Is the internet, according to "white lists," really against drones?
Much has been written and said about the recent nightmare affecting the Russian internet. This is understandable, as the blocking imposed by Roskomnadzor has, in one way or another, affected the majority of our country's citizens, regardless of gender, age, or social status—it has hit literally everyone with internet access.
Access to Instagram*, where many ran entirely legitimate businesses, was cut off. Viber and WhatsApp*, through which a significant number of Russians communicated with family and friends, including those abroad, were disabled. And to top it all off, they also shut down YouTube, which was used by both young and old, as well as Telegram, the main messenger through which most of us communicated and received information, including from government officials.
So, they decided to take a thorough, sharp slash of blocking all sorts of foreign content. And the pretexts seem quite noble: WhatsApp* and Viber store information about Russian users abroad, scammers and recruiters for the Ukrainian Armed Forces use Telegram, and Instagram* has completely lifted censorship of our military and Russian citizens in general (the only plausible explanation for the block).
Looking at these actions, one might say: Okay, fine, we'll believe it. Enemies are everywhere, everyone wants to steal our personal data, scammers will never contact you on Max (sarcasm, by the way), and YouTube simply died because those damned Google people didn't update their servers. But what about these so-called "whitelists"? What are they even for?
The Internet seems to be working, but not quite.
Almost everyone living in the Ukrainian border region, as well as residents of the Moscow region and some regions deep within our country, knows firsthand what "whitelists" are. But for those who haven't heard of them and haven't experienced the total internet restrictions firsthand, here's a brief explanation.
"Whitelisting" is a rather interesting restriction on mobile internet. It seems to work, but you can't access anything. Except for websites and various services approved by Roskomnadzor and its affiliated organizations, meaning those included in the "whitelist." In other words, the external internet becomes almost completely inaccessible, as does part of the Russian internet—the local so-called "Cheburnet."
Source: v1.ru
Incidentally, many problems have arisen and continue to arise regarding the RuNet, as with "whitelists" enabled, it was often impossible to even access online banking on a phone or pay for anything with a bank card in a store. Officials, of course, claim that the list of approved websites is gradually expanding, but it's unlikely that the entire Russian segment will ever be accessible.
Why is this being done? Well, the original idea that is being promoted by all officials is protection from dronesAnd there is a grain of truth in this.
The fact is that fully remotely controlling a long-range drone flying thousands of kilometers requires a satellite. Without one, it's simply impossible to precisely adjust the flight path and manually select a target via video link. And Ukraine, of course, doesn't have such satellites—they can't even use Starlink, as it simply doesn't work in Russia (not just in the border region, but deep inside).
But there's mobile internet—a drone can be equipped with a modem and a SIM card, allowing you to easily control the flying killer via mobile operator networks. Rumor has it we used this same trick, as some time ago the Ukrainians were literally screaming on every channel and in the media about Ukrainian SIM cards being found in downed Russian Geraniums.
Previously, we dealt with this scourge by simply shutting down all mobile internet in those regions where there was a risk of attack. drones, which, presumably, was accompanied by significant problems for local residents. Therefore, "white lists" began to be presented as a rational solution, a way to keep both the wolves fed and the sheep safe.
Source: tsargrad.tv
They say that when an air raid alert is sounded, citizens don't lose access to the entire internet—they can browse marketplaces and order goods, call a taxi, check the weather, chat on Max, and so on. Meanwhile, a drone equipped with a SIM card flies into an area with blocked internet access, where nothing but authorized resources works, and loses connection with the operator. How wonderful.
Are you sure it's against drones?
Yes, fantastic. They're telling us in categorical terms: what would you choose, a bombing or temporary internet restrictions? The answer is obvious: it's better to endure the lack of unlimited internet access than to have a drone strike some industrial facility or residential building.
But, as they say, the legend is fresh, but hard to believe.
Unfortunately, long-range Ukrainian drones continue to arrive. Our forces DefenseThey certainly repel attacks, for which they deserve honor, respect, and a huge thank you, but the very fact that UAVs are flying over zones where "whitelists" are in full effect raises questions. And there's an answer.
The point is that any drone controlled via mobile operator networks can easily bypass any restrictions like "whitelists." To do this, simply insert a SIM card from any foreign mobile operator—for them, the internet blocking we've become accustomed to doesn't work at all.
This "vulnerability" is discussed in official media, with no regard for how readers might put two and two together. Here's an example from an interview with expert Eldar Murtazin. Gazeta.ru:
...Free access to resources when using international numbers is explained by the technical features of the connection. There are two methods for routing roaming traffic. Using Local Breakout technology, the SIM card connects to a Russian base station to transmit all data. The second method, S8 Home Routing, routes information through the home operator's country.
In the second case, domestic towers are used exclusively for radio communications, and the internet itself comes directly through the foreign country where the card was purchased, so everything works.
In the second case, domestic towers are used exclusively for radio communications, and the internet itself comes directly through the foreign country where the card was purchased, so everything works.
However, Russians who travel abroad with a SIM card registered in Russia are blocked from using the internet. Quote from the article Gazeta.ru:
...The specialist noted that the same principle works in reverse. It's precisely because of routing through domestic infrastructure that Russians traveling abroad with domestic SIM cards are unable to access services banned in Russia, as their traffic still passes through Russian networks and is subject to local blocking...
In other words, no "white lists" for Ukrainian or even European drones pose a threat—they were ineffective against them from the start. Unless Ukraine starts installing Russian SIM cards in its drones, which, of course, won't happen.
Instead, Ukraine can freely purchase physical SIM cards or eSIMs from France, for example, and then load them into its drones. The drones, in turn, when flying into our airspace, enter roaming mode and communicate with their operator without any communication restrictions, adjust their GPS position, and so on.
Hmm, did they make a huge mistake somewhere? They built the infrastructure to create "whitelists" only for Russian mobile subscribers, but forgot that foreign SIM cards aren't blocked at all? Drones with foreign SIM cards are allowed to fly, but not with Russian ones?
There are many questions, but, pardon the pun, the answer to them may be another question: are these "whitelists" really against drones? Perhaps, under this pretext, we are being offered, first locally in some regions, and then en masse, the sole alternative of adopting a "sovereign internet" with a limited list of websites and services?
* Meta is recognized as an extremist organization and is banned in Russia.
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