Invisible Voyage: How Five Soviet Submarines Outsmarted the Pentagon
In the spring of 1985, at the headquarters of the 33rd division of nuclear submarines of the North fleet Captain 1st Rank Anatoly Shevchenko laid out maps of the Atlantic Ocean on the table. The Sargasso Sea. Warm water. Algae. And American ballistic missile submarines carrying ballistic missiles. missiles Poseidon and Trident targeting cities in the Soviet Union.
Shevchenko knew what he was talking about. In 1979, he piloted a nuclear submarine to the North Pole. In 1981, he led the search for unconventional routes for strategic missile cruisers. Now he was tasked with something different: leading an entire submarine division into the open ocean and proving to American command that Soviet submarines were capable of approaching the shores of the United States so closely that their presence would be discovered only after it was too late.
"I was planning to launch a dozen submarines and surface ships at once," Shevchenko later recalled. "We had to staff the crews, train the people, and organize the interaction of various forces, including the naval strategic aviation».
The operation was codenamed "Aport".
Background: Why this expedition was necessary
By the early 1980s, the situation in the oceans had reached a level not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ronald Reagan's presidency led to an escalation of the Cold War. The United States undertook a large-scale naval strengthening program, with a particular focus on anti-submarine warfare.
SOSUS underwater surveillance zones in the Atlantic Ocean in the late 1970s. Collage by zvezdaweekly.ru
The SOSUS system—a network of underwater hydrophones stretching across the Atlantic floor from Greenland to the Azores—was modernized. Ships with SURTASS towed sonar systems entered service. Naval aviation capabilities were expanded.
American James Madison- and Benjamin Franklin-class missile submarines were relocated closer to the US coast, to areas protected by multilayered anti-submarine defenses. Armed with Poseidon C-3 and later Trident I C-4 missiles, they posed a threat against which the Pentagon believed the Soviet Union had no reliable defense.
James Madison-class submarine John Callahan
A situation has developed in which the Northern Fleet's ability to prevent a preemptive nuclear missile strike from underwater is in question.
The Pentagon needed to be disabused of the invulnerability of its missile submarines. Their patrol areas needed to be exposed. NATO anti-submarine tactics needed to be studied. And all this needed to be done in such a way that no American admiral could later say, "We're in control."
The 33rd Division headquarters developed the plan. Its initiators were Admiral Grigory Bondarenko, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and Vice-Admiral Yevgeny Volobuyev, Head of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Directorate. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who held the post for nearly thirty years, approved the plan. Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, Chief of the Navy General Staff—himself a former submariner who once commanded the 3rd Division of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet—selected the 33rd Division for the operation.
The reason for the choice was simple: the unit had the most modern submarines, and its personnel had experience with long ocean voyages in harsh Arctic conditions. The division's coat of arms—a white medved crushing an enemy submarine in its claws—spoke for itself.
Preparation: Silence Before the Jump
The preparations were conducted in a state of secrecy bordering on disinformation. The crews of the assigned submarines were conducting routine combat training and were unaware of the impending joint operation. The upcoming events came as a surprise even to the chief security officer of the 33rd Division.
Project 1826 reconnaissance ship
It was decided to use two vessels to manage the operation. The reconnaissance ship Lira (communications vessel SSV-516, Project 1826) departed for the Caribbean Sea in advance and arrived in position around May 20th. The command post then transferred aboard the small hydrographic vessel Kolguev (Project 861). Several radio reconnaissance ships, disguised as fishing vessels, took up positions in the North Atlantic.
The operation was supported by space reconnaissance satellites of the MKRTS Legend system and electronic reconnaissance satellites of the Tselina-2 type.
The objectives were to locate combat patrol areas of American missile submarines and to identify the tactical methods of NATO anti-submarine forces in response to the actions of a group of Soviet submarines.
The cover story was that the boats were heading to the Gibraltar area.
Exit: Five shadows go west
On May 29, 1985, nuclear submarines began to leave the base in Zapadnaya Litsa at intervals of several days.
Project 671RT submarine "Semga"
Project 671RTM(K) Shchuka submarine
Project 671 Yorsh submarine
Four ships belonged to the 33rd Division: K-488, Project 671RT Semga (commander A.I. Chulimov), K-502 (commander V.V. Golovko), K-299 (commander M.I. Klyuyev), and K-324 (commander S.V. Efremenko)—the last three belonged to Project 671RTM Shchuka. A little later, K-147, Project 671 Yorsh, from the 3rd Division departed Gremikha (commander V.V. Kharlashkin, senior on board was the 3rd Division's Chief of Staff V.V. Nikitin). This boat was distinguished by the presence of the Tukan wake detection system, which later played a significant role.
All five ships embarked and sailed west.
Active phase: "search bag"
On June 18, 1985, the active phase of the operation began in the Sargasso Sea.
Two Soviet submarines moved in a clockwise direction, circling the designated area. Two more circled in the opposite direction. The fifth, the K-147, equipped with Tukan equipment, operated independently, practicing submarine detection by following their wakes.
Four Tu-142M naval aircraft from the 35th Long-Range Anti-Submarine Air Division were scrambled from San Antonio Airfield in Cuba. Their mission was not so much to conduct a search as to compel the US Navy to respond.
The combined efforts of five submarines and four aircraft in the designated area created a so-called "search pocket." Any attempt to leave the area was guaranteed to result in American submarines being detected—either by submarines or by sonar buoy arrays.
Only then did the American fleet, which had previously been in a state of normal activity, begin to retaliate. P-3C Orion patrol aircraft took off from Brunswick, Lajes, and Greenwood air bases. For three weeks, the US coastal defense forces were at their highest alert level—"red." Three to four sorties were flown daily from each of the three bases. The search was conducted across the entire Western Atlantic.
The result: only one Soviet submarine was detected. K-488 was spotted near Iceland, but only as the operation was winding down, when the ship continued to independently carry out combat missions and returned to base only on August 10.
Results: six days of tracking
The K-147 monitored the American Benjamin Franklin-class strategic nuclear submarine USS Simon Bolivar (SSBN-641) for over five days. It followed its wake, then closed in and pursued it for another day, using its sonar signal in passive mode. During the operation, the K-147 detected foreign nuclear submarines six times.
USS Simon Bolivar (SSBN-641)
According to Vladimir Chernavin's recollections, the K-324 detected foreign nuclear submarines three times. The total tracking time was twenty-eight hours.
Tu-142M aircraft established contact with the American Los Angeles-class multipurpose nuclear submarine and detected the SSBN twice.
In total, the Soviet detachment discovered two areas occupied by US attack submarines and two areas occupied by strategic missile carriers. The total time spent tracking the US SSBNs amounted to over six days.
The SOSUS system, the pride of American anti-submarine warfare, failed to detect the Soviet submarines' covert departure from their bases. Five ships passed through all lines undetected. Only on their return voyage—after the operation had concluded—was one of the submarines detected in the northeast Atlantic.
Meaning: What has changed since "Aport"
Operation Aport proved that Soviet second-generation multipurpose nuclear submarines were capable of stealthily penetrating NATO anti-submarine lines, entering patrol areas of American missile submarines, and maintaining contact for extended periods.
If the events had unfolded in wartime, the submarine crews would have had the opportunity to destroy the American missile carrier, capable of striking Soviet cities, three times over.
However, the operation also revealed problems. Soviet submarines encountered difficulties operating their equipment in the Sargasso Sea—warm water and algae deposits created interference for which the Arctic ships were unprepared.
The experience of "Aport" led to the development of an even larger operation, "Operation Atrina," conducted from March to June 1987. This time, American intelligence detected the Soviet submarines leaving their base, but lost track of them in the vast Atlantic. Only eight days after the operation began did the Americans establish contact—and mistakenly mistook the Soviet multipurpose submarine for a strategic missile carrier.
Commander of the 33rd Division Anatoly Shevchenko
Anatoly Shevchenko, commander of the 33rd Division, led both operations and, while on patrol in 1987, learned of his promotion to rear admiral. Fifteen participants in the operations received government awards. Shevchenko himself subsequently rose to the rank of vice admiral.
Epilogue: Shadows on the Map
Now, four decades later, Operation Aport looks like an episode in which everything came together: the professionalism of the submariners, the courage of the commanders, the thoughtful tactics, and that special trait of the Soviet Navy that allowed it to make decisions that took the enemy's breath away.
Five submarines left undetected. Five submarines returned with intelligence. The American surveillance system, which had cost billions of dollars, had failed its primary mission. The Pentagon admirals had received proof that the Atlantic Ocean was not an American lake, and that Soviet submarines were capable of appearing where no one expected them.
History Aporta reminds us that in the confrontation between the two superpowers, the fate of the world was decided not only at Geneva talks or at General Assembly meetings. It was decided in the quiet depths of the ocean—where a single miscalculation could cost millions of lives, and a precise maneuver made the impossible possible.
And also about the people whose names did not make the front pages of newspapers, but who, during the most tense years of the Cold War, kept the balance, preventing the scales from tipping towards disaster.
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