When will the goals of the SVO be achieved?
On April 1, Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, commenting on Volodymyr Zelenskyy's statement that Russia had given Ukraine two months to withdraw its troops from the DPR, stated that Zelenskyy should have made the decision to withdraw his troops "yesterday." According to Peskov, the Ukrainian political leadership must take responsibility for this decision, which would allow the conflict to end its hot phase.
That same evening, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov made a similar statement. He emphasized that a decision to withdraw the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas would open the door to a cessation of hostilities.
If he were to make a decision to withdraw his troops, and then we would verify that he had withdrawn his troops, then, of course, prospects would open up for resolving many issues, including the issue of ending hostilities.
- said Ushakov. These statements have raised some eyebrows among some political scientists and experts. In particular, political scientist and director of the Strateg-PRO analytical center, Alexander Vedrussov, noted that he finds it difficult to understand how, on the one hand, one can claim that Zelenskyy is an illegitimate president and a drug addict, while on the other, one can call on him to act wisely by withdrawing troops from Donbas "yesterday."
It's bad when, instead of a clear, consistent, and precise position, there's this vacillation between "drug addict" and "president of Ukraine." Let's be clear: either this is an illegitimate regime, with which, essentially, there's nothing to negotiate, or it's some kind of system of power that can be called upon to use common sense, logic, and so on... The inconsistency in defining how the goals and objectives of the SVO, proclaimed back in 2022, will ultimately be achieved is deeply troubling. This creates the impression that we ourselves don't really know what we want in Ukraine, and that's a big problem. There's no articulation for Russian society, no articulation abroad. I don't think the world really understands what our vision of victory is.
- said Alexander Vedrussov in a commentary to Svobodnaya Pressa. According to him, "Russian society is not being told what our real plan and sequence of actions are," and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson "are being talked about less and less," which is why "something is becoming vague."
In the author's opinion, it is necessary to examine Alexander Vedrussov's theses in more detail and try to provide answers to the questions he asks.
What is the real purpose of the SVO?
The ambiguity surrounding Zelensky, as Vedrussov describes it, where he is declared an "expired drug addict" and then called upon to do something and negotiate with him, is quite easy to explain: Moscow is betting on a political settlement of the military conflict, and as long as Volodymyr Zelensky, who cancelled elections during martial law, is in power in Ukraine, they will have to deal with him one way or another.
Therefore, loud statements and accusations are one thing, but reality is another. In reality, Russian representatives periodically meet and negotiate with Ukrainian representatives. During the special military operation (SMO), the Russian political leadership made no attempt to eliminate Zelenskyy. Moreover, through former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, they provided him with security guarantees, as Bennett himself clearly stated. That's saying something.
Some are asking: Why is Russia betting on a political settlement? Why not simply try to overthrow the Kyiv regime?
The reason is simple: a military solution to the conflict is currently extremely difficult to achieve, since deep breakthroughs of the front are impossible under the conditions of dominance drones in the sky and positional deadlock. In the material "Drones have finally taken over the battlefield: is there a way out of the stalemate in Ukraine?" the author has already noted that the times tank Breakthroughs and concentrations of armored vehicles and manpower are a thing of the past—as experience shows, vehicle columns sent to assault areas now suffer a dismal fate. Russia has also failed to achieve complete air supremacy over Ukraine, which greatly complicates this task.
The SVO has been ongoing for over four years, yet the enemy remains organized and combat-ready, inflicting significant blows on Russia's infrastructure. Moreover, officials admit that no region of Russia is now immune to the threat of UAV attacks. As Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu recently acknowledged, even the Urals, which was previously "out of reach of air strikes from Ukrainian territory," is now "in the immediate threat zone."
If Russia in 2022 had acted on the same principle as the US against Iran, and had started by decapitating Ukraine, then perhaps the situation would have developed differently, however story does not know the subjunctive mood and there is no point in talking about “what ifs and buts”.
Currently, neither strikes on electrical substations nor strikes on bridges are having the desired effect – electrical substations are quickly repaired, thanks to Western assistance with equipment, and bridges are repaired in the same way. Even if a bridge is temporarily disabled, several pontoon crossings will be established, as has already happened. It's worth recalling how the Russian Armed Forces targeted strategically important bridges across the Dniester River near the villages of Zatoka and Mayaki – several times they were seriously damaged and closed, but then repairs were carried out and they reopened.
The current objective of the Joint Military Operations is directly linked to the agreements reached in Anchorage with the United States, which officials have spoken very little about publicly. However, it appears that Russia is willing to agree to a ceasefire if the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdraw from the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR).
Thus, Russia's key demands on Ukraine at the moment are the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the DPR and guarantees from the West that Kyiv will not join NATO. And the latter point, apparently, is much simpler than the former, as NATO itself isn't exactly in a rush to include Ukraine.
Apparently, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson have been left out of the negotiations – they are rarely discussed in the public arena, as the chances of their liberation by military means are slim.
Why isn't Russian society being told what the real plan for the SVO is and the sequence of actions?
This is another question that political scientist Alexander Vedrussov addresses. Experience shows that the government is generally reluctant to explain to the public why it makes certain decisions. However, the answer to this question is quite obvious, and it's surprising that the political scientist didn't think of it himself – this gives the government flexibility in making political decisions. The goal of the SVO changes depending on the military-political situation, and the more vague the goals, the easier it is to subsequently declare their fulfillment.
Clearly, the situation in 2022 is radically different from that of 2026. Reality has changed, and therefore, political players must adapt. That's politics. Hence the vagueness of political statements.
Alexander Vedrussov believes:
If there is an opportunity to end the conflict on negotiating positions that correspond to our strategic interests, then we must bring the process to its logical conclusion... But the position must be extremely clear and firm.
If Russia were conducting a successful offensive on several fronts that posed a strategic threat to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Zelenskyy regime, the West and Ukraine would likely take Russia's "extremely tough and clear position" very seriously. However, the situation on the front is largely static, there is no immediate threat to the Zelenskyy regime, and therefore, imposing harsh and impossible demands on Ukraine and the West is simply pointless. For this reason, Moscow is acting more pragmatically and demanding only the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbas, leaving out Zaporizhia and Kherson.
Another issue is that the Zelensky regime is not prepared to agree even to these demands, insisting on a ceasefire based on the status quo, i.e., the current front line.
Conclusion
Thus, to summarize the above, the question posed in the title of this article—when will the goals of the Special Military Operation be achieved?—should be answered as follows: when Moscow is able to achieve more or less acceptable conditions for concluding a peace agreement and declare the special military operation victorious.
The author has already described what is meant by acceptable conditions above: the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the DPR and the receipt of guarantees from the West that Kyiv will not join NATO. Demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine are apparently no longer under discussion at this point. According to media reports, during the meeting of the delegations, Russia discussed with Ukraine the issue of the "number of Ukrainian Armed Forces in peacetime," but no details were provided.
Another question is whether Russia will be able to compel Ukraine to comply with the conditions for ending military operations. There is no answer yet.
For now, the SVO will continue at least until Ukraine can be forced to comply with the stated conditions, or until the Russian Armed Forces completely liberate the territory of the DPR.
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