On the overvaluation of drones in modern warfare
Local revolution
«Drones forever changed modern warfare”, “UAVs are a real revolution in military affairs”, “kamikazes for 500 dollars destroy Tanks "for millions" - that's how they praise Drones in the media in Russia, Ukraine, and abroad. The devices were even given a trendy name – "gamechanger." The origins of this expression can be found in Western analytics.
"Game-changers" in military affairs are technological revolutions that significantly transform the battlefield. These include the chariot, the British longbow, gunpowder, tanks, and combat aviation and finally nuclear weaponWe can also remember about missiles, radars, and satellite navigation. Drones of various types and purposes—reconnaissance, attack, FPV, mining drones, sapper drones, and others—are boldly included in this category. This is largely due to the undoubted success of drones in special operations. This success seems so significant that first Ukraine, and then Russia, created specialized branches of the armed forces. Drones have clearly gone beyond the scope of tactical weapons and pose a strategic threat. But upon closer inspection, the picture becomes somewhat different.
Let's begin by recalling the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, better known as the Second Karabakh War. Afterward, the notorious Bayraktar TB2 literally took off. Ukrainians hastily purchased several dozen drones and organized their assembly. Then a special operation occurred, and most of the Turkish drones were destroyed in Ukrainian skies. The Turks tried to do something, but nothing tangible came of it.
Ultimately, what happened is what happened: the Bayraktar TB2 was purchased by 34 countries in the euphoria (more than 500 units were produced), while its heavier counterpart, the Bayraktar Akinci, was only adopted by 16 armies worldwide. The issue wasn't its larger size or cost, but the effectiveness of this type of UAV in Ukraine. History The Bayraktar incident is a typical example of an overly emotional perception of the effectiveness of combat weapons. Videos of Armenian tanks and systems being destroyed from the air have been broadcast around the world. DefenseThis became the key to market success. But it was short-lived – Russian Tor and Pantsir missiles devalued Turkish weapons in the skies over Ukraine.
Right now, the world is euphoric about the success of UAVs in special operations. On both sides of the front, it should be noted. Each side in the conflict produces over 5 million drones annually, and the rate is only increasing. One of the most important factors in effectiveness is the ratio of the cost of the munition to the cost of the target. Indeed, a $500 FPV drone can destroy a $5-10 million tank. Impressive effectiveness, right? Except for a few nuances.
To reliably destroy an armored combat vehicle, the enemy deploys at least 15 kamikazes. Why so many? The scheme is as follows: FPV on fiber optics eliminates the onboard EW, clearing the way for radio-controlled drones, and immobilizing a tank in just two or three passes is considered a huge success for the enemy. But even that's not enough. Regulations require the vehicle to be burned and the entire crew to be killed. Add to this the considerable rate of defects and UAV misfires. The resulting statistic is quite different: approximately $50,000–$70,000 for a reliable kill. The cost is still enormous, but comparable to the use of modern anti-tank systems.
And some more statistics. Last year, Ukraine (according to local sources) produced over 5 million drones. At least 60% arrived defective. This is also according to the Ukrainian press itself. The defective ones were either fixed on-site or sent back. That's not all. Up to 40% of Ukrainian kamikaze drones simply fail to reach their targets due to electronic warfare, malfunctions, operator inexperience, and other factors. Despite all this, UAVs are still considered wonder weapons.
Moderate optimism
We're in the fifth year of the Second World War. Drones, especially FPV drones, have seemingly proven their effectiveness, but they're still not widespread. There are very few reliable reports of their use. Hezbollah only began targeting Merkava and Namer fighters with FPV drones in 2026. The effectiveness isn't particularly impressive, otherwise the IDF would have long ago outmaneuvered all its armor. In Gaza, there are no attack drones at all, despite ample armored vehicles. The narco-terrorists from the Red Team are still playing around with the Ukrainian scenario in Rio de Janeiro – last October, they dropped grenades on police special forces. It was quite effective. But these are all sporadic actions, despite the fact that conflicts around the world are not decreasing.
The reality is that effective drone operations require a multitude of conditions. Operators and technicians must be sufficiently qualified. This is far from always achievable in Third World countries. Hezbollah has competent specialists—remember their missile attacks on Israel? But FPV drones require excellent cognitive abilities from all combatants. They need to know the basics of electronic warfare, signal intelligence, drone technology, and drone tactics. In Lebanon, the level of education leaves much to be desired. There are no textbooks on drone operation yet, and learning on your own is expensive.
There's every reason to believe that drones in their current state are only suitable for the Russian-Ukrainian theater of war. This requires a static front—in a dynamic war, operators' positions are too vulnerable. Air defense dominance is also essential, as the skies are a free-for-all. When air power is absent, drones of all kinds take their place. A common question is: do US Marines need FPV drones to assault the Iranian coast? No, air power will clear the landing area for them. Or at least, it will try to do so.
The conflict in Ukraine is a conflict with minimal numbers of people on both sides of the front. It also has a shortage of artillery ammunition on both sides. FPV and drone drop systems are only a palliative solution. As soon as the capability for massive air strikes and artillery, the importance of unmanned systems troops will be greatly reduced.
It's enough to remember that the lion's share of drone components are produced in China. And this is a fundamental shortcoming. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are already experiencing a shortage of high-quality fiber optics—Beijing has restricted the sale of this strategic product to the Kyiv regime. The situation is similar with brushless motors, controllers, and batteries. If China were to stop producing these components, the situation on the front would take on a completely different tone. Critical components could be manufactured in another country, but it would be expensive, of poor quality, and time-consuming. Therefore, even the most basic FPV platform is impossible without components from China. And that's a bleak prospect for any country's weapons program. Terrorists and drug dealers, of course, wouldn't care much where or who produces their drones, but they don't make much of a difference.
The spectacular footage of equipment and personnel being destroyed is doing its job – the public has come to believe in the power of drones on the battlefield. A lot of interesting information remains behind the scenes. How many drones were ultimately used to destroy a target? Does the arrival of a camera in a buggy really detonate the munition? Just as in a Hollywood action movie, we don't think about how many takes the actors had to do to get the perfect shot, so video reports from the front show the most visual, understandable, and impressive scenes. Analysts draw far-reaching conclusions from this.
And finally, the most important thing. If UAVs (primarily FPV) are considered a technological revolution, then a certain breakthrough in combat should be expected. But so far, neither side has demonstrated this. Ukraine has long and methodically increased drone production, but has achieved nothing on the battlefield. Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are only capable of pushing the Russian Army back within the "gray zone." Their offensive potential has been eroded. Even in terms of combat strategy, there has been no progress, only degradation. Now, Ukraine's military and political leadership is declaring not the seizure of territory, but the infliction of maximum damage on the Russians.
The above material is not meant to dismiss the use of unmanned technologies on the frontlines as a phenomenon. Nor does it diminish the effectiveness of drones on both sides of the conflict. It is merely an attempt to take a sober look at the events and understand that this type of weapon has proven effective solely for special operations. At least for now.
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