The "Theory of Generations" and the Causes of Positional, or Firing, Deadlock
Interior of a hut near Kizhi. Petrozavodsk district, Olonetsk province, circa 1900.
The first is overly narrow specialists. Our entire leadership team has a higher education, and many, if not most, even hold advanced degrees in various fields. However, starting around the 1970s, higher education has become dominated by the approach of training highly specialized specialists. …Such an overly narrow specialist may be willing, but he or she is unable to accomplish major tasks. …This phenomenon exists in the military, in science, and in industry. Leaders simply lack the breadth of knowledge to grasp a complex problem as a whole.
"The Reasons for the Positional, That Is, Firing Deadlock." Dmitry Verkhoturov
"The Reasons for the Positional, That Is, Firing Deadlock." Dmitry Verkhoturov
From stories about the little-known. This article is the 2500th the author has published on the Military Review website since 2015. Therefore, it was only natural to want to write something, shall we say, more significant than the others. And then, our author Dmitry Verkhoturov's article on the current "positional stalemate" and its causes came to my aid. I really enjoyed the article, but, as the English say, "many hands make a better work." Therefore, I took the liberty of expanding on the topic he raised in his article and examining the problem from a broader perspective. At the same time, the idea arose to expand it not in one but in several articles, thus turning it into a short series that would conclude a number of my previous publications devoted to the socioeconomic problems of the Russian Empire, the USSR, and modern Russia.
Let me remind you that here at VO, I have already written about the problems of Russian and Soviet journalism as part of the "Poisoned Pen" series. Then there were articles about publications in the pages of the newspaper Pravda, articles about the Russian and Soviet peasantry, drunkenness in the 20s, the working class of the Russian Empire, newspaper materials about the Civil War, and, finally, articles in which, verbatim, without clarification, were quoted the speeches of Comrade Stalin at various congresses of the RCP(b) in the 20s and 30s, which allowed us to clearly imagine the very vector of development of our country that was set by Stalin's course in those years.
In these materials, as well as in responses to our readers' comments, the author has repeatedly emphasized that our ancestors at that time were ignorant of much in the field of sociology, unable to explain it, and often acting entirely intuitively, relying on theories that rigidly determined the process of social development. This was not their fault, for one cannot know what no one else knows. However, it was precisely this lack of knowledge on many issues we know today that led to the events that shaped our modern society. historyThe question is, what are these theories, how valid are they, and what impact do they have on the past from the perspective of our present-day hindsight? Let's take a look and see that our current knowledge is quite sufficient to answer the most pressing questions of our history, including the events of 1991. So, what is this knowledge, what is its field, and what does it tell us?
Let's start with the so-called "generational theory," proposed by writers Neil Howe and William Strauss. In 1991, they published "Generations," which vividly demonstrated the differences in worldviews among people of different ages in the United States, beginning in 1584. The ironic thing is that neither psychologists nor sociologists officially recognize this generational theory. However, if we apply "common sense" (which, by the way, many commentators on this site frequently suggest doing), we cannot deny that if a person lives in a given society, their personality cannot help but be influenced by the social, economic, and political conditions of their social environment and their country. Therefore, if the overwhelming majority of its citizens share certain traits, they can quite easily be considered fairly general.
Furthermore, generational theory suggests that people of different ages have distinct characteristics and values because they grew up in different times. Thus, our grandparents have completely different life experiences, and therefore often think very differently from their children and grandchildren. In my opinion, no matter what psychologists and sociologists say, this is perfectly obvious.
In other words, generational theory is a concept that suggests that people within a generation share similar values, beliefs, and corresponding behaviors due to their shared historical reality and the sociocultural environment in which they grew up. Therefore, generational theory helps explain the differences between generations over the years and understand how these differences can impact society as a whole. It is believed that generations change every 20 (25) years, and in recent years, every 15, due to the rapid introduction of new technologies and the corresponding changes in society.
People have always intuitively understood that this is the case, but they couldn't clearly articulate what was going on and choose an appropriate periodization, which, by the way, we won't touch on here, since it's unnecessary for our purposes. Turgenev's novel "Fathers and Sons" didn't appear out of nowhere, nor did Ostrovsky's "The Storm." However, they approached the problem of "fathers and sons" from a literary, not a scientific, perspective.
Spoon production in the village, 1900-1910.
Now let's answer this important question: within what framework does the most significant process of socialization of "Homo sapiens" occur, if the age of 25 is the period of their greatest social activity and significance? The science of pedagogy, and its subfield of "age-specific pedagogy," will provide us with an answer: before the age of five, a child learns more about life than in the rest of their life, and it is during this time that the most fundamental changes in their personality occur. They master speech, become familiar with the concepts of good and evil, learn to lie and tell the truth, like a sponge absorbing knowledge about the world around them. Again, our ancestors understood this, although they formulated it somewhat peculiarly: "Teach a child while he lies across the bench, but once he lies lengthwise, it is too late to teach him." Later, already, let's say, at a more conscious age, and as an adult, this person will learn a lot and acquire specific behavioral habits of an adult, which will help him effectively survive in society and... reproduce, but the experience of his first five years will remain the basis for all of this for the rest of his life.
Now let's remember that at the time of the abolition of serfdom in 1861, Russia had a population of nearly 63 million people, 46 million of whom were... serfs, essentially "slaves with huts." Roughly speaking, they were "white savages," little different from Papuans, except that they wore trousers in summer and fur coats in winter. To be convinced of this sad circumstance, a consequence of the persistence of feudalism in Russia, one need only read the study "The Life of Ivan: Essays on the Everyday Life of Peasants in One of the Black Earth Provinces" by Russian ethnographer Olga Semenova-Tyan-Shanskaya, based on her surveys of peasants in the Ryazan Province at the turn of the 20th century.
One only needs to read her description of the peasant huts in which our peasants lived not even in 1861, but at the turn of the century, to understand how little a child growing up in such an environment could learn and how truly terrible their upbringing was. These were people of serfdom, according to N.A. Nekrasov, capable of rebellion, yes, but unable to imagine themselves in any other life due to their poor intellectual development. And... they remained virtually the same after their "liberation," although many, some from poverty, some due to innate inclinations, began moving to the cities after 1861.
Urban entertainment. Fist fight near a shelter.
Now let's look at the change in their consciousness from the perspective of "generational theory." The first generation of settlers from the village to the city remained almost 100% peasants, becoming city dwellers only to a limited extent. The city broke them; it was mentally alien, but it offered many temptations and opportunities. That's why they stayed. Their children, before the age of five, learned many things they would never have learned in the village. They were already half-city dwellers, and although they were raised by former slaves, their consciousness was already different. And the children, of course, had no knowledge of the village at all. The city was their habitat, their cultural center, and their measure of success. Finally, there were the grandchildren—the third generation. These were already 100% city dwellers, whose only memory of the past was that their ancestors had come from the village. That is, the complete change in the psychology of the settlers who moved from villages to cities in Russia immediately after 1861, according to the “generation theory,” should have been fully completed in 1961.
Women and children in the fields during harvest time. Vladimir province, 1900-1910.
According to the 1897 census, Russia had 932 cities, with a total population of 16,579,694, or 13% of the empire's total. Here's the social structure of the urban population at that time:
1. 11% - representatives of the big bourgeoisie, landowners and high-ranking officials who moved to the city;
2. 13% are fairly wealthy entrepreneurs and traders;
3. 24% are very small artisans and shopkeepers;
4. 52% - workers;
5. 13,4% - commoners and intelligentsia;
6. 10,7% - the bourgeoisie, and in Russia, artisans, small traders, owners of small workshops, home-based workers, minor employees, unskilled workers, etc. were recorded as bourgeois in their passports. That is, it was the bourgeoisie, and not the workers, who constituted the most numerous layer of the urban population.
Just children who don’t yet know their destiny...1900-1910.
By 1913, the workforce in Russia had reached 18 million. However, the hereditary factory proletariat numbered only 3 million. A very high proportion of artisans and agricultural workers were employed, and female and child labor was heavily utilized. Thus, despite the growing share of hereditary workers in society, the bulk of them were still closely tied to the village. They were first-generation or, at best, second-generation settlers. Fourth-generation workers could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand.
As for city dwellers professionally engaged in intellectual labor and cultural development, their number was less than 1 million at the end of the 19th century, but by 1917, their number had grown to 1,5 million. However, this social stratum constituted less than 1% of the total population, and its representatives were concentrated in large cities. Russia's educated and spiritually advanced intelligentsia sympathized with the nation's plight and, yes, approved of the ideas of socialism. However, Russian intellectuals lacked any significant authority among the masses. Most people of the time simply did not understand their intellectualism and considered it mere whims.
To be continued ...
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