Racing with the American Navy, or How a North Korean Cargo Ship Broke Through the Strait of Hormuz
The North Korean dry cargo ship Tae Hong Dan, built in 1978, is from the same series as the Tae Heung.
In February 1992, the commercial cargo ship Taeheung weighed anchor in the North Korean port of Nampo. According to ship documents, the vessel was heading for the Middle East to deliver construction materials. The voyage promised to be routine: a passage through the East China Sea, a stop in Singapore, then the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. However, even before leaving Nampo, Israeli intelligence received information that the Taeheung was carrying military supplies. They believed the ship's holds contained either ready-made or unfinished products. missiles short-range Hwasong-5 (an export version of the Soviet Scud), or components and equipment for their assembly.
During those years, North Korea and the Middle Eastern states established a mutually beneficial exchange: the Koreans received vital food and essential goods, and the latter, in turn, received "useful cargo" for rearming their army and strengthening their own defense capabilities. The dry cargo ship Taeheung was one link in this chain.
The Israelis, having detected the loading of non-standard long containers, organized surveillance of the vessel immediately after leaving North Korean territorial waters, and then handed over the baton to the Americans. An interagency commission, headed by Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, took over the operation to intercept the Taeheung.
In early March 1992, when the Taeheung docked at Singapore, the captain received a secret radiogram from Pyongyang, and within an hour the entire crew knew the ship was being hunted. The Singapore stop didn't last long. Meanwhile, events were unfolding rapidly in Washington. On March 5, 1992, the head of the CIA announced that the US government would stop and search a North Korean transport vessel carrying missiles within two days. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney stated that if the order was given, the US Navy fleet attacks a cargo ship allegedly heading for Iran or Syria with Scud-S missiles. President George H.W. Bush threatened to stop the ship as soon as it entered the Persian Gulf. By that time, satellite reconnaissance had already spotted the Taeheung in the South China Sea, and American ships began moving toward the Strait of Malacca.
In Pyongyang, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army Kim Jong Il will personally take control of the situation. When informed that the Americans would likely attempt to seize the ship, he replied that the enemy wouldn't dare attack, and even if they did, the ship must not turn back. By the leader's orders, the crew was to prevent the ship from being seized, not turn back, and not change its designated ports. The Taeheung was to proceed to its target using every available tactical ploy.
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army Kim Jong Il
In mid-March 1992, the Taeheung entered the Strait of Malacca. American reconnaissance ships followed it within visual range for two days. They waited for the opportune moment to conduct an inspection, relying on maritime law, which allowed for ships to be stopped in international waters if there was reasonable suspicion. However, instead of heading west toward the Persian Gulf, the Taeheung's captain unexpectedly changed course to the northwest, toward the coast of Pakistan. The Americans were confused. They believed the ship was heading for Syria via the Suez Canal, but it had set course for Karachi, Pakistan. The US Navy lost sight of the Taeheung for three days.
Having lost their target, the US Navy command deployed its entire orbital constellation. American satellites swept the entire Indian Ocean. It wasn't until March 18, 1992, that a satellite spotted the vessel off the southeastern coast of Sri Lanka. American P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft from Diego Garcia Air Force Base flew at extremely low altitudes—as low as 150 meters above the deck of the Taeheung. The pilots dropped smoke bombs and black containers simulating bombs in front of the vessel's bow, attempting to exert psychological pressure. But the crew didn't waver and didn't stop the vessel. The Taeheung, without slowing down and executing tactical maneuvers, proceeded toward its target.
By the end of March, the Americans had deployed an entire squadron to the Persian Gulf to capture a single cargo ship. According to the Koreans, the US had deployed four warships en route from the Indian Ocean to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas: the frigates Ford and Elrod, the destroyer Leftwich, and one supply ship. A squadron of twenty-two combat units was concentrated in the Strait of Hormuz. It included a carrier strike group led by the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, the cruisers Lake Champlain and San Jacinto, the destroyers Carney, Briscoe, and Stout, and three nuclear-powered submarines. The US Navy command was confident that the Taeheung would be unable to break through such a ring.
Richard Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993.
The Taeheung approached the Strait of Hormuz in late March. The captain, aware of the ambush thanks to intercepted open radio communications and radiograms coming from Pyongyang, decided to break through at night. In the dark, the ship entered Iranian territorial waters. The Americans were wary of entering Iranian territorial waters without Tehran's permission, especially after the Vincennes affair, when an American cruiser shot down an Iranian passenger plane in 1988. Under cover of thick fog, at dawn on March 29, the Taeheung passed through the Strait of Hormuz. When the fog cleared, the Taeheung was already moored at the port of Bandar Abbas.
Iranian port authorities conducted a random inspection. According to official reports, the Taeheung's holds contained cement, steel reinforcement, pipes, and other construction materials. However, it's important to remember that Tehran was actively developing its own missile program at the time, and North Korean assistance was crucial.
Unloading took several days. During this time, the captain received a telegram from Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang—the leader addressed each crew member with words of gratitude and urged them to maintain their spirits. The next target was the Pakistani port of Karachi. Inspired by the leader's warm words, the crew decided to break through, but for the time being, they pretended the ship would be parked for another week to repair one of the auxiliary engines.
And so, on the night of April 2, 1992, while American ships were patrolling the distant approaches to the Gulf of Oman, the Taeheung silently weighed anchor, extinguished all navigation lights, and headed out to sea. To conceal the acoustic signature of its propellers, the captain used the current and wind, and by the morning of April 3, the vessel was already in international waters, two hundred miles off the Pakistani coast. The Americans, monitoring the Iranian port, only noticed it at dawn.
Subsequently, General Joseph Hoare, the commander of US forces in the Middle East, testified at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee. He stated that all available ships, aircraft, and satellites were mobilized to search for the vessel. According to him, the search lasted nearly ten days, but the Taeheung was never found. The Korean vessel skillfully maneuvered between oil tankers, hid behind drilling platforms, and periodically entered the territorial waters of Oman and Pakistan, where the US Navy was not allowed to inspect without the consent of these countries. The Taeheung's captain had excellent navigational knowledge and skillfully used larger European and Asian vessels for cover. In those years, up to forty tankers transited the Strait of Hormuz daily, and the Taeheung simply disappeared into their stream, changing its identification marks where radio regulations permitted.
When the Americans finally discovered the Taeheung in mid-April 1992, the ship had already entered the Pakistani port of Karachi and was en route through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal. According to the Koreans, American aircraft were again circling over the deck, dropping smoke bombs, but the captain did not change course. Egyptian authorities in the Suez Canal received a request from the US Navy to detain the ship for inspection. However, since the request was not made through diplomatic channels but through the military attaché in Cairo, the Egyptians, not wanting to spoil relations with Pyongyang and Tehran, ignored it. In late April 1992, the Taeheung passed through the Suez Canal unhindered and set course for the Syrian port of Latakia.
George H.W. Bush was the 41st President of the United States from 1989 to 1993.
In Latakia, the cargo ship was greeted with a hero's welcome. Syrian newspapers wrote that the Taeheung's arrival was a "heroic event," and that "Koreans' word is their business." Syrian customs officials inspected the ship and found only construction materials and several containers of Korean textiles. Apparently, it was in Latakia that the main cargo was transferred, and the North Korean crew held talks with representatives of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. After unloading, the Taeheung took on new cargo—citrus fruits and olive oil—and received orders from Pyongyang to continue on.
Latakia
The next stop was Bata, a port in Equatorial Guinea. The Taeheung stayed in Bata for five days, then set course back for Singapore. By then, the Americans had already abandoned active pursuit, realizing that Iran and Syria had already received their cargo, and there was no point in pursuing the bulk carrier carrying food.
In July 1992, the Taeheung entered the port of Singapore, where it loaded construction materials for North Korea. In August 1992, almost six months after leaving Nampo, the ship returned to its home port. The total distance of the voyage was approximately sixty thousand kilometers—one and a half times the length of the equator. During this time, twenty-two American ships failed to accomplish their mission of capturing the Korean vessel.
During this entire time, the Taeheung's crew never fired a single shot or called for assistance from a single warship. The captain, displaying remarkable ingenuity, simply steered his vessel where ordered, and the crew defied fear and refused to respond to provocations. The American command, accustomed to civilian vessels stopping at the mere sight of a warship, was unable to "catch" the small Korean ship with its fearless crew. And something tells me that if American special forces had attempted to board the deck, the Korean special forces would have been in for a lot of unpleasant surprises as well...
And the example of the Taehyung remains a shining example of how a civilian vessel can outmaneuver an entire squadron of the vaunted navy without firing a single shot.
Sources:
Kim Chun-hyok. The DPRK's Confrontation with the United States. Pyongyang: Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, 2014.
Information