A little about Iran's air defense, Ukraine, and air superiority
A bit of history
It is common knowledge that Operation Desert Storm, carried out in 1991, was won by international coalition forces in the air. The Iraqi system Defense понесла невосполнимые потери буквально в один день, в ходе первого удара ВВС США и примкнувших к ним стран, в результате чего средние и большие высоты оказались в полном распоряжении самолетов МНС. И те не замедлили этим воспользоваться — завоевав господство в воздухе, ВВС Америки и ее союзников методично изолировали театр боевых действий, прерывая и уничтожая коммуникации к занявшим оборону иракским дивизиям, а заодно нанесли сильнейшие удары по самим этим дивизиям, уничтожив в отдельных случаях до 50% их боевых средств.
Иракское ПВО, разумеется, не было уничтожено и продолжало сопротивление, нанеся aviation МНС известный урон. Но ни защитить войска и инфраструктуру от систематического уничтожения с воздуха, ни нанести противнику ущерб, настолько значимый, чтобы не то чтобы прекратить, но хотя бы ограничить боевые операции ВВС МНС, иракцы не смогли. Американцы настолько вольготно чувствовали себя в небе Ирака, что использовали стратегические бомбардировщики В-52 для ковровых бомбардировок свободнопадающими бомбами. А затем их сухопутные войска просто зачистили то, что осталось после сокрушительных авиаударов.
The Air Force's triumph over ground-based air defenses was so brilliant that in 1999, eager to rein in Yugoslavia (and, in my personal opinion, to undermine the stability of the European currency, the euro, through a serious military conflict in Europe), the United States didn't plan a ground operation at all. The plan was to resolve the "Yugoslav question" solely with air power. Unfortunately, the Americans succeeded, despite Yugoslavia's relatively robust air defense system, which consisted of over 30 S-125 and KUB-M battalions.
The relatively small number of aircraft deployed at the beginning of the operation (around 350, which later grew to 1000) could have played into the Yugoslavs' hands, as well as the fact that the Americans frequently warned the Yugoslavs of their targets, which explains the relatively low civilian death toll. Unfortunately, the Yugoslavs, like the Iraqis, were unable to defend themselves from the American air strikes or inflict significant losses on the US Air Force.
All of the above, of course, doesn't mean the US Air Force achieved its goals easily, effortlessly, or without losses. Desert Storm was preceded by months of round-the-clock reconnaissance—ELINT and AWACS aircraft were stationed near the Iraqi border, and satellites and other reconnaissance assets were used. Iraqi air defense zones and their positions were exposed, and the Americans set up training grounds to simulate Iraqi air defenses, using them to train pilots preparing for war.
Overall, the Americans prepared very seriously and undoubtedly succeeded. But not without cost—according to the most conservative estimates, US losses amounted to 35 aircraft shot down during combat operations, and another 7 lost in various accidents. This also includes non-combat losses, including those incurred during the preparatory phase of the operation, before the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, the Americans lost at least a dozen helicopters and 13 RQ-2 Pioneer UAVs in Iraq. In Yugoslavia, the confirmed US losses by NATO were much smaller—4 aircraft and 2 helicopters. However, the US lost only 2 aircraft in combat; the rest were lost to non-combat causes.
Of course, it's always important to remember that the US Department of Defense isn't particularly pleased to pay out death benefits when its soldiers are killed in combat, and losses in combat equipment don't exactly contribute to the image of absolute US technological superiority. Therefore, it's entirely possible that some losses were concealed and that they are actually higher. However, for the same reasons, it's impossible to assume that the actual losses of the US Air Force are lower than those officially acknowledged, so the figures cited above should be considered minimal.
And what about us?
Разумеется, патриотически настроенная общественность РФ с началом СВО рассчитывала увидеть нечто, если не подобное, то хотя бы близкое тому, что демонстрировали ВВС США в Ираке и Югославии. В исполнении ВКС РФ, разумеется. Но, увы, надеждам этим не суждено было сбыться. Наша авиация нанесла удар по ПВО ВСУ и далее попыталась действовать над территорией Украины, но тут же оказалось, что оставшегося у ВСУ-шников ПВО вполне достаточно, чтобы причинять нам чувствительные потери. В итоге ВКС РФ вынуждены были уйти из воздушного пространства противника, ограничившись расчисткой воздуха от украинской авиации по линии боевого соприкосновения, атаками по переднему краю да применением крылатых missiles Air-based. And all this without entering Ukrainian airspace at all, or only occasionally and nearby. But even so, the Russian Aerospace Forces have periodically suffered and continue to suffer losses, falling into ambushes by Ukrainian air defense systems roaming near the LBS.
Of course, the bread of Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners is bitter.
They are hunted and destroyed, and both radars and launchers of Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems are being lost. Nevertheless, the Russian Aerospace Forces were unable to achieve air superiority over enemy territory and, consequently, were unable to deplete the Ukrainian Armed Forces' brigades or isolate the combat zones.
In my opinion, this result (or rather, the lack thereof) is due to systemic errors in the construction of the Russian Aerospace Forces and personnel issues within the administration. As is well known, S.V. Surovikin served as Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces from 2017 to 2023, and it's clear that this appointment followed the general line of our party. According to the Russian leadership, being a professional isn't necessary to manage anything. There are countless examples of this: the head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, who had never worked in a bank before, a journalist and director of Roscosmos, the Minister of Defense, who only served in the army, the leadership of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Economic Development, who have no experience in industry, and so on.
I can't explain the appointment of a general of the combined arms to the post of commander of the Aerospace Forces in any other way. Seriously, where are the motorized riflemen, commanded by S.V. Surovikin, and where are the Air Force, Air Defense, Missile Defense, and Space Forces?
Но, разумеется, признавать, что наши ВКС не могут воевать в американском стиле по причине нашей же нераспорядительности, неприятно. Поэтому очень хочется верить в то, что дело не в наших ВКС, а в неких особых условиях, в которых и американцы ничего бы не смогли. И вообще в том, что мир изменился, и наземная компонента ПВО впервые за всю history its existence has prevailed over air power.
There are numerous arguments for this view. For example, this is the first time the Air Force has encountered modern air defense systems, even though the Ukrainian S-300s were well over 30 years old at the start of the Second World War, roughly the same age as the Iraqi S-300s at the start of Desert Storm. But at least the Iraqi S-300s were modernized, while Ukraine has been chronically short on funds for air defense upgrades. What's also overlooked is the fact that, no matter how good the S-300 is, it does have some shortcomings. And our military, having operated them for decades, knows these shortcomings and the tactics used to employ them in detail—they're all the same. All this makes it easier to combat them.
Or, for example, they talk a lot about external targeting, while ignoring the fact that, due to geography, NATO AWACS aircraft are simply unable to monitor the airspace over most of Ukraine. Some claim that the American satellite constellation is capable of tracking our tactical aircraft in real time and providing targeting information to Ukrainian air defense systems, but if the US has such all-seeing satellites, why does NATO even use reconnaissance aircraft near our and Iran's borders? Others claim that Ukraine is overwhelmed by foreign-made air defense systems, ignoring the fact that the first such deliveries arrived almost a year after the start of the Second Military Operation.
But on February 28th of this year, the Israeli lion roared, and Americans were consumed by epic rage, and our eyes turned to Iran in the hope that the Persians would be able to repel this unprovoked aggression.
Iran's Air Defense - A Quick Overview
Opinions on the Persian air defense varied, but overall, as of 2025, it looked quite good. The Persians recognized the need for layered air defense and airspace control back in the 70s. Initially, they naturally purchased radars and air defense systems abroad, then modernized them, and then began domestic production.
Take, for example, the MIM-23 I-Hawk air defense missile systems, purchased during the good old days of the Shah. These systems proved quite useful during the Iran-Iraq War, but naturally, the missiles were used up rapidly, and Iran's industry was unable to replenish their stockpiles at the time. Consequently, in the 80s, the country had to purchase missiles from the US and Israel through roundabout means, illegally, as part of the Iran-Contra deal. Some were imported, of course, but it was impossible to obtain large quantities of them this way.
Bottom line: Iran is developing its own Mersad air defense missile system, similar to the Improved Hawk, only better, as nearly all electronics in the system's hardware have been upgraded to modern solid-state components. Initially, the Mersad was armed with an Iranian-made MIM-23B missile, dubbed the Shahin. Then, the air defense missile system was equipped with a more advanced missile, the Shalamcheh, which has a significantly improved guidance system, resulting in increased jamming resistance and increased hit probability. Furthermore, the new missile is equipped with a more effective warhead.
I won't go into detail about Iran's air defense system in all its nuances. For anyone who wants to understand the issue, I'd be happy to recommend the brilliant work of the respected Sergei Linnik. Air Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Part 5)The link leads to the final article in the series, but it contains links to all the previous ones. The only thing I'd like to note is that this series was published in the first half of 2017, so it doesn't include the latest changes in air defense.
I'll just run through the top.
In terms of radar stations Iran sought to ensure seamless radar coverage not only of its own airspace but also of its immediate neighbors. To this end, the Persians built the Sepeh over-the-horizon radars, which were designed to monitor airspace at a range of up to 3,000 km, and the Ghadir radar, which was designed to monitor airspace at a range of up to 1100 km, and at an altitude of up to 300 km. Using these radars, Iran could monitor the airspace and near-space above Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Western India, as well as parts of the Arabian Sea and Eastern Europe—provided, of course, that these over-the-horizon radars reached their rated performance.
And they could have easily achieved this. Iran is certainly not a leader in scientific and technological progress, but, like China, it is always willing to reverse-engineer technologies it needs. Furthermore, China doesn't particularly support sanctions against Iran, which is why the Mersad air defense system uses Chinese components. Therefore, one shouldn't be too lenient with the Iranian military-industrial complex when it comes to radar technology; after all, they managed to bring the Najm 802 active phased array radar to the military testing stage, even if they did purchase parts from China.
Overall, in 2025, Iran had a plethora of conventional, non-over-the-horizon radars in its arsenal, both domestically produced and acquired from Russia and China, and previously from the United States. These included phased array radars with a range of up to 400 km, and the Fath-14 with a full 600 km. Of particular interest is that, in addition to the decimeter and centimeter bands, some Iranian radars use the meter band (for example, the 1L119 Nebo-SVU), which, in theory, should have given the Persian air defense the ability to detect targets with low radar cross-sections, such as the B-2 Spirit and the F-35, beloved by the "military" community.
What's particularly interesting is that Iran often installs its radars at elevated locations. For example, the Nazir airborne early warning radar was located in the mountains at an altitude of 2900 meters, making it a kind of stationary AWACS aircraft.
In terms of air defense missile systems. Essentially, Iran has managed to create a "multilayered" air defense system, with long-, medium-, and short-range air defense systems in impressive numbers. There are no precise figures on the number of air defense systems, but in any case, we're talking about hundreds of launchers, not counting MANPADS, of course.
The long-range air defense system consists of four divisions of S-300PMU-2 and the Iranian-developed Bavar-373.
Iran claims that even the first modification of the Bavar-373 (2019) is capable of detecting air targets at a distance of 320 km, and its SAMs can engage them at a range of 200 km and an altitude of 27 km. And in 2022, information was received that the improved Bavar-373 (2022) tracked a target at a range of 450 km and engaged it with a new SAM at a range of over 300 km.
And here's what's interesting. The Iranians themselves claim that the Bavar-373 is superior to the S-300PMU-2 and approaches the capabilities of the S-400. This was indirectly confirmed by the Persians' lack of interest in acquiring Russian long- and medium-range air defense systems. It's quite clear that the Iranian military had ample opportunity to compare the S-300PMU-2 and the Bavar-373. According to some reports, the Chinese held the Bavar-373 in very high regard. This assessment may, of course, be overstated, but in any case, it should be assumed that the Bavar-373 is at least competitive with the S-300PMU-2.
The S-300PMU-2 itself was developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1997, and was, of course, superior to the earlier S-300 models in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This means that, at least in terms of long- and medium-range air defense systems, Iran can even be expected to have a technical advantage over Ukrainian air defense systems.
In addition to the S-300PMU-2 and Bavar-373, Iran had a number of outdated S-200s, and in 2024 the newest Arman air defense system was presented.
In terms of medium-range air defense systems A similar pattern is observed. Iran took existing systems and missiles as a basis, reproduced them, and then improved them. For example, it is very likely that their Talash medium-range air defense system was armed with a SAM based on the RIM-66 SM-1MR naval anti-aircraft missile.
But Iran then developed independently, adopting the Raad-2 in 2012, followed by the upgraded Khordad air defense system based on it. The latest Khordad 15 is capable of simultaneously engaging six targets at a range of up to 120 km (according to other sources, 150 km) and an altitude of up to 27 km. Interestingly, this air defense system featured a special mode for stealth targets.
There is information that in 2025 China transferred a certain number of HQ-22 air defense systems to Iran – a fairly modern system that entered service with the PRC in 2016.
In terms of short-range air defense systems. The 29 Tor-M1 combat vehicles are probably the best here, but there are others, such as the Azarakhsh, which uses Iranian copies of the famous Sidewinder and a radar capable of detecting targets at 50 km.
In terms of MANPADS the picture is roughly the same as in the SAM system part.
In the barrel part artillery. Iran still places great emphasis on this technology. For example, in 2009, the 100mm Saeer anti-aircraft gun was adopted. A battery of these guns is centrally controlled from a command post, the guns themselves fire unmanned, but they are capable of firing 60 rounds per minute to an altitude of 15 km and a range of 21 km. Of course, all this is hopelessly outdated, and the effectiveness of the Saeer is highly questionable. Nevertheless, the Iranians possess a large number (approximately 1000) of 35mm Oerlikon GDF-001 mounts, which they have mastered producing under the name Samavat. These are quite capable anti-aircraft guns with a rate of fire of up to 1100 rounds per minute.
In terms of management. This topic has been little covered, but from the very beginning, the Iranians sought to build not just a network of air defense missile systems and radars, but to integrate them into a single, controllable system. After their existing automated control systems became completely obsolete by the early 2000s, the Persians purchased them from Russia and China, and also produced them themselves. From Russia, they received at least the Senezh-M1E (supplied alongside the S-200VE SAM system), the Baikal-1ME (S-300PMU-2), and likely the Ranzhir-M1 (Tor-M2E SAM system and Pantsir-S1E SAM/GPS system).
In terms of radio-technical reconnaissance and EW. This may seem strange, but Iran has made significant progress in this area as well. For example, in 2012, the Iranian television channel IRIB reported that 1L122 "Avtobaza" electronic reconnaissance stations were used during major air defense exercises. This station is a passive detection system that is not easily detected by radar. The "Avtobaza" is capable of detecting aircraft electronic systems and determining the coordinates of enemy aircraft and UAVs, as well as automatically transmitting this data to air defense missile systems, headquarters, and other locations. The Iranians clearly liked the idea, and as a result, they adopted their own equivalent of the "Avtobaza," the Alim.
As for electronic warfare, American intelligence officers, flying along the borders of Iran, repeatedly encountered radiation that very skillfully interfered with their work, which is why Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities were highly valued in the United States.
In terms of combat experience. By the start of "Epic Fury," the Iranians had some experience in air defense. First, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, and second, the twelve-day war of June 3-24, 2025. Not much, but Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners didn't have even that much at the start of the Central Military District.
Advantages and disadvantages of Iran's air defense
I certainly don't want the esteemed reader to form the impression, based on all of the above, that Iran's air defense system is some sort of supremely powerful force. It's anything but. An undeniable advantage is that Iran's leadership has devoted considerable attention to this branch of the armed forces, which was obviously due in part to the impossibility of building a modern air force due to sanctions. Cooperation with Russia and China has been very beneficial for Iran, especially the latter, as a significant portion of the components of Iranian systems clearly originate from China.
In my opinion, the advantages of Iran's air defense are:
1. Own industrial base;
2. A powerful network of ground-based radars;
3. The latest Iranian air defense systems are of very high quality, despite the fact that even older models are capable of creating problems for modern aviation;
4. A good combination of long-, medium- and short-range air defense systems with effective small-caliber artillery and MANPADS;
5. Availability of ELINT, electronic warfare, automated control systems, even if some of these are in insufficient quantities or outdated;
6. Combat experience, even if outdated and limited.
But along with this, there are also serious disadvantages:
1. The diversity of weapons and systems. I believe this is a real scourge for Iran's air defense, which is armed with systems from both domestic production and American, Russian, and Chinese manufacturers. Importantly, even domestically produced systems, based on completely different imported counterparts, are unlikely to be compatible with each other. The vast number of radars, air defense systems, and other equipment in Iran's air defense arsenal likely creates numerous problems in terms of personnel training, logistics, information transfer, and command and control. All this could lead to insufficient familiarity with the equipment by maintenance personnel and a low technical readiness rate. It would probably be safe to assume that, despite the well-known efforts to organize command and control and the implementation of automated control systems, Iran's air defense system consists of a collection of quite capable weapons that are incapable of functioning as a unified system. Or, at least, incapable of functioning as a system against a high-tech adversary like the United States and Israel.
2. Lack of an airborne air defense component. Attempts to modify and use Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran during Desert Storm as AWACS aircraft were unsuccessful, so the Persian state has no "flying radars." The problem with fighter-interceptors is virtually the same, as the best fighters Iran currently has are the early-production MiG-29s, and they are completely uncompetitive with the multirole fighters of developed countries.
The situation could have been somewhat improved by the delivery of Su-35S, but these aircraft arrived in Iran only recently, and Iranian pilots clearly have not had time to get used to them.
3. The extreme weakness of the Iranian Air Force. On the one hand, this seems to be a problem with the Air Force, not the Air Defense. However, it should be noted that the completely outdated equipment of the Persian Air Force leads to stagnation in the theory of aerial warfare and the inability to test modern tactical techniques through combat-like exercises. In other words, the stagnation in the development of the Air Force inevitably affects the quality of the Air Defense.
Now let's see how Iran's Air Force and Air Defense performed during the current war and whether Iran can win it or at least achieve peace on terms acceptable to itself.
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