A Missile for the "Black Lady": How the USSR Closed the Skies to Spy Planes
The late 1950s. The Cold War is gaining momentum, and information is becoming a key resource. Where exactly is the USSR hiding its missilesHow many bombers are stationed at the Ural airfields? How is the nuclear testing program progressing? The answers to these questions were worth more than any spy network. Washington needed a tool capable of peering behind the Iron Curtain from above—where no anti-aircraft gun could reach. artillery, nor jet fighters.
The U-2, designed by the legendary Clarence Johnson at Lockheed, became that instrument. "The Game," as the CIA dubbed it, could soar at altitudes of over twenty kilometers, beyond the reach of contemporary interceptors. Unarmed, with its spreading wings reminiscent of a glider, the U-2 carried cameras and signals intelligence equipment. It seemed nothing could stop it.
Clarence L. Johnson led Lockheed's research department for more than 40 years, earning a reputation as an "organizational genius." Photo: US Air Force
But engineers on the other side of the ocean weren't sitting idle. Back in November 1953, the USSR Council of Ministers decreed the creation of a mobile anti-aircraft missile system—a system capable of striking targets at high altitudes. The task was ambitious: it was necessary to combine radar, an autopilot, a liquid-propellant rocket engine, and radio command guidance into a mobile unit that could be quickly deployed and folded.
The development was divided. The guidance station and control system were entrusted to KB-1, headed by Alexander Raspletin and Grigory Kisunko. The missile was assigned to OKB-2, headed by Pyotr Grushin. The sustainer engine was created by A. F. Isaev. The radio-controlled fuse was designed by NII-504. The warhead by NII-6. The launchers were designed by B. S. Korobov at TsKB-34. The cooperation involved dozens of enterprises, and the deadlines were compressed to the limit.
The U-2 aircraft and the S-75 anti-aircraft missile system began their journey towards each other at practically the same time; both were created with broad cooperation between enterprises, in a short timeframe, and outstanding engineers and scientists took part in their creation.
A simplified version of the system, the SA-75 Dvina, was accepted into service in December 1957. By May 1959, the more advanced S-75 Desna, armed with a new-generation missile, had arrived. By 1960, eighty regiments had entered combat duty. But it was impossible to cover the entire territory of the USSR—one-sixth of the earth's surface. Corridors remained between the coverage zones, and the U-2s skillfully exploited them.
The final flight took place on May 1, 1960. CIA reconnaissance pilot Francis Gary Powers took off from an airbase in Peshawar, headed north, and soon crossed the Soviet border. The route took him over the Ural Mountains to Sverdlovsk, where secret facilities were located.
Powers didn't know that they were already waiting for him. The Soviet command Defense The flight was tracked from the moment it entered airspace. When the "Game" entered range of the anti-aircraft missile battalion, the order was given. They fired three times. The first missile missed. The second hit its target. The third, according to some reports, shot down a Soviet MiG-19 that scrambled to intercept, killing its pilot.
The catalyst for the development of a specialized high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was the Soviet Union's success in creating nuclear weapons. weapons, especially the 1953 test of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, as well as reports from military attachés on the development of the M-4 strategic bomber. Furthermore, an attempt by the British in the first half of 1953 to photograph the Soviet missile test site at Kapustin Yar using a modernized high-altitude Canberra failed—the pilots barely escaped. Work on the U-2 began at Lockheed in 1954, commissioned by the CIA, and was conducted in great secrecy. The aircraft's development was led by the prominent aircraft designer Clarence L. Johnson (1910–1990).
During operation, the U-2 was constantly upgraded by US military engineers. But soon the need for this disappeared: reconnaissance aircraft replaced satellites. Photo: US Air Force / Senior Airman Levi Riendeau
The U-2 was a subsonic (maximum flight speed at 18,300 m was 855 km/h, cruising speed 740 km/h) unarmed strategic reconnaissance aircraft, capable of flying at an altitude "inaccessible" to contemporary fighters – over 20 km. The aircraft was powered by a J-57-P-7 turbojet engine with powerful superchargers and a thrust of 4763 kg. The large-span mid-wing (24,38 meters with an aircraft length of 15,11 meters) and aspect ratio not only gave the aircraft the appearance of a glider but also allowed it to glide with the engine off. This also contributed to its exceptional flight range. For the same purpose, the design was made as light as possible, and the fuel supply was increased to the maximum possible - in addition to the internal tanks with a capacity of 2970 liters, the aircraft carried two underwing tanks with a capacity of 395 liters, which were dropped during the first stage of the flight.
"Game"
The development of a specialized high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was spurred by the Soviet Union's advances in nuclear weapons development, particularly the 1953 test of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, as well as reports from military attachés on the development of the M-4 strategic bomber. Furthermore, a British attempt in the first half of 1953 to photograph the Soviet missile test site at Kapustin Yar using a modernized high-altitude Canberra failed—the pilots barely escaped. Work on the U-2 began at Lockheed in 1954, commissioned by the CIA, and was conducted in great secrecy. The aircraft's development was led by the prominent aircraft designer Clarence L. Johnson (1910–1990).
The development of a 6-centimeter range radar with moving target selection (MTS), but in order to speed up the process, it was initially decided to adopt a simplified version with a 10-centimeter range locator on already mastered devices and without MTS.
"Hunter"
On November 20, 1953, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the development of a transportable air defense missile system, designated the S-75 (System-75). The technical specifications were approved by the 4th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense in early 1954. The very task of creating a mobile medium-range system with a high altitude reach was quite ambitious for the time. Given the tight deadlines and the unresolved nature of several issues, attractive features such as multi-channel capability (the ability to simultaneously engage multiple targets) and missile homing had to be abandoned.
The C-75 anti-aircraft missile system could hit targets at a distance of up to 43 km at speeds up to 2300 km / h. It was the most widely used air defense system for the entire history Soviet air defense forces. Photo from the archive US DoD
A simplified version of the system with the 1D (V-750) missile was adopted by the Decree of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU on December 11, 1957, under the designation SA-75 "Dvina." And already in May 1959, the S-75 "Desna" anti-aircraft missile system with the V-750VN (13D) missile and a 6-centimeter-range radar was accepted into service.
Powers ejected. His parachute landed him in a field on the Krasny Oktyabr collective farm near Sverdlovsk. The pilot was detained by local residents and soldiers. He was alive, unharmed, and—most importantly—he and the plane did not explode.
Upon learning of the plane's loss, the Americans issued an official statement: one of NASA's research vehicles had deviated from its course due to a problem with its oxygen supply. Moscow remained silent, and Washington decided it had been a success. At a press conference on May 5, Khrushchev personally announced that Soviet missiles had shot down the American spy plane and presented the wreckage. The pilot was alive. Cameras, instruments, and the coded pad—everything was still there. The lie was exposed publicly, on stage, before the entire world.
President Eisenhower found himself trapped by his own misinformation. The upcoming Paris summit of the four powers – the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France – was disrupted. Khrushchev demanded an apology, but Eisenhower refused. The negotiations reached a deadlock. The Cold War gained new momentum.
The U-2C shot down over Sverdlovsk carried radio and radar emission recording equipment in its nose. The aircraft was equipped with an A-10 autopilot, an MR-1 compass, ARN-6 and ARS-34UHF radios, and a retractable camera.
The landing gear had a curious appearance: two retractable landing gears were mounted in tandem under the fuselage. Another two gears were located under the wing surfaces and were released at the start of the takeoff roll. Initially, technicians ran alongside the aircraft, pulling the gears with cables; later, the process was automated. During landing, when the wing sagged due to loss of speed, it rested on the ground with its downward-curved wingtips. The U-2's service ceiling reached 21,350 meters (70,000 ft), its operational radius was 3540 kilometers (2,150 mi) without external fuel tanks and 4185 kilometers (2,900 mi) with external fuel tanks, and its maximum range was 6435 kilometers (4,100 mi).
To reduce its visibility, the U-2 had a smooth, polished surface. Its black, low-reflective coating earned it the nickname "the Black Lady of Spycraft" (a derivative of the U-2's original nickname, "Dragon Lady"). The spy plane, of course, carried no identifying markings. A U-2 pilot's job—even without its dubious status—wasn't easy: up to eight to nine hours in a high-altitude suit and helmet, without the right to communicate via radio, alone with a very demanding aircraft, especially during gliding. When landing, the pilot had poor visibility of the runway, so a high-speed car was deployed alongside, from which another pilot gave instructions via radio.
Powers was tried. He received a ten-year prison sentence for espionage. But he served less than two. On February 10, 1962, an exchange took place on the Glienicke Bridge in Berlin: Soviet spy Rudolf Abel, convicted in the United States, was exchanged for an American pilot. The operation became the first in a series of spy swaps that firmly earned the bridge its nickname – the "Bridge of Spies."
The loss of the U-2 near Sverdlovsk spurred work in the United States on the SR-71 supersonic strategic reconnaissance aircraft, also from Lockheed. But neither this loss, nor the Taiwanese U-2 shot down by the Chinese Air Force near Nanchang on September 9, 1962 (the Chinese later shot down three more U-2s), nor the American U-2 shot down by a Soviet S-75 air defense system over Cuba on October 27 of that year (the pilot was killed), ended the U-2's career. They underwent several upgrades (the U-2R, TR-1A, and other modifications) and continued to serve into the 1990s.
The surface-to-air missile was a two-stage missile with a solid-fuel booster and a liquid-fueled cruise engine. This combined high readiness and thrust-to-weight ratio at launch with engine efficiency during the main phase of flight. Combined with the chosen guidance method, it reduced the flight time to the target. Target tracking was performed automatically or manually, or automatically by angular coordinates and manually by range.
Radar installation of C-75 ADMS in the Egyptian desert. The USSR sold C-75 not only to socialist camp states, but also to third world countries. In particular, Egypt, Libya and India. Photo: Sgt. Stan Tarver / US DoD
The guidance station simultaneously guided three missiles to a single target. The rotation of the guidance station's antenna post and the launchers was coordinated so that the missile, after launch, would enter a sector of space scanned by the radar. The SA-75 Dvina hit targets flying at speeds of up to 1100 km/h, at ranges of 7 to 22–29 kilometers and at altitudes of 3 to 22 kilometers. The first S-75 regiment was placed on combat duty in 1958, and by 1960, 80 such regiments had been deployed. But they covered only the most important Soviet installations. For such a large country, this was insufficient, and Powers' U-2C managed to penetrate deep into the Soviet Union before it was within range of the new system.
Incidentally, the U-2 wasn't the S-75's first "trophy." On October 7, 1959, a Dvina system, handed over to "Chinese comrades," shot down a Taiwanese RB-57D reconnaissance aircraft under the guidance of Soviet specialists. And in 1965, the S-75 began its glorious campaign in Vietnam. In the following years, a whole family of S-75 anti-aircraft missile systems emerged (the S-75M, S-75D, S-75M Volkhov, S-75 Volga, and others), serving in the USSR and abroad.
The downing of the U-2 was more than just a military success – it demonstrated that technical superiority does not guarantee impunity. The "unreachable height" proved achievable. The USSR gained missile cover. And the Cold War reached a new point of tension, the consequences of which would be felt for decades to come.
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