The Balkan knot of 1912–1914, which also involved Russia. The Romanian-Bulgarian conflict and St. Petersburg, which wanted the best.
Relations between the Balkan countries, as well as the powers with interests in the Balkans, were a knot of contradictions in the early 20th century—tangled and increasingly drawn together by the competing efforts of those involved, all trying to advance their own interests. Russia was also caught in this knot, as the Balkans had traditionally been an important focus of Russian foreign policy. Among other things, this entanglement led to the First World War, a fateful event for the Russian Empire.
Balkan Wars 1912–1913
The escalation of tensions led the Balkans to a series of wars. In the fall of 1912, an alliance of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, many of whose compatriots remained in the Ottoman Empire, began a war against the Ottomans. Called the First Balkan War, the allies were victorious, but their outcome left them at odds. During the war, Serbian troops occupied Macedonia, part of which, according to the treaty concluded between the allies, was to be ceded to Bulgaria. The Bulgarians demanded the agreed-upon portion, but the Serbs and the Greeks, who had formed an anti-Bulgarian alliance with them, decided to give up nothing.
The Balkans before the First Balkan War
However, Bulgaria considered Macedonia its ancestral land. It had been Bulgarian since the formation of Bulgaria in the 9th century; ancient Bulgarian centers were located there. In 1913, its population could reasonably be considered, if not directly Bulgarian, then so closely related that they were practically the same Bulgarians. Therefore, Bulgaria decided to press its demands for Macedonia to the limit.
Since the spring of 1913, the disputes over Macedonia had reached a crisis level, threatening to escalate into war between the allies. The Russian Foreign Ministry, led by Sazonov, and Tsar Nicholas II personally proposed that the conflicting countries resolve their differences diplomatically. But on June 29, 1913, the Bulgarian army attacked Serbian and Greek forces in the disputed territories they occupied in Macedonia. This attack marked the beginning of the Second Balkan War.
British diplomat D. Buchanan (ambassador to Russia in 1910–1918) called the Bulgarian decision to attack "colossal stupidity"Bulgaria, the first to attack, blamed itself for the war. Moreover, Sofia chose a very unfavorable moment to attempt a military solution. Bulgaria found itself at the center of Balkan conflicts; all its neighbors had territorial claims against it. And these neighbors were ready to unite to enforce their claims. Moreover, the great powers were not interested in providing effective support to Bulgaria, which found itself completely isolated. The Bulgarian leadership, led by Tsar Ferdinand I, failed to grasp this dangerous situation for their country.
Ferdinand (standing second from the left)
However, blood was already flowing before the Bulgarian attack. Some of the Macedonian population no longer considered the Serbian and Greek troops occupying their territories liberators from the Turks, but occupiers. A few days before the Bulgarian attack, the Tikvesh Uprising began. The Serbs and Greeks suppressed Macedonian resistance and carried out repressions against anything considered pro-Bulgarian in the occupied lands.
Romanian territorial claims against Bulgaria and the Russian reaction to them
With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Romanian-Bulgarian relations also worsened. In November 1912, when the Bulgarian army was tied down on the Turkish front, Bucharest laid claim to part of Bulgarian territory (Southern Dobruja). Romanians made up 2% of the population of this territory, it had never been part of Romania, and the basis for the claim was simple: it was desperately needed. The Romanians backed this claim with the threat of occupying the claimed territories by military force. But carrying out this threat was risky for the Romanians. An attack on Bulgaria would inevitably provoke a Russian reaction—a reaction the Romanians feared. Moreover, Bulgaria had an existing military alliance with Serbia at the time, with which the Romanians also did not want to complicate relations.
The Romanian leadership was cautious, and since the chances of realizing their claims militarily were shaky, Bucharest decided to pursue their (that is, others') interests through diplomacy. In November 1912, the Romanian government appealed to St. Petersburg to mediate in the territorial conflict with Bulgaria. Russia was asked to influence the Bulgarians to satisfy Romanian claims. The request was accompanied by a promise: if Russia helped satisfy Romanian claims, Bucharest would change its policy to one of anti-Austrian and friendly relations with Russia.
Russia could not remain indifferent in this situation; it had to decide on its stance on the Romanian claims—whether to support them or reject them. And so, in St. Petersburg, the decision was made to support the Romanians, although not to the full extent of their claims.
The reasons for this decision were the fear of the risk of complications with Romania and the hope of improving relations with it.
Romania had an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and St. Petersburg feared that opposing the Romanians and the resulting worsening of relations with them could lead to an escalation with the Austro-Germans, threatening a major war. There was no desire to get involved in a major war over the Bulgarians. Another important consideration was that by showing goodwill toward Romania, it would attract them and weaken their attachment to the alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany.
The Russian Foreign Ministry interpreted the Romanian promises as an opportunity to improve relations with Romania and truly remove it from Austrian influence—and subsequently from the Austro-German military bloc. This outcome was tempting, as it would change the situation in the Balkans, strengthening Russia's position and weakening that of Austria and Germany. The starting point for this was seen as Russian participation in satisfying Romanian claims against Bulgaria. Sazonov and his patron, Nicholas II, decided that they could sacrifice part of Bulgaria for Romania's benefit, thereby realizing their own interests.
Russian diplomacy, on the one hand, warned the Romanians against attempting a military solution. On the other hand, acting as a peacemaker, St. Petersburg proposed that the Bulgarians cede at least some of the territories they demanded to Romania in order to avoid a war over them.
But a difference in perception between St. Petersburg and Sofia immediately became apparent. Sazonov saw Bulgarian concessions to Romania as a path to reconciliation between the two countries and a general easing of tensions in and around the Balkans. He believed that ceding a small amount of territory was a rational solution for Bulgaria, given its circumstances. Bulgaria, however, was naturally unwilling to give up even an inch of its territory. Russian recommendations for concessions were perceived as painful. Bulgarian representatives presented their own reasons, declaring that a forced concession to the Romanians would not lead to reconciliation with them, but, on the contrary, would exacerbate hostility. Nor would it benefit Russian interests in any way—Russia would not gain Romanian friendship at the expense of Bulgarian territory, but would lose Bulgaria. Sazonov soon cooled to the idea of Russian mediation. But it was no longer convenient to directly refuse the Romanians.
To extricate itself from this delicate situation, St. Petersburg convened a conference of the Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France). All the powers were reluctant to spoil relations with Romania and, to a greater or lesser extent, supported its claims against Bulgaria. In April 1913, the powers obliged Bulgaria to cede the city of Silistra to Romania. Russia was no longer alone in demanding that the Bulgarians cede something. St. Petersburg felt that it had managed to improve relations with the Romanians and fulfill its moral obligations to Bulgaria, as the scope of Romanian claims against it had been sharply reduced.
Romania's intention to intervene in the Second Balkan War on the side of Bulgaria's enemies and the position of St. Petersburg
The cession of Silistra did not resolve the conflict between Bulgaria and Romania or direct the countries' attitudes toward peace. Romania's appetites were only whetted. A few months later, the long-simmering Second Balkan War began, initially as a clash between Bulgaria and an alliance of Serbia and Greece. Bucharest decided that this war was an opportune moment to seize Bulgarian territory. To do this, it was necessary to enter the war on the side of Bulgaria's enemies. And here, Russian diplomacy once again supported the Romanians.
Buchanan believed that Russia should have restrained Romania from interfering in the brewing war between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Greek alliance. Instead, St. Petersburg deemed Romanian participation acceptable. New reasons were added to the aforementioned reasons for Russia's support of the Romanians against Bulgaria in the summer of 1912. By starting a war with its former allies, Bulgaria ignored Russia's call for a diplomatic solution to its disputes with the Serbs and a direct warning against attempting a military solution. St. Petersburg therefore considered it desirable to weaken Bulgaria, which would reduce Sofia's temptation to pursue an independent policy ignoring Russian opinion. It would also teach Sofia a lesson for ignoring Russia's position—including the need to preserve Slavic unity.
An example of Russian actions encouraging the Romanians in their anti-Bulgarian intentions was the exchange of messages between Nicholas II and the Romanian king regarding the common interests of Russia and Romania in the Balkans. St. Petersburg demonstratively declared the treaty with Bulgaria, according to which Russia was obligated to act against the Romanians in the event of their attack, invalid. The Romanians were assured that Russia would remain neutral if they intervened in the looming, and eventually began, Second Balkan War on the side of Bulgaria's enemies.
Buchanan writes in his memoirs that he pointed out to Sazonov:
By pushing Romania to intervene in this conflict, Russia, in my opinion, has chosen a path fraught with danger in the future.
The current policy alienated Bulgaria, and this would further contribute to its rapprochement with the Austro-Germans. The Briton advised the Russian government to pursue a more balanced policy toward Bulgaria. But Sazonov and his company ignored these warnings.
St. Petersburg's diplomatic maneuvers in relations with Bulgaria and Romania can be called the "Bulgarian gambit," by analogy with maneuvers in which the player sacrifices material to achieve results that suit their interests. The gambit has three components:
1. The environment in which the possibility of carrying out a combination is noticed;
2. Idea is the way of implementing the combination;
3. Goal - the results achieved by the combination.
The Russian leadership saw an opportunity to achieve its own goals in Romania's claims against Bulgaria. The idea was to sacrifice part of Bulgaria for Romania's benefit. If the stated goals of the combination were accepted, these goals were achieved. St. Petersburg avoided the risk of escalation with Romania, but, on the contrary, improved relations with that country. The events also weakened Bulgaria, and, from St. Petersburg's perspective, it had learned a lesson.
St. Petersburg sought to prevent damage to Russia's interests due to Romanian-Bulgarian tensions, but rather to exploit these tensions to its own advantage. However, as subsequent events showed, the results of this gambit were far from beneficial for Russia.
Reasons for Russia's decision in favor of the Romanians
In its actions, St. Petersburg based itself on its understanding of the situation and Russian interests, but when examining the reasons of the Russian leadership, erroneous points are revealed.
1. Negative attitude towards Bulgaria
As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Russia became the liberator of Bulgaria. A special relationship developed between the two countries. The flip side of this was the theme of "Bulgarian ingratitude," which arose in St. Petersburg when Sofia decided to act in its own interests, which conflicted with those of St. Petersburg.
A poster depicting the Balkan Union
In the summer of 1913, negative attitudes toward Bulgaria intensified, as St. Petersburg considered it to be the culprit behind the collapse of the Balkan Union and the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. Until July 1913, the Bulgarians had been heroes (in the First Balkan War, they bore the brunt of the fight against the Turks; they suffered six times more casualties in battle than the Serbs). But from July onward, in Russian public and government opinion, the Bulgarians became villains who had unleashed a fratricidal war. But this conclusion did not reflect the reality of the Balkan situation.
In the historiography of the 2nd Balkan War, Buchanan’s phrase (said specifically to Sazonov) has become obligatory:
Bulgaria is responsible for starting the war, but Greece and Serbia fully deserve the blame for deliberate provocation.
This phrase is used to demonstrate that Bulgaria wasn't solely to blame for the outbreak of the war. But in St. Petersburg, they didn't bother to examine the complex realities of the Balkan conflicts, instead placing the entire blame for the war on Bulgaria and its Tsar.
2. Concern about the risks of containing Romania
In St. Petersburg, they believed that Bulgaria's sacrifice was the least fraught solution. The alternative—a firm containment of Romania—was risky, as it could lead to complications not only with that country but also with its powerful allies. The German ambassador directly warned Sazonov against Russian intervention on Bulgaria's side in the event of a Romanian-Bulgarian military clash.
The Romanian King Charles Hohenzollern and the German Emperor, also Hohenzollern
But it was important to understand that Romania was not a country whose expansionist interests Germany and Austria-Hungary were prepared to seriously defend. Berlin and Vienna viewed Romania as a satellite, intended to safeguard their interests, but not vice versa. They rejected Romanian ultimatums to Bulgaria and refused to guarantee Bucharest's support in the event of a military conflict with Bulgaria. Without this, Bucharest would hardly have risked a real escalation of the situation, given Russia's clear stance rejecting its claims.
Moreover, in the summer of 1913, Austria-Hungary began to demonstrate a negative attitude toward Romanian claims. At this time, tensions between the Bulgarians and Serbs began to escalate, and Vienna's interest became in supporting the Bulgarians. For Vienna, they served as a counterweight to Serbia, with which Austria-Hungary had serious tensions. Furthermore, the Bulgarian throne was occupied by a member of the Austro-Hungarian nobility. Under these circumstances, Russia's containment of Romania represented an acceptable level of risk. St. Petersburg had no reason to fear that supporting the Bulgarians would draw Russia into the war.
3. Plans for rapprochement with Romania and its distancing from the Austro-German bloc
Sazonov devoted an entire chapter to this in his memoirs, demonstrating both the importance of this goal for Russian diplomacy and the fact that Sazonov considered the improved relations with Romania a personal success. This improvement was seen as a major shift in the Balkan situation, with the possible prize being the withdrawal of the half-million-strong Romanian army from the Austro-German bloc. But in St. Petersburg, there was a tendency to exaggerate Romania's importance and overstate the importance of rapprochement with it. There was no need for such a rapprochement at such a price—the cession of Bulgarian territory (with the natural consequence of worsening Russian relations with Bulgaria). The desired goal was entirely achievable without such a step.
Russian Foreign Minister S. Sazonov
The weakening of Romania's alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary occurred naturally. It was a logical consequence of the processes unfolding in Romania. Its population and economy grew, and its budget, including that allocated to the military, expanded. The country's capabilities expanded, and so did the self-confidence of its leadership. In their minds, Romania could no longer be a docile Austro-German satellite, but an independent player pursuing its own interests, even if they directly conflicted with those of the Austro-Germans.
By this time, the Romanians had prioritized Transylvania—a vast part of Austria-Hungary with a Romanian ethnic majority—as their primary interest. Romania became increasingly aware of this, as well as the fact that Transylvanian Romanians were oppressed by the Hungarian elite. The desire to annex Transylvania spread. But this was only possible over the death of Austria-Hungary.
Romania was also dissatisfied with the Austro-German dominance of the country's economy. But the seizure of Austro-German assets was also only possible through military conflict. Romania alone could not withstand it, so strong allies were needed. Territorial and economic tensions with Austria-Hungary pushed the Romanians toward the camp of its opponents.
Romania realized it was necessary to improve relations with Russia. Since 1909, the Romanian side had begun to express this desire. But the Russian side should not have been deceived by this change in Romanian sentiment. In essence, Bucharest had moved from the simple Russophobia that had previously defined its attitude toward Russia to a desire to use Russia to further its own interests.
An example of such use was the Romanian request for mediation regarding territorial claims against Bulgaria. It was impossible to realize these claims through direct negotiations with the Bulgarians, as they simply rejected the Romanian claims. An attempt at a military solution at the turn of 1912–1913 was too risky for the Romanians. Therefore, Bucharest decided to impose its conditions on the Bulgarians through Russia.
Romania's policy toward Russia should be assessed as blackmail (through the attack on Bulgaria) and manipulation (through promises to change its foreign policy orientation from pro-Austria to friendly to Russia). But on the Russian side, these tactics found traction, as St. Petersburg was gearing everything toward the idea of rapprochement with Romania.
Romanian-Russian relations did improve in 1912–1914, but this was only to a small extent due to Sazonov and his demonstrations of goodwill toward the Romanians. Relations improved because the Romanian side needed them to.
The Russian side also needed to more clearly understand that by 1913, anti-Austrian sentiment had become a permanent factor in Romanian policy, stemming from its fundamental interests. Resolving Transylvanian interests without Russia's support was impossible. Therefore, this factor motivated the Romanians to value their relations with Russia and refrain from deteriorating them. Even a disagreement over claims against Bulgaria would hardly have negated this. Russian support for Transylvania was more important to the Romanians than claims against Bulgaria.
In general, the idea of rapprochement did not at all require following the lead of the Romanians, who were securing their interests at the expense of Bulgaria.
4. The desire to avoid tension and achieve its release through compromise
The Romanians threatened to invade Bulgaria. St. Petersburg didn't want to find itself in such a situation, as it would have to decide whether to intervene against the Romanians or refrain from providing effective support to the Bulgarians. The former was fraught with grave complications, potentially leading to a pan-European war. The latter option would have cost St. Petersburg face in the eyes of the Bulgarians. Therefore, the Russian leadership sought to resolve the conflict between Bucharest and Sofia through a compromise.
But a compromise based on Bulgarian concessions did not resolve the situation. This did not entirely satisfy the Bulgarians. The Romanians were also dissatisfied with the compromise reduction of their claims. The compromise solution of the St. Petersburg arbitration (Silistra alone) did nothing to reduce tensions or prevent further Romanian conquests.
And it was necessary to more realistically assess the Romanian threat of a military seizure of the desired territories. As noted above, the conditions for the Romanians at the turn of 1912–1913 were such that their threat should have been dismissed as a bluff. In the spring of 1913, the situation changed; Serbia and Greece, instead of being Bulgaria's allies, became its enemies. But, on the other hand, Austria-Hungary's position became more pro-Bulgarian. A situational Russian-Austrian alliance to contain Romania was likely possible in July 1913. But St. Petersburg refused to contain Romania.
5. Fear of defeat and weakening of Serbia
St. Petersburg did not restrain the Romanians from intervening in the brewing, and then actual, war between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Greek alliance. On the contrary, the Russian leadership gave the Romanians encouraging signs. The rationale for St. Petersburg's decision was the fear that the Serbs, without Romanian support, would be defeated by the Bulgarians.
The Bulgarian army proved to be a formidable force against the Turks in the First Balkan War. In St. Petersburg, there was concern that if the Bulgarians decided to use force to achieve their goals in Macedonia, the Serbs would be routed. Their defeat would not only diminish the Serbian army through losses, but also result in the loss of significant territory and its population, as well as a morale blow.
But the defeat and weakening of Serbia was unacceptable to Russia. The Serbs were seen as a rather important ally in the looming war with Austria-Hungary. The stronger Serbia was, including spiritually, the more Austro-Hungarian forces it would divert from the Russian front.
St. Petersburg saw Romania's entry on the side of the Serbo-Greek alliance as insurance against its defeat by the Bulgarians. However, St. Petersburg hoped that the very threat of Romanian entry would prevent war. It was hoped that this threat would sober the Bulgarian leadership and force it to abandon the idea of a military resolution to the conflict over Macedonia.
On June 10, 1913, Sazonov telegraphed the ambassador in Bucharest to encourage the Romanians to declare that if Bulgaria started a war, Romania would side with the anti-Bulgarian coalition. On June 16, the Romanians made this declaration, adding that they would seize part of Bulgarian territory. At the same time, St. Petersburg also issued the aforementioned statement about the convergence of Russia's and Romania's interests (including preventing the weakening of Serbia). St. Petersburg intended these statements to prevent war by exerting a restraining influence on the Bulgarian leadership (which would have understood that if it started a war, it would face a powerful coalition—Serbia, Greece, and Romania).
But Bulgaria simply ignored the Romanian statement. The military party in Sofia had already taken the bit between its teeth and would not accept any factors that didn't fit their vision of the situation. The threat of Romania joining the alliance of Bulgaria's adversaries was simply not believed or taken into account. Therefore, Russian diplomacy's attempt to prevent war by exploiting the Romanian threat failed.
Those in favor of a military solution in the Bulgarian leadership did initiate military action, beginning the Second Balkan War. They pushed Bulgaria into war because they grossly misjudged the situation. They overestimated the combat effectiveness of their troops and underestimated the resolve of the Serbs and Greeks. They also assumed that the Romanians would not side with the latter.
However, the Russian leadership also misjudged the situation. St. Petersburg misjudged the true balance of power between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Greek alliance. It soon became clear that including Romania in the anti-Bulgarian coalition was an overreaction, complicating the overall situation for St. Petersburg.
6. Fear of excessive strengthening of Bulgaria
The Bulgarians were driven to war by Serbia and Greece's reluctance to give up the territories they had agreed upon in Macedonia. This reluctance stemmed not only from the fact that the Serbs and Greeks had been the first to occupy these lands during the First Balkan War and wanted to secure them for themselves. Another important reason was the fear that Bulgaria would become too powerful by annexing all the territories it had laid claim to.
Until 1912, there was a rough balance of power among the Balkan countries. If Bulgaria had achieved the territorial expansion it desired, it would have become the largest and most powerful country in the Balkans. In other words, it would have become a regional hegemon, dramatically surpassing its neighbors. The neighboring countries were categorically opposed to this prospect. Serbia, Greece, and Romania agreed that Bulgaria's further expansion must be prevented. They even considered it necessary to weaken and diminish it.
A stream of messages flowed from Belgrade and Athens to St. Petersburg, expressing concerns about Bulgaria's growing strength. Some of these messages went directly to Nicholas II and his inner circle. The Serbian and Greek leadership exploited their dynastic connections in St. Petersburg (something Sofia had forfeited by installing an Austrian aristocrat married to an Italian as monarch).
Messages from Belgrade and Athens found a foothold in St. Petersburg, as the Russian leadership shared the idea of a Balkan equilibrium and the need to maintain it. It was believed that a larger Bulgaria could pursue policies contrary to Russia's interests. Specifically, a larger Bulgaria could completely destroy Serbia, which was unacceptable to Russia.
St. Petersburg saw a potential threat not only to Serbia and Greece, but also to itself. Greater Bulgaria could direct its expansion toward the Black Sea straits and Istanbul/Constantinople. This was an area of crucial Russian interest, which Russia dreamed of controlling for itself. The threat was perceived as quite pressing, since during the First Balkan War, the Bulgarians had actually attempted to seize Constantinople, bringing the straits under their control.
The Balkans in the crisis summer of 1913. Areas of territorial conflict (southern Dobrudja and Macedonia) are outlined in black
Points (5) and (6) demonstrate that the Romanian-Bulgarian crisis was interconnected with the contradictions between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Greek alliance. Belgrade and Athens perceived Romanian claims and threats against Bulgaria, which had begun in late 1912. This situation provoked the Serbs and Greeks to harden their position from early 1913 onward. Negotiations with Bulgaria were no longer possible, and its interests in Macedonia were completely ignored. Bulgaria was faced with the fait accompli: the partition of Macedonia between Serbia and Greece, which had occupied the territory. Belgrade and Athens's course toward conflict with Bulgaria was fueled by the expectation of Romanian support.
Thus, St. Petersburg was mistaken in believing that Romania's involvement in the crisis between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Greek alliance could turn the tide away from war. The Romanian factor had the opposite effect; it only exacerbated the situation, further pushing it toward war. A contemporary analyst, L. Trotsky, concluded that if not for Romania's provocation, Serbia and Greece would not have gone ahead with their dispute with Bulgaria, and a diplomatic settlement would not have been ruled out (Trotsky perceived Bucharest's statement (coordinated with St. Petersburg) that, in the event of war, Romania would enter it on the anti-Bulgarian side as a provocation).
Consequences…
St. Petersburg attempted to exploit Romanian claims against Bulgaria, and then the resulting Romanian willingness to attack Bulgaria under favorable conditions. The situation in the Balkans was developing dynamically, and the consequences of this policy came quickly, as early as the following year, 1914. More on this in the next publication.
P.S. This publication is based on an article in the Journal historical research (No. 2, 2025, “The Bulgarian Gambit” - a combination of Russian diplomacy in 1912-1913, its causes and consequences) for my authorship.
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