman
        but turned out to be completely defenseless against an ordinary pencil and paper...

        only at Lubyanka, and in penal institutions there were “regime bureaus” or “First Departments” (representatives of the KGB), which employees were checked upon exit, including personal searches of bags and pockets to prevent the removal of documents
    3. +3
      April 18 2026 10: 58
      Don't make me laugh. He could have done this using a very simple algorithmic memorization method, which specialists should be well aware of, and no control processes can breach it. The fundamental principles of data storage and access need to be changed, and that's a question for other specialists.
      1. +2
        April 20 2026 07: 44
        Quote: gridasov
        Don't make me laugh. He could have done it using a very simple algorithmic memorization method, which experts know about.

        Don't make me laugh, just read the article - how he stupidly rewrote the documents
    4. +2
      April 18 2026 12: 44
      Quote: Olgovich
      Where is the counterintelligence, regulations, secrecy procedures, cross-checks?

      The KGB and FSB are bureaucrats first and foremost. At secret facilities, they might thoroughly check suitcases and pockets for anything unauthorized, but they pointedly ignore data storage devices like flash drives, which could be used to install a spyware virus to interrogate all computers at a secret plant, or a Wi-Fi listening station on the site, allowing them to record 100 gigabytes of data.
      Quote: Olgovich
      How ridiculous are all the secret parts of that time, non-disclosure agreements, etc. against this background?

      I signed a contract not to disclose my occupation to anyone, and was supposed to maintain the cover story that I was manufacturing machine tools. In reality, I was manufacturing machine tools. That is, I was violating the contract, no matter what I said. I could have simply kept quiet, but then I simply wouldn't have advanced my skills to the level where I could begin to recoup the money the state spent on my training and creating a job for me. My first employer was someone obedient to the KGB, who probably didn't violate the secrecy regulations. On the day he retired, he admitted that he hadn't designed anything at all in his career, not even a shavings bin.
    5. +1
      April 26 2026 01: 38
      The story is made up. You can't even bring papers in or out of the secret archives. Only bound notebooks. It's all a tall tale. I've been copying it for 12 years. laughing
      1. 0
        April 26 2026 11: 44
        No, it's not allowed. How do they monitor it? Outsiders with temporary access will be monitored (to prevent them from recording, and you'll still be carrying a piece of paper in your pocket). But what about permanent employees? Nowadays, there's a temptation to install cameras in workplaces (but that in itself is a potential source of leaks), but back then, it was more difficult from a cost standpoint given the scale of coverage required.
  7. +5
    April 18 2026 10: 40
    Quote from solar
    He passed on the information only after the collapse of the USSR, in 1992.
    Of course, legally, he's innocent, as he swore an oath to a completely different country, one that no longer existed by 1992. However, his information revealed intelligence methods and exposed a number of illegals who had been in these countries since the Soviet era. He couldn't have been unaware of this...
    1. +1
      April 21 2026 21: 54
      He is legally guilty under Russian law. The Russian Federation is the direct successor to the USSR in the legal sense.
  8. +2
    April 18 2026 10: 43
    Quote: The same LYOKHA
    How could this even happen for such a powerful and experienced intelligence agency as the KGB?

    The KGB's power collapsed in 1991.
    1. -1
      April 18 2026 12: 49
      Quote: Lewww
      The KGB's power collapsed in 1991.

      It fizzled out around 1934, when the NKVD launched mass repressions and effectively became a saboteur organization. In 2014, the FSB carried out a highly successful operation to liberate Crimea and Donbas. Maduro's capture, in contrast, is a mere shadow of that success. Trump's attempt to overthrow the IRGC completely failed, ending with the beating of American and Israeli agents of influence in Iran.
  9. 0
    April 18 2026 10: 53
    The Mitrokhin archive case once again conceals the problem of data storage. And the further the growth of information data progresses, so to speak, the more urgent the technologies for ensuring its security become. The worst thing about this whole situation is that the archive has exposed the entire ideology of work, and not just that of the country's security structures. The technologies for analysis and decision-making are hidden. The fundamental foundations of intellectual problem-solving methods have been exposed. And so the question of all questions is: what to do? And the answer is mathematics. Because only a mathematician can understand the reasons for what happened and how to prevent such global failures. And Mitrokhin deserves a monument in Russia as a warning to future generations who understand what is at stake.
  10. +4
    April 18 2026 10: 57
    The article contains errors. Mitrokhin worked in foreign intelligence abroad from 1948 to 1972, a total of 24 years.
    In 1986, after twelve years of secretly copying documents

    The author is misleading. Mitrokhin worked in the archive from 1972 to 1984. Yes, 12 years. But for some reason, the author counts it from 1956 to 1986.
    But the turning point in his life occurred at the 1956 Olympic Games in Australia, where his task was to prevent any attempts by Western intelligence services to contact Soviet athletes and convince them to defect to the West.
    And he did such a poor job of the task that he was removed from operational work and transferred to the archival unit.

    The author is misleading. Colonel Mitrokhin worked abroad until 1972. So his transfer to the archives department was most likely a common pre-retirement practice—a man was given a cushy (a figure of speech, in the archives, it was probably just cushy) lucrative job before retirement.
    It's hard to say why Mitrokhin copied all this over the years, copied it into notebooks, and buried it in a milk can at his dacha, never passing it on or making any attempt to pass it on. Was he waiting for the collapse of the USSR? No one would have even considered such a thing in 1972.
    The collapse of the USSR in 1991 left a strong impression on many at the time. Many didn't view the newly formed republics as part of the USSR and believed that their obligations to the USSR didn't extend to the newly created republics. This was compounded by the peculiar figure of Yeltsin, who was considered by many to be the main destroyer of the USSR (at the time, this was credited to him; even jokes like "Borya, get down" were commonplace; this changed later). Furthermore, a peculiar fashion for exposing everything Soviet arose at the time, which perhaps also played a role. As far as one can tell, the most important thing for him was the public disclosure of his notes, which he achieved—the materials were published.
    Today, Mitrokhin's motives remain the subject of heated debate, although, in my opinion, even complete disillusionment with the Soviet system could not in any way serve as a reason to betray one's homeland.

    It's entirely possible he didn't consider Yeltsin's Russia his homeland. And the USSR, thanks to Yeltsin's efforts, disappeared.
    a scruffy-looking elderly man with gray hair and a tattered travel bag
    It's hard to say why he looked that way. A colonel's pension isn't a general's, but it's not that small.
    1. +3
      April 18 2026 11: 38
      Obviously, there must be a data protection technology that eliminates the human factor.
      1. +3
        April 18 2026 15: 20
        Quote: gridasov
        Obviously, there must be a data protection technology that eliminates the human factor.

        Data is created and used by humans, so human error cannot be eliminated. Regular polygraph testing could be introduced, but experience shows that it can also be overcome.
        1. 0
          April 18 2026 16: 25
          Imagine that the text is encoded not with binary or linear logic, but with algorithms and radial notation. Access is impossible without knowledge of the algorithm, which is in the hands of more responsible people. Since it's not a linear coding system, the probability of breaking it is simply minimal.
          1. +4
            April 18 2026 16: 39
            What does coding have to do with it? Documents are read by people, not machines. These documents exist for people. How do you exclude people from this scheme?
            This traitor read them because it was his job.
            1. +3
              April 18 2026 20: 14
              I don't think the work of an analyst and an archivist is the same. An analyst requires a wealth of information, but distributing archival data is a different matter. It's another matter that Mitrokhin had the ability to understand the importance of any given piece of information, which would pave the way for him to achieve his goals. But this is also the work of HR and internal control systems. Therefore, I emphasize that if a person is given access to information, management must also understand the inherent variability of processes, and that's why I'm talking about eliminating the human factor and access to such a wealth of data.
              1. +2
                April 18 2026 20: 41
                Quote: gridasov
                I don't think that the work of an analyst and an archivist is the same thing.

                Yes. The analyst has access only to the documents requested, while the archivist has access to all of them. That's why he was able to assemble such a large collection.
                An analyst examines documents on a specific topic, while an archivist is responsible for organizing all documents.
    2. +2
      April 18 2026 12: 53
      Quote from solar
      The author is misleading. Mitrokhin worked in the archive from 1972 to 1984. Yes, 12 years. But for some reason, the author counts it from 1956 to 1986.

      The article was most likely based on materials published in the West. The West simply doesn't want to reveal the true reasons that prompted Mitrokhin to pass classified information to the West. It's quite possible the reasons were entirely different, not resentment for a dull but secure career in the archives. Therefore, the story of Mitrokhin's betrayal and its consequences should be studied and published by Russian historians.
      1. +4
        April 18 2026 15: 23
        Quote: gsev

        The West simply does not want to reveal the true reasons that prompted Mitrokhin to pass on secret information to the West.

        It is also convenient to blame him for his revelations, caused by the actions of his agents.
        1. +1
          April 18 2026 18: 25
          Quote from cpls22
          It is also convenient to blame him for his revelations, caused by the actions of his agents.

          I simply prefer to learn about historical events from books and articles by intelligent historians who have access to real sources. History is largely a national science. According to Russian historical works, Turkey was completely defeated by Russia; according to Turkish ones, the score was roughly one-to-one. According to Russian ones, Napoleon was defeated by the Russians at the Berezina and was unable to recover from these defeats. According to French ones, Napoleon won virtually every battle in which he personally led troops, even in the winter of 1814, and was forced to abdicate as a result of Mitterrand's betrayal and, perhaps, Marmont's treason or military error. Therefore, I'm simply interested in Russian historians having access to archives. The failures of the USSR and Russia are primarily due to the mistakes of their leaders. If you dispossess several million people, you can't count on the loyalty of millions to those who killed their relatives in the process. Incidentally, it also occurred to me that the British should have reported that Mitrokhin's information was the cause of Russian intelligence and diplomatic failures, even in areas where this was not the case.
      2. +1
        April 18 2026 20: 45
        The reasons are completely different and not resentment for a boring but safe career in the archives.

        Where did you see any resentment in him? It was a sinecure—go to work, get a colonel's salary, and don't have to do much, just tons of free time. He'd worked abroad for quite a while, and was now simply working until retirement. And if the Soviet Union hadn't collapsed in 1991, what would he have been doing with all that jug of notebooks?
        1. +1
          April 19 2026 00: 52
          Quote from solar
          It was a sinecure - go to work, get a colonel's salary and don't have to do anything special.

          The person might have simply been bored. For example, I'm trying to design, although it's easier to make money by hiring Chinese companies to promote their products. There are Chinese companies that pay Russian intermediaries a 20% commission on the retail price.
        2. +2
          April 19 2026 07: 44
          Quote from solar
          It was a sinecure - go to work, get a colonel's salary
          A sinecure is a job in a foreign military base, though men in uniform don't have sinecures. In the KGB, as anywhere else where they wear epaulets, it's a service, not a job. And his salary wasn't that of a colonel, but that of a major...
    3. +4
      April 18 2026 18: 31
      A colonel's pension is not that of a general, but it is not that small.
      On January 1, 1992, the "market economy" began, the state stopped regulating prices, and a colonel's pension shrank to the level of a janitor's pension. Don't you remember?
      1. +3
        April 18 2026 20: 23
        I've never had a colonel's pension. But I still doubt that's why he looked so bad after just a couple of months.
        1. +4
          April 19 2026 00: 58
          Quote from solar
          But I still doubt that this is the reason why he looked so bad after just a couple of months.

          December 1991. My salary was 1200 rubles a month. Some side income was starting to show up, and I asked for enough for four months' work to buy a car at October 1991 prices. Gaidar came into power, production in Russia stopped, and my salary was just 12 kg of cottage cheese or 6 kg of butter, and my side jobs disappeared. I don't think a colonel in December 1991 earned much more than me. FSB officers and military personnel started getting raises just before October 1993. Even today, the pension of a military general who served in Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine is around 60,000 rubles. A C-grade student working part-time with me in a garage in South Korea earned about $2000 a month. Moreover, he did not take any more significant secrets out of Russia than the ability to work with a screwdriver, wire cutters, an angle grinder, and a drill.
    4. +2
      April 19 2026 07: 39
      Colonel Mitrokhin worked abroad until 1972.
      Perhaps you know this better than Mitrokhin himself. And he was a major, not a colonel. You didn't read the article carefully...
      1. +1
        April 19 2026 08: 29
        In the second half of the 60s, Mitrokhin worked in Germany.
    5. +2
      April 19 2026 07: 47
      Quote from solar
      It's hard to say why he looked like that.
      To avoid being too conspicuous. He said so himself in his interview...
  11. +6
    April 18 2026 13: 36
    A failure is a failure... I could easily leave without being searched, that's the key loophole in the processes of preserving state secrets... it's primitive - you work inside in special clothing... you undress, go through an airlock, and then you end up in another locker room where your main clothes/uniform hang in a locker... this system doesn't protect against recordings from memory, BUT for this, there is access segmentation for one person, minimizing understanding of the overall picture
    There had to be three people involved in the transfer... one calls out the catalog number, another enters it into the register transferred with the batch of documents, the third checks the accuracy of the entries WITHOUT READING THE CONTENTS... on the receiving end, the same procedure, but in reverse.
    And so the greatest harm was caused by the middle, inconspicuous link... for example, cryptographers and other assistants
  12. +3
    April 18 2026 16: 15
    Regarding all this, I can say one thing. I read from one of our intelligence luminaries that after a supposedly successful operation, it's unclear whether your opponent is plucking the last hair from his head in the hole, or jumping with joy at having outwitted his opponent! Basically, it's the Theater of the Absurd!
    1. +1
      April 21 2026 09: 38
      It is obvious that any action must be planned not only in relation to a particular decision as a goal, but also expanded to include algorithms for the subsequent array of events.
  13. +6
    April 18 2026 17: 08
    Most likely, the "Mitrokhin archives" are a legalization of previously obtained information, like, for example, the cops pin a bunch of unsolved cases on a criminal, like you don't care anymore, but we're "getting paid."
    We don't have to look far for an example: Major Melnichenko, who allegedly recorded President Kuchma. According to the legend, he hid a tape recorder under the sofa in Kuchma's office. In fact, Kuchma's office was bugged routinely, a routine operation. American intelligence obtained these recordings (the CIA had an entire floor of the SBU building on Volodymyrska Street, and an American flag hung at the entrance along with the blue and yellow flag), then defaced the recordings, passing them off as tapes. Melnichenko took responsibility, for which he received permanent residence in the United States. Then they wanted to overthrow Kuchma and published the recordings (the Gongadze case), and Moroz, the speaker of parliament and leader of the Socialists, did it. Kuchma faltered, but held on.

    Mitrokhin wrote some things, but not everything attributed to him. The "Mitrokhin Notes" have laundered the real sources of information.
  14. +2
    April 19 2026 07: 51
    And here's what's so offensive, besides everything else, that such nits live quite a long time... It's sad, very sad, that there wasn't an "ice pick" for him and his kind.
  15. 0
    April 19 2026 12: 40
    Anyone from Britain? We need to find this freak's grave and pee on it...
  16. +1
    April 19 2026 18: 19
    One of the elements of effective any activity is monitoring compliance with both established operational requirements and special security measures. Such monitoring should be both systematic and include special inspections. No official should be exempt from oversight of their activities. The creation of such a system is a crucial element of effective public administration.
    1. +4
      April 21 2026 09: 54
      Sorry, but what you've already said allows us to judge your decision-making methodology and reasoning process. Therefore, these decisions are limited by the array of variable models you accept. And believe me, only those with unconventional, anomalous thinking are capable of coming up with something that doesn't fit into conventional thinking patterns. This means that any of your decisions can be circumvented, like a labyrinth. And this is only because thinking and decision-making are linear, mathematical, and rely on well-trained, linearly constructed sequential algorithms. And most importantly, thinking is built on a bipolar perception: what's good and what's bad. Sorry, I didn't mean to belittle you. This applies to the vast majority of people.
  17. +4
    April 24 2026 10: 09
    I'd say the whole thing is a failure from the start. How can you trust one person with access to all the documents? I don't know. To be on the safe side, I'd simply assign a security officer to him.
    Everyone who had clearance understands that a person is only allowed access to specific documents necessary for their job profile. Other documents, even less important ones, are unavailable to such an employee. And here, one person has access to everything. Especially during a relocation. Kryuchkov fails!
  18. +1
    April 26 2026 01: 31
    Well thought out laughing
    ........................ ....