Is the Larijani clan the US's last hope for an equal dialogue with Iran?
Ali Larijani – now from another world, does he look at Iran’s future with hope or despair?
A. Larijani and the IRGC
In the previous article, “Iran and Israel: A Conflict Beyond Logic, or Looking into the Past,” we settled on the cautious assumption that the United States and Israel were on the path to gradually restoring relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, due to objective conditions, had gradually transformed into a secular state.
Why do I think it's important to talk about this? Firstly, if we're talking about historical In the long term, it is unlikely that theocracy will survive for long in a religiously indifferent society, where, as the leading Russian Iranologist V.I. Sazhin notes:
According to the latest data from various sources, 70 percent of the population supports the separation of religion and state.
Having voiced the given figure, Vladimir Igorevich makes an important addition:
No one is against Islam. But they don't want it to be political. And that was Khomeini's main ideology.
Let me note: Shah's Iran was not a fully secular state either, despite certain efforts by M. Pahlavi to make it so, which had the opposite effect, as seen in: "The Roots of the Islamic Revolution, or the Missed Chance of the Last Shah."
Just as the Rahbars did not achieve 100% success on the path of Islamization, as also seen in: “Iran, Government, Society: On the Path of Reform or Confrontation?”
Secondly, the possible collapse of the theocracy due to a social upheaval would have consequences that would affect the post-Soviet space. One must consider not only the social tensions that have periodically spilled onto the streets in Iran since 2009, resulting in significant human casualties and material damage, but also Kurdish, Arab, and Baloch separatism.
The Americans and Israelis are currently betting on the first option, while the Gulf monarchies may play the second option after Iranian strikes on their territories.
Secondly, after the death of R. Khomeini, President A. Hashemi Rafsanjani began to curtail the course of exporting the Islamic Revolution, replacing it with a more pragmatic policy aimed at normalizing Iran's relations with Western countries.
M. Khatami and H. Rouhani followed suit. However, the process was hampered by both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's policies—see "Banisadr and Ahmadinejad: A Unity of Dissimilars, or Reflections on Iran's Future"—and by Donald Trump's first term in office. This refers to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018.
Moreover, Rouhani had a tense relationship with the IRGC, which is more than just a security agency. It can be compared to Peter the Great's guard regiments, whose officers performed, among other things, command functions. Furthermore, the guards included wealthy families.
Accordingly, after the death of the emperor, for some time the guards controlled, as they now say, the real sector of the economy.
The same applies to the IRGC. Its leadership, according to V. I. Sazhin, "directly or indirectly controls 20 to 40% of Iran's economy"; according to other sources, more than half. And whoever controls the economy also controls political processes.
Naturally, the IRGC leadership is satisfied with this state of affairs. Moreover, as a cohesive security structure, it can suppress mass, and in some places armed, but poorly organized, uprisings within the country, as the events of the last fifteen years demonstrate.
And a significant portion of Iranians, not sympathizing with theocracy—I base this assertion on the figure cited above by V. I. Sazhin—think in the paradigm of “I hope things don’t get any worse,” going out to pro-government demonstrations.
People live with their daily needs and don't want a new revolution with its bloodshed and chaos. And then there's external aggression, the murder of schoolgirls and a fourteen-month-old granddaughter, and perhaps even of a not-so-popular old man.
The disaster has united society, which plays into the IRGC's hands. But its leadership cannot help but understand that after the strikes end, the "victorious people"—and Iranians will feel so if the attacks cease without meeting the enemy's demands—will demand an improved quality of life.
This can be achieved by lifting sanctions and influxing foreign investment into the country. However, the latter will likely lead to the destruction of the IRGC's monopoly in several economic sectors and, consequently, undermine its political position.
Russian and Chinese investments, as well as those from other countries outside the G7, cannot fully meet the needs of the Iranian economy, which is in severe crisis, except for the military-industrial complex.
Without the American-Israeli aggression, Tehran had ample time for an evolutionary transition from a theocratic to a secular government, a gradual change in Iran's image on the international stage, which would open the door, after the lifting of sanctions, to an influx of not only foreign capital, but also advanced technologies.
A. Larijani – science, power, image
And A. Larijani seemed to me to be a key figure in the relatively painless transformation of Iranian statehood.
Firstly, he is an intellectual, a true mathematician who has published three books on Kant: The Mathematical Method in Kant’s Philosophy, Metaphysics and the Exact Sciences in Kant’s Philosophy, and Intuition and Synthetic A Priori Judgments in Kant’s Philosophy.
He is also the author of the work "Critique and Analysis of Descartes's Treatise on the Direction of the Mind" and a work, as noted by the Indian journalist D. Stanley, on "Saul Kripke, an American philosopher who studied issues of language and modal logic, and David Lewis, an analytical metaphysician."
Incidentally, when comparing the Iranian and American ruling elites, historian M.V. Medovarov noted a curious detail:
In Iran, the elite is now perhaps the most intellectual in the world, literally at professorial level, while on the US side we have the most illiterate elite.
Secondly, unlike Rouhani and M. Pezeshkian, A. Larijani began his career in the IRGC, having received the rank of brigadier general, which, of course, emphasizes not his military competence, but his political status.
A. Larijani was a completely respectable politician with an outwardly attractive image both in the West and in the East
And, having launched his career at a conservative institute, A. Larijani continued it at a liberal one, receiving the portfolio of Minister of Culture in the government of Hashemi Rafsanjani.
That is—and this is third—A. Larijani, unlike A. Banisadr, had solid management experience, accumulated back in the 1990s. Accordingly, he was familiar with the realities of Iran's political landscape and was even, to a certain extent, its creator.
Fourthly, if we follow the political rhetoric, then A. Larijani could be called a centrist: not as liberal as Rouhani, and not as odious as Ahmadinejad.
A. Larijani has repeatedly expressed his commitment to a conservative course, which has added to his popularity among traditionalists, and his outward intelligence has been seen as a plus in the eyes of the secular part of Iranian society and Western political and business circles.
And if we leave aside the statements made after February 28 and dictated by the response to external aggression, A. Larijani tried to refrain from an accusatory tone towards the United States and threats against Israel, so characteristic of Ahmadinejad and the late Rahbar.
But when discussing A. Larijani's career, one can't help but sense the paradoxes associated with it. On the one hand, his appointment in 2005 to the post of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and his leadership in negotiations with the West and Russia. Iran owes the nuclear deal to him. All of this would hardly have been possible without close contacts, including behind the scenes, with the Western elite, perhaps the unpublicized side of which was directly channeled through the Larijani clan.
On the other hand, despite all his influence and support from the IRGC, for reasons that are not entirely clear, A. Larijani was not allowed to run in the 2021 and 2024 presidential elections. In other words, the Rahbar, and perhaps even the IRGC, kept him in a secondary role. Why?
In thinking about the answer, it is necessary to say a few words about the mentioned Larijani clan - and this will be fifth.
A. Larijani – the “Iranian Kennedys” clan, behind-the-scenes connections and soft power
Ali's father was a prominent theologian who emigrated from the country during the Shah's reign.
The deceased's brothers also had distinguished careers in academia, politics, and management. Mohammad Javad Ardashir Larijani served as Khamenei's senior foreign policy adviser.
Mohammad-Javad Ardeshir Larijani is the eldest brother in the Larijani clan, less well known outside Iran than Ali, but also experienced and outwardly respectable.
Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani heads the Expediency Council, a curious structure given the range of issues it addresses.
On the one hand, it is an advisory body to the Rahbar. On the other, its tasks include resolving conflicts between, so to speak, the Constitutional Court and the Majlis.
Apparently, the format of relations between the judicial and legislative branches is complex, since an additional authority was needed in addition to the authority of the rahbar.
Bagher Larijani is a well-known scientist in Iran: a specialist in the field of medicine, who at one time headed the Tehran University of Medical Sciences.
Fazel Larijani received a physics degree in the USA and worked in Canada.
That is, three brothers are European-educated intellectuals, scientists, and at least four are high-level managers.
A. Larijani's wife was Farideh Motahhari, the daughter of Morteza Motahhari, an associate of Khomeini who was killed by fighters from the left-wing radical organization "Forqan," which also attempted to assassinate Khamenei, as discussed in previous articles.
Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani is an experienced functionary and perhaps the most conservative of the brothers in the "Iranian Kennedy" clan.
A. Larijani's daughter, Fatemeh, has a curious biography: she worked as an associate professor in the Department of Hematology and Medical Oncology at Emory University in Georgia. She was fired in January of this year after her father was added to Trump's sanctions list.
Could Fatemeh, having lived in the United States for almost 10 years, have become a link between her father and representatives of American diplomacy?
With such influence, the clan had plenty of enemies. In particular, Ahmadinejad's inner circle once initiated an investigation against the brothers for corruption schemes related to the illegal acquisition of property.
I believe this is why A. Larijani was barred from the presidential election: his clan was viewed negatively by some influential conservative elites centered around Ahmadinejad. Perhaps they disliked the clan's close ties to Western political and business circles.
Some of the accusations were propaganda in nature. Consider the later unconfirmed:
Last December (we're talking about 2016 – I.Kh.), wrote Iranologist V.I. Mesamed, the Larijani brothers' case once again captivated Iranian media, taking on a new twist: the Larijani clan allegedly had Jewish roots, but had once converted to Islam "in order to undermine the foundations of the Islamic regime from within and ultimately bring it down." As reported 100 years ago, the grandfather or great-grandfather of the current Larijani politicians.
More interesting is another accusation: Sadeq Larijani is accused of corruption and ownership, in the words of orientalist I. V. Sargsyan, of “business and real estate in Australia.”
In one photograph, two models of Iran's development are expressed, and, it seems to me, in a rather emotional form; A. Larijani, with a number of reservations, I believe, could be called a supporter of Rouhani.
Both Fatemeh, who lived in the US for a long time, and Fasel, who worked in Canada, and real estate on the aforementioned continent could have become an instrument of soft power for the US in its dialogue with pragmatists in the Iranian elite.
I believe V. I. Sazhin reasons in a similar way:
Perhaps, in a few weeks (after the start of the American-Israeli aggression - I.Kh.) pragmatism would have prevailed, and Larijani, who understands the West well, would have made some concessions.
The king is dead – long live the king?
Accordingly, the death of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council was more beneficial to Israel than to the United States. After all, Larijani could conduct behind-the-scenes negotiations with Washington through his own channels, behind Jerusalem's back.
And now A. Larijani is dead. But the king is dead—long live the king. By the latter, I mean the clan. Yes, his influence in the Iranian establishment has probably diminished. And what about his connections with the West? Did A. Larijani take them to the grave, or did he share them with his brothers earlier?
In any case, it seems to me that there's no real alternative to the clan in Iran. Opposition? The People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran (PMOI) seems to have disappeared from the scene in 2003.
Reza Pahlavi? He could have become a somewhat unifying figure in society if he had followed the model of the last king of Afghanistan, M. Zahir Shah, who lived in Italy and avoided making sweeping political statements. As a result, he gained the support of a significant portion of the population and safely returned to the country where he died.
Reza Pahlavi chose a different strategy and proved politically bankrupt.
Pezeshkian? Yes, he's not a mouthpiece for theocracy, but in my opinion, his downside is that he doesn't come from the IRGC. And after Khamenei's death, V.I. Sazhin openly stated that the IRGC had carried out a "soft coup" in the country, transforming itself into a direct governing body.
Now it needs to get out of the conflict with the United States without losing its image and resolve its internal problems.
Business structures, business, notes V. I. Sazhin, are, of course, completely dissatisfied with such a closed policy that Khamenei and the radicals have pursued.
Who should the IRGC rely on? I think Pezeshkian, but with the help of the Larijani clan and its connections to the Western establishment. I see no other alternative.
Pezeshkian is both a traditionalist and a moderately liberal, and if the IRGC places its bet on him, and the Larijani clan supports him, including through its connections abroad, then, given the newly elected Rahbar's limited political clout, the current president could become the optimal figure for Iran's future in the broadest sense of the word.
This is also in the interests of big business, the overwhelming majority of which, as V.I. Sazhin emphasizes, “in Iran looks to the West.”
A final note. A comment on the previous article asked, "What difference does it make to us what's going on in Iran? Let them live as they please."
The phrase seemed strange to me for the second quarter of the 21st century, considering that even though it is located on an island and protected by the strongest in the world fleet Britain abandoned its policy of splendid isolation at the beginning of the last century. We are not an island.
And the echo of the collapse – God forbid – of the Islamic Republic of Iran will reach Russia in bloody flashes, affecting the situation in the Middle East and Central Asia, where a war is already underway between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and there are tense relations between India and Pakistan.
And it's not as if, given the dormant Islamist cells—which, by the way, could awaken in the cities and villages of the Great Russian Plain—everything is stable in post-Soviet Central Asia, as discussed in a series of articles, for example: "Will Moscow, Kabul, and Tashkent join forces in the fight against jihadists?"
Let me paraphrase Napoleon - or at least what is attributed to him - regarding China: “It sleeps for now, but there will be grief when it wakes up.”
Iran is holding on, but it will not only be its people who will suffer if it collapses under American or Israeli bombs or the chaos of a new revolution.
References
Mesamed V.I. On the new corruption scandal in Iran
Mesamed V.I. Ali Larijani's resignation and the fate of Iran's nuclear program
Sazhin V.I. Is Iran facing civil war and collapse due to US bombing??
Sazhin V.I. The IRGC staged a soft coup after Khamenei's death.
Sargsyan I.V. On the relationship between Iranian President Hossan Rouhani and the IRGC
Sargsyan I.V. Iran: Ongoing controversy over appointment of Sadeq Amoli Larijani as Expediency Council Secretary
Information