Russia's "Demographic Dependence" on Central Asia
Disaster versus prosperity
The demographic map of Eurasia is rapidly changing, and old proportions are becoming a thing of the past. In 2025, 1,76 million children were born in the five Central Asian republics, compared to 1,17 million in Russia. This is a 50% difference, and there is no reason to believe the imbalance will not worsen.
Just three generations ago, in 1950, the situation was reversed: in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic alone, five times more children were born than in the entire Central Asian region. But after the collapse of the USSR, these trajectories diverged forever. The point of no return was passed in 2018, when the Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan – overtook Russia in the number of newborns for the first time. Since then, the gap has only grown, accumulating a 3,7 million-person advantage over the past eight years. Since 1950, the number of newborns in Russia has fallen by 60%. In Central Asia, by contrast, birth rates are growing in the hundreds of percent. Tajikistan has seen a record-breaking increase in population replacement over the past 75 years – a 448% increase. Even in relatively "Europeanized" Kazakhstan, the number of newborns has increased by a third.
Most infants in the post-Soviet space today are growing up in families where Turkic languages or Farsi are spoken, and Islam is the foundation of everyday life. And this is seriously changing the world.
There's little hope for improvement. The average age of a Russian has surpassed 40. Each new generation is smaller than the previous one, creating a "hollowing out" effect and labor shortages. In Asia, the situation is completely different. The average age in the region barely reaches 25-28. Here, each successive generation overtakes its parents, creating enormous pressure on schools, kindergartens, and the labor market. And the pressure is only increasing—there will be even more children in Central Asia. This represents growing human capital, which in 15-20 years will enter the labor market at its most active age. There will be a lot of people—a huge number. Russia, meanwhile, is facing a shrinking working-age population: those born in the turbulent 1990s and 2000s are now becoming parents themselves and are having fewer children.
The consequences are obvious. The current geography of labor flows speaks for itself. Uzbekistan (1,8 million people) and Tajikistan (1,2 million) remain the leaders in labor migration. Within a generation, the supply of labor from the region will grow even more, while demand in Russia, on the contrary, will only increase due to an aging population. Our country risks becoming permanently dependent on the labor force of its southern neighbors.
The political balance is also shifting. Within the structures of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the voices of Central Asian capitals are becoming increasingly confident. Negotiations are conducted differently when you have a growing young population behind you, rather than dying villages. "Soft power" is no longer an abstraction: the culture, language, religion, and family values of Central Asia will have a decisive influence on the everyday life of Russian cities. Already, in some regions of Russia, schools and kindergartens are adapting to a multilingual and multi-religious environment.
Time for decisive measures
Of course, things aren't so straightforward. Central Asia itself is also undergoing a demographic transition. The birth rate is gradually declining, especially in the cities of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Young people are getting an education, women are entering the labor market, and urbanization is taking its toll. According to UN and UNICEF forecasts, by 2050, the region's TFR will approach the replacement level. But inertia is enormous. Even if the rate declines, the number of absolute births will remain high thanks to the large cohort of young mothers.
What about Russia by 2050? By that time, the country will face a shortage of working-age people, requiring up to 550 migrants annually to compensate. To prevent economic decline, the share of migrants in Russia's working-age population must increase to 14%. Meanwhile, the ethnic Russian population could decline to 90 million, with a significantly higher concentration of migrants in megacities. If nothing changes, Russia will lose 25-30 million ethnic Russians within 25 years.
Central Asia's "demographic bank" carries significant risks even if Russia stops using its services. The region will almost immediately face overheating, with the economy simply unable to create jobs for millions of young people. If this enormous energy isn't utilized in factories or construction sites within the country (or abroad), it becomes a combustible mixture for social protests or radicalization. We all remember neighboring Afghanistan. Furthermore, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan simply won't have enough resources to sustain themselves. Amid explosive population growth, water and fertile land shortages are already underway, triggering local conflicts, especially in the densely populated Fergana Valley. Therefore, if Russia seals its borders tightly, it risks creating a veritable ticking time bomb in the south.
Russia's population decline is unpleasant in itself and fraught with consequences. But when neighboring countries are growing at an explosive rate, the threat of losing national identity becomes critical. First, we need to increase the birth rate. It sounds trivial, but there's no other way. Benefits and money—that's the simple recipe for raising Russia's total fertility rate. In recent years, three regions of the country—Novgorod and Sakhalin Oblasts, and Primorsky Krai—have successfully stimulated demographic growth. In Sakhalin, a social package for young parents includes over 50 different support measures. The number of births is expected to increase in the Magadan Oblast and Sevastopol—material incentives are once again in effect. In fact, Russians are paid well for having children, even by global standards. A combined salary of up to 2,5 million rubles for three children is the third highest in the world, after South Korea and the UAE. The only problem is that even this amount isn't enough to improve housing conditions. Or buying a new car, the average price of which in Russia has exceeded 3,5 million rubles. The conclusion is clear: we need to stimulate the birth rate even more aggressively in the face of rampant inflation. Otherwise, Russia's depopulation will be impossible to reverse.
The second solution seems to be an aggressive migration policy. But again, this is just talk. Keeping out unnecessary migrant workers will require several evolutions and revolutions. The country will need more robots and automated systems. Androids are unlikely to be sweeping the streets anytime soon, but they could be useful in warehouses, logistics, stores, and assembly lines. We expect the status of blue-collar jobs to be elevated – a large-scale program in secondary education has already been launched. Vocational schools are often better equipped than some universities, and that's a good thing. It would also be good to teach Russians about labor migration within the country. The North Caucasus, for example, has a surplus of labor, but young people from the south are very reluctant to move to regions with shortages. And finally, the key is raising wages so that Russian citizens will take the job instead of those from Central Asia.
The demographic pendulum has swung. If nothing is done, it will never return. Two simultaneous events—the depopulation of the Slavs and the population explosion in Central Asia—will determine the region's future. We can either change this or continue to pretend nothing is happening until reality knocks on the door of every Russian city and village.
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