A little about the present and future of AWACS aircraft
Recently, an article by Roman Skomorokhov was published on VO Big, expensive, practically useless, dedicated to the present and future of AWACS aircraft. Briefly, the author's key points are as follows:
1. AWACS aircraft are excessively expensive, which is why their numbers are always small, and operations to destroy them, even with the involvement of a large force and carried out over a long period of time, are always justified.
2. With the advent of long-range ground-based anti-aircraft missiles missile The capabilities of AWACS aircraft to operate from “out of reach” have been sharply reduced due to the use of complexes and air-to-air missiles of multifunctional fighters.
3. The functions of AWACS aircraft can be successfully performed by a satellite constellation.
Based on these theses, it is concluded that AWACS aircraft will soon be retired historyJust as torpedo bombers once left, and now attack aircraft are leaving.
Of course, there is a grain of truth in all these thoughts, but still, can we talk today about the imminent demise of AWACS aircraft?
Price issue
Let's start with cost. Iran recently succeeded in destroying a US Air Force E-3C Sentry, after which American sources reported that the aircraft cost American taxpayers more than $500 million, and its replacement would cost $700 million or more.
The sums are certainly impressive. It's no surprise that, given the cost, even the US Air Force couldn't afford to purchase these aircraft en masse: until recently, they had 31 of these aircraft; now, they have 30 left.
Why are the Sentry and its counterparts so expensive? The answer is simple: these aircraft, like our A-50, A-50U, and the A-100 series that never reached the final stage, represent the ultimate in AWACS dimensions and performance. The Sentry's empty weight is 78 tons, and its maximum takeoff weight exceeds 160 tons. This allowed the Sentry to acquire a radar with mind-boggling capabilities (for its time, of course) and a crew of 13-19 instrument operators—in addition to the four pilots.
And so it seems that R. Skomorokhov writes everything correctly: there are few AWACS aircraft, and they are very expensive, and operations to destroy them are completely justified, and are also facilitated by a significant increase in the range of missile use. weapons...That's all true until we put aside the US Air Force's practices and look at their own fleet.
And there we'll see a completely different model for using AWACS aircraft. Yes, of course, we'll be talking about the E-2C Hawkeye and the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye.
The US Air Force has approximately 1600 multirole fighters and 200 attack aircraft, with a total of 1800 aircraft of these classes. This means that there were, on average, 58 fighters and attack aircraft per AWACS. But if you look at Aviation In the US Navy, we see a completely different picture: 677 fighters for every 101 Hawkeyes, meaning only 6-7 fighters per AWACS. If we add the 160 aircraft to the fleet's fighters, EW "Growler", then there will be 8,3 of them, and if we add the Marine Corps aircraft, then the number of fighters and attack aircraft per Hawkeye will be only 12 aircraft.
In other words, we see a fundamental difference in the US Air Force and Navy's approaches to AWACS. While the Air Force relies on one such aircraft, roughly, per regiment, the Navy, by any stretch of the imagination, relies on a squadron, or even half a squadron. While the Air Force views an AWACS aircraft as a treasure to be treasured, cherished, and nurtured, the Navy views it as essentially a disposable asset, just like conventional multirole fighters and attack aircraft.
Why is that? I suspect price played a significant role. While the Sentry equivalent is estimated to cost over $700 million, the Navy's newest E-2D Advanced Hawkeye cost approximately $179,4 million to produce in 2014. Adjusted for inflation, that price would be $237,9 million today. While that's certainly not cheap, the Navy's F-35C costs $102,1 million, making the Advanced Hawkeye the equivalent of 2,3 times its current multirole fighter jets.
The F-35A costs the Americans $82,5 million—less than the carrier-based version. This is entirely justified by the requirements imposed on the aircraft by carrier deployment. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the Advanced Hawkeye, developed for the Air Force, would be less expensive than its naval version, costing around $200 million or less.
Some might argue that Advanced Hawkeyes are much more expensive, citing the deal with France, where the Americans asked $2 billion for three E-2Ds. True, but this is a peculiarity of international pricing, which can include servicing these aircraft throughout their entire lifecycle, pilot training, the supply of simulators, and so on, as well as, of course, profit, which can sometimes be considered "extra." Or it may not: for example, the deal with Japan for nine E-2Ds was planned at just over $3 billion. In our case, what matters is not how much the Americans sell the aircraft for, but how much the US Air Force and Navy buy them for.
In short, an AWACS aircraft doesn't necessarily have to be a super-expensive, one-off toy. But to understand whether it's possible to replace AWACS aircraft now or in the foreseeable future, it's necessary to first examine the tasks they perform.
Radio Intelligence
Oddly enough, an airborne early warning aircraft uses its radar not so much for reconnaissance as for follow-up reconnaissance of targets detected by passive electronic reconnaissance (ELINT). For this purpose, the AWACS is equipped with a powerful system for this purpose.
Of course, combat missions vary, and in some cases it will be necessary to ensure a zone of continuous radar coverage—then the AWACS radar will operate without interruption. But generally, the Advanced Hawkeye "listens" to the space around it, turning on its radar only when something is detected, or periodically, for a couple of turns, and then immediately turning it off. Clearly, this AWACS operation allows it to monitor vast territories while significantly increasing its combat resilience.
Of course, other aircraft equipped with the appropriate equipment could perform electronic reconnaissance. It would be cheaper than an AWACS, as it eliminates the need for a very powerful and expensive radar, its power supply, and the personnel to operate it. However, a specialized ELINT aircraft would be significantly less effective than an AWACS, precisely because the latter combines the ability to conduct both passive and active reconnaissance over long distances.
Radar reconnaissance
Regardless of how you look at it, this is a key function of an airborne early warning aircraft. However, recently, it has become widely believed that this function is gradually becoming less necessary. This is due to the constant improvement of radar systems on multirole fighters, which are gradually capable of detecting targets at ranges of 300-400 km. This is already becoming comparable to the capabilities of the E-3C Sentry, which raises the reasonable question: is it worth investing in AWACS if its primary mission, albeit with somewhat less effectiveness, can be performed by multirole fighters?
However, such analogies are false for a simple reason: as a rule, the radar systems (RLK) of AWACS aircraft of a very respectable age or of a clearly budget segment are compared with the advanced radar systems of the best multi-role fighters in the world.
Comparing comparable models, it turns out... it's very difficult to compare them simply because information about modern US radars is classified. However, publicly available data suggests that the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye radar can detect targets at 550-650 km while the F-22 and F-35 radars can detect them at a maximum range of 300 km.
This may not be the case, of course, but let's think about it rationally. A modern fighter's radar weighs several hundred kilograms, while the AN/APY-9 Advanced Hawkeye's weighs up to three tons. Of course, this isn't a completely fair comparison, since the AN/APY-9's weight also includes the supporting structure, but without a doubt, in a comparable configuration, it is several times (if not an order of magnitude) greater than that of the AN/APG-77 and AN/APG-81 radars—the systems found on the F-22 and F-35, respectively. Or the Su-35's H035 Irbis radar, if you prefer. Common sense dictates that devices serving the same purpose, but differing so significantly in size and yet built at the same level of technological advancement, should differ significantly in their capabilities.
Providing target designation to missile weapons
Just a couple of decades ago, the most AWACS aircraft could do was detect an enemy on the ground or in the air and dispatch fighters or attack aircraft to intercept them. This was undoubtedly a crucial and essential task. However, time has changed, and in the 21st century, AWACS aircraft have learned to guide anti-aircraft missiles to the targets they detect.
The importance of this capability cannot be overstated. We are undoubtedly proud of the achievements of our domestic military-industrial complex, which has created the S-400 air defense system, capable of engaging enemy aircraft at a range of up to 400 km.
Unfortunately, many people, upon learning this, sincerely believe that the S-400 is capable of hitting any enemy aircraft within a 400-kilometer radius, thereby creating a no-fly zone covering half a million square kilometers. This is absolutely not true.
Yes, the S-400, using the 40N6E SAM, can hit an aerial target at 400 km (according to other sources, 380 km). But to do this, the target must be at an altitude of approximately 9 kilometers. If the target flies lower, the S-400's radar simply won't see it due to the curvature of the earth's surface: it will be beyond the radio horizon. Thus, although we have SAMs capable of hitting targets at extremely long ranges, their capabilities remain very limited.
The Americans encountered the same problem on their naval ships: their SM-6 SAMs, while having a comparable range to our 40N6E, suffered from similar issues. A solution was found by training the Advanced Hawkeye to correct the SAM's flight path, guiding it to its target. Therefore, today, the same Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, with an SM-6 and an Advanced Hawkeye above it, can easily engage even a low-flying target at a range of 370 (or even 460) km.
Of course, in theory, any aircraft can (and should!) be trained to provide target designation. Ideally, armed forces should operate under the "see one, see all" paradigm, and modern communications and software are perfectly capable of achieving this. However, the advantage of an AWACS aircraft lies in the superior performance of its radar system—it provides 360-degree visibility and sees much further than a conventional fighter.
Air combat management
The "U" in the acronym "DRLOiU" is extremely important—currently, such an aircraft is essentially the flying headquarters of an air detachment, leading it and providing it with intelligence. For this, the DRLOiU has both the necessary equipment and the appropriate personnel. In this regard, it is completely unrivaled by multirole fighters or electronic warfare aircraft like the Growler. And the importance of timely and precise command and control in combat is something I believe goes without saying to VO readers.
Alternatives to AWACS - hello!
At present, there is simply no alternative to the “flying headquarters”, and there are many reasons for this.
Multirole fighters (MFI). An AWACS can cost as much as 2,5 such aircraft. However, a couple of MFIs are incapable of staying in the air for as long, lack electronic reconnaissance equipment, their radars are significantly inferior to AWACS, and cannot serve as a command post due to the small crew size. In short, they are not even close to being a replacement.
A Growler-style radio reconnaissance aircraft, only with ELINT equipment instead of electronic warfare. In theory, something like this would be feasible; the aircraft could perform reconnaissance and, if necessary, provide additional reconnaissance, using its radar. But such an aircraft couldn't serve as a command post; its radar capabilities weren't even close to those of an AWACS aircraft, and the price... It would probably be more expensive than the MFI and not much less expensive than an AWACS aircraft. But its capabilities would be significantly inferior.
UAVs and all that. There are two options here. The first is to build a large UAV equipped with a radar and electronic warfare system from an AWACS aircraft, but without a crew. In this case, the command post could be located somewhere on the ground, receiving data from the UAV's instruments via broadband internet or some similar communication channel. This way, the UAV could be made lighter, or, by saving on the crew, it could be loaded with additional equipment or fuel. Moreover, this approach would save many lives—after all, UAV operators and the crew of a "flying command post" on the ground clearly have a better chance of survival than during a combat sortie.
This is, in principle, a sound concept, but it's important to understand that it doesn't fundamentally change anything—that is, the AWACS aircraft remains in place, it's simply becoming unmanned. However, in my opinion, the implementation of such UAVs is premature for two reasons.
Firstly, quite a large number of reconnaissance UAVs have been produced. And, as experience has shown, they suffer heavy losses even against countries that are far from technologically advanced. Overall, the combat resilience of UAVs is currently significantly inferior to that of manned aircraft.
Secondly, the concept of such a UAV will only work if it can transmit massive amounts of data over hundreds of kilometers, and do so in real time. This seems possible now—Starlink is an example—but who's to say that tomorrow they won't invent countermeasures that will say:
As for trying to replace AWACS with a "swarm" of relatively small UAVs, such a "swarm," while performing equally well, would be significantly more expensive than an AWACS aircraft. Because UAVs of this type are generally expensive. The American MQ-4C Triton reconnaissance aircraft cost over $120 million per unit in 2015, more than half the price of an Advanced Hawkeye, despite not having even a quarter of the Advanced Hawkeye's capabilities. The Triton carries a radar called the AN/ZPY-3, which, with a 360-degree field of view, scans an area of 5,200 square kilometers, meaning its range does not exceed roughly 41 kilometers. However, the Triton is supposedly equipped with a very decent electronic warfare system.
In general, reconnaissance UAVs with radar and ELINT systems of a relatively small size will be expensive, and the combat stability of a "swarm" composed of them will be significantly lower than that of even a large AWACS UAV. Firstly, as mentioned above, the presence of a pilot does increase the combat stability of the aircraft, and secondly, without the ability to carry powerful ELINT and ELINT systems, the "swarm" will have to operate in much closer contact with the enemy.
Space reconnaissance satellites. It's entirely possible, even certain, that in the distant, though perhaps not so bright, future, satellites will indeed be able to take over the functions of the radar and reconnaissance systems of an AWACS aircraft. This would require "very little":
1. Provide radar coverage of half a million square kilometers at any given time, with a resolution significantly less than 1 meter, arbitrarily moving it across the Earth's surface. Moreover, there must be several such coverages, they must operate simultaneously and be located, at the military's discretion, anywhere on the globe. Oh, and they must also be maintained indefinitely (which AWACS aircraft can do, rotating periodically).
2. Provide electronic reconnaissance in the above-mentioned areas of equal quality with AWACS aircraft.
3. Transmit information to control centers in real time. This means that an operator somewhere in a bunker should be able to see the imagery provided by active and passive radar reconnaissance satellites, just as the operators of the radar and electronic reconnaissance stations on an AWACS aircraft see it on their workstation screens.
4. Ensure satellite communications in real time. After all, the guidance of a long-range SAM must proceed in the following order:
- An active radar reconnaissance satellite “tracks” the target and the SAM and transmits data to a ground checkpoint;
- The ground control point makes the necessary calculations and makes adjustments to the SAM’s flight trajectory;
- The specified correction is transmitted to the relay satellite, and from there - directly to the SAM.
Moreover, the entire cycle must take a few fractions of a second and be constantly repeated, and the communication must work flawlessly and not be suppressed by electronic warfare.
Fortunately, today's satellites can't do anything like that. The world marvels at Iran's strikes on US bases, and there's little doubt that China's satellite reconnaissance is helping them do so, but still, to hit those same aircraft on the runway:
- Radar reconnaissance is not required, conventional optical reconnaissance is sufficient;
"Images could be transmitted with a delay of several hours. Simply put, the American Stratotankers didn't change their position in space every hour, or even every day. It would have been enough to film the runways where they were clustered for a while and figure out where they were usually positioned when not on combat missions, in order to plan and carry out an attack."
The capabilities of satellite reconnaissance are greatly exaggerated today. The Air Defense Forces play a significant role in this. It's often said that the inability of our Aerospace Forces to achieve air superiority over Ukraine is due to American space reconnaissance, which is capable of tracking our aircraft in the air and promptly reporting them to Ukrainian air defense systems. But if this were true, would the Americans continue purchasing E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes? Would they move their Sentry missiles closer to Iran?
Conclusions
Of course, the star of AWACS aircraft will inevitably set someday. But not today, not tomorrow, and unlikely in the next 40-50 years, so the design and production of such an aircraft for the Russian Aerospace Forces is of utmost importance and utmost necessity.
It's clear that long-range anti-aircraft missiles pose a significant threat and, to a certain extent, limit the capabilities of AWACS aircraft—after all, that's what they were designed for. This is precisely why we need to move away from the "Beloslonism" concept—the monstrous size and cost of the A-100 Premier.
Toward moderately sized and costly aircraft in this class. AWACS aircraft should become as expendable for the Aerospace Forces as operational-tactical aircraft, and their use should be as routine and natural as it is in US naval aviation.
Thank you for attention!
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