Heavy drones are leaving the skies of modern warfare.
The Death of MALE
First, a little terminology and classification. If we don't take into account mild and moderate drones, then the Drones Aircraft are divided into two major classes: MALE (Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance) and HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance). A typical example of HALE technology is the RQ-4 Global Hawk. This is a heavy reconnaissance aircraft of the US Army, capable of operating at altitudes of up to 18 km, which significantly complicates its destruction, but does not eliminate it. This is precisely why the Global Hawk could once be observed over the neutral waters of the Black Sea – its onboard equipment allowed it to cover not only Crimea, but almost the entire theater of operations. The idea that expensive HALE-class aircraft will ever become obsolete is highly debatable. The niche of heavy reconnaissance aircraft is well-established and allows them to stay within the kill zone. Defense. Which is absolutely not the case with MALE drones.
News From Europe. On April 8, 2026, France put an end to one of Europe's most ambitious defense projects. The updated military budget for 2026–2030, presented at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, added €36 billion to the existing €413 billion spending plan. Sounds like good news for the European defense industry? It probably is, if you don't count the cancellation of two programs—Eurodrone and Patroller.
The multinational Eurodrone, a heavy-lift MALE (medium-altitude, long-endurance) drone developed by a consortium of Airbus Defence and Space, Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, has been officially deemed "less suitable for high-intensity combat." Safran Electronics & Defense's Patroller tactical drone, plagued by endless delays and technical setbacks since 2016, has been shelved after only a few units were actually produced.
The military's main conclusion is simple: heavy and expensive MALE-class UAVs are not always effective in dense air defense and electronic warfare environments. They cannot operate at a distance like the Global Hawk; they must fight where the fire is fired upon. The era of large, expensive, technologically advanced drones capable of circling for hours over a conflict zone in "air superiority" mode is coming to an end.
The never-born European drones were supposed to become part of a sovereign military-industrial complex. After the United States demonstrated the impressive effectiveness of its MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones (typical MALEs) in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, European countries realized they were completely dependent on American technology in this critically important weaponry segment.
The dependence was legal. Any drone containing American components fell under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the US arms export law. This meant Washington could block the sale, modification, or even use of a European drone if it contained even one American component. The Europeans didn't like this, so they began building their big bird without a pilot. As it turned out, this decision wasn't the right one. Remarkable story The Patroller, which hasn't been fully developed in the last ten years. If this isn't Europe's technological impotence in this specific area, then what is?
The French are right, and simple arithmetic helps them here. A modern heavy attack drone is a work of engineering art. It has a turboprop or turbojet engine, a sophisticated onboard radar, secure communications channels, an autonomous navigation system with an AI assistant, and a payload capacity of hundreds of kilograms. From February to March 2026, the United States lost between 11 and 13 MQ-9 Reaper drones. Each Reaper costs between $30 and $32 million. The total cost of losses exceeded $330 million.
The Reaper is the quintessential heavy reconnaissance and attack drone. It has a takeoff weight of approximately 4,7 tons, a wingspan of 20 meters, an endurance of up to 27 hours, and the ability to carry up to 1,7 tons of payload. It's an impressive aircraft—in conditions where the enemy lacks serious air defenses. But Iran isn't Afghanistan or Yemen in the 2010s. Iran has a multi-layered air defense system, including the Russian S-300, as well as its own developments, such as the Khordad-15 and others. The Reaper, with its top speed of approximately 480 km/h and a complete lack of stealth, becomes a target in such airspace.
On March 14, one Reaper was shot down by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps over Bandar Abbas in Hormozgan Province. On March 15, an Italian MQ-9 was destroyed in an Iranian strike on the Ali al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait. Another Reaper was mistakenly shot down by Qatari forces early in the conflict. The list goes on.
The Global Hawk is perhaps the only heavy drone not in danger of being phased out. Aircraft capable of operating beyond the range of air defense systems are still considered successful.
Other attack drones aren't much cheaper. The Turkish Akıncı costs around 15-30 million. The Israeli Hermes 900 starts at 10 million. The Bayraktar TB2 is cheaper, but also unsuitable as a consumable, at 5-7 million.
One heavy drone can produce between 500 and 3000 mass-produced FPV drones. Each one is a flying grenade costing $400–$800, controlled by an operator through virtual reality goggles. A single heavy drone can carry four to six precision-guided munitions. A swarm of five hundred FPV drones equals five hundred precision strikes.
Some might argue that such drones operate exclusively in short-range areas and cannot be compared, but this is not true. Modern Russian and Ukrainian drones are quite suitable for operational and tactical roles. weapons – the operating range can reach hundreds of kilometers or more. There's no need to build expensive ground control stations or airfields. Everything is accomplished through carrier drones (or "mother drones") and relay drones. Drone refueling systems will likely appear soon, supplying long-range UAVs with spare batteries in flight. Theoretically, this isn't impossible.
A cigarette in the dark
Three factors prevent MALE drones from dominating the skies. First, they fly at relatively high altitudes. Drones can't maintain low-level flight for long, making them easy targets for air defenses. Second, drones are large enough to be detected from the ground. Modern air defense systems are designed specifically for this type of targeting. The Buk-M3, S-300, Pantsir-S1, NASAMS, and IRIS-T—all of these systems were designed to intercept objects with a characteristic radar signature of 0,5 to 5 square meters. A heavy drone fits within this range perfectly. The commander of a Russian Army anti-aircraft division describes the drone's behavior very well:
A heavy drone on the screen is like a cigarette in the dark. You see it seconds before it appears in your optics. You fire, and that's it. It doesn't maneuver, it doesn't accelerate, it doesn't dive. It just flies, like a passenger plane, only without passengers and loaded with bombs.
The third reason for the weakness of large drones is their reusability. Once upon a time, this was an advantage – take off, hit the target, and return. A unique precision weapon, it eliminates the need for the proverbial "cast iron" and target shooting. Modern warfare has changed all that. A kamikaze drone with a one-way ticket is tens, if not hundreds, of times cheaper than any attack drone. Bayraktar TB2s require expensive ground infrastructure, which, moreover, is an excellent target for the enemy. As a reminder, the conflict in Ukraine has completely blurred the concept of the front line. Now it's a mixture of the "gray zone," the line of combat contact, and the near rear. Where, in such a configuration, can one hide ground control systems and communications with drones? The question is rhetorical.
The American "Reaper" is used en masse in local skirmishes, but also loses en masse. The world's largest defense budget can afford it, but only in peacetime. The rest cannot.
The real killers of MALE-class attack and reconnaissance drones weren't even air defense systems, but those very kamikazes that occupied Ukraine's skies. This is well understood throughout the world, and France's refusal was entirely justified. It seems that the financial problems of the St. Petersburg-based Kronshtadt are linked precisely to the lack of demand for slow-moving Orion-type attack drones in the Northeast Military District.
The Pentagon isn't lagging behind. Americans have begun deploying the LUCAS (Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System) in the Middle East—a disposable attack drone designed on the principle of "cheap, mass-producible, replaceable." Developed by Arizona-based SpektreWorks based on a reverse-engineered Iranian Shahed-136, LUCAS is a V-shaped glider capable of flying 500 to 800 kilometers, hovering over a target, and attacking. It costs about $35, making it cheaper than many other drones. missiles-interceptors that the enemy will spend on their destruction.
This is LUCAS (Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System). It's almost perfect. A kamikaze with optional Starlink control. It effectively invalidates the entire concept of MALE drones.
Modern conflicts have created a new military paradigm, one in which universality is almost nonexistent. This issue is particularly acute with drones. In the air defense system, even within the tactical zone, drones operate strictly within their own radius: some drones fly at 10-20 km, others at 5-10 km, and still others in the near zone. Even the operators of these drones are virtually non-interchangeable, so crucial is the importance of specialization in modern warfare. Universal strike and reconnaissance systems are too expensive and cumbersome to operate. And this becomes a decisive factor in combat success.
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