Hiroshima Walking Tours: Military-Industrial Attractions
The Toyo Koge Plant in Hiroshima. Here is the very road the victims took toward Kure; the Enka River and the cape ahead at the entrance to Hiroshima Bay; the plant's assembly shops, and in the distance, beyond the smokestack, the white-roofed buildings—the plant workers' settlement.
The location of ports in Hiroshima was, as already mentioned, a significant factor in industrial development. Firstly, industry sought suitable, more or less level sites for production facilities; in mountainous Japan, these were primarily located near the sea and at river mouths, which is where ports were built. Secondly, the proximity of an enterprise to a port dramatically reduced transportation costs for the delivery of raw materials and fuel, and the shipping of products. The most advantageous location for an enterprise was within the port itself, with a pier located on the enterprise's premises. This kept costs to a minimum, which was important for the most material-intensive industries: ferrous metallurgy, mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, and so on.
The previous section noted that until the late 1930s, Hiroshima was dominated by light and food industries. However, Japan was undergoing intensive, war-driven industrialization, and large heavy industrial plants closely tied to military production quickly emerged and expanded in Hiroshima.
When a bomb costs more than a city
After the war, in 1948, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade published a handbook for 1945 (Showa 20), which contained data on industrial development collected in 1943–1944. Publication of industrial census data was planned for 1945, but preparations were suspended in July of that year. Work on the statistical data was resumed at the suggestion of the American occupation administration in 1946, and over two years, the ministry managed to collect, partially verify, and fill in some gaps related to the loss of data. This is likely the most comprehensive summary of Japanese industrial data as of circa 1944 and early 1945.
The data in the directory is presented by prefecture. Hiroshima Prefecture occupies primarily the vast, mountainous and forested region of the Chugoku Mountains, while almost the entire population and industry are located in the coastal cities of Hiroshima, Kure, Mihara, Onomichi, and Fukuyama. Among these, Kure, the main Japanese naval base with its shipyards and factories, was particularly prominent, followed by the rapidly developing Hiroshima.
Thus, at the beginning of 1945, there were 2211 industrial enterprises in Hiroshima Prefecture, employing 96 thousand people, including 14,7 thousand employees and 76,8 thousand workers.
Of these, by leading industries:
Mechanical engineering – 443 enterprises, 49,7 thousand people (employees and workers together)
Shipbuilding – 99 enterprises, 25,8 thousand people
Chemical industry – 235 enterprises, 7,6 thousand people;
Metallurgy and metalworking - 137 enterprises, 5,1 thousand people;
Aircraft manufacturing – 49 enterprises, 5 thousand people;
Machine tool manufacturing and tools – 75 enterprises, 3,5 thousand people;
Engine manufacturing – 35 enterprises, 3,4 thousand people;
Internal combustion engines – 23 enterprises, 2 thousand people.
For comparison, the leading branch of light industry, textiles, had 351 enterprises and 12,4 thousand employees and workers.
As we can see, the enterprises were mostly small, which was typical of Japanese industry. Mechanical engineering employed an average of 112 people, shipbuilding 260, aircraft manufacturing 102, and so on. The Japanese often fragmented production into smaller and smaller units, whose output, through a complex tree-like system of contracting and subcontracting, flowed to the main, largest, and most heavily staffed enterprises that manufactured the final products. All these small units were typically united by numerous associations, unions, unions of unions, and other cooperative structures, which is why I sometimes half-jokingly call Japan of that time "a state of aggressive cooperators." It was a New Economic Policy, but not a benign one, like N.I. Bukharin's, but one geared toward war and expansion.
However, Hiroshima Prefecture produced relatively little and occupied a small share of Japanese industry. The total output of Japanese industry was 43,966.4 million yen, including Hiroshima's 774,9 million yen, or 1,76%. In mechanical engineering, Japan's total output was valued at 21,776.1 million yen, including Hiroshima's 194,3 million yen, or 0,88%.
The Manhattan Project, which produced three bombs—Trinity, Little Boy, and Fat Man—cost approximately $2 billion, or approximately $660 million per bomb. Using the August 1945 "occupation" yen exchange rate of 15 yen to the dollar, the annual production of the entire Hiroshima Prefecture in 1944 can be estimated at $51,66 million, of which roughly a third—approximately $17-18 million—came from Hiroshima itself.
It turns out that the Americans inflicted significant economic damage on themselves by wasting such a precious munition on destroying something that cost nowhere near as much as the bomb itself. Even taking into account the value of property and structures, it's unlikely that Hiroshima as a whole cost more than the atomic bomb dropped on it.
By comparison, the attack on Tokyo on March 10, 1945, was a devastating blow, as Tokyo Prefecture accounted for 13,5 billion yen of Japanese mechanical engineering output at the time, or 62% of all Japanese output. Even in theory, a nuclear strike on Hiroshima could not have significantly weakened Japanese industry, not to mention the fact that the Americans simply missed key factories.
Big guns
Among Hiroshima's military-industrial landmarks, the most notable is the Nihon Seikosho Works (日本製鋼所), founded in 1920 through the acquisition of several local metalworking companies. Often referred to as a metallurgical plant, it was actually a Japanese version of the Putilov factory, producing various metal products such as anchor chains, steel castings, valves, and faucets from high-quality steel, and therefore had its own steelmaking, ironmaking, and rolling mills.
In 1931, the plant became an almost purely military enterprise, specializing in the production of artillery guns for the army and fleetIn 1937, the plant was literally inundated with orders, and it moved to a new site in Funakoshi, a district of Hiroshima on the easternmost outskirts, closer to Kure, and set up production of large-caliber weapons there. artilleryIf in 1937 the value of orders was 28,5 million yen, then by 1942 it had risen to 100 million yen.
During its existence, the factory produced 8071 guns, including 4000 between 1941 and 1945. This included the unique 460mm Type 94 guns for the Yamato-class battleships, of which 27 were manufactured. The barrels were cast and machined at the Hiroshima plant. Another unique weapon was the 150mm Type 5 anti-aircraft gun, manufactured in two copies.
In addition, the plant produced guns for tanks, armor plates for ships and tanks, as well as forged blanks for crankshafts aviation engines, steel forgings weighing over 100 tons, including high-pressure reactors for the production of synthetic fuel.
It was the largest plant in Hiroshima Prefecture, employing 39600 people at the peak of war production in November 1944, of whom up to 20% were mobilized students.
That is, a major enterprise, on which the armament of both the army and navy depended. Nevertheless, the plant was virtually undamaged by the nuclear strike. The shock wave tore off roofs and shattered windows in some workshops.
This photo of the plant was taken shortly after the war ended. As you can see, there's almost no damage.
After the war, the plant switched to producing equipment for plastics processing and the chemical industry.
Mitsubishi Shipyard
The previous section discussed how Mitsubishi secured the best land among the landfills being built between the Ota and Temma rivers, which overlooked deep water. Although the backfilling work was not yet complete, and according to American maps and aerial photographs, it was not completed until 1945, construction of a large shipyard began here.
As soon as one slipway was completed, the first ship was laid down—the Hisakawa Maru (久川丸), a Type-2A cargo ship with a displacement of 6886 tons, for the Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Shipping Company. She was laid down on December 22, 1943, launched on June 20, and delivered on September 10, 1944. Captain Takesuke Nakamatsu took over the ship. In Hiroshima, the ship took on its first cargo—20 boats and 2500 tons of weapons and ammunition—and departed for the port of Wakamatsu on September 13. The Japanese have a record of all voyages and cargo for merchant ships. This ship carried primarily iron ore and ammunition.
It didn't last long—only 16 voyages. On January 1, 1945, it departed Moji Port as part of Convoy Mota 30 (a total of five transports and four escort ships), carrying 2117 soldiers from the 19th Division, who were being transported to Kaohsiung, Taiwan, and then on to the Philippines. On the morning of January 9, 1945, the Americans bombed the convoy in the Taiwan Strait. The ship was hit by bombs and sank that afternoon. Almost all the crew and soldiers perished.
This is what the Hisakawa Maru looked like.
At this still far from finished shipyard, they began to build new ships: Tesshō-maru (鉄捷丸) - delivered in March 1945, survived the war, evacuating Japanese soldiers and citizens from Southeast Asia; Keishō-maru (慶捷丸) - launched in March 1945, was standing at the fitting-out quay at the time of the nuclear explosion, completed in 1946; Shōshō-maru (昭捷丸) - stood on the slipway, completed after the war according to a modified design.
In the spring of 1945, the laying of new ships ceased, and the shipyard began building landing craft of the Daihatsu type, Kaiten torpedoes, and also repairing damaged ships.
At the time of the nuclear blast, 9200 people were at the plant, including 3200 mobilized students. The shock wave tore off roofs, shattered windows and doors, and damaged some equipment. Three people died at the plant, and 40 died in the city, where they had been sent to build firebreaks. After the attack on Tokyo and the massive fire, authorities in Hiroshima decided to demolish some buildings in the densely built-up center to create wide avenues to prevent the spread of the fire. Battalions of workers from the factories were sent to do the demolition work. These firebreaks were unfinished by August 6, 1945, and were of no help.
Across the Temma River, Mitsubishi seized another landfill site and established a machine-building plant there, producing steam turbines for ships and diesel engines for auxiliary ships and submarines, as well as large compressors, pumps, various marine equipment, and parts for aircraft engines and torpedoes. By the end of the war, the plant had almost no skilled workers: Koreans worked in the hot and forge shops, while mobilized schoolchildren and women worked in the machine shops and assembly. In early 1945, due to the threat of bombing, some equipment began to be moved to underground tunnels dug in the nearby mountains. On August 6, the plant suffered damage similar to the shipyard: roofs were torn off, windows and doors were blown out.
The shipyard and machine-building plant became places for the wounded, either arriving on their own or transported from the most severely damaged areas of the city. Cremation sites were established on the shipyard's riverbank for the dead, as well as for charred remains brought from areas of severe destruction. Bodies and remains were quickly rinsed in river water and burned on numerous pyres. Although burials were as simple as possible, the ashes were nevertheless collected in urns. Subsequently, in 1955, an underground crypt was built beneath the burial mound in Peace Park, housing approximately 70 urns containing the ashes of unidentified remains.
Against the grim backdrop of funeral pyres, the fate of the unfinished shipyard was being decided. Given the destruction and damage, the concern's management was leaning toward closing the shipyard. But the director of the shipyard and the Niva Machine-Building Plant, Yasujiro, who was in the machine-building plant's main office at the time of the explosion and was injured by broken glass, categorically refused to close the shipyard. After completing the emergency aid work for the victims, he ordered the shipyard workers to restore order, and the training workshop, which had lost its roof in the explosion, was rebuilt to produce essential items—pots, teapots, basins from scrap aluminum and iron sheets, and other similar consumer goods.
Niva then carried out a kind of "on-the-fly conversion," converting all production to civilian use so that the equipment wouldn't be dismantled and shipped away as reparations. He managed to convince the American occupation administration officers to abandon the shipyard and factory with minimal dismantling.
Nuclear explosion on birthday
On August 6, 1945, the founder of the Toyo Ko:ge: company (東洋工業株式会社) Matsuda, Jujiro, celebrated his 70th birthday.
Matsuda - photo, apparently pre-war
But the old industrialist was so accustomed to rising early and going to work that he didn't change his mind that day. At the time of the explosion, he was in his car, quite far from the epicenter. The shock wave threw his car off the road, but Matsuda escaped with only minor injuries.
That was his birthday present. Upon reaching the factory, he received a second and third gift. The second was that his eldest son and heir, Tsuneji Matsuda, had survived. The third was that the factory itself had suffered minor damage: torn-off roofs, shattered windows and doors, 119 dead (including 73 working in the city building firebreaks), and 335 injured. He later learned that his youngest son, Yoshiki, had died along with his wife and son.
Toyo Koge (Toyo meaning "Eastern Ocean"; the official name until 1984, although the cars were marketed under the Mazda brand) was a true "emperor's forge." Matsuda initially manufactured balsa wood products, but later realized that mechanical engineering was a more profitable venture. He had a friend, the director of a shipyard in Kure, who advised him to invest in the production of parts and components for military shipbuilding. In 1928, Matsuda opened a new production facility near the railway bridge over the Enko River. But friendship is friendship, and service is service. Despite these connections, the new company had to work for two years to become a primary supplier to naval shipyards in 1929; before that, Matsuda had been a subcontractor.
But military contracts weren't his favorite: though well-paid, they were irregular. Matsuda, however, longed for big business. He attempted to produce aircraft engines, propellers, and various precision machines, but ultimately found his niche in the automobile industry. In 1931, Matsuda launched his masterpiece, the Mazda-Go, a three-wheeled scooter with 9,4 horsepower, through the Mitsubishi dealer network. The scooter was a hit with the Japanese public, earning the nickname "the green ant."
This made Matsuda a major automaker. Before the 1937 China Incident (a skirmish on the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing), Matsuda attempted to establish production of motorcycles and passenger cars.
In January 1938, under the mobilization law, his factory was transferred to the direct control of the army. Army command decided to place it into production of Type 38 rifle parts and Type 92 machine guns to supply the arsenal in Kokura. After some debate, Matsuda agreed. But then, when production of the Type 99 rifle began in 1941, Matsuda built a large factory employing 8556 people. A total of 585,6 rifles were produced during the war, bearing the factory's own seal. A significant figure—23,4% of the total output of such rifles.
In addition, the plant continued to produce scooters, both civilian and military versions, aircraft engine parts—pistons, crankshafts, small aluminum fuselage parts—as well as gauges and micrometers, and metalworking machines.
After the explosion, the Toyo plant became a gathering point for people fleeing the devastated and burning city eastward, toward Kure, the road to which skirted the plant grounds to the east. Matsuda ordered the injured to be housed in the plant's hospital, the cafeteria to be hastily converted into a hospital, and other assistance provided to the wounded and burned. The plant had its own wells with clean, radiation-free water, as well as its own food supplies.
Surviving officials and police officers also appeared here. On the evening of August 6, 1945, Hiroshima Prefectural Governor Genshin Takano arrived. Matsuda gave them some of the plant's office space, as the city and police buildings had been destroyed and burned. Telephone operators managed to quickly restore telephone and telegraph service with Tokyo, and a temporary communications office was established here. Surviving employees of the Chugoku Shimbun newspaper and NHK Hiroshima radio station relocated to the plant's premises.
The Americans who arrived stationed a group of liaison officers at the plant, who monitored the work of the city and prefectural administration, as well as the progress of the restoration work. Matsuda, despite the fact that his plant was producing mountains weapons, completely avoided dismantling, since he immediately announced to the Americans that he was ready to transfer all capacities to the production of scooters:
The city doesn't need tanks, but rather carts with motors to take out the garbage and bring in rice.
The phrase, although formulated somewhat later, reflects Matsuda's actual position, as recorded in a number of documents. The Americans considered the proposal and agreed. In December 1945, the plant resumed production of scooters, which played a major role in the reconstruction of Hiroshima.
Scooter assembly at a factory in Hiroshima
Non-controversial logic
And so on. There are countless similar stories about Hiroshima. By the summer of 1945, virtually all of the city's industry had been militarized, right down to the brush workshops, which began making brushes for cleaning rifles and guns.
For example, the Kinka Seisakusho Factory (株式会社金華製作所), located north of the port of Ujina and south of the aforementioned army uniform warehouse, which produced army uniforms and shoes, was partially repurposed in 1944 to produce ammunition: fuses and distance tubes, fuses for 75-mm anti-aircraft shells for the Type 88 gun, stabilizers for 60 and 250 kg caliber aerial bombs, cases for incendiary aerial bombs, 7,7-mm cartridge cases for the Type 99 rifle. This enterprise was completely undamaged by the nuclear explosion, and the Americans found it in almost the same condition in which it was abandoned on the morning of August 6, 1945.
Why didn't the Americans hit? They certainly knew the location of the major factories. It would have been easy for them to shift their aiming point approximately 4,5 kilometers southeast to hit and severely damage these major enterprises, army depots, arsenals, and the port of Ujina—in other words, to seriously disrupt the supply of Japanese troops on the mainland. However, as far as can be judged from American records, they were counting on the fact that by destroying the numerous small subcontractors and home-based workshops that supplied approximately 30% of military production, particularly parts and components, the large factories would also be unable to operate. The scale and approximate locations of these small enterprises were known to the Americans from various sources, including prisoner interrogations and careful comparison and analysis of aerial photographs. A single nuclear strike, according to this logic, promised to disrupt the city's entire military production.
But this logic could hardly be relied upon entirely. Large enterprises, possessing capital, labor, equipment, and the full support of the military command, would have quickly replaced the destroyed small enterprises with new ones had the war continued, especially since a large-scale program was planned to transfer military production to underground tunnels.
Information